CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03184093
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 9, 1961

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
%Or acumc
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
9 March 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
N'alir-
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Iwo TOP SECRET
LATE ITEM
USSR: Sputnik IX was launched from Tyura Tam at about
0629 GMT (0119,EST) 9 March 1961. The period of the orbit
appears to be about ninety minutes. Preliminary data re-
ceived suggests the satellite may be similar to Sputnik V and
VI.which both carried dogs as part of the payload. Sputnik V
was successfully recovered on 20 August 1960 after about 25
hours in space while Sputnik VI burned up on re-entry prob-
ably during a recovery attempt.
It is probable that the Soviets will attempt
a recovery of Sputnik IX within about 24 hours.
TOP SECRET
A
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
r
'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3184093
; lifidSECRET
�sod
9 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in the Congo. (Page t)
2. India: Nehru believes Khrushchev attempting to iso-
late New Delhi from African neutralists. (Page t)
3. Burma: General Ne Win to visit USSR, (Page ti)
4. West Germany: Adenauer cool to Brandt in meeting
prior to latter's visit to US. (Page ti)
5. West Germany: Bonn may be less forthcoming in
financial negotiations with US following currency re-
valuation. (Page Li)
Communist China: Peiping postpones program to
communize Tibet. (Page lit)
7. Rumania: Local disturbances and peasant dissatisfac-
tion reported in southern Rumania. (Page tit)
8. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page iii)
-SEeltEr
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
" Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Banan
Brazzaville
1,4 Luanda
31594 D
9 Mar 61
MALAYA
150
Gemena
IN
1,150
TUNISIA
MALAYA,:
6 tQL
MOBUTU
Scattered _Forces
(7)1-4_/i r/VILLE,
Leopoldvill-e
ysviUe
MOROCCO
ANA
1,?00
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
EZ:1 Kalonji
Tshombe
United Nations Forces
_
7.172:: Selected railroad
Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
STATUTE MILES
a I
1001
of the Congo
MOBOTLT
lt6OZ
-t FrancqUI,
uluabourg
Bakw
Basoko
�
Luputa
.0pala
LIBERIA
Usurnbura
TnnqC,T,",
iileyville
El HP PIA
E HIOPI
NIGERIA
Kongolo
At
NIGERIA
Elisa hv Ile
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
orat...nr,
Noe
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
9 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Congo: Tshomb4 has so far held the center of the stage
at the Tananarive conference. He is apparently playing on the
general opposition of the participants to the UN in an attempt -/r)
to create a united front and bring about increased military co- jetAP
operation. Mobutu is still touring Equateur Province. In re- tr,(1) 5,1
sponse to repeated urging from Leopoldville officials, he has
reportedly agreed to launch an attack against Orientale Prov-
ince, However, EVIobutu remains reluctant to undertake the 7
operation. Moreover, the troops that he had brought into Equa-
teur, except for 800 in Bumba, have been disDersed in small
units and will be difficult to reassemblel
a visiting Ghanaian
delegation agreed that arms now in Cairo would be sent to
Gizenga via Accra. The details of this agreement have appar-
ently not yet been worked out. (Backup,
Page 1) (Map)
India-USSR: Eehru apparently has interpreted Khrushchev's
recent letters on the Congo and UN reorganization problems as
a deliberate attempt to isolate India from the leading African neu-
tralists and thus counter New Delhi's restraining influence. For-
eign Secretary Dutt reportedly described Nehru in early March as
irritated and puzzled by the Soviet leader's unusual action in pub-
licly expressing flat disagreement with Indian positions. Dutt
characterized Khrushchev's proposal that the UN operation in
the Congo be replaced by an African commission as a personal
affront to Nehru, since the prime minister had already made his
contrary position clear to Moscow. New Delhi apparently belieupj
-TOP 5ECRE-
/4�
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO3184093
VOYP�SfeRE-T--
PA
at a recent proposal of further economic aid from Soviet
First Deputy Premier Kosygin implies an attempt to black-
ail the Indian Government into changing its independent
olicies. Nehru probably is also concerned that Indo-Soviet
friction will make it more difficult for New Delhi to pursue
its tactic of trying to play off Moscow against' Peinince-)
Burma- SR: General Ne Win will visit Moscow for two
weeks beginning 30 March,
While Ne Win in the past has been opposed to the procurement
of Soviet military equipment, he reportedly now feels American
influence in the army is "excessive."
(Backup, Page 3)
West Germany: aloth Chancellor Adenauer and West Ber-
lin Mayor Brandt apparently intend to use their forthcoming
visits to the United States to enhance their positions with the
West German public prior to the election campaign this fall.
