CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/04/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177893
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: April 26, 1960

/Zd frd WZZ WW.1 ,1:11:7/7,,,.
f
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
26 April 1960
Copy No. C 6s
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
111111UMENT NO 917
ND MANGE IN CLASS. A/-
O DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TOs T$ $
NEXT REVIEW DATE' c20/0
AUTHI HR
9 JUN 1980
DATE' RIVIEWERI
4-01110--Sfelt-E-T-
ji Ord id 7/777,,,,jel V', Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C031778930 filf/M ZIWZ/Z/Zd
Approved fo7rinere-asen:M707/73 C03177893
�Tap-crr-nor-T�
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
J�������-,������Ilell
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
26 APRIL 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev speech at Baku.
USSR--Lenin anniversary speaker refutes
Chinese Communist views on inevitabil-
ity of war. 0
USSR sounding out Turkey on subjects to
be discussed during Premier Menderes'
visit.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru and Chou En-lai fail to reach any
substantive agreement in New Delhi talks.�
President Bourguiba more concerned
that Tunisia will be caught in middle of
French-Algerian rebel fight.
Nationalists of Somalia and British Soma-
liland proclaim intention to form republic �
on 1 July.
�Afghan Prime Minister Daud in USSR,
probably trying to reach agreement on
future aid.
III. THE WEST
�Cuba appears to be using US more and
more as scapegoat for complex internal
problems.
LATE ITEMS
0 Laos--Incomplete election returns show
overwhelming conservative victory;
losers claim fraud, probably with jus-
tification.
�President Rhee's offer to resign and
other pledges appears to have mo-
mentarily calmed situation.
�Frrte�art�T�_
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
A:V\
� ,�.&`:.
Ak,\\
N N . \ \ \
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO3177893 .
. ,...-\
.L.CRET
%iv :me
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
�
,
\ \
26 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: In his 25 April speech in Baku, Premier Ithru-
shch-Frc-Fmbined a prediction that the "favorable" interna-
tional trend would continue after the summit with an effort
to increase pressure for Western concessions on the major
summit topics. As in previous statements, he sought to
create the impression that Soviet unilateral action on a sep-
arate German peace treaty could be dependent on the outcome
of the summit, while carefully avoiding committing the USSR
to such a position. rForeigp. Minister Gromyko also restated
the standard Soviet position on Berlin and Germany to Am-
bassadors Thompson and Bohlen, while hinting that an in-
terim Berlin solution was still negotiable. BoCKhrushchev
*Id Gromyksgtook an optimistic line on the chances for resolv-
ing the main issues of a nuclear test agreement, and Gromyko
stated that Khrushchev would be seeking a "concrete" e ision
on disarmament which could be translated into actionl
(Page 1)
USSR-China: The Soviet Union has used the major speech
given in Moscow for the Lenin anniversary celebration to re-
fute the views on the inevitability of war developed by the Chi-
nese Communists in their two Red Flag editorials on the occa-
sion of Lenin's birthday. Attributing the views not to the Chinese
but to "bold publicists in the West," the speaker, Presidium mem-
ber Otto Kuusinen, asserted that such ideas are one-sided, obso-
lete dogmatism and that today the policy of peaceful coexistence,
as developed by Lenin and followed by the USSR, is the "only
correct and vital policy." (Page 3)
USSR-Turkey: EA Soviet diplomat in Turkey is reported to
be taking soundings on political subjects which could be discusse
during Premier Menderes' visit to Moscow in July, presumably
to determine how far the Turks are willing to go in their talks)
o.4
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
Z \ N
\
. Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
4\
I
IJo
arith Khrushchev. Ankara has earlier indicated that it is ready
to conclude cultural and health agreements and possibly an eco-
nomic agreement with the USSR, but that Turkey will continue
to base its forPign noliev on the military pacts with its Western
alliej (Page 4)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
India = Communist China: The failure of Nehru and Chou
En-lai to reach any substantive agreement as a result of their
six days of talks in New Delhi makes it almost certain that re-
lations between New Delhi and Peiping will remain strained for
some time. While neither side was willing to budge from its
basic position, both apparently hoped to reduce tension along
the frontier and agreed, in a communique on 25 April, to es-
tablish a joint panel of officials to study evidence supporting
respective border, claims. These lower level meetings from
June to September are likely, to accomplish little beyond keep-
ing the border problem on the diplomatic level.
