CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/03/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179284
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: March 4, 1960

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4 March
3.5(c) /
3.3(h)(2)
1960
Copy No. C (is
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 1/1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ler
0 DECLASSIFIED
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imirF
4 MARCH 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR trying to develop subversive poten-
tial in Iran to exploit any antiregime feel-
ing. 0
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR orders 75-percent reduction in
"emergency forces" required to be pres-
ent in national guard units in Egypt and
the Sinai Peninsula.
Jordan--King Husayn criticizes Nasir
and Qasim for their pronouncements on a
separate Palestine state.
Nehru expects coming border negotiations
with Chou En-lai to be concentrated on
Ladakh.
Philippines�Garcia promises implemen-
tation of his "Filipino First" economic
policies.
III. THE WEST
�De Gaulle using visit to Algeria to reas-
sure French Army and put pressure on
FLN to speed cease-fire talks.
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DALIA1-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 March 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Iran: SAVAK� the Iranian security service, is
showing increased concern over Soviet-sponsored subversion
and has alerted its foreign and provincial posts to keep a
"careful watch" on such activities, including Tudeh penetra-
tion 1forts based in Iraq.
viet "agents"--presumably both Soviet intelligence per-
sonnel and members of the outlawed Tudeh party--are tryin
to establish contacts with antiregime nationalist elements
The USSR, unsuccessful
in its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns of the past year to
make Tehran modify its pro-Western policies, now apparently
hopes to develop a subversive potential which could exploit any
movement aimed at the overthrow of the regime or take advan-
tage of any sudden upheaval. There are considerable numbers
of Iranian nationalists who, while not pro-Communist, are frus-
trated by government suppression and probably would accept
Soviet support. (Page 1)
� II, ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israel: Cairo on 1 March ordered a 75-percent re-
duction in the "emergency forces" required to be present in
UAR national guard units in Egypt and the Sinai PeninsulaIII
me air and army units had returned to bases in the canal
zone, but that the mass of troops moved to the peninsula last
month apparently were still there.
some Syrian Army units have been called
back from the Israeli froig Israel's relatively relaxed posture,
evident during the past few days, apparently continues. A minor
clash involving Egyptian infiltrators and an Israeli border patrol
on 2 March has had no immediate repercussions.
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Nur,
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Jordan-UAR-Iraq: King Husayn in a radio speech on
1 March implicitly attacked both Nasir and Qasim for their
Pronouncements about a separate Palestine states which
Jordan opposes. The speech apparently was prompted by
the debates at the just-concluded Arab League conference in
Cairo: which failed to produce an agreement on a Palestine
"entity," as well as by Qasim's recent unilateral advocacy of
a p lestine state.
the UAR Embassy in Amman
interpreted the speech as being an attack on Nasir. The UAR
Embassy commented further that the US and the UK had prob-
ably instigated the speech as a reply to Nasir's threat to the
"tripartite" countries. Both Nasir and Qasim probably will
respond with new propaganda blasts.
(Page 3)
Sino-Indian Border Dispute: ehru is reported to expect
Chou En-lai to come to New Delhi in April with a fairly strong
negotiating position. He believes that Chou, having reached a
border agreement with Burma and possibly with Nepal by that
time, will suggest that India be equally reasonable. He also
thinks that China, to indicate its own reasonableness, may of-
fer to withdraw Chinese troops from Longju outpost in Assam.
Inasmuch as Nehru feels that negotiations probably will be con-
centrated on the northeastern portion of the Kashmiri province
of Ladakh, he is faced with the problem of how to reconcile his
public statement that he will "give nothing away" with the prob-
ability that the Chinese will insist on holding the territory they
now occupy there. Nehru reportedly has said he would accept
a solution calling for neutralization of the disputed territory in
Ladakh. The chinesa, however, have already rejected a sim-
ilar proposal:1
Philippines: President Garcia's recent speech to a conven-
tion of Philippine businessmen, in which he promised full im-
plementation of his "Filipino First" economic policies, is a
further indication of his determination to make political capital
out of growing Philippine nationalism. The program, aimed at
4 Mar 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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achieving "economic independence," has led to increasing
restrictions on foreign business activity, including that of
American firms. The "Filipino First" slogan appears to
be extending into the foreign policy field, with Philippine
officials beginning to voice the nee�for greater "national
self-assertion:' (Page 5)
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: De Gaulle's 3 March statement at
Constantine that the Algerian problem cannot be settled for
a long time and only after the victory of French arms prob-
ably has the double purpose of reassuring the French Army
and putting pressure on FLN leaders to speed cease-fire
talks. By confining his Algerian tour to military field in-
stallations, De Gaulle is further emphasizing his interest
in army operations and in officer opinion.
