CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/11/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03178397
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: November 7, 1957

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
7 November 1957
Copy No. 13
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1. SPECULATION ON POSSIBLE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT
OF FORCE-LEVEL CUTS (page 3).
2. KHRUSHCHETS 40TH ANNIVERSARY SPEECH
(page 4).,
3. NEW FORM OF COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
MAY ESULT FROM 40TH ANNIVERSARY MEETINGS ,
(page 6).
24. 4. MOSCOW MOVES TO DISC �URAGE POLISH ECONOMIC TIES
WITH WEST (page 7).
5. CZECH PRESIDENT'S ILLNESS
(page 8).
6. DISCUS I EST GERMAN MISSILE PRODUCTION CON-
TINUES (page 9).
7. RIGHTIST DEMONSTRATION IN ALGERIA APPEARS LIKELY
ON 10 OR 11 NOVEMBER (page 10)0
6242 8, VIOLENCE IN LEBANON
(page 11).
9. DUTCH-AUSTRALIAN COOPERATION MAY PROVOKE INDO-
NESIAN REPRISALS (page 12).
10. PROSPECTS FOR RESTORATION OF SUKARNO-HATTA
PARTNERSHIP REMAIN DI? (page 13).
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1. SPECULATION ON POSSIBLE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT
OF FORCE-LEVEL CUTS
The present situation in the USSR sug-
gests that the time may be propitious for an announcement
of a further unilateral reduction of the Soviet armed forces.
The resolution of the Zhukov affair fa-
cilitates making such a decision for political and economic
reasons at the expense of the military.
The Soviet announcement on 4 November
that the USSR would no longer participate in talks in the
present UN Disarmament Commission and Subcommittee
suggests that Moscow is again seeking new ways to increase
the pressure against the Western disarmament position. An
announcement of a further unilateral cut would tend to focus
on the West the dissatisfaction among UN members over lack
of progress in the subcommittee discussions.
The present armaments posture of the
USSR, with its earth-satellite successes supporting claims
of satisfactory ICBM tests, would permit a force-level re-
duction without affecting world opinion of Moscow's enhanced
position of strength.
The additional cut in the armed forces
would facilitate more flexible allocations of manpower be-
tween industry and agriculture in the next few years, when
the increases in labor supply contributed by population growth
are expected to decline. Savings derived from a reduction in
military manpower, according to present estimates, could be
applied to investment in consumption, or permit a further ex-
pansion of expenditures for military programs beyond that al-
ready predicted.
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2. KHRUSHCHEV'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY SPEECH
Comment on:
Khrushchev opened the 40th anniversary
celebrations in Moscow on 6 November
with a three-hour speech to a gathering
of over 15,000 officials of the Commu-
nist world, including 61 foreign delega-
tions and deposed leaders Ka,ganovich and Shepilov. Khru-
shchev reviewed in glowing colors 40 years of Soviet achieve-
ment and made confident predictions for the future. He
touched lightly on domestic political problems, and spoke
frequently--in general and conventional terms--of the prin-
ciples of party unity and of the supremacy of the party in
all spheres of Soviet life. Referring briefly to recent con-
flicts in the party's top ranks, he asserted that the central
committee had upheld these principles in ousting the "anti-
party group" in June and Zhukov in October.
In his first formal pronouncement on
Stalin since the attack at the 20th party congress, Khru-
shchev struck the now familiar pose of balancing Stalin's
vices against his merits. He asserted piously that Com-
munists had the strength to admit mistakes, but rejected
attempts to attribute Stalin's mistakes to the Soviet system.
Attacking the concept of "national Communism," he damned
Djilas and Nagy as revisionists whom the West described as
"liberal Communists." Although he condemned the two ideo-
logical extremes of "revisionism" and "dogmatism," Khru-
shchev avoided entirely any discussion of the problem of
nonconformity in Soviet intellectual life.
Khrushchev, in the first long-range,
high-level, economic estimating since Stalin's 1946 fore-
casts for 1960-1965, gave preliminary figures for produc-
tion 15 years from now for certain key industrial items,
in support of his assertion that catching up with the United
States is not a visionary aim, but an achievable goal. The
projected growth, while impressive, generally implies an
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annual rate of growth somewhat slower than that during
1950-1957. His forecaSt levels of output appear reasonable.
Specific 1957 performances appeared
less impressive than Khrushchev's picture of the Soviet
past and future. Both steel and electric power will regis-
ter slight shortfalls from the modest 1957 plan, despite the
moderate overfulfillment for total industrial production im-
plied by Khrushchev's figures. He reaffirmed the economic
policies and programs which had been cited in the September
announcement of the decision to draft a long-term economic
plan for the 1959-1965 period.
