CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/07/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185145
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: July 25, 1960

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25 JULY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists renew criticism of
Khrushchev's policies.
Peiping to buy up to 500,000 tons of Cuban
sugar annually for five years; Chinese
also to extend economic aid.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran's recognition of Israel draws bitter
criticism from Arab states.
Comment on Congo situation.
Brief disorders in Malagasy Republic
likely to lead to growth of nationalism.
Morocco--Crown Prince Hassan moving
to strengthen his position at expense of
moderately inclined King.
0
0
0
I. THE WEST
0Latin American Youth Congress opening
in Havana tomorrow to be attended by
bloc delegations; meeting will propagan-
dize anti-US subjects.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 July 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - USSR: The Chinese Communists, whose
criticism of Khrushchev's policies had been muted since early
July, are renewing their attacks. Speaking to the Third Congress
of Chinese writers and artists on 22 July, politburo alternate mem-
ber Lu Ting-i implicitly attacked Soviet post-Stalin policies for
permitting a degree of intellectual freedom which might cause bloc
countries "to degenerate into capitalism." Lu insisted that Mao's
"hundred flowers"' campaign of 1957 was never intended to be a pol-
icy of liberalization. (Page 1)
Communist China - Cuba: The trade pact concluded on 23 July
represents a strong Chinese effort to win diplomatic recognition
from Cuba, which appears imminent, and is intended to demonstrate
Peiping's willingness to back anti-US movements with considerable
material support. Peiping has promised to buy at world prices up
to 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar annually over the next five years--
well over twice the amount of sugar normally imported from nonbloc
countries by China. The trade agreement is to be followed later
this year by an economic aid agreement under which Peiping is to
provide industrial equipment and presumably technical assistance
to Cuba. (Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Arab States-Iran-Israel: Arab governments are reacting vig-
orotsly to the Shah's announcement of Iranian recognition of Israel.
The secretary of the Arab League is contacting its members to pre-
pare a joint stand, and Radio Cairo has attacked Iran as "a base for
Western operations against the Arabs," saying it is not surprising
that a regime comparable to that of Nun i Said in Iraq "should have
fallen prey to Zionism."aran has long had de facto relations
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E,with Israel, and a key reason for the Shah's decision to grant
formal recognition may have been overtures which Israel has
been making through unofficial channels to furnish Iran with
technical and economic aid. jArab governments have a limited
ability to retaliate by intensifying internal difficulties for the
Shah; they might be able to stir up tranhie arnrma� thp Arah and
Kfirdish minorities in southern Iran.
(Page 3)
Congo: United Nations forces have arrived in strength, and
the easing of tension continues. Meanwhile, the formal proposal
of Katanga Premier Tshombe to have his province join with the
five other Congo provinces in a federation of autonomous states
offers the possibility of a n7 approach to the Katanga secession
problem.
Premier Lumumba
is planning to go to Moscow after his visit to the US and Canada.
There is no other information concerning Lumumba's plans in
this regard. (Page 4)
Malagasy Republic: Disorders with an anti-European cast
erupted briefly ml the capital city of Tananarive on 20-21 July,
when three nationalist leaders returned from lengthy exile in
France. The government of President Tsiranana has blamed
"imbeciles" under foreign influence and "Communists" for the
violence and has adopted strong measures to prevent a renewal
of the disturbances The Malagasy Republic,, which gained its
independence from France on 25 June, is governed by a mod-
erate, pro-French regime which is expected to win the forthcom-
ing parliamentary elections in September. Thereafter, however,
the three returned exiles are likely to develop a wide following
which will probably lead to a more nationalistic government.