(Page 5)
Tunisia: tepped-up activities by the French and Algerian
rebel elements along the Algerian-Tunisian frontier, together
with rebel efforts to "internationalize" the war by recruiting a
"foreign legion," have aggravated President Bourguiba's fear. that
Tunisia will be caught in the middle. The President publicly
warned France on 24 April against further border incursions,
(Page 7)
Somalia - British Somaliland: aTationalists of the Italian-
administered trust territory of Somalia and of the British Soma-
liland Protectorate announced on 22 April, at the conclusion of
VLa week-long conference, their intention to unite the two terri-
tories under a new "Somali Republic" on 1 July. The conferees
apparently also reached agreement on the composition of a)
26 Apr 60
DAILY BRIEF
SECRET
pproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
' �
\
S.
�
���
;����:
�
aational assembly, the selection of a president, and the formation
of a coalition government. Ethiopia, apprehensive over, the at-
traction such a union would present to its large Somali minority
is reported to have increased its security forces in the Somali
border areas. (Page 8)
Afghanistan-USSR: Afghan Prime Minister Daud, who is in
the USSR for a three-week vacation, is probably trying to settle
points of disagreement over future economic and cultural pro-
rams which apparently arose during Khrushchev's visit to Kabul
n early March. If Da,ud is successful in eliminating objectionable
*Soviet conditions, a new agreement for Soviet assistance to Afghan-
istan's next five-year plan (1961-1966) may be announced at a later
eit date. (Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Cuba: Complex internal problems are impelling the Castro
regime more and more to use the United States as a scapegoat.
_ Ambassador Bonsai believes these internal tensions and Castro's
eaction to them may mount to dangerous extremes on May Day,
0
with possible danger to American lives and property. The am-
bassador considers Castro's 22 April television attack on the US
to be the strongest, most direct, and most insulting to date.
(Page 10)
LATE ITEMS
*Laos: Conservative candidates appear to have achieved an
overwhelming victory. in Sunday's National Assembly elections. In-
complete returns indicate that Communist or pro-Communist can-
didates won very few seats, if any. The defeated leader of the fel-
low-traveling Santiphab party has charged, probably with justifica-
tion, that the elections were "faked" and claims to have photographic
evidence of election imgularities. The apparent manipulation of the
vote may bring on an intensification of guerrilla attacks by the Com-
munist insurgents and would weaken the prestige of the new govern-
ment to be formed after 10 May.
26 Apr AiILY BRIEF
iii
NApproved for Release: 2020/03/13
C03177893\
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
trfiVrriVritrrritt
�gorse
*South Korea: The National Assembly has requested
that President Rhee immediately resign as he had earlier
offered and has called for new presidential elections. Rhee's
resignation probably will place control in the hands of a care-
taker government now being formed. Such a government will
require military support. Martial law probably will be con-
tinued.
The populace, encouraged by the successes of its mass
action, probably will be easily aroused to take violent action
again should there be any delay in carrying out reforms or
if popular expectations are not satisfied.
26 Apr 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
CONFIDENTIAL
I Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
..LCI-CL, 1
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ithrushchev Reviews Soviet Position on Summit Topics
In his 25 April speech in Baku, Premier Khrushchev outlined
in standard terms the Soviet position on the major East-West is-
sues which he intends to take up at the summit. Prefacing his
statements with a prediction that the present "favorable" trend in
international affairs will continue after the meeting in Paris, Khru-
shchev singled out disarmament as the first item for discussion,
to be followed by the German and Berlin questions.
The Soviet leader sought to build up pressure for Western con-
cessions on Berlin by repeating his threat to sign a separate peace
treaty with East Germany. Although he did not spell out the timing,
by discussing the problem in the general context of the May meet-
ing he again gave the impression that lack of progress at the sum-
mit could be followed by such a treaty. In a further effort to urge
the West to seek an interim solution on Berlin, he repeated, as he
recently, did in Paris, his claim that a separate treaty would end
all Western occupation rights, including access to Berlin. an a
private conversation with Ambassador's Thompson and Bohlen,
Foreign Minister Gromyko also restated the standard Soviet posi
tion on a peace treaty and a free city, while hinting that an interim
agreement could be negotiatecij
Ithrushchev adhered closely to the Soviet position taken at the
disarmament talks in char:Ong that the West continues to substitute
control for disarmament. K4yomyko stated that at the summit Khru-
shchev would be seeking a "concrete" decision on disarmament,
which could be translated into future actionq This approach provides
further evidence that Moscow will press for a joint statement en-
dorsing the main principles of a treaty for "complete and general
disarmament" which the Soviet delegation at Geneva could represent
as a directive to proceed with the Soviet plan.
