CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/04/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177890
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: April 19, 1960

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19 19 April 1960
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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19 APRIL 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru still believes talks with Chou En-
lai starting tomorrow will result only in
routine statement and establishment of
joint commission to pave way for nego-
tiations; but some form of Indian conces-
sion may be unavoidable. 0
Demonstrations spread in South Korea
against rigging of last month's presiden-
tial election; Rhee regime may adopt
more forceful repression measures.
Djakarta press, with army encourage-
ment, criticizes Sukarno and projected
new parliament; this seen by some as
"groundwork" for possible move against
Sukarno by General Nasution.
Bland communique marks end of UAR
President's six-day official visit to Pak-
istan.
UAR and Lebanese dockworkers declare
boycott of all US shipping; no indication
this will affect Suez Canal passage.
0 Moroccan and Tunisian governments
concerned over possibility that antici-
pated stepped-up Algerian-French hos-
tilities will lead to new incidents within
their boundaries.
Critical attitude of Congolese national-
ists suggests economic round-table con-
ference in Belgium this month will be
acrimonious and probably inconclusive.
South African prime minister's condi-
tion reportedly not good, despite op-
timistic statements put out by govern-
ment.
III. THE WEST
0 Fidel Castro evidently worried about
inability thus far to suppress guerrillas
operating in Sierra Maestra.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
India-Communist China: [Nehru continues to feel that
his talks with Chou En-lai which begin tomorrow will result
in nothing beyond a routine statement of peaceful intentions
and the establishment of a joint commission to pave the way
for future negotiations. Pressure from both domestic and in-
ternational quarters for holding firm on India's stated posi-
tion seems to have restricted Nehru's room for maneuver.
Some form of concession, however, may be unavoidable as
the talks progres2A (Page 1)
*South Korea: Demonstrations protesting the Rhee regime's
rigging of last month's presidential election have spread from
Masan to Seoul, Inchon, and the Pusan area, and the government
has proclaimed "preparatory" martial law. Attempts by demon-
strators to storm the presidential mansion on Tuesday were re-
41) pulsed by gunfire. The Rhee administration is intensifying its
efforts to substantiate its claims that Communist subversion
Is responsible for the disturbances. ;Page 2)
Indonesia: The anti-Communist press in Djakarta, with the
active encouragement of the army, is directing an unprecedented
campaign of criticism against President Sukarno and his projected
new parliament. Sukarno is out of the country on the third week
of his eight-week world tour. he American Embassy reports
that the consensus in informed circles in Djakarta is that the ar-
IA) 0 my is deliberately whipping up public sentiment as "groundwork"
In the event army leader General Nasution decides to take power.
Nasution thus far has not committed himself to such a move, part-
ly because of uncertainty over how much he could count on unified
anti-Communist supporg (Page 3)
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Pakistan-UAR: Nasir's six-day official visit to Pakistan
ended on 16 April with a bland joint communique announcing
a cultural agreement and trade discussions. Although the
visit produced a show of amity on some issues such as Al-
geria and South Africa, Pakistan's alignment with the West
will probably limit the extent of its cooperation with the neu-
tralist UAR. Nasir's public offer on 15 April of his good of-
fices in the Kashmir dispute will please the Pakistanis but an-
noy the Indians, who claim that Kashmir is already an integral
part of India and that this is no longer a live issue.
UAR- Lebanon: UAR and Lebanese dockworkers have de�
clared a boycott of all US shipping in retaliation for the picket-
ing of the UAR freighter Cleopatra in New York by the Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Association and the Seafarers' Interna-
tional Union protesting the UAR boycott of ships which have
traded with Israel. American vessels may be denied supplies
and other facilities in UAR and Lebanese ports, but there is no
indication of any plans for restrictions on their use of the Suez
Canal. The UAR is urging other Arab states to join in the boy-
cott. (Page 4)
North Africa: The Moroccan and Tunisian governments are
concerned over the possibility that anticipated stepped-up hostil-
ities between the French Army and the Algerian rebels will lead
to new incidents within Moroccan and Tunisian boundaries. The
Moroccan Foreign Ministry has formally protested an alleged
French "bombardment" of Moroccan soil on 14 April. Tunisia's
President Bourguiba has publicly warned that his country will re-
sist any French incursions; he said Tunisia had rejected a French
request that Tunisian residents be evacuated from frontier areas.