(Page 5)
Morocco: Crown Prince and Deputy Premier Moulay Hassan,
, who is accused by some Moroccan officials of seeking to estab-
lish a rightist dictatorship, seems to be steadily strengthening
25 July 60
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hi Is position, even though he continues to antagonize democratic
and liberal elements in Morocco. The prince is vigorously car-
rying out the conduct of the government and is isolating the
moderately inclined,King by securing the removal of advisers
not subject to the prince's control. Unless he eventually over-
reaches himself in his maneuvers against the King, the prince
shows every sign of continuing to dominate Moroccan foreign
and domestic policy. (Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Cuba: The long-planned Latin American Youth Congress,
which opens on 26 July, will be a major effort to propagandize
the Castro--and Communist--goal of "liberating Latin America
from US imperialism." Because the congress is likely to be com-
pletely Communist dominated, youth groups in Peru, Bolivia,
Chile, and other countries have boycotted it, but delegates are
expected from most Latin American countries and from the Sino-
Soviet bloc. (Page 7)
25 july 60
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Sino-Soviet Dispute
After a three-week lull in its public dispute with Moscow,
Communist China has resumed its oblique criticism of 1thru-
shchev's policies with another attack on "modern revisionists."
Peiping had evidently been persuaded, following the meeting of
bloc party leaders in Bucharest in late June, to mute its open crit-
icism in the interest-of maintaining an appearance of bloc unity,
but Moscow has continued on every occasion since that time to
put forth arguments for detente and coexistence which the Chi-
nese find repugnant.
Speaking at the Third National Congress of Chinese writers
and artists, politburo alternate member Lu Ting-i charged that
"modern revisionists, with the Tito clique as their representa-
tive;', are charting domestic and foreign policies to suit the needs
of -"imperialism." On the matter of domestic policy, Lu stated that
there should be no slackening in the political as well as ideological
fields in a socialist society, and that "only through protracted and
repeated struggle" will it be possible to eradicate revisionist views.
The context of his remarks that bourgeois ideas could cause social-
ist society to degenerate into capitalism indicate they were primar-
ily directed toward the situation in China, but they, were nonethe-
less an oblique attack on Moscow's post-Stalin policy of permitting
a degree of intellectual freedom in the USSR and other bloc coun-
tries.
Lu's comments on Mao Tse-tung's "hundred flowers" cam-
paign were defensive in tone; he insisted that this move has been
proved "completely correct" and never was intended to foster
"liberalization!' He argued that the campaign was not inconsist-
ent with strong political control, whereas actually such degrees
of "free speech" had been reached in 1957 that even Moscow was
critical and Mao_harl_t_a_da_a_humiliating about-face and abandon
the campaign.
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Chinese Communists Conclude Trade Pact With Cuba
The trade pact concluded by Peiping and Havana on 23 July
represents a strong Chinese effort to win diplomatic recogni-
tion, which appears imminent, and is intended to demonstrate
Peiping's willingness to back anti-US movements with considera-
ble material support. Since the Castro takeover, Peiping has
worked diligently to deepen the leftist commitment of Cuban lead-
ers and secure its first breakthrough in diplomatic recognition by
Latin America.
Under the provisional quotas of the agreement, Peiping is to
take up to 500,000 tons of sugar annually during the next five years--
well over twice the yearly amount normally imported from its non-
bloc sources. The first 500,000 tons, however, probably includes
the 130,000 tons purchased earlier this year from Havana. In re-
turn for the sugar, minerals, and other commodities, China will
supply Cuba with manufactured goods and agricultural products, in-
cluding rice.
In view of China's shortage of merchant ships, difficulties in
the transfer of commodities--particularly sugar--may be encoun-
tered which would limit the prospects for increased trade envis-
aged in the new pact.
Peiping hopes to strengthen further its economic ties with the
Castro regime by extending credit for Cuban economic development
to Havana. A Cuban mission is to visit Peiping later in the year to
conclude a credit agreement for deliveries of complete�probably
small�industrial plants. This credit probably will be repaid with
additional Cuban exports.
The Chinese sugar purchases raise total bloc purchases to about
2,500,000 tons for this year, approximately half of Cuba's foreign
sales. Most of the remainder has gone to the United States.
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Arab Reaction to Iran's Recognition of Israel
Arab governments are reacting vigorously to the Shah's an-
nouncement on 23 July that Iran has recognized Israel de jure.