, On the question of nuclear tests, Khrushchev said he intended to
conduct serious negotiations at the summit, adding an optimistic
SECRET
26 Apr 60 CEIX-pp-ro'v'edfo�r-Relrase: 20-20/032.1.376i 77893 Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
-S-EeltE=F
assessment that a treaty could be concluded, in view of the
Eisenhower-Macmillan 29 March statement proposing a volun-
tary moratorium on small underground tests. The Soviet pre-
mier, however, implied that the lenetl) of the moratorium would
be a key question.
26 Apr 60
rCkk.1.711 A I 11. rrrl I ri I is I
"''-'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
CONFIDEMLIAL
The USSR Fterates Chinese Views
The Soviet Union has used the major speech given in Mos-
cow in commemoration of Lenin's 90th birthday to refute the
views recently expressed by the Chinese Communists in their
two Red Flag editorials on the same occasion. Attributing the
Chinese views to "bold publicists in the West," presidium mem-
ber Otto Kuusinen, without mentioning Communist China, con-
demned those who assert that Lenin was an opponent of peace-
ful coexistence.
Claiming that "these falsifiers" take from Lenin's works
only those passages which support their own thesis, Kuusinen
maintained that Lenin developed the idea of peaceful economic
competition in the world. Contradicting the Chinese, who in-
sist that wars are inevitable so long as imperialism exists,
Kuusinen stated that the conclusions reached at the 20th and
21st party congresses about "the absence of inevitability of
wars in our epoch" are "a new contribution to Marxism."
Kuusinen noted that to be loyal to Marxism-Leninism to-
day it is not enough to repeat the old truth that imperialism is
aggressive--as the Chinese do. To look on only this one side
of the question is "dogmatism," he said, and such dogmatism is
obsolete. Kuusinen alleged that Lenin foresaw long ago that
"the time will come when war will become so destructive as to
be impossible."
In developing the theme that the strength of the socialist
world will soon be such that it cannot fail to win out in peace-
ful competition, Kuusinen made the interesting observation that
the significance of violence is soon exhausted, but that "influ-
ence and example will tell." He asserted, therefore, that the
Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, now being followed by
the Soviet Union, is the only correct and vital policy.
Kuusinen's observation echoes Khrushchev's admonition in
Peiping last September that Communists should not "test the
stability of the capitalist system by force." The speech as a
whole is an expression of Khrushchev's view that bloc coun-
tries should do nothing to jeopardize forthcoming negotiations
in which the West will have no choice but to make accommoda-
tions to Cpmmunist demands Ilecause of the shift in the balance
of power.
CONFIDENTIAL
26 Apr 60 Caik-p-prOVed`f-c7r-Rele-ase:-2-02CO3/13 C63177893 Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
-Jur
Moscow Sounding Out Turks on Khrushchev-Menderes Talks
be Soviet Govertiment is appadnIly seeking to determine
how far the Turks are willing to go in discussing political sub-
jects during Premier Menderese visit to Moscow in July. A
Soviet diplomat in Ankara is reported to have recently consulted
a prominent Turkish lawyer with excellent contacts among high-
er Turkish officials to get his reaction to the Khrushchev-Men-
deres exchange of visits and to specific subjects which might be
brought up for discussiotit7
arj particular, the diplomat was anxious to elicit a reaction
to a possible Soviet suggestion that Turkey reduce its armed
forces. While it is highly unlikely that Menderes would enter
into serious discussions with Khrushchev on this subject, So-
viet policy-makers may be planning to use the announcement on
14 January by Khrushchev of a 1,200,000-man cut in the Soviet
military establishment to urge that Turkey should "match" the
reduction as a contribution to ending the cold war. Following
Khrushchev's statement, the Supreme Soviet appealed to other
governments for military cutbacks, and Soviet spokesmen have
repeatedly criticized the Western powers for failing to responc_lj
&Ilhile Turkey agreed to the exchange of visits largely in
order to put itself in better position to take advantage of any
improvement in East-West relations following the summit meet-
ing in May, Turkish officials have emphasized they envisage
no change in their firmly anti-Communist foreign policy0
rurkey plans to conclude only cultural, health, and veterinary
agreements with the USSR. and possibly an economic agreemerig
the Soviet ambassador
has complained that the atmosphere in Turkey is "not very warm"
for Khrushchev's reception this evalua-
tion is correct and he has informed US officials that Ank7
no intention of taking measures to improve the climatD
26 Apr 60
TOP SECRET
CEKITEI A I IkITCI I irtckirc DliiiCTIKI
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
SEUKL I
NEW
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru-Chou Talks Fail to Produce Border Agreement
The inability of Prime Minister Nehru and Chinese Premier
Chou En-lai to make any real headway toward a border agree-
ment during their six days of talks in New Delhi makes it almost
certain that Sino-Indian relations will continue strained for
some time. The two leaders admitted in a joint communique
on 25 April that while their "long, frank, and friendly talks"
had led to a better understanding of their opposing views, they
"did not resolve the differences that had arisen."
