CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/05/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179252
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: May 23, 1960

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23 May 1960
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23 MAY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's failure to make customary
major speech at a "welcome-home" rally
probably reflects decision to take further
political soundings before making any new
moves.
Bloc now may be prepared to sup 1 Cuba
at least token deliveries of arms.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Djakarta demands Peiping stop anti-
Indonesian broadcasts; Indonesian inter-
cepts show Djakarta considering with-
drawing its consul from Shanghai. (TOP
SECRET DAUNT)
Ceylon's United National party faces stiff
fight with three-party united front in elec-
tions scheduled for 20 July. 0
Nasir apparently inviting showdown with
present Baathist leaders by sponsoring
formation of new international Baathist
organization.
�Protest march by Turkish cadets may
mark beginning of more serious new
phase in Turkish internal situation.
�Mali officials reportedly discover net-
work involving French officers for smug-
gling arms from Mali to opponents of
Toure in Guinea.
III. THE WEST
�Icelandic cabinet minister says Iceland
will withdraw from NATO if British naval
vessels again enter country's 12-mile
limit.
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23 May 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Khrushchev's failure to make the customary
major speech to a "welcome-home" rally in Moscow prob-
ably reflects a decision to take further political soundings
both inside and outside the bloc before making any new moves.
Soviet propaganda has echoed his generally moderate speech
In Berlin, while the Chinese Communists--who have not dis-
guised their opposition to a moderate policy--have not yet re-
acted to it.
Mikoyan's continued absence from Moscow seems a further
Indication of his loss of influence.
Czechoslovakia-Cuba: The Soviet bloc now may be pre-
pared to supply Cuba with at least token deliveries of arms.
On 12 May the head of the Technical Directorate of the Czech
Ministry of Foreign Trade which handles Czech exports of
military equipment and which is involved in the bloc's arms
deals with nonbloc countries was issued Cuban visas for him-
self and several other Czech trade officials. These Czechs
may participate in the talks now being held in Havana between
a Czech commercial delegation and the Cuban Government.
(Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesia - Communist China: Indonesia's stiff protest
note Of 21 May to Communist China, demanding the cessation
of anti-Indonesian broadcasts over Radio Peiping, follows on
the heels of Djakarta's request that two Chinese Communist
consuls be withdrawn from Sumatra and Borneo because of in-
terference with the Chinese repatriation program. The Chinese
leaders, who show no inclination to end their intervention in the
repatriation program, will probably reject the protest and
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continue their propaganda attacks on Djakarta for its "persecu- �
�
tion" of Overseas Chinese.
Diakarta is ennsidering withdrawing ifs ennsnl in qhancr-
hai.
�
the existence of a previously reported no-contest agreement be- ,
0 K tween these three parties, two of which are leftist. The UNP :.\\
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faces a straight contest with the front for over a third of the 151 �,
. \\
elective seats. In many constituencies, the combined vote of the
\\
front parties last March was greater than that given the UNP.
(Page 2) ,
Ceylon: The united front formed by three important parties
for the national elections scheduled for 20 July will make it dif-
ficult for Ceylon's relatively conservative United National party
(UNP) to retain even the plurality it won in the elections this
past March. Candidate statistics released on 20 May confirm
UAR: Nasir appears to have invited a showdown with the
present leadership of 1,he influential, pan-Arab Baathist party
by openly sponsoring the formation of a new international ,
Baathist organization. The Damascus press last week announced
the formation of a new "provisional" Baathist organization headed
by a Jordanian, Abdallah al-Rimawi, who was expelled from the
eF 3- that despite his suppression of the older Baathist party's activity
older 13aathist party last year. Nasir apparently feels confident
,
in the UAR, he retains sufficient following among the party's mem-
bership to gain ccotrol of its nationalist activities elsewhere in the
Arab world. (Page 3)
\\ Turkey: CThe situation in Turkey appears to have entered a .,
.\,
more serious new phase with the protest march of military cadets
:.
