CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03184163
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 4, 1960

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4 August 1960
Copy No. C 71
CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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4 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Sino-Burmese border commission ap-
parently reaches agreement on boundary
issues.
Comment on Chou En-lai's conciliatory
notes to Nepal on recent border incidents�
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Comment on Congo situation.
Iraq�Nationalist elements committing
violence, including assassinations,
against Communists in Mosul and
Kirkuk areas.
Lebanon�sew cabinet composed of men
of widely differing political views; drift
toward military control may result if
government operations inhibited.
III. THE WEST
Dominican Republic�Resignation of
Trujillo's brother as President seen un-
likely to mollify regime's critics.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
China-Burma: The Sino-Burmese joint boundary commit- (9
tee apparently has reached agreement on the main points at vip-c..4-7�d-,
issue in the long-standing border dispute between the two
countries. Peiping has permitted Burma to decide how much
territory it will cede in the Kachin State, and Burma in turn
has accepted China's demand for a smaller area farther south
in the Wa States. A formal border treaty may now be readied,
possibly in time for U Nuts expected visit to Peiping in October.
In commentary clearly directed at Indian and other Asian opinion,
Peiping has publicized progress toward the treaty as "proof"
of its willingness to conduct "neareful negotiations" on bound-
ary questions (Page 1)
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China-Nepal: Chou En-lai's recent replies to Nepal's pro-
tests over Chinese border activities are designed to mollify
Katmandu and smooth the way for joint border commission
talks scheduled to begin on 8 August. Although Chou again de-
nied any violation of Nepal's borders, Nepali officials said
he offered "profuse apologies" for the "confessions" which
captured Nepalis had been forced to sign and stated that Chi-
nese troops had been withdrawn from the demilitarized zone
on 25 July. Nepan.; prime minister has welcomed the con-
ciliatory Chinese actions, although he still contends that the
clash in the Mustang area in late Tune took place in Nepali
territory. (Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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*Republic of the Congo: Strong Belgian reaction to Ham- -
marskjold's announcement of the imminent entry of UN tr,00ps
Into ICatanga may stiffen Tshombe's opposition to this =we and � ;
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force a delay in UN plans. This would further complicate
the position of Dr. Bunche in negotiations with Tshombe,
although Tshombe is unlikely to maintain his stand for full
independence for Katanga. Dr. Bunche is scheduled to ar-
rive in Elisabethville on 5 August. Tshomb0 has previously
indicated his willingness to reconsider his secession from
the Congo, provided the Congo is made a federation with each
province retaining a large measure of autonomy. Brussels
probably hopes that Tshombe can rejoin the Congo on these
terms; Belgian officials, however, have indicated that they
are unwilling to risk censure in the Security Council by re-
taining troops throughout Katanga. The anticipated re-
grouping of Belgian troops at the Kamina base in Katanga will
fall short of satisfying Lumumbats demand for total evacuation
of all Belgian armed forces. (Page 3)
Iraq: A renewal of assassinations in Mosul, presumably
against Communists, has caused concern to security authori-
ties there,
The Communist press in Baghdad has been
complaining for some time about murders of "patriots" in the
Mosul and Kirkuk regions. Slowly, but apparently methodically,
Communist leaders in the regions are being eliminated by venge-
ful nationalist elements. (Page 4)
Lebanon: Saib Salam's 18-man cabinet, the largest in
Lebanese history, formed on 2 August represents nearly every
hue of the Lebanese political spectrum, including several pro-
Nasir extremists. If the wide disparity of views represented
in the cabinet inhibits effective operation of the government, a
drift toward military control could result. While President
Shihab's recent one-day "resignation" appears to have increased
his prestige and influence, the new cabinet will be a test of his
continued control.
III. THE WEST
Dominican Republic: The resignation of President Hector
Trujillo, brother of the dictator, and the elevation to the presi-
dency of Vice President Balaguer seems another step in the
4 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF
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dictator's efforts to create a more favorable atmosphere prior
to the 16 August meeting of foreign ministers of the OAS to hear
Venezuelan charges against the Dominican Republic. However,
only the removal of the dictator, his family, and close cohorts
is likely to mollify the hatred of the Trujillo dictatorship inside
the Dominican Republic as well as elsewhere in the hemisphere.
