CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/09/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03178364
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: September 7, 1956

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
r Release: 2019/10/23 C03178364
7 September 1956
Copy No. / 0,57 3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE-. IN CLASS.
CLASS. CHANGE:0 TO: -11'
DECI.AS,-mF;d0
DATE REVIEWER:
//
4 NEXT REVIEW DATE:
/
AUTH: H 70-2
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
17F
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CONTENTS
1. EDEN RECALLS PARLIAMENT page 3).
2. FRENp,T_PIT!.LIC OPINION OPPOSED TO WAR OVER
SUEZ (page 4).
3. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY LEAVES REPORTED CANCELED
(page 5).
4, LEBANESE CHRISTIANS FEAR NASR SUEZ VICTORY WOULD
INCITE MOSLEM FANATICISM (page 6).
5. BRITISH COMMUNIST REPORTS ON ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
page 7).
6. MOVE TOWARD GREATER LIBERALISM CONTINUES IN
HUNGARY (page 9).
7. COMMUNIST-NENNI SOCIALIST BREAK MAY TAKE FOUR
OR FIVE MONTHS page 10).
THE ARAB - LI SITUATION
(page 11)
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1. EDEN RECALLS PARLIAMENT
Prime Minister Eden has called Par-
liament into special session on 12 Sep-
tember to seek renewed support in the
Suez crisis in view of heavy criticism
of the government's handling of the situation. Labor leader
Gaitskell's demand of 31 August for a special session was
rejected by Eden, drawing criticism even from the London
Times, which alone had been consistent in supporting the
government's actions on the Suez issue.
The cabinet presumably believes that
Nasr will reject the London conference proposals and that
the Cairo talks will be over by the time Parliament con-
venes.
Parliament will be in session on the eve
of what is widely regarded as the critical mid-September
period. British military plans for action against Evnt call
for completion of the build-up by 15 September.
n the 3rd Infantry Divisiom which is now in rea
�S-outhampton, the division is to move to the
Middle East immediately if the Menzies talks appear likely
to fail.
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*t00%
2. FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION OPPOSED TO WAR
OVER SUEZ
The French people, especially those
living outside of Paris, oppose force-
ful measures against Nasr, according
to a poll conducted by the French
interior Ministry.
he French ca11neL, wnien nas unanimously supported
Premier Monet's firm policy, may be in for a nasty shock
when it learns this, and that hitherto fire-eating deputies
who are now in their eon stituencies may also change their
tune0 opposition to forceful action ain-
ing ground in Paris in the past few days, and the
majority of permanent government officials feel this way.
the French Foreign Ministry
appears to be giving priority consideration to alternatives to
military action.
7,Sept 56
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slew Name
3. SOVIET BLOC MILITARY LEAVES REPORTED CANCELED
Reports of Communist origin circulating
in East Berlin assert that military leaves
in the Soviet bloc have been canceled be-
cause of the Suez crisis, according to the
press.
The action was said to have been taken
since Britain and France started their current military build-
up on Cyprus.
� Comment If true, such an action would indicate an
increase in Soviet concern over the Suez
dispute. These reports may be designed to impress on the
British and French the possibility of direct Soviet interven-
tion. There are no other indications of Soviet offers to Egypt
beyond "volunteers" and economic and military aid.
7,Sept 56
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4. LEBANESE CHRISTIANS FEAR NASR SUEZ VICTORY
WOULD INCITE MOSLEM FANATICISM
Christian leaders in Lebanon have ex-
pressed their concern to the American
embassy in Beirut on the future of
Christians in Lebanon and throughout
a yptian president Nasr attains a victory
in the Suez dispute and remains in power. They said that
Nasres success already had stimulated dormant Moslem
determination to subjugate the Christians, and expressed
the hope that there would be no peaceful solution of the
Suez crisis. They stated that "Moslem fanaticism, intol-
erance, and ambition" toward Middle Eastern Christians
and the West would subside for 30 or 40 years if Egypt were
defeated militarily, but conceded that a clash might have
bloody consequences for the Christian minority in Egypt.
Comment The Christian population, dominant in
Lebanon, has traditionally feared that
Lebanon would be "swallowed up" by the surrounding Arab
states. The rise of Nasr and the accompanying spurt of
Arab nationalism increased these fears. On 30 August
Lebanese army units were reportedly instructed to "stand
by" because of government fears that the Suez Canal dis-
pute might instigate local strife between Christians and
Moslems.
