CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/07/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185141
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: July 19, 1960

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19 JULY-1980
I THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists move jet fighters to
Southwest China, providing air defense
capability in area and improving offen-
sive capability against Southeast Asia.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
The situation in the Republic of the
Congo.
New Japanese prime minister probably
to face crisis soon in invoking govern-
ment authority against leftist agitators.
Syrian economic situation worsening and
discontent mounting among populace.
Turkish provisional government plans to
retire many senior military officers;
could increase political ferment and
cause damage to military establishment. 0
0
Cambodia�Sihanouk continues to threat-
en to seek Communist bloc military aid.
0
Ceylonese national elections on 20 July
unlikely to resolve political stalemate. 0
III. THE WEST
�Venezuelan foreign minister's p
trozalits n evidenced.
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" CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 July 1960
DAILY BRIEF
LI
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: Between 13 and 17 July, at least
24 biaToTs1117aTrarregiment of 30-36 Chinese Commu-
nist jet fighters deployed, perhaps permanently, to Kun-
ming from Suichi. No jet fighters are known to have been
based in this area previously. The establishment of a jet
fighter unit in Southwest China, in addition to providing an
air defense capability in the area, also gives the Chinese
Communists an improved offensive capability against South-
east Asia. (Page 1) (Map)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Republic of the Congo: Brussels' stated intention to ig-
nore Premier Lumurnba's ultimatum to remove its troops
from the Congo may lead to a formal Congolese request for
Soviet assistance. Lumumba's freedom of action, however,
appears to be checked by opposition in the Congo Senate to
any Soviet "interference" in the Congo, and by the action of
Belgian troops in yielding their security responsibilities to
UN forces in some areas.CUN representative Bunche in
Leopoldville reports that he had great difficulty in convinc-
ing Lumumba that UN forces would not be turned over to him
to use against the Belgians, and characterized Lumumba as
"crazy.":
(Page 2)
Japan: Hayato Ikeda, the new prime minister, probably
, will be faced with a crisis in the next few days in invoking,
government authority against leftist violence. Top labor,
Socialist, and Communist leaders are on the scene mobilizing
leftist forces to block an injunction against picketing at a
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Tais'--SECREL
large coal mine on Kyushu Island, where bloody clashes
have already occurred during a protracted strike. The
striking union is heavily penetrated by Communists, and
both the leftist forces and the government realize the out-
come of the struggle will strongly influence developments
In labor and the Socialist party.
The speedy formation of the new Japanese cabinet, its�
composition, and the apparent solid backing Ikeda received
in the vote for prime minister together suggest that the gov-
erning Liberal-Democratic party is emphasizing party har-
mony in preparation for the elections expected this fall or
early next year. (Page 3)
IJAR (Syria): The economic situation in Syria is worsening
and may become disastrous, according to the American Con-
sulate General in Damascus. Discontent is mounting as a re-
sult of the economic deterioration, suspicions that Nasir
intends to relegate Syria to the position of a colony, and
fears that Cairo will soon act to nationalize Syrian indus-
tries and unify Egyptian and Syrian currencies. Open crit-
icism of Nasir is now being heard.
The value of the Syrian pound has gradually declined in
rpe Mit WPPICS�
the people are disturbed about
the "collapse" of the Syrian currency and that selling of the
Syrian pound has raised the prices of foreign currencies to
an "unnrPeetiPnted levpl"
%:�).
(Turkey: The provisional government of Turkey plans
to retire many senior officers of the armed forces and has
requested US financial support for the program. While re-
form in Turkey's military personnel management practices
is badly needed and should remove much "deadwood," sum-
mary retirement of large numbers of senior officers could
ncrease political ferment in the country and result in some
damage to the military establishment.
(Page 5)j
,
,
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DAILY BRIEF
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(Cambodia: Chief of State Sihanouk continues to threaten,
'n speeches and articles, to seek Communist bloc military
d unless the United States meets his demands--which have
ot yet been formally presented--for more and better arma-
ents. This posture reportedly is causing some consterna-
ion among other Cambodian leaders, including Armed Forces
omma,nder General Lon Nol, who apparently are not being
consulted. Despite any reservations they may have on this is-
sue, however, they probably would continue to support Siha-
o should he move closer to the bloc.
