CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/01/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03182293
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: January 13, 1958

rrr)//7
re AMved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293t
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
7 CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c) /
13 January 1958
SC No. 00035/58
Copy No.
DOC...11ME IT Ti).
(-LASS.
TS
FI tr.l.
AUTH:
DINI E.
F
143
REviEwER: 372044 1
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance
with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
�
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be
gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Top SECRETz
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Irmol �Lid
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
CONTENTS
1. USSR PROPOSES EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE
IN EUROPE (Confidential) (page 3).
git 2. POLES PLAN CAMPAIGN FOR RAPACKI PLAN IN WEST
GERMANY (Secret Noforn) (page 4).
9--k 3, SOVIET ARMY POLITICAL CHIEF REPLACED (Secret)
(page 5).
4. NEW CHIEF OF STATE IN RUMANIA (Confidential) (page 6).
5., INDONESIAN DISSIDENTS HESITANT ON BREAKING WITH
Aa
we
DJAKARTA (page 7).
6, INDONESIAN COMMUNIST TACTICS (Confidential Noforn)
(page 8):
7. PROBABLE RIGHTIST-LEFTIST MERGER INCREASES LIKE-
LIHOOD OF VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA (Secret) (page 9).
8, THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION (Secret) page 10).
9. HAITIAN STABILITY THREATENED (Secret) (page 11).
-1-44'14 6777.� '7;6 /1,
er-ft 10. PRESIDENT RHEE TO REJECT US-PROPOSED SOUTH
KOREAN ARMED FORCES REDUCTION (Secret Noforn)
(page 12).
A,0 11, TURKISH REACTION TO NEW BRITISH CYPRUS PROPOSAL
(page 13).
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
QflFT�
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
13 Jan 58
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
TLALAL JIM.ILAL I .11..Z.CA.A.4
Now,
via*
1. USSR PROPOSES EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR-FREE
ZONE IN EUROPE
Comment on:
he Soviet Union has stepped up its
iplomatic efforts against the NATO
greement in principle to establish
ided missile bases in Western Eu-
ope.
The Rapacki plan originally proposed
banning nuclear weapons in both Germanies, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia., Premier Bulganin's letters to the pre-
miers of Norway and Denmark on 10 January call for the
addition of Scandinavia and Finland to the "nuclear-free
zone," and the prohibition in the zone of "all types of rocket
weapons" as well. On 11 January, Foreign Minister Gromyko
suggested to an Italian "Peace Partisan" delegation visiting
Moscow that Italy and apparently Albania be added to the zone.
Bulganin's expression of satisfaction with
the refusal, of Norway and Denmark to allow no nuclear weapons
and missiles on their territories and his proposal to include
northern Europe in the Rapacki Plan reflect the Soviet leaders'
belief that they can take advantage of the strong neutralist sen-
timents in these countries to detach them, in effect, from full
military participation in NATO. Moscow is probably also con-
cerned with indications that Sweden may soon initiate produc-
tion of atomic weapons.
The Bulganin letters term a new heads-of-
government meeting the "most expedient" means of resolving
East-West differences and berate Western skepticism over
Soviet motives, stating that the 6 January announcement of a
Soviet armed forces cut constitutes a "manifestation of good
intentions" over reduction of international tensions.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
ifymprillONTTI AT.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
NNew4 ''Tft�pv
2. POLES PLAN CAMPAIGN FOR RAPACKI PLAN
IN WEST GERMANY
Comment on:
enior Polish officials and Polish journ-
lists stationed in West Berlin and the
ederal Republic met on 11 January to
'scuss the manner in which the Rapacki
plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe can be pro-
moted in influential circles in West Germany. The meeting,
in West Berlin, also examined ways of influencing West
German public opinion during the coming months in favor
of expanded diplomatic and cultural ties and increased trade
between the two countries.
The Poles now may feel that the climate
of public and official opinion in the Federal Republic is
swinging toward improved relations with Poland. They have
probably been encouraged by reports that the Rapacki plan
struck a responsive chord among some West German polit-
ical figures. Poland is interested in establishing full diplo-
matic relations with West Germany, but Bonn fears such a
step would imply acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line.
(NOFORN)
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
.SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
3. SOVIET ARMY POLITICAL CHIEF REPLACED
Comment ont
Colonel General A. S. Zheltov has
apparently been relieved as chief of
the main political administration of
the Soviet armed forces, a position
equivalent to a chief of a department
of the party central committee. According to the 10 Janu-
ary issue of Pravda, the post is now held by Colonel F. I.
Golikov, former commander of the Armored Forces Academy.
Several reports at the time of the ouster
of Zhukov alleged that his relations with Zheltov were strained
over the problem of political indoctrination and training in the
armed forces. Since that time, however, there have been in-
dications that the political training is still insufficient, and this
may account for Zheltov's removal. No new position has been
announced for Zheltov, who had held the political administra-
tion job since 1953.