(Page 5)
Belgian Congo: The growing belligerency of leading Congo-
lese nationalists toward Belgium's economic role in the Congo
suggests that the economic round-table conference scheduled to
begin in Brussels on 25 April will be acrimonious and probably in-
conclusive. The Congolese plan in particular to attack as inadequate
19 Apr 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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the measures taken by the Belgians to prevent the flight of cap-
ital from the Congo, which has amounted to about $150,000,000
since January 1959. The Congolese are also likely to oppose
Brussels' plan for Belgian management of the budget and of the
national banking system. (Page 6)
*South Africa: 1ontrary to the optimistic statements put
out by the South African Government, Prime Minister Verwoprrit
condition is not good,
The damage suffered in me w April attack has probably affected
his brain, and he may never again resume his dominating role in
the government. Meanwhile, the government has no real leader,
and violent disagreements reportedly have developed in the cab-
inet and in Nationalist party circles over the selection of an act-
ing prime minister. Minister of Lands Paul Sauer and Finance
Minister Theophilus Don es are said t
didates
III. THE WEST
I I V
Cuba: Fidel Castro is apparently worried about his inability
thus far 'to suppress the guerrilla bands now operating in the rug-
ged Sierra Maestra, where outlaw bands have traditionally sought
refuge. I. high-level Cuban Communist leader, Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez, has also indicated concerg The guerrilla activity
will be a test of the support Castro claims to have among the peas-
ants of the Sierra Maestra, since the guerrillas cannot operate
there long without peasant support. (Page 7)
19 Apr 60 DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indians Remain Dubious About Outcome of Nehru-Chou Talks
Official circles and press commentators in New Delhi are
Increasingly doubtful that the talks between Prime Minister Nehru
and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai beginning on 20 April will pro-
duce definitive results. Nehru reportedly continues to feel that
the meeting will result only in agreement on a general easing of
Sino-Indian tension, steps to eliminate the risk of further border
incidents, and the establishment of some form of joint commis-
sion to study the border problem and prepare for future substan-
tive negotiations.
tNehru's attitude toward the frontier question has hardened
recently, apparently as a result of domestic and international
pressures to maintain a firm position combined with increasing
indications that the Chinese intend to be less conciliatory in deeds
than in words. Nehru probably has been influenced by admonition
from President Prasad, cabinet colleagues, opposition leaders,
and the press, some of whom may fear that Nehru will be maneu-
vered by Chou into a position where he feels some concession is
required to maintain India's reputation for conciliatory policies.
In addition, both Nasir and Sukarno during their recent visits re-
portedly urged Nehru to stand firm in order not to weaken Asian
resistance to Communist aggression.]
Chou, who arrives in New Delhi on 19 April following his stay
in Burma, probably will get a polite but cold reception from most
of the Indian public during his six-day visit. Chou may offer to ex-
change Chinese claims in Assam for clear title to Ladakh. In
Rangoon, he stated that a mutual "exchange" of territory had been
successfully negotiated--an effort to use the Sino-Burmese agree-
ment as a precedent.
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Seoul Attempting to Attribute Spreading Unrest to
Communist Subversion
Demonstrations protesting the rigging of the South Korean
presidential elections and demanding the release of Masan stu-
dents seized by the police have spread to Seoul, Inchon, and
Pusan. The police are still using conventional riot-control
procedures to restore order, but influential elements in the
government favor more extreme measures. President Rhee
and other ruling party leaders have already publicly expressed
their determination to deal harshly with demonstrators.
The possibility of violent repression is underscored by ef-
forts of the regime, on the basis of what appears to be flimsy
evidence, to attribute the disturbances to Communist subver-
sion. Government-controlled newspapers are giving Commu-
nist instigation of the riots heavy play.
the Masan riots were caused
by Communist subversives ordered the police to "ferret out"
the spies and determine if "spy-agitators" are behind the demon-
strations in various localities.
