CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03184152
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 14, 1959

Approved6Rte4TigGiW184152
Nose
14 October 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN Cl
DECLASS/Fla)
CLASS. CHANGED TO: -7.1 SoiA
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
Aurvi
DATE _
-
TOP SECRET
Approvedf6r -20-26/0-2/1-033-18-415i/
riFWIEWER:
Approvedfor RTlea";770752/21 C03184152
41001
'Noe
TAP FfRFT
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
14 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev indicates concern that
his claims of reduced tensions may
lead Russians to expect rapid improve-
ment in living conditions.
Moscow moves against "bourgeois
nationalism" in Kazakhstan.
Khrushchev tells Nehru he hopes for
cordial Sino-Indian relations; Nehru
wary of Chinese unpredictability.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Chinese Communists refuse to issue
joint communiqu�ith Nepal on bor-
der problems.
Pakistani and Turkish leaders seeking
meeting with Shah of Iran, apparently
In effort to strengthen CENT�.
I/
0
//
�
,
0 Venezuelan disorders apparently no
threat to Pr...aident Betancourt's posi-
tion.
LATE ITEM
USSR�ICBM test firing over extended
ralve expected at Tvura Tam within
next few days.
'rrn o rr. 0 yr
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
VA
/1'6
I;
Ok
�Approved for Release: 2020/02/21
��./ IL
'40.1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
C03184152
fie
14 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Khrushchev's speeches during his recent tour of
Siberia reflect concern that the Soviet people may come to
believe that his US visit has so reduced world-wide tensions
that they can expect a rapid improvement in living conditions.
Nevertheless, the moderate tone of his speeches, the omis-
sion of references to Berlin and other potentially critical sit-
uations, and his assertion that the visit produced a warmer
international climate, have presumably conveyed the impres-
sion that a new nhae in US-Soviet relations is under way.
(Page 1)
USSR: Soviet Kazakhstan is the latest target in Moscow's
campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" in the minority re-
publics. The appointment of former KGB first deputy chairman
Konstantin Lunev as Kazakh secret police chief follows closely
the publication of an article in the authoritative party journal
Kommunist calling for new measures to combat Kazakh nation-
alism. Persistent unrest in the central Asian republic is al-
legedly being fostered by young intellectuals who object to
Russian influence over their language and culture and who
glorify the ancient Moslem traditions and customs. Moscow
has accused some Kazakh officials of "putting the interests of
Kazakhstan in opposition to those of the Soviet Union as a whole."
In recent months, similar tendencies have led to major per-
sonnel shake-ups in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbavdzhan;
shake-ups have also occurred in Belorussia and Moldavia.
Soviet Union - India - China!
TOP SECRET
A,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152/
IA
4, �
�Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
%ad
tjo
the USSR appreciated the "salutary steps taken by India" in
withdrawing "several border outposts" which were found to be
outside Indian territory and added that the USSR hoped China wi
follow suit and maintain peace with India. Nehru is reliably re-
ported to feel that even if the present crisis is solved there will
be no lasting accord2 as "the Chinese mind is unpredictab1e:9
(Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Communist China - Nepal: Communist China has antago-
nized a Nepalese delegation which had come to Peiping to suggest
talks 9n formal riemnreatinn of the hnrder hetureen the two nun-
tries.
Peiping reneged on an agreement made verbally by Chou
En-lai and refused to become publicly committed in a joint corn-
muniqud which would agree to the traditional Nepal-Tibet boun-
dary as a basis for negotiation. The Nepalese were planning to
leave Peiping on 13 October.
Peipingb, tactics toward Nepal are similar to those employed
toward Burma and India, with the Chinese giving friendly assur-
ances of readiness to negotiate border issues in general but stall-
ing on specific details and blocking efforts for a quick settlement.
(Page 3)
� Pakistan-Turkey-Iran: IESArachi and Ankara are trying to ar-
range a meeting in early November between the Shah of hams,
Pakistani President Ayub, and Turkish President Bayar or Prime
Minister Menderes, The Pakistanis and Turks are deeply con-
cerned over Iran, which they regard as the weak link in CENTO.
