CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/04/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03181201
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: April 29, 1955

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3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
29 April 1955
Copy NO. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 20
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ..O /0
AUTH: HR 70-2
PATE:Cillida., REVIEWER:,
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'TOP SECRET
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Nue
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Hatoyama reportedly sends personal message to Mao favoring
diplomatic relations (page 3).
2. British suspicion of Chinese Communist sabotage
of Indian airliner (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Thai foreign minister believes Chou sincerely wants peaceful
solution of Formosa problem (page 4).
4. North Sumatran terrorism may be spreading southward (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Spain seeks to diminish France's influence in Tangier (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. West German Socialists reported floating new German unity plan
(page 7).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 9)
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NW'
FAR EAST
1. Hatoyama reportedly sends personal message to Mao favoring
diplomatic relations:
Prime Minister Hatoyama reportedly is
sending a personal message to Mao Tse-
tung stating that Japan wishes to accord
diplomatic recognition to Communist
ma and intends to maintain a policy calling for coprosperity
and coexistence with China.
Comment: Hatoyama is publicly on
record as favoring the "two Chinas" concept and may wish to test
Mao's willingness to proceed along these lines. On 28 April he
stated publicly that Japan has no intention of recognizing Peiping
at present, but might do so if the "situation changes so as to per-
mit it."
During his recent Diet speeches, Hato-
yama gave special emphasis to Japan's basic policy of close ties
with the United States. A simultaneous approach to Peiping of
this sort would illustrate the prime minister's belief that Japan
can maintain friendly relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc within
the framework of this basic policy.
Peiping is not likely to agree to diplo-
matic recognition so long as Tokyo maintains formal relations
with Taipei. Communist China is currently attempting to maneu-
ver Japan into de facto relations.
2. British suspicion of Chinese Communist sabotage
ci in al-r�aer:
the explosion in the Indian airliner--
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which crashed en route to� Bandung on 11 April with several Chi-
nese Communist officials aboard--at the time Peiping radio first
made its charges of sabotage involving explosion. The Foreign
Office has come increasingly to suspect that the Chinese Commu-
nists knew in advance what would happen to the plane.
Comment:
Peiping might have learnea oi tne explosion irom
a clear message which was sent by a Chinese boat in the area of
the crash.
There are several circumstances, how-
ever, which support the British suspicion: the only Bandung-bound
plane to crash was the one about which Peiping warned the British,
the warning itself was too vague for effective action, and the Indians
were not warned at all. The Chinese Communists would appear to
have had opportunities to sabotage the plane in either Canton or
Hong Kong.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Thai foreign minister believes Chou sincerely wants peaceful
solution ai Formoga Problem:
Prince Wan, the Thai foreign minister,
told Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta
on 27 April that he believes Chou En-lai
sincerely wants a peaceful solution of
the Formosa problem. Senior American
officials in Djakarta believe Chou was
highly successful in convincing even the
most anti-Communist Asian and African
leaders of his desire to "relax tensions." They see a danger that
Chou may believe that he has succeeded in creating the impression
the United States is refusing to negotiate a settlement and that he
can now count on at least the private sympathy of these leaders
for an attack on the offshore islands.
Comment There is no doubt that Chou's
proposal to negotiate with the United States made a good impres-
sion on the conference. If no negotiations materialize, Peiping
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might believe itself to be in a stronger political position for re-
suming attacks on the offshore islands.
4. North Sumatran terrorism may be spreading southward:
There was a sudden increase of terrorism
in the Medan area of Sumatra last week,
for which Moslem dissidents, moving
southward from the Atj eh area at the
northern tip of the islands, are blamed
by several sources (see map, p. 6). Amer-
ican officials in Medan and Djakarta be-
lieve the objective of the dissidents is not
only to embarrass the Indonesian government, but also to attract
the attention of the various Moslem delegates who were attending
the Bandung conference.
Comment: Atjelmese rebels, who have
been fighting for autonomy-sTrice�S�eptember 1953, recently were
reported to be more than holding their own against government
forces. Antigovernment sentiment along Sumatra's east coast is
fairly widespread, and the infiltration of any significant number
of agitators from neighboring Atjeh might seriously complicate
the problems of the thinly spread security forces in the area.
Medan, which has been relatively free
of terrorist activity, is located in a rice, rubber and petroleum
producing area in which there are large American holdings.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Spain seeks to diminish France's influence in Tangier:
The Spanish consul general in Tangier
proposing
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101
a change in Tangier's international status. The consul general
expects to submit the proposal to the International Committee of
Control next month.
The objective of this proposal is to re-
lieve the Moroccan sultan's present local representative and re-
move the position from French control. Spain also seeks to
eliminate French jurisdiction over the native appellate court.
Comment: This proposal would worsen
the already tense French-Spanish relations in Morocco. It is
part of Spain's over-all plan to diminish French influence in the
area, thereby enhancing its own prestige and control.
France and Spain dominate the government
of Tangier. Spain seized the international zone when France capit-
ulated to Germany in June 1940, occupied the zone until October
1945, and has long sought to incorporate it into Spanish Morocco.
WESTERN EUROPE
6. West German Socialists reported floating new German unity plan:
West German Social Democratic leaders
will attempt to persuade representatives
of the coalition Free Democratic Party
to make common cause on a new approach
to German unity
The Socialists have drafted a plan calling
for a gradual fusing of the East and West German government
administrations, and for the subsequent creation of an all-German
government through free elections. Four-power controls would be
retained over the new government for a period of time. Germany
would be pledged to 25 years of neutrality following the withdrawal
of occupation troops.
Comment: This suggests that for the
first time some responsible West German politicians may be will-
ing to consider working directly with the East German government
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on unity matters. The fact that the Socialist plan calls for
neutrality evidently reflects the influence of the tentative agreement
between the Soviet Union and Austria.
There is little prospect that the Free
Democrats would support the reported plan. Some Socialists
would probably also balk at it.
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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 28 April 1955.
1. The Peiping radio on April 28 granted that Secretary Dulles'
statement was "more flexible" than the 23 April statement of the State
Department, but criticized him for expressing "skepticism" as to
Peiping 's intentions. Peiping noted that instead of talking about the
"withdrawal of US armed forces from the Formosa area--a question
whose solution is the key to relaxation of tension in the area and the
Far East," Secretary Dulles talked about a cease-fire even though
"there is no war going on between China and the United States." Pei-
ping quotes his statement that the US would not deal with the rights
and claims of the Chinese Nationalists in their absence.
While this statement does not alter Peiping's earlier stand
on the "liberation" of Formosa, it is notably free of vituperation and
implies the possibility of further exchanges on the terms of possible
negotiations. Emphasis on the absence of war between Communist
China and the US may be Peiping 's effort to reply to the initial US
stipulation concerning a cease-fire.
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CHINA- FORMOSAApril1955 SITUATION
28
Nautical miles
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� A OPERATIONAL
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COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND
USEABILITY DESIGNATIONS
PR ILrIARY: considered most important in area, with prepared runway
MIG-17, TA-A, I L-28 generally 5000 feet or longer.
I TU-2, I L- ID, LA-9/ I I, Li-2, etc.
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* Fields not Considered capable of
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OPERATIONAL: Consistently used by military & civilian aircraft.
SERVICEABLE: capable of use by aircraft.
UNKN()NN: current status undetermined.
OTHER: under construction, abandoned or unserviceable.
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