(Page 6)
Ceylon: The 20 July national elections are unlikely to
resolve 7�the political stalemate produced by the elections last
March. Again neither major party seems capable of winning
a majority in parliament. Support for the moderately social-
ist Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) does not appear to have
dropped substantially since March, and the party will benefit
from a no-contest agreement with two leftist parties. The
relatively conservative United National party has made good
use of several key issues, however, and should be able at
least to hold the slim plurality it won in March. If the SLFP
again comes in a close second, with leftist support it prob-
ably could command a larger parliamentary coalition with
which to form a government. (Page 7)
I I I. THE WEST
Venezuela-Cuba: Venezuelan Foreign Minister. Arcaya,
who has often differed with President Betancourt on relations
with Castro, is evidently making a concerted effort to muster
the support of both Latin American and neutralist nations in be-
half of the Cuban regime,
In a conversation with the UAR and Bolivian ambassadors
in Caracas on 12 July, Arcaya referred to the recent pro=Castro
statements of prominent Mexican congressmen and recommended
that "the parliaments of the neutral nations" take a similar stand.
Arcaya also informed the two ambassadors of his conversation
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with US Ambassador Sparks earlier the same day on the
� Cuban situation and added that Venezuela, in certain cir-
cumstances, would "not hesitate" to back Cuba against the
US in the OAS or the UN General Assembly.
(Page 8)
19 July 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
TOSERET
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19 JULY 1960
"SEC--REI
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Communist China Moves Unit to Southwest China
The deployment of possibly a regiment of Chinese Commu-
nist jet fighters to Kunming from Suichi between 13 and 17 July
probably reflects the expansion of the Chinese Communist air
defense system into Southwest China. The aircraft involved are
believed subordinate to the 26th Air Division, which has been
based at Suichi for a number of years. Transport activity be-
lieved associated with this movement suggests that the deploy-
ment is permanent.
some air authority of higher
than divisional echelon had been established in Southwest China.
A month earlier,
an air defense district--the seventh--had been set up
n Southwest China, with headquarters probably at Kunming, which
is also the headquarters of the Kunming Military Region. Previ-
ous information had indicated that the airfield at Kunming was be-
ing improved.
A regiment of jet fighters based at Kunming will provide an
air defense intercept capability in an area where one has not been
maintained previously. The establishment of an air command in
this area also gives the Communists an improved offensive capa-
bility against Southeast Asia.
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� Situation in the Conga
Brussels' stated intention to ignore Premier Lumumba's
ultimatum to withdraw Belgian troops from the Congo may lead
to a formal Congolese request for Soviet intervention. The Bel-
gians continue to airlift reinforcements to the Congo, and while
Belgian troops have yielded to UN authority in certain areas of
Leopoldville Province, they have shown no disposition either to
leave the country or to withdraw to Belgian bases there.
Although Lumumba has threatened to request Soviet "inter-
vention" on 19 July, there are indications that members of his
government are emerging from their recent shock and are con-
cerned over the present course of events. On 18 July, the Congo
Senate adopted� a resolution opposing Lumumba's ultimatum to the
Belgians and rejecting any Soviet interference in the Congo. Op-
position to Lumumba appears likely to increase as the present
trend toward political fragmentation continues.
In Katanga Province, which has declared itself independent
of the Congo, Premier Tshombe has formally requested recogni-
tion from the UN and from various Western states. L it is possible
that his anti-Lumumba regime will be recognized by Portugal and
supported by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.] Belgium
is reluctant to accord precipitate recognition to Katanga lest it be
accused of establishing a puppet state in its erstwhile colony.
Should any other country recognize Katanga, however, Brussels
would probably follow suit.
There is no confirmation to date of Tshombe's claims that
the Congo's Kivu and Kasai provinces will affiliate with Katanga.
In these and in Leopoldville Province, however, further seces-
sionist moves are possible.
Meanwhile, UN representative Ralph Bunche in Leopoldville
reports that he had great difficulty in convincing Lumumba that
UN forces would not be turned over, to him to use against the Bel-
gians, and characterized Lumumba as "crazy."]UN officials in
the Congo have recommended that UN troop strength, now approx-
imately. 5,000, should be brought to 10,000 as soon as possible,
while UN headquarters in New York hopes to move a Swedish
battalion to the Congo in order to allay the misgivings of Congo
Europeans concerning
gents of the UN force.
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New Japanese Government Faces Renewal of Leftist Disorders
Hayato Ikeda, elected Japanese prime minister on 18 July,
faces an almost immediate crisis caused by disorderly leftist
elements who are planning to use force to bar resumption of op-
erations at a major mine in the depressed coal industry.