In preparation for his visit, scheduled to begin 11 March,
Brandt met with Adenauer on 1 March. Adenaueris reception
of Brandt was formally correct but "frigid." He avoided giving
Brandt any guidance for his trip, indicating that he now regards
him strictly as a political riv.�,
(Backup,. Page 4)
West Germany: American officials in Bonn believe that
as a consequence of the 4 March revaluation of the mark, West
Germany may be less forthcoming in current financial negotia-
tions with the US on debt prepayment and military orders. On
the question of aid to underdeveloped areas, the Bonn cabinet
seems to be near agreement that future German contributions
should be limited to one percent of the gross national product,
or approximately $700,000,000 at the 1960 rate. According to
embassy officials, the primary factor in the decision to revalue
the currency was the sudden realization that the government
and central bank were unable by other means to cope with grow-
ing inflationary pressures only six months before national
9 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
m
OP SECRET
A
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Ers P SECRET
,golOr
elections. Embassy officials do not believe the move will
have a lasting impact on West Germany's trade or balance
of payments and expect that the only significant effect will
be short-term money movements in which foreign specula-
tors will withdraw funds to take their profits.
Communist China: 'ale Chinese Communists have post-
poned their program of communizing Tibet in the face of per-
sistent opposition there. The Tibetans have been told that �cob/
further "reforms" have been deferred for four years. In ad- 1-,Apt
dition, some of the land
already collectivized is being returned to its former owners, -
political indoctrination meetings have been suspended, pri-
vate trade is being resumed on a small scale, and harassment
of religious activities has been halted. Internal Chinese prob-
lems, particularly food shortages, probably contributed to the
regime's decision against committing the resources and man-
power needed to force the Tibetans into the Communist mold
at this ti! ej (Backup, Page 6)
Rumania:
several isolated local disturbances resulting from
peasant dissatisfaction have taken place in the past month in
southern Rumania. These difficulties apparently are caused
by peasant opposition to the regime's program for agricultural
collectivization and compulsory purchase of livestock. In one
local demonstration, several militiamentwere rumored killed
or wounded. The reported unrest is reminiscent of similar
outbreaks in .eastern R 58, which the regime was
readily able to control. (Backup, Page 7)
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
A. No change from last week.
9 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
6.)11
-�"�51.
-;727
�-gz ,
Aft,
� : '7;4
*11
'W4F
/
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
�416P�SfeRET INS
B. No change from last week.
C. In Laos, Communist attacks at the Phou Khoun road junc-
tion do not appear to have been planned as the start of a
major counteroffensive against government forces, but
Communist success in this instance may lead them to seek
further limited military gains.
D. Significant political compromises among the factions in
the Congo in the near future appear unlikely while Gizenga
continues to have reason to hope for outside support. The
probable replacement of Dayal may permit a less partisan
and more effective UN operation in the Congo and will re-
move one of the obstacles to the return of UN forces to
Matadi and Banana. The deteriorating economy and rapidly
growing inflation in the Congo could lead to disorders.
9 Mar :61
DAILY BRIEF iv
�Ter SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
SPOP SECRE1
Situation in the Congo
dikrumah's 7 March General Assembly speech, in which
he called for a strengthening of the UN under a "primarily"
African command, further modifies his earlier proposals
which would have excluded European units in the UN force
and would have put Asians in a subordinate role. He told
American officials earlier in the day that his desires would
be met with the designation of an African or Asian as UN mil-
itary commander and some increase in Afro-Asian member-
ship in the UN staffs. He presented these proposals which
may have originated with General Alexander, the British com-
mander of the Ghanaian army as a means for stimulating a
willingness among uncommitted nations to contribute troo_p_s27
Mobutu reportedly is unhappy over the failure of civilian
officials in Leopoldville to consult him before setting up the
Ileo government. He apparently is traveling around Equateur,
his home province, paying little attention to political develop-
ments. He has reorganized the upper echelons of his command
in an attempt to strengthen his control and may ask Belgium to
provide him with military advisers who could serve with his
forces as "civilian" technicians. Plans for his military opera-
tion into Orientale envisage the capture of the gasoline supplies
at Aketi, with Stanleyville a possible second objective. Mobutu
reportedly is approaching the operation "like a sheep going to
slaughter"; he seems to believe he will be killed during the
campaign. Furthermore, no attempt has been made to keep
up training or increase discipline]