They feel the necessity of strengthening the Shah's confidence and
sense of solidarity by stressing their determination to cooperate
in building up CENTO to resist Soviet pressures and threats. They
may also wish to discuss problems relating to Afghanistan and in-
creasing Soviet activity there...3-
(Page 4)
14 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF
11
4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152/
A
4 "Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3184152
III, THE WEST
F(�
Venezuela: The broad political and labor support which
quickly rallied to the Venezuelan Government after its arrests
on 12 October of 40 persons for conspiratorial activity sug-
gests that President Betancourt is not seriously threatened at
this time. The arrests followed a series of bombings in Caracas
beginning 9 October. The bombings came at a time when the
public is uneasy over labor contract negotiations in the oil in-
dustry, uncertainty over the economic outlook, recent rumors
of plotting by both civilian and military groups and some fric-
tion among the three parties in the coalition. (Page 5)
LATE ITEM
*USSR: he USSR is expected to conduct a test firing of an
ICBM over an extended range from Tyura Tam within the n
few days. Such a test is indicated by weather reporting at
Myuchi, flights by Soviet aircraft, and operations of three
EE,.ir-class missile range instrumentation ships. At least
two of these ships are now located about 1,200-1,400 miles south-,
east of the usual Kamchatka impact area on an approximate great
circle extension of the Tyura Tam test range. This would be the
first direct support to be provided by these vessels in a test-
ICBM launching;/
14 Oct 59
V.
DAILY BRIEF iii
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031841527 A
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
.� � 49, JIM � � ��� .16.,
vase
vire
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Cautions Soviet People Against Overoptimism
Resulting From US Trip
The chief purpose of Khrushchev's five speeches during
his recent tour of Siberia apparently has been to define the
ideological and practical limits of current US-Soviet rela-
tions. Recent lectures and press articles by other members
of the Khrushchev delegation to the US also seem to have had
the same general purpose.
Khrushchev appears to be concerned lest the Soviet people
get the impression that his visit has so reduced world-Wide ten-
sions that they now can expect a rapid and substantial improve-
ment in living conditions. His injunctions about the need for hard
work and his pessimistic remarks on price reductions and pri-
vate ownership of automobiles make it clear that higher living
standards will not be achieved easily. Similarly, his frequent
reaffirmation of the superiority of "socialism" and references
to "forces" at work in the US for continuing the cold war put
the Soviet people on notice that the regime does not intend to
make ideological compromises.
Khrushchev's speech in Krasnoyarsk, published on 11 October,
is of particular interest. It is more tendentious in tone than his
other recent statements and, for the first time since the US visit,
omits favorable comment on President Eisenhower. Further,
his reference to the "poison of bourgeois ideas" seems to pre-
clude the possibility of a significant breakthrough on the ex-
change of press and radio information and may even presage a
resumption of intensive Soviet jamming of the Voice of America.
However, the generally moderate tone of Khrushchev's
speeches, the omission of references to Berlin and other po-
tentially critical situations, and his admission that the visit
produced a warmer international climate, have presumably con-
veyed the impression to the Soviet people that a new phase in US-
Soviet relations is under way.
CONFIDENTIAL
14 Oct 59
Ik morn � I 11.1.....11 1 1".1-1k /al di I r...ra�
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003184152
Nee
Khrushchev Letter to Nehru on oipo-inalan tsorde/ Dispute
th upon appreciatea tne "salutary steps taken by India" in
withdrawing "several border outposts" which were found to be
outside of Indian territory and added that the USSR hoped China
would follow suit and maintain peace with India. These expres-
sions of good will are consistent with the stand maintained both
publicly and privately during the course of the current dispute
by the USSR, which is trying to soft-pedal the issue as much
as possible to minimize the damage to its long-standing policy
of fostering Nehru's "benevolent neutralisin2.7
(N_ehru informed Mukhitdinov that India would tolerate no
further border incursions, probably in the hope that the warn-
ing would persuade Soviet leaders to continue to exercise a re-
straining influence on the Chinese. The Chinese, for their part,
have repeatedly stated their willingness to negotiate, but have as
yet made no move in that direction:j
(1ST-6hp' and Prasad reportedly agreed that even if
the present crisis is resolved there will be no lasting accord on
the Sino-Indian border problem, and therefore future arrange
mentsforkontier.security will have to be made.
Indian Army strength in the northeast
frontier region, which now comprises more than two divisions,
could be reinforced if necessarYD
SECRET
14 Oct 59
r=kITD A I IkITC1 I 1/"�Dkle'D DI II I DT11.1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003184152
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
S
a
Name
Communist China Balks on Border Communique With Nepal
A Nepalese delegation to Peiping left for Katmandu on 13
October: apparently miffed because Communist China would not
sign a joint communique accepting the "traditional boundary" as
a basis for negotiating the border between Nepal and Tibet. The
Nepalese felt that the Chinese, by refusing to sign, had reneged
on Chou En-lai's 9 October verbaLagreement to accept this po-
sition for negotiating purposes.