Top labor, Socialist, and Communist leaders are reported
to be on the scene mobilizing a force of at least 30,000�includ-
ing radicals from the Zengakuren student federation--to prevent
the enforcement of a court injunction against picketing at the
Miike mine of the Mitsui Coal Company on the island of Kyushu.
The leftists probably have been encouraged by the success of re-
cent demonstrations against the Ki hi government,:and,
they may recelVe financial
assistance from the USSR and the World Federation of Trade
Unions for the Miike strugglei3 Some 10,000 police are expected
to attempt to enforce the injunction within the next few days, and
a violent clash is considered likely.
The Miike mine has become a focal point in the struggle be-
tween management and labor over moves to reduce the labor force
and raise efficiency and productivity in key Japanese industries.
The outcome of the dispute at the mine is expected to have a sweep-
ing effect on this problem in industry and strongly influence future
developments in labor and the Socialist party. A split between mod-
erates and pro-Communists in the union at the mine, which has
been struck since last January, has led to at least four pitched bat-
tles and one death in recent months.
Ikeda favors forceful action, but his awareness of the Japanese
public's disapproval of the use of strong police measures may in-
duce him to move cautiously. The new labor minister, Hirohide
Ishida, followed a firm but nonrepressive program when he occu-
�pied this post in 195'7. It seems doubtful at this time, however, that
anything legs �than an ail-out government effort will overcome
leftist resistance at the mine.
The ruling Liberal-Democratic party's almost solid backing
for Ikeda in his election as prime minister, as well as the speed
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with which he has completed the formation of a cabinet, indi-
cates that the governing party temporarily is emphasizing
harmony in preparations for general elections expected this
fall or early next year. The new cabinet line-up includes rep-
resentatives of most major factions, but the relative absence
of "top" names suggests that an enduring coalition of party fac-
tions will depend on the outcome of the elections. The new for-
eign minister, Zentaro Kosaka, and trade minister, Mitsujiro
Ishii, are supporters of close ties with the United States.
Page 4
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r Bulk of Turkey's Senior Military Officers Face
Forced Retirement
[ The provisional government of Turkey, in,a move prompted
by the National Unity Committee (NUC), plans to retire 2,000-
3,000 generals and field-grade officers. Rumors of the pro-
posed forced retirement program already are reported causing
unrest in the officer corps.-3
Turkey's military personnel management practices, which
for years have allowed an accumulation of deadwood in top ranks,
have been badly in need of reform. Summary retirement of the
large number proposed, however, could increase political fer-
ment throughout Turkey and result in some damage to the mil-
itary establishment. The procedure would undoubtedly result
in the dismissal of some able officers, as the Turkish armed
forces lack an effective personnel evaluation system. Ambas-
sador Warren has noted that the proposed step could be no more
than a move to complete the revolutionary process of the "col-
onels coup" and ensure that NUC members are left in effective
control of the military forces.-)
I-The high level and unusual intensity of the Turkish approaches
to American officials on the retirement plan indicate the impor-
tance Ankara attaches to it. General Gursel, chairman of the
NUC and interim chief of state, accompanied by his top adviser,
Colonel Turkes, and by Foreign Minister Sarper, made a strong
appeal for American financial support. Gursel was highly crit-
ical of the military goals of the former regime and claimed that, if
the present government spent the amount required to meet them,
Turkey would become "an army without a country." 3
he ambassador cautions that future Turkish decisions on
other phases of Turkish-American relations, including current
and contemplated US requests for defense facilities, could be in-
fluenced by the American reaction to the current approach. He
further noted that Turkish leaders are apparently determined to go
aheadwith the retirement program, and that, if the American re-
sponse is negative, the chances of influencing future military per-
sonnel policies would probably be very slight.
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Sihanouk Continues Criticism of American Military Aid
Chief of State Sihanouk, in speeches and newspaper arti-
cles, is continuing his propaganda campaign of invective
against alleged shortcomings in American military aid to Cam-
bodia. Ina violent speech on 14 July in the northwestern pro-
vincial center of Siem Reap, Sihanouk reiterated his threat to
accept proffered Communist bloc military aid if the United
States does not meet what he claims to be Cambodia's defense
needs.
Sihanouk's unilateral actions in this matter are causing
,some consternation among other top figures in the government.
Major General Lon Nol, chief of the Cambodian armed forces,
he was taken completely by
surprise and is place in a 'cult position as a result of
Sihanouk's attacks on the United States. Lon Nol reportedly
stated that if Sihanouk had his way Cambodia would have bloc
rockets and jets, "none of which we need or could maintain."