(Page 6)
4 Mar 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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ver
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow Making Effort to Build Subversive Potential in Iran
Rile Soviet Union, unsuccessful in its diplomatic and prop-
aganda campaign of the past year to make Tehran modify its
pro-Western policies, now is trying to develop a subversive
potential in Iran which could exploit any movement aimed at the
overthrow of the Shah's regime or take advantage of any sudden
upheaval. Soviet "agents"--presumably both Soviet intelligence
personnel and members of the outlawed Tudeh (Communist)
party�are making a substantial effort to establish contacts
with antiregime nationalist elements.
several Iranian military figures have also
been approached as possible candidates to head a nationalist group-
ing. SAVAK has "definite information" that Soviet
authorities have prodded the Tudeh high command, concentrated
in East Germany, to display greater vigor in developing a sub-
versive apparatus inside Irar2.3
riliese statements are supported by other information,
describing contacts with antiregime nationalists by a
Soviet national and by Tudeh personnel]
luring the past two months
SAVAK has become increasingly concerned over Soviet-sponsored
subversion, and that it has alerted its foreign and provincial posts
to keep a "careful watch." Iranian authorities are paying close at-
tention to Tudeh penetration efforts based in Iraq and to the activ-
viet and other bloc nationals in Iran.
Nationalist elements in Iran, harassed by security forces for
the last six years, have been unable to evolve any effective organ-
ization. Ranging from the rightist Pan-Iran party to the left-wing
Third Force, they all oppose the present Iranian regime, hope to
remain neutral between the Soviet Union and the West, and display a�
xenophobia ranging from mild to violent. Some leading nationalists,
4 Mar 60
CCAITO A I ikrrei i"rkie.r ni go 1."FIL I
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-lase
frustrated by years of suppression, would probably be willing
to accept Soviet support, although the more moderate elements
wnnlci nrnhahlv nrpfpr Western backing.
Soviet material and moral support will
7robablv increase significantly the nationalists' capabilitiesn
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II, ASIA-AFRICA
King Husayn Attacks Nasir and Qasim on Palestine Issue
King Husayn of Jordan made a radio speech on 1 March
in which he denounced those "in some Arab quarters...who
have spoken lies" against Jordan. Other portions of the
speech made clear that he was directing his remarks at Na-
sir and Qasim, who have made rival proposals for the estab-
lishment of a Palestine "entity" or state. Husayn opposes
such proposals because they tend to undermine his control
over the Rest Bank area of Jordan, formerly part of Pales-
tine, and promote separatist feelings among the Palestinian
two thirds of Jordan's population. Jordanian citizenship is
available to all Palestine refugees who do not reside in the
UAR or Lebanon. Husayn's grandfather, King Abdullah, an-
nexed the West Bank in 1950--a move which has never been
approved by the other Arab states.
The speech apparently was prompted by the debates in
the recent Arab League conference in Cairo, where Jordan
opposed UAR-backed efforts to get agreement on establish-
ing some sort of Palestine entity and a Palestinian army.
The league finally assigned the problem to a committee,
which has been ordered to complete plans "with regard to
various national and international aspects of the Palestine
question." The league may meet again at the end of April.
the UAR Em-
bassy in Amman interpreted Husayn's speech as an attack
on Nash. and suggested it had been instigated by the US and
UK as a reply to Nasir's recent attack on the Tripartite
Declaration of 1950, in which the US, the UK, and France
guaranteed the frontiers or armistice lines of Israel and
the Arab states. The speech, viewed in this light, will
nrnhahlv nrryunkp nput re opaganda, bursts from Nasir.
