CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/09/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03178365
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: September 6, 1956

Apprpved.for 2 g 2/(14.01/(2.13dp317,8365
6 September 1956
Opy NO,
3.5(c)
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLAS
CI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE
REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOr SECRET/ � ./ 7/ ,
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CONTENTS
1. HAMMARSKTOLD TO CONVOKE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
IF SUEZ SITUATION WORSENS (page 3).
2. BRITISH POLICY PLANNING CONCERNING SUEZ SITUA-
TION (page 4).
3. INDIA REPORTEDLY RENEWS v.VFORTS ii\T CAIRO TO
SOLVE SUEZ CONTROVERSY (page 5).
4. FRANCE MAY LINK SUEZ "WAR" TO ALGERIAN REFORMS
(page 6).
5. PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT THREATENED
(page 7).
6. BRAZILIAN DENUNCIATION OF ATOMIC PACTS WITH
UNITED STATES (page 8).
7. POLITICAL CRISIS APPROACHING IN GREECE
(page 9).
6 Sept 56
* * * *
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 10)
* * * *
THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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1. HAMMARSICJOLD TO CONVOKE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
IF SUEZ SITUATION WORSENS
Secretary General Hammarskj old has
informed British foreign secretary Lloyd
and Ambassador Lodge that he feels le-
gally obliged by the UN charter to bring
the Suez situation before the Security
gotiations break down without a settlement
and the parties themselves do not appeal to the UN.
Hammarskj old told Lodge he thought the
British and French were acting in a "fantastic" manner. He
said that if they used force in the mistaken belief that they
could re-establish their position in the Middle East, war
would probably result and the UN might be destroyed.
Comment Most members believe that some type of
UN action is necessary to a solution of the
Suez situation. Opinion among them differs regarding which
UN body would provide the best forum--the Security Council,
where the USSR might use the veto in Egypt's favor, or the
General Assembly, where the anticolonial and underdeveloped
nations could raise a large majority, particularly if force were
used against Egypt.
6 Sept 56
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2. BRITISH POLICY PLANNING CONCERNING
SUEZ SITUATION
Approaching the situation on a day-to-
day basis, Prime Minister Eden has permitted military
preparations to advance, but has not yet given specific
guidance to the British chiefs of staff, who at the end of
July adopted 15 September as the date for completion of
military deployment in the editerranean area. . 7
Comment the impression
that the British government has not
reached a final decision as to the use of force in the event
negotiations with Nasr are unsatisfactory. In any case,
London appears to believe that for moral justification some
further move--perhaps including recourse to the UN Security
Council--would be a necessary preliminary to the use of
force.
6 Sept 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 4
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3. INDIA REPORTEDLY RENEWS EFFORTS IN CAIRO TO
SOLVE SUEZ CONTROVERSY
India's Krishna Menon, during his visit
to Cairo on 29 and 30 August, worked
out with President Nasr a compromise
proposal on the Suez Canal to be pre-
sented to the committee of five,
The proposal centers on the setting up
of an international advisory committee, ostensibly con-
trolled by Egypt, but with powers extending to administra-
tion of the canal.
India
Is trying to freeze the USSR out of a position of influence
with Nasr and that Menon resisted attempts of the Soviet
ambassador to Cairo to see him during his stopover there.
The Indian attitude,
is the result of Nehru's belief that the success
of India's Second Five-Year Plan depends on an effective
guarantee of freedom of transit through the canal and the
Indian prime minister's unwillingness to depend on Nasr
for this.
Comment Nehru reportedly was dissatisfied with
what he considered to be Menon's sharing
of a position with the USSR at the London conference.
Congress Party parliament members that India's econoniic in-
terests could be better served by the Dulles formula than
the Soviet position,
Nehru reportedly has also given a gen-
eral directive on Suez to Indian newspapers, and his attitude
may be reflected in editorial criticism of Nasr's action on
the canal which appeared for the first time on 2 September.
6 Sept 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 5
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414,. FRANCE MAY LINK SUEZ "WAR" TO
ALGERIAN REFORMS
The French government intends to
balance sanctions against Egyptian
premier. Nasr with the announcement
of radical political reforms in Algeria,
Premier Mollet
has decided to offer a decentralized federal status to
Algeria and to invite the rebels to negotiate on this basis.
Announcement of this concession might be delayed, however,
if. Nasr backs down before 15 September or if military ac-
tion is not taken against him.
Military action would pre-
sumably be pegged to the resignation of canal pilots and the
consequent need to keep the canal open.