d K in Ankara on 21 May. This demonstration, the first by a military
unit since the initial outbreaks last month, was sparked by reports
of police brutality against army officers. Other reports have em-
i\ 0 to)t. y phasized a growing antagonism between the police and the army in
both Ankara and Istanbul. It seems certain that the pressure on
. n C Premier Menderes will increase, even from within his own party23
�: `)I
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23 May 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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or the removal of certain officials and even for his own resig-
nation. Menderes, however, appears confident that he continues
to enjoy the support of the rural population, and he may misjudg
the extent of opposition to his government in the cities and within
the military,j (Page 4)
Mali-Guinea-France: a:officials of the Mali Government re-
portedly have discovered a network organized by French military
officers and African e].ements for smuggling arms from Mali to
opponents of President Toure in Guinea. Mali officials are likely
to regard such a discovery as confirmation of Toure's charges of
a French-controlled plot against Guinea, and the sympathy of mod-
erate Malians for France may be seriously weakened.
A,
In Guinea, pro-Soviet elements are reported exploiting the al-
n an effort to draw Guinea closer to the blo
Fle�e-cl-1111Page 5)
THE WEST
Iceland-Britain: EIceland's Justice Minister Benediktsson has
categorically declared to US Ambassador Thompson that Iceland
will withdraw from NATO if British naval vessels re-enter the
12-mile fishing limit established by Reykjavik in 1958. Because
of Benediktsson's influential position and his straightforwardness
in past dealings with the US Embassy, Thompson believes his
statement must be taken seriously. The British Trawler Federa-
tion announced on 12 May that it would respect the 12-mile limit
for the next three months. A British Foreign Office official has
privately stated London would find it difficult to deny the trawlers
Royal Navy protection should they return within the 12-mile limig
(Page 7)
23 May 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Bloc May Be Preparing to Provide Military Aid to Cuba
the Soviet bloc may be
prepared to supply Cuba with at least token deliveries of arms.
On 11 May, soon after talks opened in Havana between a Czech
commercial mission and the Cuban Government, the head of the
Chief Technical Directorate of the Czech Ministry of Foreign
Trade requested Cuban visas for himself and several other Czech
trade officials. The Technical Directorate handles Czech exports
of military equipment and is involved in the bloc's arms deals
with nonbloc countries. On 12 May the Cuban Foreign Ministry
issued the visas, and presumably the Czechs will be available to
participate in the negotiations now under way in Havana for a
trade and credit agreement.
Castro's intense desire to obtain jet aircraft led to earlier
Cuban attempts to procure military equipment from the bloc, but
so far all such efforts have been unsuccessful. The visit of the
Czech delegation at this time suggests the bloc now may be will-
ing to provide military items not available from Western sources.
Since Mikoyan's visit to Cuba last February, bloc activity in
Cuba has increased sharply. Total bloc sugar purchases for 1960
have risen to 1,340,000 tons, Soviet oil and other raw materials
have begun to arrive in Cuba, and new commercial agreements
have been signed with Poland and East G rmanv in eh-Minn to
d credit pacts with the USSR.
ten Soviet technicians are en route to Cuba, probably
o begin preliminary 71anning for Droiects under the $100,000,000
Soviet line of credit.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Conservative Party in Ceylon Faces Hard Election Fight Against
United Front
The electoral agreement among three of Ceylon's major polit-
ical parties for the parliamentary elections on 20 July will make
it difficult for the relatively conservative United National party
(UNP) to retain even the slight plurality it won in the national elec-
tions in March. The list of candidates released on 20 May indi-
cates that 57 of the UNP's 128 candidates will face straight contests
in the balloting for 151 elective seats. In March, when the UNP won
50 seats, the vote was divided among at least three contestants in
all but one constituency. The number of candidates then totaled 898,
compared with approximately 393 nominated for the new elections.
The second-ranking Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP), a mod-
erately socialist group which won 46 seats in March, on 6 May en-
tered into a no-contest agreement with the Trotskyite Lanka SamaSamaj
party (LSSP), holder of ten. seats in the present Parliament. The
nominations now published confirm that the SLFP will be uncontested
by the LSSP in 98 constituencies and will not run against the LSSP in
21. The Communist party, which also participated in the no-contest
agreement, apparently will not be opposed by the other two parties
in most of the seven seats it is contesting.