the Ileo government,meanwhile, has sent the UN a proposal
for reorganizing the Congolese army, according to the American
embassy in Leopoldville. Although the Congolese suggestions are
carefully hedged to retain final Congolese control over the pro-
gram, their substance is fairly moderate. The proposals envis-
age establishment of a joint UN-Congolese defense council, headed
by a "neutral" officer responsible to Kasavubu. The message also
expresses the Leopoldville government's willingness to permit the
UN to begin with the reorganization of Mobutu's troops, provided
firm agreements are made for similar steps to be taken with
other Congolese forces. There is no indication that these pro-
posals would be accepted by the troops concerned, who ar9
TOP-SECRET
9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Nirri
TOP SECRET
Glready wary of possible disarmament moves and who are
largely unresponsive to civilian authorityji
the Soviet Gov-
ernment has asked permission to transport 3,000 tons of gas-
oline by rail across Kenya and Uganda for shipment into areas
in the Congo loyal to Gizenga. No other information is avail-
able concerning this request. If Gizenga should receive petro-
leum products through this channel, one key aspect of Mobutu's
blockade of Orientale Province would be broken. Uganda offi-
cials comment that such a shipment could not legally be denied
if payment is arranged outside of East Africa; however, the
British in Kenya and Uganda are unlikely to permit its passage
unimpedeaj
The US ambassador in Khartoum has been assured by high
Sudanese officials that the Sudan, despite its recent statements
critical of the UN and its withdrawal of troops from the Congo,
will not change its position regarding denial of transit rights for
movements into the Congo not under UN auspices3
, �
CDR first contingents of Indian troops are being readied
for a scheduled departure from New Delhi on 14 March en route
to Leopoldville. The airlift is to be completed during the follow-
ing two weeks. New Delhi now is planning to send a brigade group,
which with 3,000 infantry troops and supporting units will total
4,731 men3
�
r_t_lh Gizenga has expressed,
is displeasure with the passive attitude taken by the
Ghanaian UN force in Luluabourg at the time of the abortive in-
cursion into that area by Stanleyville troops. Gizenga complained
that he had expected active support from the Ghanaian command
and considers himself betrayed by its failure to assist in secur-
ing control of the area for Stanleyville. He asked for clarifica-
tion of Nkrumah's position, evidently in an effort to determine
how much reliance he can place on arrangements to use Accra
as a transshipment noint for moving arms from the UAR to
Stanleyvillej
TOP SECRET
9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Burma May Obtain Soviet Arms
there have been persistent rumors of projected Burmese
arms purchases from the Soviet Union, including an unsubstan-
tiated press report of a $20,000,000 purchase agreemeatg
al. 1957 a military purchasing mission carried on negotia-
tions with European satellite governments but failed to obtain
satisfactory terms for the materiel they sought. With the ex-
ception of small quantities of Czech small arms and transport
equipment for the military police, the army is equipped largely
with British materiel, supplemented by supplies from Israel,
Japan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Under a 1958 contract, Burma
has purchased much of its modern materiel from the United
States and negotiations are under way for extending these pur-
chase_
although the bloc was not responsive to Burmese efforts
to obtain military supplies in 1957, since early 1960 it has
made extensive efforts to build up its economic relations with
Burma and, in connection with this economic offensive, there
have been several efforts to introduce military equipmeng
Efn,January 1960 the Soviet Union presented Burma with
"samples" of small arms--from carbines to heavy machine
guns--and General Ne Win has had a standing invitation to
visit Moscow as a state :vest since his resignation as prime
minister in April 1960. he projected military mission to
Moscow, which Ne Win apparently will lead, reportedly is be-
ing sent at the invitation of the Soviet Governmen9 Burma's
current irritation over the Chinese Nationalist irregulars and
their supplies of allegedly American materiel w7ld also make
the Burmese more willing to accept Soviet arm,s]
9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
"s CONFIDENTIAL
Brandt Seeking Enhanced Prestige in US Trip
aandt reportedly hopes to use his forthcoming visit
to the United States to enhance his prestige in the West
German political campaign this fall by "proving" to the
German electorate that he is on a par with Adenauer in
dealing with the United States and that American leaders
accept him as a possible chancellor. Brandt also seeks
to impress US officials that they have nothing to fear from
him as chancellor. The least he hopes to achieve is a
neutral US attitude toward the election outcome:)
L�I'D leaders are worried over the damaging effect of
the current CDU smear tactics against Brandt, because
he spent most of the war fighting in the Norwegian underground
against the Nazis. He is being assailed for deserting the
fatherland and returning to Germany in a foreign uniform.