(Page 5)
IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to
initiate hostilities, the Watch Committee conclusions remain nega-
tive.
4 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF Page iii
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SINO.BURMESE BORDER AREA
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Burma andtw6mmunist China Nearing Final rder Settlement
The Sino-Burmese joint boundary committee apparently has
reached agreement on the main points at issue in the long-stand-
ing border dispute between the two countries.
Peiping has accepted the Burmese definition of the extent of
territory to be ceded to China in the Hpimaw area of the Kachin
State in return for Rangoon's acceptance of China's more modest
territorial demands farther south in the Wa States.
China had originally asked for the return of the Nam-
wan Tract, which had been under perpetual lease to Burma
dating back to the period of British rule, but subsequently agreed
to accept compensatory territory in the Wa States in return for
granting Burma clear title to Namwano China had also sought
about 100 square miles more in the Hpimaw area than it appears
to have gained.
The joint boundary committee will soon begin drafting the
final boundary treaty, which will possibly be ready for signa-
ture during Premier Nu's Contemplated visit to Peiping this
October. Even though small territorial concessions have been
made to China, the Burmese will view a final settlement on
these terms as a triumph for their government in that China
will have settled for much less than it could plausibly have
claimed. A final settlement will remove the single most im-
portant source of friction between Burma and China, and will
almost certainly increase Burmese receptivity to any new Chi-
nese Communist economic and political initiatives.
Peiping, anxious to counter adverse Asian reaction to its
difficulties with India, Nepal, and Indonesia, is publicizing
progress toward the treaty as evidence of its observance of the
Bandung principles of peaceful coexistence. For the past 18
months Peiping's propaganda has been holding up Sino-Burmese
relations as a model for those with China's Asian neighbors.
Chou En-lai on 1 August hailed Burma as the non-Communist
country "always in the lead" in expressing friendliness toward
China, pointing out that it was the first to conclude a treaty of
friendship and nonaggression and will be the first to sign a
boundary treaty with China. In commentary clearly directed
toward India, the Chinese Communists point to the progress of
the talks as proof that complicated boundary questions can be
settled through peaceful negotiations provided the governments
and leaders are mutually willing.
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Peiping Conciliatory Toward Nepal's Protests
Premier Chou En-lai has answered Nepalese Prime Min-
ister Koirala's protest of 11 July over Chinese border activi-
ties with three separate communications designed to mollify
Katmandu and smooth the way for the joint border commission
talks scheduled to begin on 8 August. Anti-Chinese sentiment
in Nepal has not subsided, and Peiping appears eager to deny
India the opportunity to point to incidents along the Sino-Nepali
border as proof of China's aggressiveness.
Chou again denied that Chinese troops had entered Nepal
and said that ICoirala was "misinformed" over reports of recent
incursions of Chinese on photographic and survey missions.
Nepali officials said Chou did offer "profuse apologies" for the
action of Chinese troops in extracting "confessions" from ten
Nepali villagers captured at the time of the 27 June incident
in the Mustang-area, however, and stated that troops had been
entirely withdrawn from the demilitarized zone.
As an additional conciliatory gesture, the first Chinese
ambassador resident in Katmandu arrived on 2 August.
ICoirala has welcomed Peiping's conciliatory moves, al-
though he continues to contend that the recent incident took place
on the Nepalese side of the border. In reply to critics inparlia-
ment who urged a tougher policy toward China, Koirala has cited
Peiping's apology, its prompt payment of compensation, and
its withdrawal, of troops from the demilitarized zone, as well
as the pending border commission meetings, as more im-
portant than the precise determination of the locale of the
Mustang incident.
ernov-Ept-T-m+-
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Tshombe Opposes Projected UN Occupation of Katanga
Strong Belgian reaction to Hammarskjold's announcement
of the imminent entry of UN troops into Katanga may stiffen
Tshombe's opposition to this move and force a delay in UN plans.
This would further complicate the position of Dr. Bunche in
negotiations with Tshombe, although Tshotribe is unlikely, to
maintain his stand for full independence for Katanga. Dr. Bunche
is scheduled to go to Elisabethville on 5 August. Tshombe, who
probably has no more than 500 trained non-Belgian troops at
his command, has previously indicated his willingness to re-
join the Congo if it is reorganized as a confederation with a
high degree of provincial autonomy.
