CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179290
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 26, 1960

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26 October 1960
Copy No, C
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLER\
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II Ur ZOCURE. �
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ILMIN I IL
26 OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR steps up propaganda attention to
Cuba, and apparently is giving priority
to filling Cuban trade requirements;
Cuba's Guevara leaves on economic mis-
sion to USSR, China, and other bloc coun-
tries.
Marshal Kiril Moskalenko is new Soviet
missile chief; predecessor killed in air
accident.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in the Congo.
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ULLETN
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TE C MUNIST BLOC
-Cuba: The USSR in the past week has stepped up
-aff,anda co' erae of the Cuban situation and, in its
no,....11dc trade, apparen:7.7 E7iving to priority to filling Cu-
trata requiremertf..% Tht Soviet press now is fea.turirg
.r.nir.73 o p. s for "counterrevolutionary
172:7ac� oris" of Cuba, -3 cl?cnunciations of the recently
new US Asc exports to. Cuba and of Am-
re Sov:.Lt media have avoided, how-
suggest/0m,, might Intervene
ny, and there have bc,7.-.n. 7:3 ref2rences to nrushcheV's July
yczt to ufze rockets in ri7:271) Ore Cf Castro.
LI reaction to .the US ra rectrictions, Havana will
" 15,7 sock additionalconcnie support from the bloc; how--
becau.se of the riaC. of Cuba's industrial plant, it may
forced to seek 1mnY. a.ernate sources of supply in non-
countries, which arc t,..ttf.l.r equipped to supply Cuba's im-
needs. This may ert further pressure on Cuba's for-
n exchange position.
"Che" Guevara, pr,,-,ffiz:ent of the Cuban National Bank,
7t. on 21 October on cconon-ic mission to the bloc, and is
:ozrded to visit-Czecorlovakla, the USSR r.nr-tryitirsil- Chi-
r, North Korea, and East. Germany. (Page 1)
*T.;7:7171: Marsha.1 i1 'f.ilo:fn.lenko, sixty year old corn.-
ancor of the Moscow 1:Lint-try District, has been named chief
e7. F237let rocket forces and deputy defense minister of the USSR
to replace Yitrolan Nedelin, wi,o was killed in an air accident
en 21 October. A veteran ground forces officer, Moskalenko
r,-;_-;arently h.ar ties to Soviet premier Ithrushchev which date
irk-m early in World War II. He is one of the "southern clique"
of field comin,:lnders who were with Khrushchev at Stalingrad
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and who have been brought into key positions in the Soviet high
command since the ouster of Marshal Zhukov in 1957. Moska-
lenko's previous association with missile forces appears to have
been limited to a three-year tour as commander of the Moscow
air defense (PVO) district during the early 1950's.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Republic of the Congo: Criticism of the UN Command by
supporters of both Mobutu and Lumumba reflects apprehen-
sion in both camps over the course of events in the Congo. The
UAR ambassador in Leopoldville
did "not believe that the UN blan nave any place tor Lumumba;"
Lumumba had re-
questea tacimies in Lair� for the education of his three children.
Meanwhile, Mobutu's cancellation of his projected trip to
UN headquarters in New York appears related in part to his
fears of being eclipsed by Lt. Col. Boboso, commander of
the garrison at Thvsville. ahnit 80 miles south of Leopold-
ville. (Page 4)
III. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SIT UATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
has been reactivated and will report on the Berlin situation monthly,
or more frequently as circumstances require.
1. Khrushchev has again committed himself to some
kind of a "solution"--negotiated or unilateral--of the Berlin
problem within a time limit, in this case during 1961.
2. He would still prefer to attain Western acceptance
of a change in the status of Berlin through negotiations, pre-
sumably beginning with a summit meeting which he has in-
dicated should come in the first half of 1961.
26 Oct 60
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3. The USSR hopes to confront the West with a series
of faits accomplis designed to weaken the over-all Western
stand when and if negotiations are resumed.
4. The current encroachment tactics in the area of
West German�West Berlin relations are likely to continue
and intensify. But Moscow will be careful to maintain control
of East German actions in order to hold risk of hostilities
to a minimum. For the same reason the more explosive
and risky issue of Allied rights and access has been receiving
less emphasis.