In the field of foreign relations, IChru-
shchev emphasized the importance of an understanding be-
tween the United States and the USSR and called for a "high-
level meeting of representatives of capitalist and socialist
countries to exclude war as a means of solving political
questions," and to establish relations between states on the
basis of peaceful coexistence.
Khrushchev sought to portray the Soviet
Union as the champion of peace, in contrast to the Wet's al-
leged desire to "keep the world on the brink of war."
The confidence which marked Khrushchev's
speech suggests that the Soviet leaders believe their recent
technological achievements have given them a strong political
initiative which will increase pressure on the West to make
concessions. The Russians apparently believe they can, from
their new "position of strength," isolate the United States and
persuade America's allies that their interests dictate a more
independent policy.
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3., NEW FORM OF COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
MAY RESULT FROM 40TH ANNIVERSARY MEETINGS
Comment on:
some sort of international Commu-
nist organization will materialize as a re-
sult of the 40th anniversary celebration
in Moscow. A TASS correspondent in
Belgrade has suggested that the new or-
ganization would "exchange experiences"
but would make no attempt to enforce
ideological discipline on the various Communist parties.
no single
organization is contemplated but, rather, regional groupings
in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, and the
Communist countries, bound together by an international pub-
lication "quite different" from the Cominform journal. Such
groupings would have the advantage of minimizing Kremlin
control and could even be designed to permit membership of
non-Communist left-wing parties, particularly in the Middle
East, Asia, and Africa.
The appearance in Pravda on 5 November of a
detailed statement by Gomulka on his well-known "separate
roads to socialism" doctrine was probably intended to assure
the Communist world that any establishment of a new form of
international Communist cooperation would not affect the sov-
ereignty of the countries involved.
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4. MOSCOW MOVES TO DISCOURAGE POLISH ECONOMIC
TIES WITH WEST
Comment on:
The American embassy in Warsaw be-
lieves that a recent increase in Soviet
funds available to Poland for large-scale
purchases in the USSR will almost cer-
tainly arrest the trend of growing trade between Poland and
the West. Poland has obtained an estimated 200,000,000
rubles as a result of Soviet agreement in September to pay
for transit facilities used from 1946 to 1954. Settlement of
this issue is presumably a part of the Soviet effort to lure
Poland back into closer economic ties with the bloc.
Polish consumers prefer Western goods,
but payment difficulties, the exhaustion of Western short-
term credit possibilities, and reduced prospects for Polish
exports will force Poland to turn to the bloc for needed con-
sumer goods.
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5. CZECH PRESIDENT'S ILLNESS
Comment on:
The American embassy in Prague,
commenting on the serious illness
of 73-year-old Czechoslovak Pres-
ident Zapotocky, predicts that his
death could lead to a showdown be-
tween Party First Secretary Novotny and Premier
Siroky, the younger members of Czechoslovakia's rul-
ing triumvirate. The embassy believes that a rivalry
exists between these two leaders and that the apparent
equilibrium in the upper levels of the Prague regime is
based mainly on Zapotocky's influence.
Novotny, who was endorsed by Khriishchev last July,
is an advocate of the softer internal policies generally
associated with Khrushchev. Siroky, as well as other
top Czechs, is usually identified with a Stalinist-type
line.
Although this potential for friction
may exist, the Kremlin would almost certainly intervene
to suppress any dispute which could affect the present
stable conditions in Czechoslovakia.
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6. DISCUSSION ON WEST GERMAN MISSILE
PRODUCTION CONTINUES
Comment on:
Recent reports that Bonn will be re-
leased from treaty restrictions on the
production of guided missiles were in-
spired by British Foreign Secretary
Selwyn Lloyd's 1 November press conference in which he
implied he might favor revision of the WEU treaty to allow
Germany to participate in a joint NATO program for mod-
ern weapons production. In seeking an adequate response
to increased Soviet missile capabilities, British govern-
ment leaders, like those of many other European countries,
are probably more open-minded on German missile produc-
tion than at any time since 1945.
While Bonn expects a relaxation of treaty
restrictions, it would probably not initiate a request without
definite assurances of support from at least the UK and France.
West German Foreign Minister Brentano stated on 4 November
that he could not "anticipate our answer" if the question of mis-
sile production were raised in NATO or WEU meetings. The
question is reported to be "under constant study" in Bonn.
Revocation of the missile restrictions would
require a request from Bonn, followed by a similar request
from SAC EUR, and a two-thirds vote in the WEU council. The
restrictions on production of atomic, bacteriological, and chem-
ical warfare weapons, however, could not be lifted without nego-
tiating a protocol to the London and Paris agreements, a proc-
ess that would presumably require ratification by the seven na-
tional legislatures involved.