Golikov, a specialist in mechanized war-
fare, has held staff, field4, and diplomatic posts. He has no
discernible connections with any members of the top party lead-
ership, and his assignment to a political post does not appear
consistent with his purely military background. (SECRET)
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
�SRCR 1'T
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
11.411,1 11,1E� AJLFIL;41. .11,.CALK4
4. NEW CHIEF OF STATE IN RUMANIA
Comment on:
extraordinary session of the Grand
ational Assembly on 11 January
lected Ion Gheorghe Maurer to suc-
eed the deceased Petru Groza as chair-
man of its presidium--titular chief of
state. A lawyer, economist, and experienced diplomat,
Maurer is probably one of the ablest men in the Rumanian
regime. His election was probably designed, at least in
part, for its effect on the diplomatic community in Bucha-
rest, which holds Maurer in relatively high esteem.
Although he has long been considered a
close associate of party First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej,
Maurer's appointment as foreign minister in July 1957
marked his emergence from comparative political obscu-
rity. In his conversations with Western diplomats in
Bucharest�particularly the former American minister--
Maurer has shown interest in increasing trade with the
United States and understanding that domestic concessions
would be necessary to improve Rumanian-American rela-
tions. He has been relieved of his duties in the Foreign
Ministry. (CONFIDENTIAL)
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
rilltIFTTIFATTT A T.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
vreil9
5. INDONESIAN DISSIDENTS HESITANT ON BREAKING
WITH DJAKARTA
Comment on
donesia's dissident colonels who have
een meeting in Sumatra are by no means
nited as to how fast they should move in
stablishing an independent regime
ote of caution prevailed over the meet-
ng due to the desire of all participants
o avoid civil war and establish a "normal,
fficient, and democratic government" of
Indonesia.
the dissidents have
agreed to issue an ultimatum to acting President Sartono de-
manding the establishment of a new government under former
Vice President Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, and to set up
a rival "provisional government of all Indonesia" if the ultima-
tum is ignored. The dissidents, however, set no exact date
for issuing their ultimatum, although they are presently plan-
ning to act before the return of President Sukarno. They also
made no decision as to the ultimate disposal of Sukarno and
Army Chief of Staff Nasution. Another weakness of their plan
is the fact that Hatta has indicated that he would not assume
government leadership during Sukarno's absence, and the Sultan
is about to leave Indonesia on a trip to the United States.
There are strong indications that the pres-
ent government intends to stand its ground, at least for the
present. On 8 January it issued a decree ordering the outer
regions to cease their barter trading. The finance minister
has backed the decree with a threat to cut off the subsidies
that Djakarta has continued to pay out if the regions do not
comply. The current army raids, which reportedly have re-
sulted in the arrest of several thousand persons, appear to be
designed as a show of force in support of an earlier warning
that strong action would be taken against anyone who might be
planning to "change the government."
13 Jan 58 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 7
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
1.46.F.I. � At JILAJJ1.0.4.
*ego/
wie00'
G. INDONESIAN COMMUNIST TACTICS
The Indonesian Communist party (PICI)
appears content at this time to con-
tinue posing as the government's cham-
pion and to exploit opportunities created
by the government's anti-Dutch drive.
PM satisfaction with current trends
is indicated by numerous reports, in-
cluding one which states that the party
believes that, although the time is not
yet ripe to assume leadership, the confis-
cation of Dutch firms is a significant ad-
vance in the process of making Indonesia
a socialist country.
Two Indonesian newspapers have reported
that secret PKI instructions had criticized the army for prevent-
ing strikes and further seizures of businesses by the workers
and had urged Communists to infiltrate key government positions.
The PM plans to sue the more anti-Communist of these newspa-
pers over the charges, which the American Embassy believes could
be bona fide.
The Communist-influenced Djakarta town
military command is conducting a series of raids with the an-
nounced intention of seeking out "illegal arms caches and sus-
pected terrorists." Accompanying arrests could well develop
into a roundup of the more important non-Communist leaders
there. Several anti-Communist newspaper editors have already
been taken into custody for "questioning." It is likely that the
raids will further enhance the Communistb' position by reduc-
ing opposition potential. (NOFORN)
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
CONFITIPNTIA T.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
"IS
7. PROBABLE RIGHTIST-LEFTLST MERGER INCREASES
LIKELIHOOD OF VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA
Comment qn:
The probable pre-election deal between
rightist Guatemalan presidential candi-
date Ydigoras and the Communist-infil-
trated Revolutionary party (.), which
may re-
sult in an Ydigoras vistory at the polls on 19 January.
Ydigoras has
promised the PR four cabinet posts, including the key Min-
istry of Interior which controls the police, in return for its
support. The Communist minority in the PR, which can be
expected to step up its efforts to gain control of the party,
would find such an arrangement almost ideal for attaining
its objective: the consolidation of its political position for
a future bid for full power.
Bloodshed appears inevitable, with the
most likely time immediately after the elections. If center
presidential candidate Cruz Salazar wins, Ydigoras and the
PR are practically certain to charge fraud and resort to mob
violence to upset the election results, as they did last Octo-
ber. Ydigoras has publicly declared that "civil war" would
follow any attempt to "steal" the election from him.
his sup-
porters are being told to converge on the capital after the
elections. On the other hand, if Ydigoras wins the PR sup-
port, the army may attempt to keep him from assuming power.