Comment Monet will meet Lacoste, the French
minister residing in Algeria, this week
end and may try to gain his support for a modification of
the "pacification first" policy by reassuring Lacoste of Paris'
intention to deal firmly with Nasr.
Ambassador Dillon in Paris does not be-
lieve the cabinet has, as yet, decided to employ force, but
he reports a growing French feeling that military action may
become necessary.
6 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
ST:CR FT
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5,. PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT THREATENED
Armed violence may occur in Panama
as a result of the reported decision
by leaders of three opposition politi-
cal factions and anti-American stu-
dents to support a strike by the Com-
munist-dominated auto transport
workers' union. President-elect
Ernesto de la Guardia appears just-
ilea in ms iears� expressed publicly on 4 September, that
the objective of the strike would be to promote disorders
aimed at preventing his inauguration on 1 October.
Representatives of the union, the
university students' strike committee, and opposition
leaders--including two former presidents--met and de-
cided on 4 September to co-operate in a joint strike pro-
gram and to attack the Panama National Guard headquarters
and other nubile hnildintrs
the student leaders
uotainea a promise trom tne otners at the meeting for sup-
port in demonstrations against the American embassy,
"including possible violence," These actions are allegedly
planned for sometime between 5 and 12 September.
The students' strike committee has
numerous leftist anti rommimicd- members,
6 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
SECT FT
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fL BRAZILIAN DENUNCIATION OF ATOMIC PACTS WITH
UNITED STATES
Brazil's 30 August decree suspending
exports to the up of fissionable rare
earths and terminating a joint uranium
prospecting agreement is a tactical
victory for Communist and nationalist
forces. However, the move probably should not be con-
sidered as a shift in Brazil's basically pro-US foreign pol-
icy, according to the American embassy in Rio de Janeiro.
In signing the decree, the president
apparently hoped to end the bitter and embarrassing con-
troversy over the administration's alleged "selling out of
Brazil's interests" in fulfilling atomic materials contracts
signed by previous administrations. By this action Kubit-
schek may be seeking to weaken popular opposition to any
military bases agreement Brazil may make with the United
States in current negotiations.
The government action will almost cer-
tainly be followed by increased agitation in the Brazilian
congress for the creation of a state monopoly on atomic
materials.
6 Sept 56
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JP., Lilt, I
Nine'
7. POLITICAL CRISIS APPROACHING IN GREECE
Greek prime thinister Karamanlis' -
government feels itself seriously
threatened as a result of recent Cyprus
developments.
Karamanlis feels that his country's
allies are forcing him to seek support from the Soviet
bloc and Egyptian-dominated Arab states. Karamanlis re-
cently told the American charge that his government will
soon be forced either to revise its pro-Western foreign
policy or to resign.
The Greek government's increasing iso-
lation from its allies over the Cyprus issue is strengthen-
ing domestic advocates of neutralism. If Karamanlis should
fall, Greek frustrations over Cyprus would bring to power a
government susceptible to Communist influence in promot-
ing the Cypriot cause regardless of the effect on the country's
alliances.
6 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 5 September)
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of Israel has
flatly rejected all the United Nations Security Council proposals
for improving the Arab-Israeli border situation and strengthen-
ing the armistice machinery, according to UN truce supervisor
General Burns. Secretary General Hammarskjold, who sought
Arab and Israeli acceptance of these proposals this spring, said
he considered that Ben-Gurion's attitude closed the door to fur-
ther action by him unless the Security Council takes new steps.
Hammarskj old last spring obtained only partial and conditional ac-
ceptance of the UN proposals from the Arab states. Israel has
long maintained that Arab commitments to the armistice agree-
ments are worthless, and that the UN is incapable of obtaining
strict Arab compliance. Ben-Gurion's latest statement to Burns
probably stemnLafiaAcs on Aimr_
Arab raiders.
6 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
TOP .SFCRET
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BIWEEKLY SUMMARY
(23 August-5 September 1956)
THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Taiwan Strait Problem
1. There was no significant combat activity during the
period. (
2. Recent progress in the construction of the trans-Fukien
railroad suggests that the Communists may complete the line to
Amoy in November or December. Peiping has announced comple-
tion of the roadbed and the laying of tracks on 290 miles of the
422-mile line. Construction of the railway station at Amoy is un-
der way.
Mao Tse-tung told the
Laotians that, although Communist China desired to negotiate
with Chiang Kai-shek, it was in no hurry. This playing down of
the urgency of the Taiwan problem is in contrast to former Chi-
nese Communist statements which stressed the "inevitable" early
"liberation of Taiwan,"
6 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
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TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION
5 SEPTEMBER 1956
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