5. In general, Soviet Bloc actions regarding the Berlin
problem will be determined to a considerable extent by
developments not specifically related to this question. Inter
alia, developments in the military balance and the outcome of
Moscow's current dispute with Communist China could have
an important impact on the Soviet approach to the Berlin
question. The sub-committee would like to caution therefore
that Soviet decisions on the Berlin issue may be determined
by factors beyond its terms of reference.
26 Oct 60
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USSR, Increases
.:532eca.LI 7.1;7, e
mants to Cuba, Lee:e.,,
zaie Cuban sea..ir.
anings of
aaaar:1,7 irivesiona"
US trade reetricte:
22 October. Sovice
i'aee.nt covereje to the
77::hrtishchev
front peeee 'was domiie.
oegaalzed by the ITS."
eeenzat a partial embargo on ship-
:77Z f..; �y�1 d up its propaganda cover- .
oviet press now carries
-.wee:a:yen plans for "coLuaterrevolu-
. aateeeelan bases and denunciations
a-...�e.aebassador Bonsai's recall.
age_eria media gave full and promr
iertioa of a Cuban journalist delega-
a Soviet journalists, and Iavestia's
'sorts of "invasion preparations
the United Nations on 19 October, Soviet delegate Zorin
eiaIrted from the text c;`. a speech on disarmament to make a
s.eeteraent supporting Cu a-, rating Cuban accusations of "US ag-
geeesien and acts of bac aer eon" and charging the United States
a pel'cy of "oelea ealeaaey provocations." Moscow has, how-
ever, avo�ded any see :Ion that the USSR might intervene mil-
eqy in Cuba, and - Java been no references to Ithrushchev's
theaeat on 9 July to uee �:bet: a support of Castro.
its noribloc-tn_ ST1 apparently giving top pri-
_
�ea-ay to filliTesr Cuba:: tireaents, and in the wale of new US
coonic restrictioas probebly move to demonstrate still
fti.ar its willingnere tp in economic terms its moral
and political support c : "national liberation struggle." Moe-
cone already has made ._,ic'eerable and relatively costly read-
!ustments in its shina:. 3e rxtion s to accommodate Cuban
. petroleum requests Lee co make timely deliveries of such items
as fertilizers, wheat, more recently, agricultural machin-
ery and equipment.
Havana probably see!: additional economic support from
the bloc. However, beceuee el' the nature of its industrial plant,
Cuba may be forced to seek immediate alternate sources of sup-
ply in nonbloc countries�possibly Canada--which are better
equipped to supply Cuban import needs. This may exert further
pressure on Cuba's foreign exchange position.
"Che" Guevara, president of the Cuban National Bank, left
on 21 October for an economic mission to the bloc and now is in
Prague ca --::rring with economic officials. 11e.is scheduled to
go on to USSR., Communist China, North Korea, and East
Germany.
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New Soviet Missile Chief
The Kremlin has chosen Marshal Kiril Moskalenko to suc-
ceed the late Mitrofan Nedelin as supreme commander of Soviet
missile forces and USSR deputy defense minister. Moskalenko's
appointment was announced by TASS on 25 October, immediately
following a terse communique that Marshal Nedelin had been
killed in an air accident the previous day. No details concerning
the location or circumstances of the crash have been released.
The new Soviet missiles chief is a veteran of more than
forty years service in the ground forces. He was born in the
Ukraine in 1900, joined the army during the civil war, and by
1940 was a major general of artillery. He commanded a divi-
sion and a corps during the early years of World War II, and
was an army commander after mid-1943.
Like the other key figures in the present Soviet high com-
mand, Moskalenko has ties with premier Khrushchev which
date from the war years, when Khrushchev was a political
officer with the rank of lieutenant general. The most im-
portant link between the two was probably forged at Stalingrad,
where Moskalenko served with Marshals Malinovsky, Chuykov,
and Yeremenko�the "southern clique" of field commanders
which appears to have enjoyed Khrushchev's patronage particu-
larly since the ouster of Marshal Zhukov in 1957.