Such an attempt would be certain to result in bloodshed.
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
Trl?FT
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Num./
nrEmp.=_TrAisusITUATION
Comment on:
The composition of the new Venezuelan
cabinet formed on 10 January tends to
confirm that President Perez is a figure-
head of the military and that his tenure
Is subject to their will. At the inaugura-
tion of the new cabinet, Perez admitted
that the changes were made to achieve
harmony among the armed forces and
were in agreement with their wishes. Ousted National Se-
curity Chief Estrada and Interior Minister Vallenilla, the
strongest civilian supporters of the Perez dictatorship, who
were both resented by the officer class, have left the country,
and two key officers, arrested for implication in the 1-2 Jan-
uary revolt, have been released.
The military now control key posts in the
new cabinet, which is in part a shuffling or retention of for-
mer incumbents. The new minister of the interior, General
Llovera, was a member of the junta which governed from 1948-
1952, and may be inimical to Perez. General Fernandez, new
defense minister and apparently still armed forces chief of
staff, fell into disfavor with Perez in 1956 because of his al-
leged presidential ambitions. The air force and naval com-
manders have also assumed important positions in the govern-
ment.
The military, however, may be forced to
make some concessions to the heretofore passive civilian op-
position in order to avoid violence, as indicated by the 10 Jan-
uary demonstration in Caracas against the dictatorship. For-
mer President Betancourt, exiled leader of the outlawed Dem-
ocratic Action, has claimed that the three principal opposition
factions have agreed to unite against Perez. These parties
apparently conducted some negotiations to co-ordinate their
efforts in opposition to Perez' re-election last December.
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
RECRFT
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
NNW
9. HAITIAN STABILITY THREATENED
Comment on:
The stability of Haitian President
Duvalier's two-month-old govern-
ment is threatened with an early re-
sumption of the riots and coup at-
tempts which obtained throughout
most of 1957. A marked rise last
week in the size and activity of Du-
valier's recently organized palace
police evidently is causing apprehension in the army under
Brigadier General Kebreau, to whom the President has pre-
viously been subservient. There are increasing indications
that Kebreau is considering assumption of the presidency,
posSibly with a military junta. Blame for any resulting vio-
lence might be diverted to opposition groups who object to
Kebreau's power and have tried to cause a split between the
army and Duvalier.
Duvalier's popularity has declined con-
siderably since his inauguration. His failure to implement
his campaign promises, particularly those regarding eco-
nomic recovery, has disappointed even some of his own fol-
lowers. His failure to establish a coalition government, his
sweeping implementation of the spoils system, and the arbi-
trary arrests and mistreatment of opposition partisans have
encouraged numerous antigovernment plots. Kebreau, how-
ever, is probably aware that an army coup, even if successful,
would probably be opposed by all political groups and could
not establish stability.
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
FeRFT
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
NNO
10. PRESIDENT RHEE TO REJECT US-PROPOSED SOUTH
ORCES REDUCTION
re uc ono eau
60.000 -man cut.
he South Korean defense minister, the
hairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
e army chief of staff are all firmly sup-
orting President Rhee in seeking to limit
orized strength of the armed forces to a
the President will
not agree to a 100,000-man reduction proposed by the US. The
UN Commander, General Decker, expects Rhee to exert strong
pressure on the US to back his stand.
Although outwardly courteous and friendly
toward American officials conducting the negotiations, Rhee is
said to be quite angry over US "discourteousness" in setting
forth the higher figure after he had decided to accept what he
considered an earlier proposal for a 60,000-man reduction.
Actually; Rhee's "acceptance" was con-
tained in a counterproposal which would primarily have elim-
inated many unfilled table-of-organization slots, without any
significant reduction in actual strength. The US has argued
that only a 100,000-man reduction in authorized strength, now
set at 720,000, or a 60,000-man reduction in actual strength
will suffice to meet reduced American military assistance
funds.
Rhee hopes to block any reduction until at
least some of his forces receive weapons adaptable for nu-
clear warfare. (NOFORN)
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293
vouro
11. TURKISH REACTION TO NEW BRITISH
CYPRUS PROPOSAL
Comment on:
The new British proposal for a Cyprus
solution,
calls
for a seven-year period o se -govern-
ment, after which the Greek and Turkish
communities would have separate and
equal rights of sell-determination. London
is seeking official Turkish reaction before
approaching the Greeks and Archbishop
Makarios.
The provision for the possibility of even-
tual partition meets Turkey's basic demand but runs counter to
the Greek position and may thus lead to an early renewal of
violence on Cyprus. Turkish officials apparently question
whether peace between the communities could be maintained
during the intervening period of self-government.
An air of pessimism is spreading among
Greek Cypriots over Governor Foot's progress in London, and
EOICA has already threatened to unleash renewed violence if
Foot returns with "too little."
13 Jan 58
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 13
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03182293