0 National Police announcement on 17 April that the tear-gas
bombs used to restore order in Masan were supplied under a
United States aid program could be an attempt to imply Ameri-
can support for the government's actions. Last year the authori-
ties based the closing of the outspoken pro-opposition Kyonghyan
Sinmun, South Korea's second largest newspaper, on i US mili-
tary government ordinance rather than on the newly revised Na-
tional Security Law.]
19 Apr 60
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Indonesian Army Encourages Anti-Sukarno Press Campaign
Rumors and reports continue that the army, supported by
non-Communist political elements, will attempt a coup either
during President Sukarnob absence or shortly after his return
from a global tour in early June. Principal evidence support-
ing these rumors is the army's active encouragement of a vig-
orous and unprecedentedly critical campaign by the anti-Com-
munist press against President Sukarno and his newly_ appointed
parliament. The leftist press, which has defended Sukarno and
the parliament, is hampered by newsprint shortages, and the
Communist daily has been banned for the past three weeks.
The consensus in informed circles in Djakarta, however, is
that the intent of the army's press campaign is to prepare the pub-
lic in case Army Chief of Staff and Security Minister General
Nasution should decide to take some form of anti-Sukarno action.
Such action could be limited to blocking the installation of the ne
parliament in June or to preventing Sukarno from including Com-
munists in a revised cabinet.] Nasution thus far has not com-
mitted himself to any decisive anti-Sukarno move, presumably
because of his assessment of Sukarno's power position and in
part because of uncertainty over unified anti-Communist support.
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UAR and Lebanese Dockworkers Boycott American Shipping
In retaliation for the picketing of the UAR freighter Cleo-
patra in New York, UAR longshoremen have declared a boy-
cott of American ships, which may also be denied supplies and
other facilities in UAR ports. Longshoremen in Beirut and
Aden are reported ready to take similar action against Ameri-
can shipping. The UAR is urging dockworkers throughout the
Arab world to join in the boycott; the executive council of the
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions reportedly
will meet on 20 April to discuss the situation.
Members of the International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion and the Seafarers' International Union have been picketing
the UAR freighter Cleopatra in New York since 12 April, and
loading of the ship has been halted. Their action is in protest
against the UAR's boycott of ships which have traded with Israel.
Cairo news media claim the demonstration is Zionist sponsored
and that it is a "last desperate effort by Zionists to break the
UAR economic blockade of Israel and force passage of the Suez
Canal."
The picketing of the Cleopatra has been hailed by the Israeli
press as a possible turning point in Israel's struggle for Suez
passage. The Israelis are hopeful that picketing of UAR ships
will spread to ports in other countries and that the incident will
publicize the blockage of Israel's shipping through the canal and
inspire support for overcoming these restrictions. The UAR,
on the premise that a state of war still exists between it and
Israel, bans from the canal ships chartered by Israel or by
firms in which Israelis have part ownership, as well as Israeli
ships and cargoes. On 10 April the greek ship Astypalea was
released from Port Said after nearly five months of detention.
It had been chartered by an Israeli firm to carry cement from
Haifa to Djibouti via the canal. The cargo was unloaded before
the vessel's release. qi_n Israeli Foreign Ministry official has
said that ships with cargoes from Israel will continue to be
sent through the canal "from time to time.")
-CONFIDENTIAL-
19 Apr 60
CENTD A I ikrrei rim III i�rik
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CONFIDENTIAL
Morocco and Tunisia Fear Expanded Algerian Conflict
The Moroccan and Tunisian governments are again ex-
pressing concern over the possibility that hostilities between
the French Army and the Algerian rebels will lead to new in-
cidents within Morocco and Tunisia. The possibility that the
rebels will launch a spring offensive has revived fears that
the French military forces will retaliate against Algerian
bases in Morocco and Tunisia.
