CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/07/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185143
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: July 21, 1960

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21 July 1960
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21 JULY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet memorandum to Austria on Berlin
free-city problem offers no new pro-
posals but hints Soviet willingness to
explore question with West Berlin mayor.0
Communists increase pressure on West-
ern military missions in East Germany
in effort to extort 'some acknowledgment
of East German jurisdiction.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Republic of Congo- Lumumba's reitera-
tion of threat to request Soviet troops
generates opposition within the govern-
ment.
Indonesian Army refuses President Su-
karno's request for release of recently
arrested Communist politburo member.
Lebanese President Sliihab maneuvers
to increase army influence over govern-
ment.
Ceylon--New government to be formed
by neutralist socialist party likely to be
unstable despite parliamentary majority.
III. THE WEST
�Top West German Socialists endorse
West Berlin Mayor Brandt as chancellor
candidate.
�.EmeR-F,r
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 July 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC'
USSRLBerlin: Gromyko's memorandum on Berlin, given
to the Austrian foreign minister in early July with the inten-
tion that it be passed to West Berlin Mayor Brandt, does not
offer new proposals on a West Berlin free city but hints at
Soviet willingness to explore the question with Brandt. The
memorandum warns that Brandt should not miscalculate the
extent of Western support and strength, and emphatically re-
peats Moscow's pledge to meet force with force after a sep-
arate peace treaty has transferred Berlin access controls to
East Germany. Moscow probably hopes by a combination of
threats and hints of flexibility to stimulate an initiative from
the West German Social Democrats. Failing this, however,
Moscow would probably publish the memorandum and point to
a refusal to negotiate as further justification for any step to-
ward a separate peace treaty.
(Page 1)
East Germany: Moscow is at least acquiescing in the ex-
ertion of greater pressure by the East Germans on the Western
military liaison missions in East Germany in an effort to ex-
tort an acknowledgment of some degree of East German juris-
diction. East German party boss Ulbricht in his press confer-
ence of 19 July charged that the US and British missions had
been caught spying. East German officials are spreading the
word that the USSR no longer feels its own liaison missions in
West Germany are important. i.Soviet authorities, reportedly
ised by the Western powers' failure to retaliate against
viet missions, are permitting East German pressure tac-
ut have not co:mmitted themselves firmly on the East
axis' alleged desire to abolish the missions.
(Page 2)
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TDP-SEGREL
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Noe
Republic of the Congo: Premier Lumumba's reiteration of
his threat to request the dispatch of Soviet troops to the Congo
appears designed to obtain a UN resolution demanding the im-
mediate withdrawal from the Congo of all Belgian troops. Lu-
mumba's recent actions, however, appear to have generated
considerable opposition within the government, notwithstand-
ing his statement that a request for Soviet intervention would
not imply "political conditions." The Congo legislature re-
portedly is considering a resolution censuring Lumumba for
"dictatorial" and "pro-Communist" acts, and one opposition
leader has called for the overthrow of the Lumumba govern-
ment.
*In the event of a formal appeal from the Congo Government
for Soviet intervention, it is unlikely that Moscow would respond
by dispatching Soviet forces. Moscow might temporarily avoid
an outright rejection, however, while attempting to exploit the
threat of such action as a means of stimulating pressure for the
speedy and complete evacuation of Belgian forces from the Congo.
(Page 3)
Indonesia: The Indonesian Army reportedly has refused
President Sukarno's request for the release of a recently ar-
rested member of the local Communist politburo who is concur-
rently a vice chairman of the government's National Planning
Council. the
army hops to avoid a head-on clash with Sukarno on the Commu-
nist issue, but for the time being is standing firm on this spe-
cific incident. 3The army reportedly has issued summonses for
all eight members of the politburo for interrogation on the Com-
munists' antigovernment statements of 8 July, but so far it has
located only one of the eight. (Page 4)
[*Lebanon: President Shihab's abrupt resignation and his sub-
sequent withdrawal of it on the same day by "popular request, "
as well as the reported appointment of the commander of the army
- and the chief of staff to ministerial posts, probably indicate a de-
sire by Shihab to reconfirm his mandate and increase army influence j
21 July 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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TOP�SEC�REL,
Laver the civilian government. Army commander Gen. Adil
Shihab, the President's cousin, has taken over the defense
portfolio, and Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Yusuf Shumayat has
been appointed deputy minister of interior. Both are retaining
their military posts.
both the President and General Shihab believe the military must
dominate the Lebanese political scene in order to maintain
stability.