Radio Cairo has attacked Iran as "a base for Western operations
against the Arabs" and has said it is no surprise that a regime
comparable to that of the late Nun i Said in Iraq "should have fal-
len prey to Zionism." The reaction from Jordan and Lebanon
�has been similar, if less vitriolic, and the secretary of the Arab
League is contacting representatives of all member states to
prepare a joint stand.
The timing of the Iranian announcement was particularly ir-
ritating to President Nasir. UAR celebrations of the anniversary
of the Egyptian revolution are under way, units of the IJAR's new
"Palestine Liberation" army have been paraded, and propaganda
has been emphasizing solidarity against Israel.
Last week,
the Iranian foreign minister told the Saudi ambassador in
Tehran that Iran was in an embarrassing position because Switzer-
land wished to discontinue looking after the interests of the many
Iranians in Israel. This appears, however, to have been a conven-
ient excuse. IA key motive for the Iranian
decision was probably the overtures w-frich Israel has been making
through unofficial channels to furnish technical and developmental
De facto relations have long existed between the two countries;
there has been a considerable measure of cooperation in intelli-
gence matters, and oil has been shipped from Iran through middle-
men to Israel. For several weeks certain Iranian officials are re-
orted to have been considering formal recognition.
TO
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.Congo Situation Eases
The continued arrival of United Nations troops and their dis-
persal throughout the Congo except in Katanga Province appear to
have contributed to the easing of the tension in the Republic of the
Congo. The withdrawal of Belgian forces from Leopoldville to the
Belgian base at Kitona was effected on 23 July apparently without
incident. Essential port, pipeline, and other transportation facil-
ities are gradually being returned to operation, and some Belgian
and other refugees are returning to the Congo.
Unemployment and food scarcities remain urgent problems,
and UN authorities seek to enlist the services of trained adminis-
trators from other African states.awo members of the Belgian
Communist party claim to have been approached by the Congo Gov-
ernment to accept positions as technical advisers,
The formal proposal of Katangan Premier Moise Tshombe that
all six Congo provinces join in a federation of autonomous states
may offer the possibility of a new approach for settling the problem
of Watangan secession. Tshombe, who has failed to secure interna-
tional recognition for an independent Katanga, now is attempting to
enlist support for a loose confederation less likely to require rich
Katanga to support the other provinces.
� Premier Patrice Lumumba appears to have great hopes for a
50-year financial and management agreement which he signed with
the Congo International Development Corporation, a newly created
private organization. [This agreement, which provides for the fi-
nancing and developing of all natural resources and a technical assist-
ance program, must be ratified by the Congo Parliament. The agree-
ment may cause serious repercussions, however. The American am-
bassador in Leopoldville anticipates "trouble" when, as in the past,
grandiose plans of the firm's president, Edgar Detwiler, fail to ma-
terialize.
.�)
Lumumba arrived in New York on 24 July for a ten-day visit to
the United States and Canada in search of economic and technical as-
sistance.
the Congolese UN delegate as saying Lumumba would trav-
el to Moscow immediately thereafter. This is unconfirmed.
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Disorders in the .Malagasy Republic
Disorders were sparked in the capital city of Tananarive
on 20 and 21 July by agitators in the crowd of 40,000 persons
who gathered to welcome the return of Dr. Joseph Raseta,
Dr. Joseph Ravoahangy, and Jacques Rabemananjara, leading
Malagasy nationalists who had been in exile in France for their
part in leading the abortive nationalist revolt in 1947. The
Malagasy Council of Ministers on 22 July adopted strong meas-
ures to prevent a renewal of the disturbances, which included
attacks on European property until they were quelled by prompt
police action. The government blamed "imbeciles" under for-
eign influence and "Communists" and promised quick and severe
punishment, including the expulsion of troublemakers to offshore
islands.
There are no Sino- Soviet bloc diplomats in the new repub-
lic, which gained independence on 25 June. However, a Com-
munist-front organization, the Congress party for the Independ-
ence of Madagascar (AKFM), is the leading opposition to moderate
President Tsiranana, and probablywas involved in the disturbances.