ksTeither Nehru nor Chou retreated from his basic position on
the border issue. Nehru,
during the first three days or talks, insistently argued that In-
dia was the injured party and that the next conciliatory move
was up to the Chinese. He apparently refused to accept any
agreement based on the status quo, demanding Chinese mili-
tary withdrawal from Ladakh as a condition for any substantive
negotiations. Other top Indian Government officials reportedly
were even more outspoken in expressing New Delhi's indigna-
tion over Chinese actions in the border are_p_._..3
Ehou reportedly met this uncompromising attitude with
equal obstinacy, insisting that "rightful" Chinese occupation
of disputed territory constitutes a prime criterion of owner-
ship and holding that the entire border is undelimited, there-
fore subject to negotiatio!lj, During his stay in India, Chou
hinted broadly in public that acceptance of the Chinese posi-
tion could lead to an eventual exchange of disputed areas in
Assam for those in Ladakh. Attempting at the same time to
salvage some good will, Chou restated his old assurances
that Peiping would not send troops across the McMahon line,
even though the line "is completely unacceptable to China."
Nehru and Chou agreed to turn the border discussions
over to subordinate officials of both countries, who will meet
26 Apr Apr 60
cEt.11-13 A I IkITCI I Ir'�C1.-1/^C DI II I CTIkl
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
bLC,Ifr.
*gm,
from June to September to "examine, check, and study" the
historical evidence each side has advanced in support of its
territorial claims. These officials are not empowered to
recommend a solution but only to draft a report on points
of "agreement and disagreement." "Every effort" will be
made during this period to avoid further border clashes. These
meetings, to be held in Peiping and New Delhi, are likely to
accomplish little beyond keeving a channel open for eventual
negotiations.
-SEC-RET
26 Apr 60
Cp.ITD A I IkITCI I letckir.c DI II cTIK.I
'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
C;UPIVIDEN1 'IA L
Tunisian Presidefit Warns France affd Rebels
resident Bourguiba, striving to maintain Tunisia's offi-
cial noninvolvement in the conflict in Algeria, recently warned
both France and the Algerian rebels to refrain from actions
which would compromise his government's position. In a bel-
ligerent speech on 24 April he warned France: "Tunisia is
capable of successfully conducting a war if she is obliged to
do so by aggressions." He was referring to a series of recent
border incidents which have arisen from the stepped-up activi-
ties of both French and Algerian rebel troops in the Algerian-
Tunisian frontier areaaj
ageanwhile, the President is believed to have admonished
the Algerian rebels in Tunisia not to engage in any activities
near the border which might stimulate such French retaliation,
as ground fire against concentrations of Algerian military units
on the Tunisian side of the border, Bourguiba also apparently
told Algerian officials that any new materiO must cross with-
out delay from Libya to Algeria, without assembly or stockpil-
ing in Tunisia0
&he Tunisian foreign minister has indicated that the efforts
of the Algerians to "internationalize" the conflict, particularly
the acceptance of "volunteers" from other states, would pose a
problem for his country. He said that any Tunisians volunteer-
ing would lose their citizenship. In the case of foreigners, Tunis
would hold their own governments responsible for their actions
in Tunis 1a)
CONFIDENTIAL
26 Apr 60 CEV-pp-ro'v'edfo�r-Rele�as-e': .2-0.20/03./.1.3766.177893 Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
Somalia and ritish Protectorate Intend to F....sn Union
6Tationalist leadrstoi me nanan-agtmimstered trust terri-
tory of Somalia and of the British Somaliland Protectorate an-
nounced on 22 April, at the conclusion of a week-long conference,
their intention to unite the two territories under a "Somaliland
Republic" on 1 Julyj
[Britain has invited protectorate leaders to London in May
and apparently hopes to dampen enthusiasm for early independ-
ence and union. Various British officials have expressed doubts,
however, about their ability to influence developments, and Lon-
don might considerably shorten the present tentative schedule
calling for independence in two or three year
Cihe conferees- -who met in Mogadiscio, capital of Somalia and
the designated capital of the new state--released a joint communi-
que at the end of the conference outlining their plans for the union.