*Ceylon: The moderately socialist Sri Lanka Freedom
party emerged from the national elections on 20 July
as the strongest single group in Parliament, holding slightly
more than a majority of seats. The Governor General almost
certainly will call on Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike, widow of the
late prime minister and active leader of the SLFP during the
two election campaigns this year, to form a government. Mrs.
Bandaranaike may seek the support of the Trotskyite group and
the smaller orthodox Communist party to strengthen her majority.
The new government is likely to follow the neutralist foreign
policy and moderate domestic program of the former Bandaranaike
regime. Broad ideological and personal differences among the
SLFP leaders will again make for unstable and ineffectual govern-
ment.
THE WEST
West Germany: Endorsement by top Socialist leaders of West
Berlin Mayor Brandt as chancellor candidate for the 1961 West
German national election and the naming of a shadow cabinet so
far in advance of the regular party convention in November suggest
that the Socialists feel it may take some time to convince the
4/ electorate of the sincerity of their new foreign policy line sup-
porting a strong Germany in NATO. Brandt and party Deputy
Chairman Herbert Wehner, who have joined forces to control
the party, are reported successful so far in quelling rank-and-
file opposition to their course. (Page 6)
21 July 60
DAILY BRIEF lii
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21 July 60 DAILY BRIEF
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CI V. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions
to initiate hostilities, the Watch Committee Conclusions remain
negative.
The Director of Intelligence and Research of the Department
of State believes that the following note should be added as applica-
ble to the Watch Committee Conclusions: "Although the above con-
clusions remain negative, the increased militancy of Soviet foreign
policy could give rise to situations in which the danger of hostil-
ities would be perceptibly increased."
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New Soviet Memorandum on Berlin
During Khrushchev's trip to Austria in early July, Soviet
Foteign Minister Gromyko gave the Austrian foreign minister
a memorandum on l3er1in to be passed to West Berlin's Mayor
Brandt. The memo hints at Soviet willingness to explore the
problem with Brandt but makes no new proposals. Asserting
that it is not in the interest of West Berlin authorities to have
the Berlin problem solved through unilateral action, Moscow�
claims that� Brandt is aware the Berlin situation is abnormal
and is looking for a way out of the blind alley. As the best so-
lution of the Berlin problem, the memo puts forth the standard
Soviet proposal for a free city under guarantees by the four
powers and the UN and supported by an East German obligation
to maintain access to the city.I
Warning Brandt against miscalculating the extent of West-
ern strength and support, the memo specifically dismisses
Western willingness to fight over the question of East German
control of access routes. Moscow also resorts to a reiteration
of its pledge to meet force with force in support of East Germany
after a separate peace treaty transfers access controls.
Moscow probably hopes by a combination of threats and hints
of flexibility to stimulate new initiative from the West German
and Berlin Social Democrats. Inasmuch as the Social Democrats
appeared more willing than the Adenauer government to explore
a similar Soviet initiative last January, Moscow has probably
been encouraged to believe that its latest move will either elicit
a response or become a divisive issue in both Bonn and Berlin.
In the absence of a favorable reply, Moscow will probably pub-
lish the memo as part of its effort to demonstrate a willingness
to negotiate and point to German refusal as further justification
for any steps toward a separate peace treaty.
