CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/09/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03184171
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: September 22, 1960

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22 September 1960
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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22 SEPTEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet officials tell French ambassador
that Moscow has not changed its policy on
Algeria, but is finding it more difficult
to maintain "reserved" attitude.
Peiping announces new agreement on
provision of Chinese labor to Mongolia. 0
Shake-up in Ningsia Hui government again
points up Peiping regime's continuing
problems with various minority groups. �
II. ASIA-AFRICA
French, concerned over possible Souda-
nese moves in retaliation for Paris' recog-
nition of Senegal, plan steps to prevent
any direct Soudanese aid to Algerian
rebels.
LATE ITEMS
Situation in Laos.
Situation in the Congo.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 September 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-France-Algeria: Soviet officials have assured the
French ambassador in Moscow that the USSR's policy toward
Algeria has not changed, and that Moscow's recent propagan-
da criticism of De Gaulle's handling of the Algerian problem
was designed to "appease" Arab governments.
o
the Soviet officials warned, however, that it is becoming
more difficult for the USSR to maintain a "reserved" attitude
because of "pressures from within and without." Although the
USSR appears to be less concerned now than last year about
avoiding offense to France, and may therefore give stronger
support to Algerian rebel demands in the United Nations, it
is unlikely that Moscow intends to change its policy in the
near future to the extent of reragnizinP; the rebel Algerian
government. (:Page 1)
Mongolia: Peiping has announced the negotiation of a k_
new agreement on the provision of Chinese labor in Mongolia,
where there now are 10,000 Chinese workers. This announce-
ment, which comes less than two weeks after the new Soviet
loan to Ulan Bator of over $150,000,000, is further evidence
that Mongolia is profiting from Sino- Soviet competition to de-
velop its economy. In May, the Chinese extended a $50,000, -
000 loan to cover economic assistance for Mongolia's Third
Five-Year Plan beginning in 1961.
Communist China: The persistence of separatist tenden -
cies among China's religious and ethnic minorities is high-
lighted by the shake-up in the government of the Ningsia Hui
Autonomous Region, a Moslem area in northwestern China.
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Communist China�Autonomous Regions
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HUI ATJTONCPWOUS
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1 Autonomous Region
i Under preparation for autonomous status
Autonomous Regions established on dates shown
UNCLASSIFIED
STATUTE MILES
WAN CHUAN
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The chairman (who is also a member of the Chinese Commu-
nist party's central committee), a vice chairman, and one
other member of the Ningsia governing body were dismissed
from their posts last week. The local press accused "nation-
alist elements" of "confusing nationality and religion" and
warned of "severe punishment" for those who fail to reform.
China's various minority peoples--which pose a continuing
problem but no threat to Peiping--comprise about 6 percent
of the population and occupy about 50 to 60 percent of the
total land area. (See map on opposite
page)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
France-Soudan: he French Government, concerned over
possible moves by Soudan in retaliation for Paris' recent recog-
nition of Senegal, is taking steps to prevent any direct Soudanese
aid to the Algerian rebels across the Soudanese Saharan border
and to ensure retention of French military bases in the area.
French military officers are in contact with the nomadic Tuareg
tribes of northern Soudan, and are prepared if necessary to
furnish them arms and encourage a separatist movement. A
formal statement on Soudan's relationship with the French
Community and on Soudanese intentions vis-a-vis Algeria may
come from the conference of the ruling Soudanese party now
scheduled for Bamako on 22-23 September.
(Page 3) (Map)
III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. �No Sino- Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the immedi-
afp future
Note:
22 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF
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B. No Sino- Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies,
or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
Note: Recent East German moves to assert control over West
German access to Berlin and to assert "sovereignty" over
the Soviet sector of the city have brought the bloc to a new
stage in its efforts to separate West Berlin from West
Germany as a part of its program to undermine the West-
ern position in Berlin.
C.
Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet-Com-
munist hostile action continue to exist in Laos and the Middle
East. In Laos, the continuing differences between opposing
elements favor Communist exploitation and could stimulate
increased Pathet Lao military activity.
LATE ITEMS
*Laos: iPrince Boun Oum has notified King Savang that
General Phou i and other military leaders associated with the
vannakhet Revolutionary Committee are prepared to attend
a conference of Laos' top military commanders as proposed by
the King, but only if the meeting is held in Savannakhet. This in
effect amounts to a polite rejection of Sayan& proposal and may
discourage him from further efforts to mediate the crisis for
fear of diminishing his authority. pie Revo-
lutionary Committee on 20 September asked provinces loyal to
It to nominate delegates to a constituent assembly. This step
conforms with previously reported plans to change Laos from
a unitary to a federated state. Implementation of this plan pre-
sumably will be effected whether or not Phoumrs forces succeed
In, retaking Vientiane.
22 Sept 60
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*Congo: Colonel Mobutu's continued control of the army
in the Leopoldville area appears to have put his opponents on
the defensive. He has publicly charged Ghana and Guinea with ,3 , 5 an attempt attempt to restore Lumurnba to power and has demanded the
withdrawal of their contingents of the UN force. The UAR
ambassador, who earlier had made strenous efforts to destroy "7-7) -2)
evidence of his involvement in the plot,
"the most important thing" was to "protect Lumumba's
life." Mobutu, although his troops control Leopoldville, seems
to have been somewhat bewildered by recent events. One observer
said he was "like a man in a trance, ' and the UAR ambassador
termed him "confused" and "fanatical."
Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General Hammarskj old, following
reports of brutal suppression of unrest in Katanga, is threatening
more direct UN action in the tribal warfare in Kasai and Katanga.
He has also raised the possibility that local troops might be
disarmed by UN forces. (Page 4)
22 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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USSR's Algerian Policy
Soviet officials, including several allegedly close to Khru-
shchev, have assured French Ambassador Dejean in Moscow
that the USSR's policy toward Algeria has not changed and that
recent propaganda criticism of De Gaulle's handling of the Al-
gerian problem is designed to "appease" Arab governments,
The ambas-
sador was informed that visiting Algerian rebel leaders were
told last spring they should not count on material support from
the USSR but should instead seek to end the Algerian war by
negotiations with Paris. The Soviet officials warned, however,
that it was becoming increasingly difficult for Moscow to main-
tain its "reserved" attitude because of "pressures both from
within and without."
These warnings are apparently intended to pave the way
for some departure from the Soviet attitude of last September
when, in meetings with Arab diplomats in Moscow, Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin pledged
Soviet "moral aid" to the Algerians, but stressed that the
USSR was not willing to extend diplomatic recognition to the
rebel government because of "international conditions." Khru-
shchev, in a speech last October, gave cautious endorsement
to De Gaulle's Algerian plan, and during his visit to France
last spring he publicly expressed approval of De Gaulle's policy.
In recent weeks Soviet propaganda has been more critical
of De Gaulle�particularly his handling of the Algerian issue--
than at any time over the past year. Moscow now appears to
be less concerned about avoiding offense to France and may
therefore give strong support in the UN General Assembly to
any proposed resolution setting forth the suggestion of rebel
Premier Ferhat Abbas for a UN-supervised and -controlled
referendum in Algeria,
the provisional
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government, in preparation for the General Assembly discus-
sion of the question, is scrapping its policy of deference to
Western feelings and has instructed its four-man "delegation"
at the UN to seek Soviet support.
It is unlikely that the USSR would risk antagonizing De
Gaulle by changing its policy on Algeria in the near future
to the extent of recognizing the rebel government. The USSR
continues to hope that De Gaulle's ambition and independence
will provide Moscow with an opportunity to gain French sup-
port for Soviet positions on Germany and disarmament.
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22 SEPTEMINER 1080
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500
31328
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NIGERIA
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Gulf of Guinea
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CAFrance Concerned Over Possible Soudanese Aid to
lgerian Rebels
Paris fears that its recognition of Senegal on 11 Septem-
ber may lead Soudan to retaliate by recognizing the Algerian
provisional government and aiding the Algerian rebel military
forces. Although Soudanese reaction thus far has been re-
strained, Soudan might carry out its earlier threat to break
with the French Community and force the withdrawal of French
troops from Soudanese territory. In that event, France pre-
sumably would lose the bases ceded to it by Mali under the co-
operation agreements signed last April when Senegal and Sou-
dan were members of the Mali Federation. Loss of the bases
at Gao and Tessalit in northern Soudan would make it difficult
for France to prevent arms shipments and personnel reinforce-
ments from crossing the Soudanese Saharan border and reach-
ng the Algerian rebels.
French military officers in contact with the nomadic
Tuareg tribes of northern Soudan are apparently trying to in-
crease traditional tribal rivalries between them and the Bantu
tribes of the center and south, which control the Soudanese
Government. The French reportedly are prepared, if the sit-
uation warrants, to encourage a separatist movement among
the Tuaregs and furnish them arms.
A formal statement- of Soudan's relationship with the
French Community and on Soudanese intentions vis-a-vis
Algeria. may come from the conference of the ruling South-
nese party now scheduled for Bamako on 22-23 September.
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*NS
Congo Situation as of 0300 EDT
Colonel Mobutu's continued control of the army in the Leopold-
ville area appears to have put his opponents on the defensive. After
allegedly discovering documents linking Lumumba with "Communists
and Guineans and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana," he has de-
manded the withdrawal of the Ghanaian and Guinean contingents of th -
UN force.
Mobutu had told him that Ghana and Guinea had been "caught"
supporting Lumumba. As a result, the embassy made strenous
efforts to destroy the evidence of the UAR's involvement in the
efforts to return Lumumba to power.
the African states were still follow-
ing events closely, but that "the most important thing" at the moment
was to "protect Lumumba's
tAlthougkiMobutu's troops control Leopoldville and have turned
the country's administration over to the new "College of High
Commissioners,"atie colonel himself remains in the army camp
near the city under the protection of a heavy security guard. He
seems tor have been somewhat bewhildered by recent events; one
observer said he was "like a man in a trance," and he UAR
ambassador termed him "confused" and "fanatical.
Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, taking ad-
vantage of the recent General Assembly endorsement of his Congo
policy, is threatening more direct UN action in the tribal warfare
In Kasai and Katanga provinces. Following reports that unrest in
nordernKatanga had been brutally suppressed by Katangan forces,
Hammarskjold warned President Tshombe on 21 September that
further "repressive measures" would be resisted by the UN
forces. He also warned that the activities of Katanga's troops
raised the possiblity that local troops might be disarmed by UN
forces. He stated that the UN action would be undertaken to
"protect the civilian population" and that it would be "in no way
restricted by rules of non-intervention applied to the force in
relation to domestic conflicts."
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Now' *1�40
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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