The front organization is dominated by hard-core Communists and
reportedly receives important financial and other support from the
French Communist party. In municipal elections held last fall, the
AKFM made a strong showing in urban areas such as Tananarive
and the major French naval base at Diego-Suarez.
Parliamentary elections this September are expected to favor
President Tsiranana, who will capitalize on the attainment of inde-
pendence, but the three returned exiles will probably thereafter
lead the opposition to Tsiranana's pro-French policies. The three
have a special appeal to the Merina tribesmen in interior areas of
the island who were politically dominant before the 1947 rebellion.
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Moroccan Crown Prince Seems to Be Gaining Strength
Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, who is deputy premier of the
government of King Mohamed V, seems to b e steadily strength-
ening his position even though he continues to antagonize the
democratic and liberal elements in Morocco. Several cabinet
ministers who have disagreed with the prince or have become
disgusted with what they consider his overbearing mien are ru-
mored to have attempted to resign. The ministers apparently
were dissuaded by the King's assurances that the prince would
not get wholly out of hand. The minister of public works feels
the King's patience with the prince and "his clique," who openly
seek to "establish a dictatorship," is not unlimited.
The American Embassy in Rabat believes the King is becom-
ing less and less a curb on the prince. Moulay Hassan's recent
public and private remarks and his acceptance of invitations to
visit Moscow and Peiping suggest that he is increasingly inclined
to pursue a policy of nondependence. In his view this would have
the advantage of permitting Morocco and himself to play the role
of leader among newly independent states of Africa, of gaining the
maximum benefits from playing the East against the West, and of
gaining personal prestige by obtaining objectives of the leftist op-
position, such as securing the evacuation of foreign troops.
The prince, who conducts governmental affairs with initiative
and vigor, is further isolating the King by the removal of personal
advisers such as former Director of National Security Mohamed
Laghzaoui and the former director of the royal cabinet, Mohamed
Hamiani. Moreover, he apparently has reorganized the military
and internal security services so that they are more responsive to
his control. The embassy believes the prince may increasingly
mold the Moroccan Government to his purposes, eliminating those
ministers who refuse to collaborate with him. The prince shows
every sign of dominating both foreign and domestic policy in
Morocco, but he may yet overreach himself with his father and
conservative political parties.
CONFIDENTIAL-
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Developments in Cuba
The long-planned Latin American Youth Congress, which
opens in Cuba on 26 July, is to be a major propaganda effort
promoting the Castro-Communist goal of "liberating the Latin
American people from US imperialism." Cuban agents have for
some months been organizing delegations in other Latin Amer-
ican countries with the help of local Communists. The congress
is likely to be completely. Communist dominated--an expectation
which has led important youth organizations in Peru, Bolivia,
Chile, and other countries to boycott it. Nevertheless, youth
delegations, however unrepresentative, are likely from all or
most Latin American countries.
Foreign "dignitaries" expected in Cuba for the conference
include Mexican Communist labor leader Vicente Lombardo Tole-
dano, who is to represent the Communist-front World Federation
of Trade Unions,Land pro-Communist Jacobo Arbenz, former
President of Guatemala
"Fraternal delegates" are also arriving from most Sino-
Soviet bloc countries, including the USSR, Communist China.
North Vietnam, and North Korea.
la special Cuban plane is to
pick up representatives of the "Vietnamese youth farmers" in
Geneva to take them to Cuba. The date for the flight is given as
3 August, which suggests that further gatherings among foreign
representatives may be scheduled after the close of the youth
congress. The youth congress will provide Communists from all
parts of the world with an opportunity for liaison and the develop-
ment of joint programs.
Meanwhile, Italian oil magnate Enrico Mattei has turned down
a Cuban request to manage the foreign refineries seized in Cuba
early this month, but he is considering the sale to Cuba of refinery
equipment for cash and the provision of technical aid. Officers of
the seized refineries maintain that Cuba's biggest problem in run-
ning them will be access to replacement parts.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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