--e-olemENTIAL_
21 July 60 rFkITD Al IkITCI I incturcDIIIiCTJkI
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Pressure on IN.mitern Military Liaison Mission&qn East
� Germany Increases
In a letter to the American commander in chief in West Ger-
many on 17 July and in a press conference two days later, East
German party boss Ulbricht charged that members of the US and
British military liaison missions in East Germany have spied on
military objectives. To support his claims, he produced maps,
photographs, and documents allegedly, taken from mission officers
by East German police. Earlier, on 20 May, while IChrushchev
was in East Berlin, Ulbricht asserted that "US officers" had been
caught with espionage material and called for the abolition of the
missions. The East Germans reportedly are spreading word that
Moscow is no longer interested in maintaining its own liaison mis-
sions to the Western commanders in chief in West Germany.
Moscow is at least permitting East German efforts to increase
pressure on the missions, probably in an effort to extort some ac-
knowledgment of East German authority over their movements. In
a letter replying to British protests against East German assaults
on the British mission, the Soviet commander in chief on 4 July de-
clared the mission had "carried out activities which, under the
present circumstances, could lead to undesirable consequences,"
adding that he could guarantee safety only "so long as members of
the mission strictly observe the laws and regulations of the German
Democratic Republic."
Soviet autnormes ao not at present want the missions abolished,
but are surprised at the lack of Western retaliatory restrictions
against the Soviet missions in West Germany, in conjunction with
the stiff Western protests against East German harassment. They
reportedly have authorized the East Germans to intensify pressure
on the missions to test Western firmness on the issuej
Moscow would probably be willing to sacrifice its own missions,
if it could erode Western occupation rights in East Germany by halt-
ing the activities of the Western missions. In the meantime, for the
period 13-21 July, Soviet authorities have imposed the most exten-
sive restrictions on mission travel known to date, barring mission
members from the :Larger part of East Germany.
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Congo Premier May Ask for Soviet Troops
The reiteration by the Congolese cabinet of Premier Lu-
mumba's threat to request that Soviet troops be sent to the
Congo appears designed to obtain a UN resolution demanding
the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian troops from the coun-
try. Although the leftist-dominated cabinet resolved to make
"an immediate appeal" to the Soviet Union or to other nations
of the Afro-Asian bloc, Lumumba subsequently indicated that
he would delay action pending events in the UN Security Coun-
cil on 20 July. He added, however, that he would seek help
from "the devil or anybody else" to force Belgian troops out
of the Congo.
Although the cabinet remains largely responsive to Lu-
mumba's anti-Belgian polemics, his recent performance ap-
pears to have generated considerable opposition elsewhere in
the government. The Congo legislature reportedly is consid-
ering a resolution censuring Lumumba for "dictatorial" and
"pro-Communist" acts, and his bitter rival within the National
Congo Movement, Albert Kalonji, has called for the overthrow
of the Lumumba government. Lumumba probably plans to take
advantage of the UN occupation to stabilize his regime and to de-
velop a police force responsible to himself.
Belgian officials in Katanga have assured Premier Tshombe.
of Brussels' willingness to provide technical and other assistance
and, according to the American Consulate, have attempted to give
the impression that their presence constitutes de facto recogni-
tion of Katanga's independence. Brussels continues hesitant con-
cerning formal recognition, but Lumumba's pro-Communist tend-
encies may prompt nations such as South Afri .a. the Rhnd sian
Federation, or Portugal to recognize Katanga
21 July 60 COMTD A II IN1TC1 I inckirc DI II I CTIk1
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Sukarno and Indonesian Army Clash on Communist Issue
[The Indonesian Army has refused President Sukarno's re-
quest for the release of Sakirman, a recently arrested member
of the local Communist party politburo who is also a vice chair-
man of the government's National Planning Council. '\ Sakirman
was arrested on 16 July, apparently as the result of antigovern-
ment statements issued on 8 July by party Secretary General
Aidit and two Communist dailies,
the army had issued summonses for all eight members of the
politburo for interrogation on the party's new antigovernment
line, but so far has :Located only one of the eight.
� The army's actions are reported to have been ordered by
Army Chief of Staff General Nasution from North Sumatra, where
he was then on tour. Nasution also issued from North Sumatra
on 18 July an unusually strong anti-Communist statement in which
he accused the Communists and the various insurgent groups as
a whole of constituting that small segment of the population which
opposed government policy.