Only two of the remaining ten parties are represented by a sub-
stantial number of candidates. The Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, led
by leftist politician Philip Gunawardena, is entering 55, and the
Federal party, leading organization of the Tamil minority, is put-
ting up 21 candidates.
The threat posed for the UNP by the new electoral alignment is
underscored by the fact that in most of the constituencies where
either the SLFP, LSSP, or Communist party placed second to the
winning UNP candidate in the March election, the combined vote of
these parties was considerably larger than that of the UNP.
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Nasir Challenges Leadership of Baathists
UAR President Nasir appears to have challenged the tradi-
tional leadership of the strong, pan-Arab Baathist party for
control of the party's activities throughout the Arab world. A
new top-level "provisional" group for reorganization of the party
was announced in Damascus on 18 May--a move which almost
certainly had Nasir's approval. The Damascus group, composed
of pro-Nasir Baathists and headed by former party leader Abdallah
al-Rimawi, a Jordanian who was expelled from the party last fall,
reportedly was chosen by delegates from various Arab countries.
Its objective apparently is to displace the old leadership in Beirut.
he initiation of a
press campaign against. Michel Aflaq, Syrian head of the party and
its top theoretician, who is in virtual exile in Beirut.
After its founding in 1954, the Baathist (Arab Socialist Renais-
sance) party strongly backed Nasir's Arab nationalist policies. Its
top leadership, however, became divided over the issue of continued
cooperation with the UAR President when party activities in Egypt
and Syria were banned following union of the two regions in 1958. The
ban was the direct cause of the alienation between Nasir and for-
mer UAR Vice President Akram Hawrani, one of the party's founders
whose activities now are closely watched by Syrian security men.
Nasir apparently feels that, despite his suppression of the older
Baathist party's activity in the UAR, he still retains sufficient inter-
national following among the party's membership t7in enritrn1 nf ith
nationalist activities elsewhere in the Arab world.
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Turkish Internal Situati
LThe march of Turkish-military cadets through the streets of
Ankara on 21 May, apparently in support of the recent student
demonstrations against the government's repressive policies, is
a blow to Premier Menderes' regime. This development, the
most serious so far in the current political unrest, is the first
open indication of dissatisfaction among army elements and will
encourage both students and other opposition groups. Recent re-
ports have also indicated that lower and middle-grade army of-
ficers are taking an increasingly active role in civilian-directed
street demonstrations:7
/The 21 May demonstration followed reports that an army colonel,
father of one of the cadets, had been beaten by police while watching
a student demonstration against the government on 20 May. There
have been other reports in recent days of minor brushes between the
police and army which probably have resulted in the growth of con-
siderable hostility. The participants in antigovernment demonstra-
tions repeatedly have shown respect and even friendship toward army
troops sent to disperse them but have indicated open hostility toward
the policeD
/1:4 crowd of civilians who followed the cadets in their march also
demonstrated later and called for the resignation of Minister of In-
terior Namik Gedik and Director General of the National Police Cemal
Goktan. Premier Menderes previously has been reported contemplat-
ing the removal of bath men, and the pressure within his own Dem-
ocratic party (DP) for such a step will probably increase. The par-
ticipation of elements of the armed forces in demonstrations may give
anti-Menderes leaders within the DP the incentive to demand that the
premier also step downj
Lmenderes, however, is reported reassured of popular support
by his recent trip through Turkey's Aegean provinces. It now appears
likely that he will misjudge this basically rural support for nationwide
endorsement of his policies and refuse to compromise with his oppo-
sition both within and outside his party. It is doubtful that his recent
promises of "early" elections will be enough to prevent continued dem-
onstrations against his government despite stringent preventive meas-
ures such as those taken in Ankara on 22 May; these banned
grezation of more than five persons without written licens?j
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Arms-Smuggling Network Directed Against Guinea Regime Reported
Exposed in Mali
[-African authoritidli in Mali--the federation of Senegal and
Soudan which is scheduled to become sovereign within the French
Community next month--reportedly have uncovered in Senegal an
arms-smuggling network aimed at the overthrow of Guinea Pres-
ident Sekou Toure's authoritarian regime.
