CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/04/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03180498
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 2, 1959

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
2 April 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
DOC1JM7NT NO,
,to CHAV1/' IN CLASS.
, fiEt-,E.AriSINED
CLASS. CIIAN!":1E0 TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
ALITH�
DATE,
_REVIEWER.
-T-O-P-SEC-RET
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INV
2 APRIL 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow and Peiping have given Latin
American Communists detailed guid-
ance on future tactics in "imperialist
backyard."
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru promises to raise Tibetan is-
sue with Peiping and to ask for full
Tibetan autonomy.
Nasir's top aide cautions UAR ambas-
sador in Washington against rushing
into a rapprochement with the United
States.
Sudan - Dissident officer group still
planning to move against its oppo-
nents in the government.
Special USIB Watch Committee re-
port on Israeli-Syrian recalls of
reserves.
Turks and Iranians discussing reor-
ganization of Baghdad Pact military
planning structure.
-Top SECIE3
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TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Communist bloc outlines tactics for Latin America: Latin
American delegates to the 21st Soviet party congress have re-
turned from Moscow and a side trip to Peiping armed with
new tactical plans worked out with the Soviet party as well as..
guidance and offers of training from the Chinese Communists;)
(The delegates were told to eliminate defense of the USSR
fro their propaganda and to play down their subordination to
Moscow, concentrating instead on the "liberation" of their own
countries. They decided to schedule an anti-imperialist "Peo-
ple's Congress" to meet sometime before July in Latin Amer-
ica and, concealing its Communist origin, to attempt to exploit
the popularity of Cardenas, Figueres, Be ancourt, and Castro
who would be asked to serve as sponsors.
The Latin American Communists were received in Peiping
by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi who expounded at some
length on the benefits not only of maintaining but of increas-
ing tension, which "benefits all Communist parties" and forces
the West to scatter its strength over a vast area. As an ex-
ample, the Chinese cited their tactics in the Taiwan Strait sit-
uation which had "helped by di rting imperialist forces" fol-
lowing US landings in Lebanon.
The treatment given the delegation in China provides the
strongest indication to date that Peiping is bent on increasing
its influence in Latin America. Peiping has decided to sponsor
a 4-6 month course in "practical" tactics for Latin American
Communists, The Chinese Communists stressed the need for
clandestine activity carried out by underground parties parallel
with existing 'Latin American Communist parties.)
(Page 1)
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(Yt
VA
Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin. ergo significant changes
bearing on the possibility of hostilities.
LI
IL ASIA-AFRICA
India-Tibet: rime Minister Nehru, in a k.neeting on
31 March with the Dalai Lama's brother, who is one of the lead-
ers of the Tibetan resistance movement in India, assured him
he would take up the Tibetan question with Peiping and urge the
granting of full Tibetan autonomy. Although he doubted that this
approach would be successful, Nehru felt it was the only action
he could now take. In reaffirming his intention to grant political
asylum to the Dalai Lama, Nehru thought it best that th9 Dalai Lama stay
near New Delhi where he could keep in touch with him-)
(Page 3)
Sudan: e junior officers movement led by Brigadier
Sharman is m kin lans to arrest its opponents on the Supreme
Military Council,
Shannan had abandoned an earlier plan for a showdown within
the council itself, but his group, which reportedly includes pro-
Communist and pro-Egyptian elements, will probably make a
bid for increased power in the near future)
(Page 5)
2 Apr 59
DAILY BRIEF
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( Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino- Soviet bloc hostile
action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Mid-
die East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situation in the
area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-
scale hosti 'ties is unlikely in the immediate future.
Iraq: he rapid progress of the Communists to ard con-
trol of Iraq is continuing.
Israel-Syria: Special Watch Committee report on Israeli-
Syrian recalls of serves)
(Page 6)
Iran-Turkey: Iran's defense problems and reorganiza-
tion of the military planning organization of the Baghdad Pact
were the major subjects of recent talks in Tehran between
Turkish and Iranian military leaders. In response to an Irani-
an question; the chief of the Turkish General Staff stated that
the Shah would become commander in chief of the Baghdad
Pact military structure in time of war. The Shah also reit-
erated his concern over Communist encirclement and his con-
tinuing dissatisfaction with the level of American military aid.
(Page 8)
2 Apr 59
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow and Peiping Lay Out Tactics for Latin America
Latin American delegates to the Soviet 21st party congress
hav returned from Moscow and a side trip to Peiping armed
with new tactical plans worked out with the Soviet party as well
as guidance and offers of training from the Chinese Commu-
nists)
the 20 Latin American parties, 18 were represented
in Moscow and 12 during the subsequent visit to Peiping. In a
series of conferences with key Soviet officials in early Febru-
ary and with Chinese Communist party leaders later in the
month, the Latin Americans were given extensive advice on,
increasing their effectiveness in the "imperialist backyard.")