7 Sept 56
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74.1.1
Nog,
5. BRITISH COMMUNIST REPORTS ON ANTI-
STALIN CAMPAIGN
While in the Soviet Union from May to
July, Secretary General Gollan of the
British Communist Party was informed
that the decision for Khrushchev to at-
ii in a secret speech before the Soviet 20th Party
Congress was not taken until after the congress had con-
vened. B. N. Pono-
_
marev, a leading Soviet co-ordinator of foreign Communist
matters, told Gollan that the response to earlier revelations
within party circles of Stalin's crimes and the inadequacy
of the public statements against Stalin that had been made
during the early sessions of the congress resulted in the de-
cision.
Gollan, who asked for and was provided
with a Soviet text of the secret speech, said it was sub-
stantially the same as the American version. He illustrated
the determination of the Soviet party presidium to prevent a
recurrence of the "cult of personality" by citing a decision
that all presidium members would be provided with copies of
private letters addressed to any one member.
Gollan was much impressed with the pa-
tient and friendly reception given by Soviet leaders to his
criticisms of the Soviet party and to his blunt accounts of
the difficulties facing British Communists. The Soviet lead-
ers claimed that agitation over the more sensational aspects
of the anti-Stalin disclosures would soon subside, empha-
sized the importance of worldng-class unity, and warned the
British Communist Party against the danger of succumbing
to Social Democratic ideology.
Upon Gollan's return home, other British
Communists obliged him to amend his draft of a resolution
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summarizing the talks on the grounds that it implied that
the Soviet Union had satisfactorily answered the questions
on the "cult of personality" which had arisen in the British
party.
Comment The British Communist Party state-
ment issued on 16 July, after Gollan's
return to Britain, strongly endorsed the Soviet party reso-
lution of 30 June on de-Stalinization, but expressed the
belief that further light would be shed on some issues "still
not fully clarified' This qualification may have been the
amendment to Gollan's proposed draft.
7 Sept 56
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6. MOVE TOWARD GREATER LIBERALISM CONTINUES
IN HUNGARY
According to the American legation in
Budapest, the present Hungarian re-
gime's control of the political situation
now appears to be less effective than
agy s con r 53 and 1954. The legation comments
hat events since Rakosi's resignation in July have moved
aster and more favorably than most observers anticipated
t the time. It notes, however, that conflict continues be-
ween those wishing to cushion the effect of the Soviet 20th
Party Congress in Hungary and those willing or wishing to
permit a freer development of ideological thought and polit-
ical practice.
Comment Recent party statements dealing with
political, cultural and economic policy
indicate that the compromise decisions enunciated in the
mid-July central committee resolution are being modified
in order to conform more to the demands of the "moderate"
party elements and intellectuals who have been pressing
for more liberal internal policies.
The implementation of more liberal
policies would probably at least temporarily satisfy large
numbers of the party moderates, but would probably in-
crease dissatisfaction among the more doctrinaire Commu-
nists, including newly appointed party first secretary Gero.
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NINO"
7. COMMUNIST-NENNI SOCIALIST BREAK MAY TAKE
FOUR OR FIVE MONTHS
In a report to French premier Mollet
on the results of the Nenni-Saragat
meeting of 25 August, French Social-
ist leader Pierre Comrnin predicted
Italian Socialist reunification but
poflWd�tThfthe time was not yet ripe and that many dif-
ficulties, especially in the foreign policy field, remained.
He recommended strongly against putting pressure on Nenni
to break openly with Italian Communist chief Togliatti now.
Commin predicted that if Nenni were "left alone" he would
break with the Communists on foreign policy issues within
four or five months. He also predicted Nenni would adopt
policies that would make him acceptable in the Socialist
International within the next six months.
Although Commin had not received as-
surances from Nenni, he seemed to think Nenni would
shortly announce a change of position on NATO.
Comment Nenni differed from the Communist
position on both the Poznan riots and
the Suez issue.- On 26 August Nenni told the Italian press:
"We attacked the Atlantic pact during the period when it
appeared to us an element of imperialist offensive. We
recognize that the situation is no longer the same!' In a
statement on 3 September, however, he confined his views
on foreign affairs to a general expression of hope that the
world not be divided into two military blocs.
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 6 September)
According to King Saud, King Hussain of
Jordan desires to conclude a military agreement with Saudi
Arabia similar to that recently concluded between Jordan and
Syria. This agreement is believed to involve a joint military
command and a joint operations staff under the authority of the
Arab joint command in Cairo. Jordan's move toward co-opera-
tion with Saudi Arabia may be part of the price of major Egyptian-
Syrian-Saudi arms aid for Jordan's National Guard. King Saud
has invited military representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and
Lebanon to meet in Riyadh on 7 September to discuss measures
to improve defense of the Jordan-Israel border.
7 Sept 56
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