�The army has also banned the Communist daily, Harlan Rakjat,
reportedly again on orders from Nasution. This action appears to
have been a countermove to the banning of an anti-Communist pa-
per, Nusantara, on Sukarno's orders during Nasution's absence.,
Although reports are conflicting as to the extent of the moves
by both Sukarno and the army, army action appears to have been
sufficient to increase tension between the two
he army hopes to avoid a head-
on contlict witn buicarno on me L.ommunist issue3 The success of
the army's holding action on the Communist party depends on
Sukarno. The President, however, seems likely to continue his
policy of balancing the army against the Communists, and Nasu-
don's latest actions may encourage him to proceed with his inten-
tions to reshuffle the army high command.
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Now
Ceylon's Moderate-Socialist Freedom Party to Form
New Government
The outcome of Ceylon's national elections on 20 July leaves
the prospects for stable parliamentary government still doubtful.
The Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP), committed to the socialist-
neutralist policies of the late Prime Minister Bandaranaike, has
emerged as the largest single party in Parliament. It holds
slightly more than a majority of seats alone, and, with its leftist
supporters, a generous majority. The relatively conservative
United National party, winner of a slim plurality in the elections
last March, has suffered considerable losses, although the
final party standings are not yet clear. The three leftist parties
�have again lost some ground.
Governor General Goonetilleke will almost certainly request
SLFP President Mrs. Bandaranaike to form a government.
While she was not a parliamentary candidate, she was the party's
most active campaigner and its choice for the prime ministership,
and thus can be appointed to the position pending a parliamentary
by-election. In order to assure a solid parliamentary majority,
Mrs. Bandaranaike may seek the support, although probably not
the active participation in the government, of the Trotskyite Lanka
Sama Samaj and the smaller orthodox Communist party, which
were partners in a no-contest agreement with the SLFP.
The SLFP's strong showing on its own will reduce its depend-
ence on the extreme leftist minority and enable the new government
to retain the essentially moderate outlook of the former Bandaranaike
regime. The deep ideological and personal conflicts among the
SLFP politicians and the probable battle for behind-the-scenes
control will weaken the government; however, and will limit its ability
to deal with the economic and social problems arising from the
past four years of instability.
--CONFIDENTIAL-
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West German Lea-7017g 7cp-prove Brand andidacy
- The executive committee of the Social Democratic party
(SPD) on 19 July endorsed West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt as
the party's new standard-bearer and chancellor candidate in the
1961 West German national election. The committee also named
a shadow cabinet which--along with Brandt's candidacy must
be formally ratified at the SPD national convention in November.
These actions--so far in advance of the convention suggest that
the Social Democrats feel it may take some time to convince
the German electorate of the sincerity of their new foreign pol-
icy line supporting a strong Germany in NATO. The shadow
cabinet represents a good cross-section of the party, both ide.-
�logically and geographically, and is probably intended to assure
the voter that all shades of opinion will receive consideration in
a new government. The principal weakness of the previous lead-
ership was its inflexibility and devotion to narrow class doctrines.
Brandt's nomination also indicates that he and Deputy Chair=
man Herbert Wehner have joined forces to control the party. So
far they reportedly have been able to quell rank-and-file opposi-
tion to their course.
*ehner's recent pronouncements on foreign
policy were closely coordinated with Brandt in every detail. He
also stated that Wehner has endeavored to work closely with
Brandt and is extremely careful to avoid clashing with him. Weh-
ner's strong support of Brandt is prompted by his belief that the
SPD's only hope of winning in 1961 lies in having the dynamic
young mayor as party standard-bearer.]
One of Brandt's close advisers, the Berlin Senate's repre-
sentative in Bonn, GuenterKlein, has raised the question of
whether Brandt can return to Berlin as mayor should he fail
to win the chancellorship. Klein feels this would be difficult be-
cause Brandt would have become too deeply committed in West
German politics to withdraw, and that if he did withdraw, and re-
turn to West Berlin, Wehner would probably gain control of the
party and become its leading contender for chancellor in 1965.
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,L.,4 NI ICI La
Now"
�
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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