the Soviet officials pro-
fessed concern that emphasis on Moscow's domination of the
Communist movement had hampered the activities of national
Communist parties, and called for the elimination from all
Communist literature of reference to the "directing role" of
the USSR. The Latin American delegates were told to elim-
inate defense of the USSR from their propaganda and to play
down their subordination to Moscow, concentrating instead on
the "liberation" of their own countries, thereby weakening the
"common enemy." The Latin Americans decided to convene
a "People's Congress," sometime prior to July. By conceal-
ing its origin, the Communists hope to attract former Mex-
ican President Cardenas, former Costa Rican President Fi-
gueres,Venezuelan President Betancourt, and Cuban Prime
Minister Castro as sponsors of the congress and to reap the
advantages of their popularity. The major theme of the con-
gress would be struggle against Latin American dictatorships
and defense of the new revolutionary "democratic" regimes)
e attention shown the 12 Latin American delegations
whic visited Peiping after the Soviet congress was a strong
indication of Peiping's interest in increasing its influenc!)
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(among Communists in underdeveloped areas, particularly
Latin America, Mao Tse-tung and second-ranking party
leader Liu Shao-chi, among other top leaders who conferred
with the Latin Americans, impressed on them the suitability
of Chinese Communist revolutionary tactics in the underde-
veloped conditions of Latin America, The Chinese argued
that events in Cuba had proven that the "imperialists are pa-
per tigers." They asserted that a "policy of tension" benefits
Communist parties, which can force "imperialists to spread
their forces thin over a vast area." As an example, they cited
their tactics in the Taiwan Strait situation which had "helped
by diverting imperialist forces". following US landings in
Lebanon)
(The Chinese advised formation of clandestine parties in
each .Latin American country to function parallel to the es-
tablished Communist parties, arguing that they themselves
had used similar methods, "especially in Shanghai," to great
advantage)
(The Chinese offered to set up in Peiping, at Chinese ex-
pense, a four- to six-month course for Latin American lead-
ership cadres. The course, to begin in August, would stress
the "practical experience" of the Chinese revolution, rather
than genyal Communist theory "which could be learned in any
country."
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Nip?
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru's Position in Tibet
(While officially maintaining his policy of noninterference
in the Tibetan situation, Prime Minister Nehru apparently has
given secret assurances to resistance leaders in India that he
will provide what diplomatic support he can, as well as asylum
for the Dalai Lama and his staff. The Indian leader on 31 March
publicly expressed his sympathy to a large delegation of Tibetans
from the Indian frontier town of Kalimpong, but pointed out that
India was not in a position to intervene and counseled patience)
In a meeting later with the Dalai Lama's brother, a
leader of the Indian-based resistance movement, Nehru prom-
ised he would take up the Tibetan question with Peiping and urge
that Tibet be granted full autonomy. Nehru's own doubt that this
approach would be successful suggests that his offer of support
represents more a gesture to the ,5ebels than an indication of
firm intention to pressure Peiping
(Ip the event Nehru does approach the Chinese on behalf of
the Tibetans, they probably will inform him that Tibet is consid-
ered "autonomous" and that Indian representations are regarded
as "interference." People's Daily on 31 March stated, "No for-
eign country should inter ere in the Tibet rebellion, �which is an
internal affair of China)'
Peiping's repetition of charges that Kalimpong is a "corn-
man ding center of the rebellion" provoked a new uproar in the
Indian Parliament on 1 April. In view of the fact that Nehru had
categorically denied this allegation on 30 March, the deputy ex-
ternal affairs minister ) ccused the Chinese of challenging Nehru's
"integrity and honesty."
r(he Dalai Lama's party was last reported to have been expected
at the Indian frontier in Assam on 31 March. In reaffirming that the
Indian Government would "definitely" grant asylum to the Dalai Lama
and his staff, Nehru told the Lama's brotlier it would be best that he
be brought to the New Delhi area, where Nehru could keep in touch
with him. The prime minister said his government was already mak-
ing arrangements for the Dalai Lama's stay in India and he would Der-
sonally discuss his future with him)
2 Apr 59
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"111.
NNW
UAR Attitude on Rapprochement With US
(Despite the expressed desire of some UAR officials for
a demonstration of American support of Nasir's anti-Commu-
nist campaign, the regime apparently hopes to avoid the im-
pression of a rapprochement with the United States which
would lend credibility to Communist charges that Nasir is
now subservient to the "imperialists."
Cairo wishes
to be "cautious and reserved" in dealing with Washington.
apparently referring to Kamal's reports to Cairo on his ta s
with US State Department officials,
Cairo is obviously
anxious to continue at least the appearance of neutrality. Both
Baghdad and Moscow have claimed repeatedly that Western
interests are behind Nasir's attacks on the USSR and Arab
Communists. Cairo officials are also fearful of a cessation
of Soviet economic and military aid as retaliation to Nasir's
continued attacks on the USSR's interference in Arab affairs.
They probably hope for American assurances of support in
the event of Soviet sanctions, but at this time they apparent-
ly wish to keep moves to improve relations with the United
States as unobtrusive as possible.)