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7. RIGHTIST DEMONSTRATION IN ALGERIA APPEARS
LIKELY ON 10 OR 11 NOVEMBER
Comment on:
Euro-
ean extremists in Algeria plan to
emonstrate on 10 or 11 November
gainst any major change in the pres-
nt status of Algeria. Such a demon-
tration could easily evolve into serious
isorders.
Veterans and other European extremists
who oppose all concessions to Algerian Moslems have re-
portedly called for an evening memorial ceremony in honor
of war victims followed by a torchlight parade to protest
any "abandonment" of Algeria by Paris politicians. There
are also rumors that extremist action groups may attempt
a coup in cooperation with French military elements in
Algeria and declare a settler republic. French officials
in Algiers, who admittedly expect trouble, have not yet
banned the demonstration or reinforced the city's security
guard, but Minister for Algeria Lacoste and General Massu,
paratroop commander and supreme security chief of the
Algiers area, �are prepared to take firm
measures. No significant segnient of the military in Algeria
appears prepared at this time to participate in a coup di-
rected against the civilian administration.
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8. VIOLENCE IN LEBANON
Comment on:
The director of the Lebanese Interior
Ministry has linked the attempted dyna-
miting of the Lebanese parliament build-
ing and government executive offices in
Beirut on 6 November to the activities of
outlawed Communist and rightist Syrian
Socialist Nationalist parties. It is un-
likely that the diametrically opposed
Communists and Syrian Nationalists would cooperate in any
operations, but the Syrian deuxieme bureau might be involved
In terrorist actions of this kind under its present policy of
fomenting subversive activities in Lebanon.
With President Chamoun out of the coun-
try on a visit to Spain and Greece and a number of ministers
absent, foreign and domestic opposition elements may be-
lieve the time is opportune to unseat the Sulh cabinet, and
possibly Chamoun. They have been encouraged by clashes
on 3 November between police and Beirut municipal workers
which resulted in the arrest of strike leaders,and the workers'
case has been taken up by the opposition: National Front in an
effort to embarrass the government. The army, under the
command of pro-Western General Shihab, is the key to the
situation.
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9. DUTCH-AUSTRALIAN COOPERATION MAY
PROVOKE INDONESIAN REPRISALS
Comment on:
The 6 November statement of high
Dutch and Australian officials that
they intend "to continue and strengthen"
their cooperation on policy and admin-
istration in their respective territories
in New Guinea demonstrates that The
Hague�with strong Australian support--
remains adamantly opposed to Indonesian
demands for Netherlands New Guinea.
A Dutch official suggested that neither
the statement nor the forthcoming talks
would have any major impact in Indonesia since "no re-
sponsible Indonesian official thinks for a moment that the
Netherlands will relinquish New Guinea." Recent develop-
ments in Indonesia, however, indicate that both The Hague
and Canberra are underestimating the effect their negotia-
tions will have against the background of the current Indo-
nesian agitation over New Guinea. The American ambas-
sador in Djakarta has warned that the Dutch-Australian an-
nouncement "might easily be the spark which sets off the
explosion." He believes that Indonesian threats to break
relations with The Hague and nationalize Dutch interests
must be taken seriously.
The Indonesian Communist party and
President Sukarno will seize on the joint talks to stimulate
further public demands for extreme measures against the
Netherlands. The second phase of Indonesia's "Regain West
Irian" campaign will be launched on "Heroes Day"--10 No-
vember. Neither the police nor the Indonesian army plans
to take special precautions against any violence which may
result from the demonstrations ordered by Sukarno.
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10. PROSPECTS FOR RESTORATION OF SUKARNO-HATTA
PARTNERSHIP REMAIN DIM
Comment on:
Indonesian Prime Minister Djuanda is
encountering extreme difficulty in his
efforts to restore an effective partner-
ship between President Sukarno and
former vice president Hatta, a devel-
opment which he feels is the only course
which can save Indonesia from fragmen-
tation and the island of Java from Com-
munist control.
Sukarno has made clear that he will IVA
accept Hatta as prime minister, and there are increasing
indications that Sukarno's leftist and Communist advisers
are making every effort to bar Hatta from any important
post in the government. Hatta, for his part, reportedly is
prepared to announce open support for anti-Communist forces,
including dissident groups in Sumatra and Celebes, if he is
unsuccessful in achieving his own demands for participation
in and reorganization of the government to eliminate Commu-
nist influences.
This newly reaffirmed antagonism be-
tween the two men and their supporters is unlikely to be
resolved by either the second national conference on 25 No-
vember or by the highly nationalistic campaign for Nether-
lands New Guinea.
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