His illegitimate birth, as well as his change of name during
the Nazi period, has also come under heavy CDU fir_q
an response to Brandt's complaint to Adenauer about
these attacks, the chancellor replied that he regretted them
but was not responsible for them and that a political cam-
paign is "rough and difficult to control.
[-Brandt's close associates are also worried over his
failure to win complete support of SPD elements who have
in the past opposed his independent political thinking and
complained over his failure to win the SPD many votes in
last fall's local elections.)
atheir meeting, Chancellor Adenauer said that
Foreign Minister von Brentano had given him a fairly
gloomy report on the "increasingly negative" attitude of the
American press and people toward Germany. Adenauer
said, however, that he did not believe the situation to be as
bad as pictured by several opposition Socialist leaders who
recently visited the United States. The chancellor also in-
dicated that he considered the Berlin situation "very serious,"
in view of the Soviet intention to push for an interim solution
9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
CONFIDENTIAL -too
((->n Berlin this year and Soviet insistence that Berlin be
dealt with apart from other East-West issues]
Vhile in the United States Brandt will make a conscious
attempt to demonstrate that he is more flexible on the Ber-
lin question than is Adenauer, whom he has often criticized
for failing to take a sufficiently strong stand in defense of the
city's interests. He has cited specifically Bonn's reluctance
to continue annual Bundestag meetings in West Berlin. Brandt
firmly believes that West Berlin's interests must be consid-
ered in any negotiations on'the city's future, and will
to reserve the right to approve any future solutions)
CONFIDENTIAL
9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Socialization of Tibet Postponed Again
[Peiping's postponement of socialization in Tibet marks
the second time that the Communists have had to suspend
their program for transforming Tibetan society. The first,
announced in February 1957, was presented as a six-year
moratorium reversing the programs set in motion a year
earlier with the establishment by Peiping of the Prepara,-
tory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. This pe-
riod of grace came to an abrupt end in 1959 with the Tibetan
uprising and Peiping's subsequent decision to Sinicize Tibet
as quickly as possible. Implementation of this decision in-
cluded the introduction of numbers of Chinese into Tibet as
well as a new attempt to impose socialist "reforms." Fol-
lowing the same general pattern as was used within China,
the Communists plunged into a program of land reform,
moving from that to mutual-aid teams and cooperatives.
Efforts were also made to halt private trade and weaken
the Lamaist Church7
Eoespite Peiping's claim that the Tibetans eagerly ac-
cepted these changes, the regime now acknowledges that
"too many errors" were committed by Chinese and Tibetan
cadres, intimating that their highhanded practices aroused
a good deal of wrath among the public. The Tibetans are
also disgruntled by local food shortages as serious as those
plaguing China itself. In addition, the imposition of Chinese
will on a recalcitrant populace is made difficult by Tibet's
position at the end of a very long supply line. This line is
all the harder to maintain as a result of the current fuel
shortage in Ching
the regime is making it clear that the retreat is
only tactical. Tibetans are being told by Peiping that the
political need for reforms persists, and the likelihood is
that the process of socializing Tibet will be started again
whenever the circumstances are deemed favorable, even if
the promised four-vear grace period has not elapsed
CONFIDENTIAL
9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
l'uLeeNFf0E-N-T-I*L--
Peasant Unrest in Rumania
While the Rumanian populace, with the exception of the
Hungarian minority in Transylvania, has been passive to-
ward the Communist regime, the peasants have, on occasion,
maintained a more independent position and the government
has moved somewhat more slowly than most other East
European states in collectivization. There are rumors that
peasants in the Arges and Oltenia regions of southern Ruma-
nia have petitioned for authority to withdraw from collectives,
made a series of oral complaints about agricultural policies,
and conducted public demonstrations.
The regime's recent actions tend to support these rumors.
Party leader Gheorghiu-Dej and politburo members Borila
and Ceausescu visited Arges region from 16 to 17 February
on a tour which the American Legation speculates may have
been a reflection of official concern over developments in the
area. On 28 February, the regime promulgated a liberalized
resolution dealing with the purchase of cattle in a move which
may have been designed to minimize popular discontent over
the compulsory sale of livestock to the state. Furthermore,
the regime, after initially pushing its collectivization vigor-
ously in the early part of this winter, has slowed down its
efforts during the, past month.
Five separate trip requests by US diplomatic officials
for travel to the areas of reported unrest were refused
during the period from 24 February to 6 March, although
this may have been because of military activities.
CONFIDENTIAL
9 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
A.% A 1. yr. v Imr v pry I
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
Nwod um,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIA L
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03184093
y i itz ./zzrzzzzzzz