According to Lon Nol, Sihanouk's decision to send three of his
sons to Communist China for schooling was intended to show
the West that he was not bluffing, but this move touched off a
bitter quarrel between Sihanouk and his mother, Queen Kos-
samak.1
The Cambodian Government thus far has not formalized
Sihanouk's demands for more and better. American arms, al-
though it has indicated that preliminary talks would begin soon
in Phnom Penh and that Lon Nol would be coming to Washington
later for further negotiations. LLon Nol, however, reportedly
has stated that "much depends on the results of Deputy Premier
Tioulong's trip to Czechoslovakian Tioulong arrived in Prague
on 20 June and is believed to be negotiating some kind of arms
deal with the Czechs.
CO
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Ceylon's National Elections Unlikely to Resolve Long-Standing
Political Stalemate
Ceylon's national elections on 20 July are unlikely to re-
solve the political stalemate which resulted from the elections
last March, since once again no single party seems capable of
winning a majority. The two leading contenders are closely bal-
anced, and no last-minute issue has developed which would set
a distinct election trend. The relatively conservative United
National party (UNP) seems to hold a slight lead, howeVer, and
should maintain the four-seat plurality it won over the i+oderate-
socialist Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) last March.
The UNP's efforts to exploit Singhalese-Buddhist national-
ism and to expose the role of international as well as local Com-
munism in Ceylon have kept the opposition on the defensive
throughout the campaign. The much-publicized meeting in mid-
June between two local Trotskyite leaders and the Soviet ambas-
sador has recently become the UNP's chief weapon against the
SLFP. Press speculation that the SLFP's electoral pact with the
Trotskyite and orthodox Communist parties is merely the tradi-
tional first step in Marxist strategy for seizing power may have
aroused latent suspicion of Communist intentions. While it is not
clear whether enough voters are aware of this issue to affect
election trends, some 200 people in Colombo demonstrated a-
gainst the Soviet Embassy on 12 July, demanding the ambassa-
dor's return to Moscow.
However, support for the SLFP does not appear to have
dropped substantially since March. Moreover, the party should
benefit from its no-contest agreement with the two leftiSt parties.
If the SLFP again ranks a close second, with leftist suOort it
probably could command a larger parliamentary coalition than the
UNP.LSLFP President Mrs. Bandaranaike reportedly indicated
recently that she would not object to having Trotskyite party lead-
er N. M. Perera join an SLFP government. This reverses earlier
denials that the party would cooperate with the Marxists after the
elections.
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Venezuelan Foreign Minister Evidences Pro-Castro Senti ents
Venezuelan Foreign Minister. Arcaya, a stanch defender of
Castro, is evidently trying to muster the support of Latin Amer-
ican and neutralist nations for the Cuban regime.
Arcaya, in a conversation with the UAR
and Bolivian ambassadors in Caracas on 12 July, referred to the
recent pro-Castro statements of prominent Mexican congressmen
and recommended that the "parliaments of neutral nations" take a
similar stand. Arcaya and the Bolivian ambassador specifically
mentioned Yugoslavia and India as countries which should be ap-
proached for such support. The UAR reportedly has sent a sym-
pathetic telegram to the Castro government, possibly in response
to Arcaya's proposal.
Arcaya informed the two ambassadors of his conversation
earlier the same day with US Ambassador Sparks on the Cuban
situation and added that in certain circumstances Venezuela would
"not hesitate" to back Cuba against the United States in the Organ-
ization of American States or the UN General Assembly. He re-
portedly "did not hide his regret" over the postponement of the
Havana underdeveloped, nations' conference, a key "neutralist"
scheme of the Cuban Government which has failed thus far to win
Latin American cooperation.
CArcaya's position on relations with Castro has differed from
that of President Betancourt, who has long recognized the problem
Castro presents in the hemisphere and has agreed to take a leading
role in resolving it after Dominican dictator Trujillo is ousted.
However, Arcaya and the leftist party he represents in the coalition
cabinet have close ties with the Cuban regime and may be advising
it Informally of US efforts to win Venezuelan support in the contro-
versy with Cuba. "In discussion with Sparks, Arcaya is frequently
vehement in defense of the Cuban regime and parries proposals for
facing the Cuban situation with recommendations of delay and im-
practical plans for future action.)
015-sse.,REI
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of-the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
C&NELDENTIL
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