Nasir is going ahead with the organization of Palestini-
ans in Egypt, Syria and the Gaza bably in the hope
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Nor
that they can eventually dominate any all-Palestinian govern-
ment. The Damascus press of 29 February carried the views
of Gaza Mayor Munir Rayyis, who had just completed con-
sultations with Nasir. Rayyis stated that the inhabitants of
Gaza had been accepted into the IJAR's single-party political
organization, the National Union, and that plans were under
way to include Palestinians of Syria and Egypt. He suggested
that the National Union might eventually serve as the vehicle
for unifying all Palestinians, or perhaps as a nucleus for a
Palestinian state.
Nasir is compelled to keep the initiative on the Palestine
issue, in the face of competitive efforts by Qasim and Husayn
to pose as champions of the Palestinian cause. Qasim has
exploited the question in his propaganda by creating a fund for
the establishment of a Palestine republic and by promising
to restore refugee "rights," while criticizing both Nasir and
Husayn for alleged inaction. In a statement in December,
Qasim grouped Egypt and Jordan with Israel as "usurpers"
of Palestine.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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tAJ1A1 IN 1 1AL
AlWir
Philippine President Emphasizes "Filipino First" Policy
President Garcia's determination to capitalize on grow-
ing Philippine nationalist sentiment has been emphasized in
his recent speech to the Philippine Chamber of Commerce
promising full implementation of his "Filipino First" policy
in order to wrest control of the economy from "alien dom-
ination." Garcia's remarks are likely to encourage the con-
gressional clamor for legislative restrictions on foreign
nationals and firms in the Philippines. In addition to an ex-
isting law, aimed primarily at the Overseas Chinese, for the
gradual exclusion of aliens from the country's retail trade,
there has been a growing tendency to apply discriminatory ad-
ministrative measures to all foreign businessmen, including
Americans.
Despite the relatively weak appeal of the administration's
"Filipino First" slogan in last November's senatorial and local
elections, Garcia may hope that continued exploitation of na-
tionalist sentiment will divert attention from the opposition's
effective attack on government inefficiency and corruption. He
may increasingly seek to place the blame for his domestic fail-
ures on close ties with the United States. A developing Philippine
tendency to make unilateral reinterpretations of existing agree-
ments with the United States may indicate that the "Filipino First"
theme is being extended from commercial to foreign policy ques-
tions.
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4 Mar 60 CENTRAI INTFI I inciurc Di II
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle Says Algerian Settlement Possible Only After
Military Victory
President de Gaulle's statement on 3 March that the Alge-
rian problem would not be settled for a long time, and only
after the victory of French arms, is his toughest public state-
ment yet on the Algerian problem and probably reflects his
mounting irritation with FLN slowness in moving toward a
cease-fire. The statement is almost certainly an attempt to
bring additional pressure on FLN leaders. The French Pres-
ident has indicated that he hoped to achieve a settlement in
Algeria prior to Ithrushchey's visit in mid-March. De Gaulle
has not yet mentioned the 29 February statement of rebel
leader Ferhat Abbas, but French officials in Tunis have in-
dicated that it was regarded by Paris as "constructive in tone."
The statements, made to French Army officers at Con-
stantine, the first stop on a tour of military installations in
Algeria, are probably also intended to reassure the army in
the wake of the repression of the January "revolt" and the re-
sulting command shifts. De Gaulle stated clearly that "France
must stay in Algeria," although he said the conditions would de-
pend on the wishes of the inhabitants. De Gaulle is probably also
attempting to sound out army opinion and gauge army sentiment
on moving ahead with self-determination.
De Gaulle's omission of the city of Algiers from his tour
may have been partly on security grounds but was probably also
a way of implying to the army that he is satisfied with the prog-
ress in shifting local administration from army to civilian con-
trol. On the eve of De Gaulle's arrival in Constantine, a direc-
tive of the Delegate General explained that the shift was made to
permit the army to concentrate on "operational action."
--CONR-DENTIAT
4. Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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