Brussels' stated willingness to withdraw its forces in
Katanga to its main base there, and to cooperate with the
UN occupation of Katanga, appears to be in part a response to
Western pressure. It will seriously impair the position of
Tshombe, who is confronted with internal pressures for the
maintenance of order and for reunification with the Lumumba
government. Tshombe's parliamentary opposition has denounced
his secession from the Congo and dissociated itself from as-
sembly activities. At the same time, Belgian financial interests
in Katanga are already hard hit by a decline of confidence in the
Congo franc and by a 70- to 80-percent decline in business activity
and are unlikely to encourage Tshombe in any unpromising mili-
tary ventures.
Belgian officials reportedly accept "in principle" the need
for a total military withdrawal from the Congo. Brussels ap-
pears to be moving toward such an evacuation, although the
Belgians may attempt to negotiate with the Lumumba govern-
ment for the retention of one or more of Belgium's three Congo
bases to which they have withdrawn their forces. The Belgian
cabinet is particularly sensitive to Belgian public opinion con-
cerning any appeasement of the Lumumba government. The UN
command in Leopoldville reportedly plans to send white con-
tingents to KatgaJnan effort to reassure the 15, 000 Europeans
still there.
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Communist Leaders Being Murdered in Northern Iraq
A renewal of assassinations in Mosul, presumably of
Communists, has caused concern to security authorities
there,
For the past two months there
has been a series of political killings of Communists in the
Mosul-Kirkuk area. The perpetrators have been either anti-
Communist nationalists or members of families who lost
relatives at the hands of the Communists during the reign of
terror which followed the Mosul revolt in March 1959. These
two groups appear to have joined forces in a campaign to elim-
inate Communist leadership in the area.
The Communist press in Baghdad has complained about
a continuous series of anti-Communist incidents which have
occurred without police censure in the Kirkuk-Mosul area.
On one occasion the Baghdad Communist paper Ittihad al-
Shaab listed 20 attacks on Communist "patriots"--burning of
shops, woundings, assassinations, beatings, bombings, and
arrests, and interference with union elections by the authori-
ties. assassinations of Com-
munists have averaged 22 a month for the past several months.
Iraqi security authorities appear to have been ignoring at-
tacks on Communists and making arrests among the party's
supporters,
police had discovered papers in the home of one
Communist which "reveal the existence of a plan for thepetro-
leum union to take over the pasr. Petroleum Company."
a Communist meeting in Baghdad
it was said to be "the duty of the party" to assassinate prominent
anti-Communists.
the Iraqi director of security has ordered "strict
surveillance" of the I "orthodox" Communists.
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Brother of Dominican Dictator Resigns From Presidency
The resignation of President Hector Trujillo�brother of
the dictator Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo--and the elevation
of Vice President Joaquin l3alaguer to the presidency seems
to be another effort to create a more favorable attitude toward
the Dominican Government among western hemisphere nations
before the OAS foreign ministers' meeting on 16 August. The
regime has also released approximately fifty imprisoned dissi-
dents and two leaders of the January plot against the regime,
and has issued a last-minute invitation to an OAS Commission
to visit the Dominican Republic to investigate Venezuela's
charge that Trujillo sponsored the attempted assassination
of President Betanc:ourt on 24 June, The Generalissimo prob-
ably is convinced that the United States and most OAS mem-
ber nations will recommend some form of multilateral action
against the Dominican Government after their foreign minis-
ters meet to consider Venezuela's charges that his dictator-
ship is guilty of aggression.
A government-controlled newspaper reported on 3 August
that Generalissimo Trujillo has given up his office in the Na-
tional Palace in favor of a private office elsewhere. However,
only the complete removal from the scene of the dictator, his
family, and close cohorts is likely to mollify the hatred of the
Trujillo dictatorship inside the country as well as elsewhere in
the hemisphere. The dissidents are known to associate Bala-
guer with atrocities carried out against enemies of the regime.
the Goner lissimo, envisioning
sanctions and boycotts by the OAS,is planning a false and blood-
less revolt by military officers loyal to him. A false revolt, how-
ever, could e sily result in genu-
ine revolt. General "Ramfis" Trujillo- -the dictator's son�re-
portedly left the Dominic n Republic on 27 July to live in Switzer-
land.
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NigIre
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CON I
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