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Instability in the Sudan
espite Premier Abboud's repeated assurances to the
peop that the Sudan's military government is stable and
united, jockeying for power continues at the highest army
levels, and the leaders of the suspended political parties
are maneuvering to improve their positions. The junior
officers' movement, led by Brigadier Abd al-Rahim Shan-
nan, has been holding nightly meetings since 24 March,
and is plan-
ning an attempt to seize power by arresting most of the
senior members of the Supreme Military Council. Briga-
dier Muhyi al-Din Abdullah, who participated with Shannan
in leading the early March coup, is now being excluded from
the group's secret .plans, apparently because he opposes fur-
ther drastic action.
(The senior council members are acutely aware of the
threat posed by Shannan's group, which reportedly contains
pro-Communist and pro-Egyptian elements as well as other
dissident officers; they are therefore attempting to build up
a counter-movement within the army. They also have to con-
tend with political and religious leaders who want a n mber of
military members of the cabinet replaced by civilians.
he governmental changes since early March and the
death on 24 March of Ansar leader Sayyid al-Rahman al-
Mandi have resulted in a sharp decrease in the power and
influence of the Ansar sect and its Umma party, the strongest
pro-Western elements in the country. The demands of leaders
of the neutralist National Unionist party (NUP) that they
be included in the Abboud government have so far been refused,
but the senior officers in the government may resort to an !'al-
Hance" with NUP political leaders against the junior officers'
movement.)
SEeRE-T-
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mar'
Israeli-Syrian Recalls oi Reserves
'The USIB Watch Committee issued the following report
afte a special meeting held at 1730, 1 April 1959: )
( An Israeli mobilization, announced at 1900 GMT
on April, recalling "all" reserves to report for re-
serve duty was followed prior to 2100 GMT by a UAR
order to personnel of the First (Syrian) Army to re-
turn from leave and to all reservists detailed to cer-
tain numbered formations to report to their units by
the morning of 2 April. A later Israeli order ordered
reserves of three units (probably brigades) to report
by 1700, 2 April. By 2100, a spokesman of the Israeli
Defense Forces described the call-up as a recall of
certain reservists of only three reserve units for ord-
inary training and the Lsraeli finance minister, speak-
ing for the prime minister in the Knesset, declared
that the order was only a routine call for training and
that no importance was to be attached to it. The Israeli
Embassy in Washington has also characterized this ac-
tion as "lt unusual," .olaserving that "the days of Suez
are over."
No preliminary mobilization measures, such as
re isitioning of motor vehicles or rail rolling stock,
have been observed or reported in Israel. The strength
and deployment of Israeli military forces are believed
to be normal. Recent incidents along Israel's borders
have been minor and have not been treated as serious
by the Israeli press, and the only specific source of
tension between Israel and the UAR recently publicized
has been the Egyptian seizure of cargoes of Israeli-
chartered ships. Israel is known, however, to be con-
cerned over a rapprochement between N sir and the US
and possible UAR action against Qasim.
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(The Syrian recall order appears to be a direct
rea tion, about 2 hours later� to the Israeli order.
Possible explanations for the Israeli recall of re-
servists, based on limited evidence, include:)
-as the most likely, a mobilization exer-
cise esting the "codeword" open radio call-up,
with the codewords indicating the unit and its lo-
cation to the reservists involved. The Israeli
fiscal year begins 1 April and funds may have
just become available for such an exercise.
--a demonstration of readiness for action
as a pressure tactic.
--a true reaction to information unknown to
us of real or suspected impending changes in sit-
uations along its borders.
--as the least likely, an intention to recall
reservists, under the guise of a training exercise,
for possible military action)
Whatever the purpose of the Israeli mobilization,
this action and the Syrian mobilization in apparent reac-
tion can raise Israeli- UAR tensions. In the face of the
Syrian call-up, xIsrael may now retain its recalled forces
on ready tatus4
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Iranian-Turkish Military Talks Strengthen Ties
During recent discussions in Tehran between Iranian and
Turkish military leaders, the chief of the Turkish General
Staff, General Rustu Erdelhun, stated in response to an Irani-
an question that in time of war the Shah would "of course"
become the commander in chief of Baghdad Pact forces. Any
such decision, however, would require the approval of Britain
and Pakistan.
The Shah, pleased with the outcome of the talks and im-
pressed with Erdelhun's presentation, has ordered the chief of
the Iranian General Staff to coordinate closely with Turkey on
defense problems and on Baghdad Pact military organization.
The Turks and Iranians also agreed that, to assure concerted
action in an emergency, the Baghdad Pact Military Planning
Organization should have a proper staff structure headed by an
American officer. These issues probably will be raised for-
mally during the July meeting of the Baghdad Pact Military Com-
mittee,
The Shah emphasized to Erdelhun his fear that Iran would
be encircled by hostile powers now that Iraq is working with the
Communists. Erdelhun, who is a highly competent officer and
strong advocate of close Turkish-American military cooperation,
attempted to calm the Shah by stressing that Turkey and Pakistan
stand on Iran's flanks and that US power will deter aggression by
the USSR.
In respect to the Shah's continuing dissatisfaction with the
level of American military'aid, General Erdelhun stressed that
both Turkey and Iran must increase the literacy and technical
competence of their service personnel before they can make ef-
fective use of modern weapons.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Tnergy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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