The text of the proposed communique is not available, but
Peiping previously has avoided public statements which could be
construed as accepting another nationb, version of ill-defined
boundaries. Thus, while Chou's comments probably were intended
to reassure the Nepalese, the Chinese may have felt the wording
Insisted on by the delegation was too definitive of the "traditional
boundary" and possibly prejudicial to Peiping's present stand on
the Indian border question. Chou's original offer to send a border
negotiating team to Nepal probably will not be withdrawn, although
initiative to get talks started appears to be back with the Nepalese.
Nepal's Prime Minister Koirala had not expected much in the
way of border definition from the delegation's visit and is not
likely to be too surprised by Peiping's tactics. However, he will
probably continue to insist that the traditional border be used as
a basis for any negotiation, and he also is likely to stall on Chou's
offer of Chinese technicians to help set up a cement plant and paper
mill under the provisions of Peiping's 1956 technical aid agreement
with Nepal.
TOP SECRET
14 Oct 59
rrmTo Al IMTPI I irtrmrc RI II I CTIkl
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
Nue,
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Pakistani and Turkish Leaders,See Need to Reassure Shah
Of Iran
,rachi and Ankara are trying to arrange a meeting between
the Shah of Iran, Pakistani President Ayub, and Turkish President
Bayar or Prime Minister Menderes in early November. The
Pakistanis and Turks consider Iran the weak link in the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) and feel the necessity of strengthen-
ing the Shah's confidence and sense of solidarity by stressing their
determination to cooperate in building up CENTO's ability to resist
Soviet pressures and threats. They probably fear that without
periodic assurances the Shah may reopen negotiations with the
USSR to obtain aid and bring about the cessation of hostile Soviet
radio propaganda:3
tihe Shah would probably be pleased with such a meeting,
which would enhance his prestige both at home and abroad.]
EBoth the Pakistani and Iranian governments wish to secure
more military aid through CENTO and may discuss ways of co-
ordinating their policies to this end. All three countries probably
also want to discuss problems connected with Afghanistan. They
have shown concern over the USSR's increasing activity in Afghanistan
and apparently fear the development of a Soviet threat from that
direction. Turkey is interested in expanding its military training
assistance to Afghanistan, while Iran is concerned over Kabul's
refusal to agree to Iranian demands regarding the division of
waters of the Helmand River. Karachi is annoyed over Kabul's
stepped-up attacks on its "suppression" of the tribes Of. Pushtoon-
istkij
..)47opaganda warfare between the two has reached a new intensity,
and a by-product of the proposed meeting may be a sharpening of
Afghanistan's sense of isolation from its two free-world neighbors,
Iran and Pakistan with who
14 Oct 59
'Approved 'for'iReie-a's'e72-62.076-2/ii C63164.152 Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
Nay, Nur
III. THE: WEST
Venezuelan Government Moves Against Conspirators
The Venezuelan Government on 12 October arrested 40
persons�allegedly followers of former dictator Perez--for
conspiratorial activity. This move followed a series of
bombings in Caracas which began on 9 October. They came
at a time when the government is under pressure because of
unrest over the negotiations for a new contract in the oil in-
dustry, rumors of plotting by civilian and military groups,
some friction among the three parties in the coalition, and un-
certainty over the economic outlook. However, the broad po-
litical and labor backing, including Communist, which quickly
rallied to support President Betancourt suggests that the sta-
bility of his regime is not seriously threatened at this time.
Moreover, plotting in the armed forces thus far probably has
not succeeded in winning substantial military or civilian back-
ing.
On the other hand, Betancourt is threatened with labor
strife--which Communists might attempt to spread--in the
event the oil workers' federation does not reach a satisfactory
agreembnt with the oil industry, on which the government and
economy are largely dependent. A prolonged strike against the
oil companies accompanied by violence could serve as a pre-
text for an attempted military take-over of the government.
14 Oct 59
rCkITD Al IkITGI I ir�ekie�e bull rTiki
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
lk-A-1.011.11/1-,11 If 1 I L�L L.d
'ftpie
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184152
4