After the war, Moskalenko served in the western Ukraine,
and about 1950 was posted to the Soviet capital as commander
of the Moscow air defense (PVO) district. His assignment as
commander of both the Moscow garrison and the Moscow mili-
tary district in July 1953 coincided with the arrest of former
secret police chief Lavrenty Beriya, and he was a member
of the trial board which condemned Beriya to death in December
1953. Moskalenko was promoted to the rank of Marshal of
the Soviet Union in March 1955, and at the 20th Party Congress
in 1956 he became a full member of the Party central com-
mittee without having served previously as a candidate member.
The missile forces were formed as a separate branch of
the Soviet armed services last May; as their commander,
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Moskalenko enjoys a rank roughly equivalent to that of the heads
of the other three major components. The only available as-
sessment of his abilities comes from captured German documents,
which claim that while he was an accomplished tactician, he was
temperamental and hd fendnpy to lose his self-confidence in
difficult situations.
26 Oct 60
CEkITD Al IkITC1 I IfICklf"D Dl iii CTIkl
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The Situation in the Congo
Recent criticism of the UN Command by supporters of
both Lumumba and Mobutu reflects apprehension in both
camns over the rourse of events in the rongo.
the UN plans have
no lace for "Lumumba or for any true Congolese," and
Lumumba had requested facilities in Cairo for
t e e ucation of his three children.
Meanwhile, the attention of both pro- and anti-IVIObutu
elements appears centered on the Congolese Army garri-
son at Thysville, about 80 miles south of Leopoldville. UN
spokesmen have charged that Belgian specialists are aiding
Congolese troops to ready armored vehicles there, presum-
ably for an attempt to intimidate the UN into releasing Lu-
mumba.
Mobutu had requested reinforce-
ments from Thysville and Matadi for the purpose of attacking
Lumumba's residence.
A new factor on the Congo scene may be the commander
of the Thysville garrison, Lt. Col. Louis Boboso. Boboso,
who is reported to be a stronger personality than Mobutu, is
said to be under pressure from army elements to replace
Mobutu. Mobutu's cancellation of his projected trip to New
York appears related in part to his fears of being eclipsed
by Boboso. Boboso's political inclinations are not known, but
Lumumba told the UAR ambassador in early October that he
had cultivated Boboso and "made sure" of him.
Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's erstwhile vice premier, is
reported to be active on Lumumba's behalf in Orientale Prov-
ince. According to press reports, pro-Lumumba police in
Stanleyville have arrested the local army commander on�
Gizenga's orders. char-
acterized Gizenga as having "reversed the situation in Stan-
leyville for the benefit of Lumumba."
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11.4
The Situation in the Congo
Recent criticism of the UN Command by supporters of
both Lumumba and Mobutu reflects apprehension in both
camps over the course of events in the Congo. The UAR
ambassador on 23 October reported that the UN plans have
no place for "Lumumba or for any true Congolese," and
stated that Lumumba had requested facilities in Cairo for
the education of his three children.
Meanwhile, the attention of both pro- and anti-M0butu
elements appears centered on the Congolese Army garri-
son at Thysville, about 80 miles south of Leopoldville. UN
spokesmen have charged that Belgian specialists are aiding
Congolese troops to ready armored vehicles there, presum-
ably for an attempt to intimidate the UN into releasing Lu-
mumba
il1lobutu had requested reinforce-
ments from Thysville and Matadi for the purpose of attacking
Lumumba's residence.
A new factor on the Congo scene may be the commander
of the Thysville garrison, Lt. Col. Louis Boboso. Boboso,
who is reported to be a stronger personality than Mobutu, is
said to be under pressure from army elements to replace
Mobutu. Mobutu's cancellation of his projected trip to New
York appears related in part to his fears of being eclipsed
� by Baboso. Boboso's political inclinations are not known, but
Lumumba told the UAR ambassador in early October that he
had cultivated Boboso and "made sure" of him.
Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's erstwhile vice premier, is
reported to be active on Lumumba's behalf in Orientale Prov-
ince. According to press reports, pro-Lumumba police in
Stanleyville have arrested the local army commander on
Gizenga's orders. char-
acterized Gizenga as having "reversed the situation in tan-
leyville for the benefit of Lumumba."
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
1The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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