The legislative bodies of the two territories are to merge to form
the new national assembly which will elect a president to head a
coalition government formed by the political parties now in power
in the respective countriyq
e agreement appears to be a major victory for Somalia's
Prime Minister Issa. He was believed to favor a loose associa-
tion with the protectorate in order to prevent upsetting the deli-
cate tribal balance which would permit him to remain in power,
but he now appears to have executed a clever, political maneuver
which probably will strengthen the position of his party and greatly
enhance his own popularity. In return for agreeing to accept the
protectorate's plan for total integration, Issa apparently received
�a pledge of support from the protectorate leaders as either prime
minister or president of the new state_D
(Addis Ababa is apprehensive over the attraction such a union
would present to the nomadic Somalis who inhabit Ethiopia's Ogaden
region, and has substantially increased its security forces in the
Somali border areas during the past year. Three battalions of Im-
perial Body Guard troops�Ethiopia's elite fighting force�report-
edly were moved into this area recentV
SECRET
26 Apr 60 CErA-p-prOfedloT-T4ele-:"2-00/-0-3713-6-63;177893 Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
;1144"SteKti
Afghan Prime Minister Daud Talks With Ithrushchev
Afghan Prime Minister Daud, who began a three-week vaca-
tion in the USSR on 14 April, is probably trying to settle points
of disagreement with Moscow over future economic and cultural
programs. Daud's sudden visit to the USSR suggests he believes
that high-level policy problems require further discussion be-
tween himself and Soviet officials. These problems were appar-
ently first recognized as serious during Khrushchev's visit to
Kabul in early March and accounted for the tense atmosphere at
Khrushchey's departure.
The Afghans are probably concerned that Soviet proposals for
closer economic and cultural cooperation may undercut Afghan-
istan's neutrality and independence. Soviet officials apparently
tried unsuccessfully to secure an outlet for "cultural" propaganda
by establishing a binational cultural center in Kabul under the
terms of the cultural agreement signed by 1C.hrushchev and Daud.
his government "continually reminds" the USSR that
an ideological campaign "or any other kind of propaganda activ-
ity" in Afghanistan would shake close Afghan-Soviet relations "to
their foundations."
[mother source of friction could be a reported Soviet proposal
to place Soviet personnel in the Afghan bureaucracy to expedite im-
plementation of future economic assistance programs. The USS
will probably insist that future large-scale economic assistance
for Afghanistan's Second Five-Year Plan (19614966) consist of
loans rather than grants, while Afghanistan's policy is to accept
only grant aid until it can service additional debttj
Daud reportedly met Khrushchev at Sochi on 24 April.
TOP SECRET
26 Apr 60 s�rn Al IL r..r1 10.�11L10.41.. 111 III IL '
`-uApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893 Page 9
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893-
--T-ef"3EeRer
III. THE WEST
Castro's Growing Problems Impelling Him Toward More and
Stronger. Attacks on US
Cuba's increasingly complex domestic problems are impel-
ling the Castro regime more and more to use the United States as
a scapegoat. Ambassador Bonsai, believes these internal tensions
and Castro's reaction to them may mount to dangerous levels on
May Day, when the regime plans to stage mass demonstrations of
loyalty highlighted by parades of workers' and students' militias
and addresses by Castro and other top officials. Workers in five
of Cuba's six provinces are being offered free transportation to
Havana for the May Day events. In view of the bitterness against
the United States which Castro, other top officials, and the pro
government press are attempting to promote, the atmosphere on
1 May could produce serious incidents against the lives and prop-
erty of US citizens.
Castro, in a television appearance on 22 April, described
United States policy toward Cuba as "fascist, Goebbels-like, and
a betrayal of the principles for which thousands died in the past
war against fascism." Ambassador Bonsal described this attack
on the United States as Castro's strongest, most direct, and most
insulting to date.
1he political situation has become serious, "creating
great expectations with the approach of 1 May, the date on which
It is hoped that Castro will define the ideological orientation of this
government (with respect to Communism) before a crowd of a mil-
lion people. . . It is felt that the moment for a definition has ar-
rived. . . Confusion is widespread, discouragement. . . and even
despondency."
In Oriente Province, once Castro's stronghold,
support for Castro is declining
26 Apr 60 CE V"� A I � M."' I ".."""k
I I
.Approved for Release: 2620/63/1. I .
3 703k I 177893 Page 10
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
TOP SECRET
among all classes, overnment intervention in
business and agriculture has cut off many sources of private in-
come and has led to an economic recession.
all attention is focused on the economic situation
and that the Communist issue is not an important factor in the
discontent.
26 Apr 60
TOP SECRET
11111 Al Ilk mr9 1k ni II I r�VII I Page 11
%-i-Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
erimrincmrru A
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
� Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
ind-txrrirrtnarrry_A-r___
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893 4
lior � Emma wlb.�.
-TOP-SECRET-
for Release: 2020/03/13 C 03177893W,, Z