The Moroccan Foreign Ministry is reported to have for-
mally and energetically protested an alleged French bombard-
ment of Moroccan soil for several hours on 14 April. The
French Foreign Ministry claims the alleged incident occurred
inside Algeria. President Bourguiba publicly warned France
on 15 April that Tunisia would resist any French incursions.
He said that Tunisia had rejected a French note asking that
Tunisian residents be evacuated from the border area.
The French charge d'affaires in Tunis told the American
Embassy he had pointed out to the Tunisian Government the
increased danger for Tunisians in the vicinity of rebel in-
stallations in Tunisia resulting from French fire against Al-
gerians who are in the process of crossing the border. He
stressed, however, that France had not raised any claim re-
garding the right of "hot pursuit" either by French ground or
air forces, which remained under instructions against incur-
sions into Tunisian territory. In Paris, the Foreign Ministry
issued a formal denial that the government had made any al-
lusion to the right of pursuit.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Congolese Critical of Bekian Economic Policies
Leading Congolese nationalists Patrice Lumumba and
Joseph Kasavubu are increasingly critical of Belgium's pol-
icies in regard to the Congo's deteriorating economic situa-
tion. They believe that Brussels has taken inadequate meas-
ures to halt a serious capital drain which since January 1959
has exceeded the normal capital outflow by at least $150,000,-
000. This represents the remissions of both companies and
private individuals. The currency drain and a growing short-
age of investment capital may have serious political conse-
quences for the government to be formed in June.
Several months ago, Belgian and Congolese leaders agreed
to hold economic discussions beginning on 25 April. Brussels
has hoped to obtain agreements which would provide for Bel-
gium's continued controlling influence in the Congo's financial
affairs following its independence on 30 June. Specifically,
Belgians would continue for several years to manage budget
affairs, the national banking system, and the comptroller's
office until Congolese could be trained in financial affairs.
Recently, Congolese criticism of Belgium's financial admin-
istration has mounted, and both Lumumba and Kasavubu will
probably come to the Brussels talks in a belligerent mood. They
are likely to demand a complete inventory of official and private
Belgian interests in the Congo and may seek extensive financial
changes involving the return of foreign exchange credits and
tax receipts from semi-official companies operating in the Congo.
Further complications would arise if the Congolese persist in
their argument that any agreements reached at the April conference
would not be binding on the government to be formed in June. In
this case, the Congo would achieve independence without giving
Brussels legal guarantees for Belgian property or ensuring its
paramount influence in the local economic situation.
FIDENTIAL
19 Apr 60
CFKITRAI INTELLInENCE BULLETIN
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III. THE WEST
Persistence of Guerrilla Action Apparently Bothers Castro
Fidel Castro is apparently worried about his inability to
suppress the guerrilla bands now operating in the Sierra Maestra.
Castro claimed on 17 April that there was only one guerrilla
band of 14 men, but he remained in Oriente Province longer
than his purported "inspection trip" warranted. The govern-
ment-controlled daily Revolucion and news agency Prensa
Latina are both taking great pains to discount the importance
of the uprisings.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, considered the Cuban Commu-
_
nist party leader closest to Castro, is reported
to be concerned over the situation. The Commu-
nists anticipate hostile intervention in Cuba and evidently fear
that the insurrection, if not soon suppressed, will hasten an ex-
ternal attack.]
Guerrilla leader Manuel Beaton's continued ability to elude
Castro forces would indicate support from local peasants. There
is one report that they have already given him assistance, and
may have led him to the cache of government arms and ammunition
Beaton is reported to have filched. Beaton himself is a native of
the area who guided Castro's guerrilla fighters. Since the Sierra
Maestra peasants were Castro's chief supporters during much of
his revolt, and are supposed to be its chief beneficiaries, their
desertion would be a significant indication of disillusionment.
Some of Castro's opponents in Cuba had suspected that Beaton--
a revolutionary army captain who escaped to the mountains from
imprisonment for a murder he denies having committed was
planted by the regime to trap counterrevolutionaries. They con-
sidered his guerrillas chiefly outlaws, who traditionally hide from
justice in the Sierra Maestra, and planned to send only a few vol-
unteers in order to test his sincerity.
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71F
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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