French military, Senegalese, and dissi-
dent Guinean elements all are involved in the network which has
been engaged in infiltrating by truck into northern Guinea arms
from French Army depots in Senepl. The arms are said to have
been distributed among anti- Toure Guineans who formerly served
in the French Army and were repatriated after Guinea became in-
dependent in 1958.
pro-Tours Guinean
students in Dakar who are in close touch with Conakry were largely
responsible for the exposure of the networkj
Lsince last month Tour e has been preoccupied with the suppres-
sion of antiregime elements. Some of these elements appear
merely to have favored the establishment of an overt opposition
party, while others�reportedly including local Lebanese and non-
official French residents�apparently hoped to launch a coup.
Toure's public response to the situation has from the beginning
been designed to distract attention from the discontent which has
been growing in Guinea for some time by concentrating on allega-
tions that France and "African traitors" had mounted a counter-
revolutionary plot against his regime from neighboring Senegal
and Ivory Coast. On 3 May, Radio Guinea announced that 25 per-
sons had been arrested in connection with the seizure of a cache
of arms and munitions in Guinea near the Senegalese border; sub-
sequently, Senegalese authorities disclosed the discovery of Other
caches in two villages on the Senegalese side of the frontieij
L_Leading members of the influential pro-Soviet clique in the
regime's hierarchy are reported to be exploiting the alleged plot
in an effort to induce Toure to establish closer ties with the biog.,/
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LThe government-controlled news media, whose output may be in-
fluenced by bloc "advisers" in Guinea, already have embarked on
a campaign which appears designed to arouse the masses against
the West in general, including the United States...3
Lin Mali, meanwhile, officials are likely to regard the reported
arms network as confirmation of Toure's charges against the French.
As a result, Senegalese leaders, most of whom have heretofore fa-
vored close ties with France after Mali becomes independent, now
may be more inclined to yield to influential Soudanese elements
who already have a predilection for ties with the bloc.
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� III. THE WEST
Icelandic Official Threatens Withdrawal From NATO If British
Navy Resumes Fisheries Patrol
[During an jnfOiuuui uioii CU Lire ll;eld.11 ic-British fish-
eries dispute, Icelands Minister of Justice Benecliktsson told US
Ambassador Thompson that the Icelandic Government "with his
support and on his initiative" would withdraw from NATO if Brit-
ish naval vessels resume patrolling within Iceland's 12-mile fish-
ing limits. The ambassador comments that Benediktsson's state-
ment must be taken seriously in view of his influential position
within both the government and the governing Conservative party
and his straightforwardness in past dealings with the embassy_j
Denediktsson's remarks reflect the concern of the Conserva-
tive - Social Democratic government that it would not be able to
resist the public clamor for drastic steps if the dispute resumes,
particularly since Iceland's efforts to enforce respect for the
12-mile fishing limits, which it proclaimed unilaterally in 1958,
have not been notably successful. Furthermore, the government,
which already is somewhat on the defensive with the implementa-
tion of its sweeping economic reform program, is increasingly be-
ing forced to compete with the Communists and other groups which
accuse it of selling out Iceland's interests on this important issue: j
LBritain seeks to avoid recurrence of the situation under which
British trawlers for 18 months operated in the disputed waters un-
der naval protection, and hopes that a compromise settlement can
be negotiated. On 12 May the British Trawler Federation announced
that it would respect Iceland's 12-mile fishing limit for three months,
as it had been doing since mid-March when the Law of the Sea Con-
ference convened in what proved to be an unsuccessful effort to
reach international agreement on territorial waters and fishing
limits. There remains considerable pressure within the British
fishing industry for assertion of British rights on the high seas,
however, and a Foreign Office official has stated that if the traw-
lers return within the 12-mile limit, it would be difficult to deny
them naval protection)
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political. Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Departn-tent of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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