CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/03/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177886
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: March 3, 1960

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3 March 1960
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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.drought,
Iranian ambassador in Moscow sees no
hope for improved Iranian-Soviet rela-
tions.
Repercussions of Pakistani propaganda
attacks on Afghanistan affect US.
Laos�Preparations for elections may be
complicated by Thai and South Vietnam-
ese interference.
3 MARCH 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow denounces US intention to re-
sume high-altitude flights to Berlin,
Chinese Communists virtually ignore
1Chrushchev's Asian trip.
II, ASIA-AFRICA
0
0
Iraq--Qasim appears to be trying to un-
dercut Communist control of Peace Par-
tisans. 0
Jordan and Israel likely to request Amer-
ican assistance to overcome effects of
0
III. THE WEST
�Swedish foreign minister makes thinly
veiled attack on US position on nuclear
testing.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 March 1960
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Berlin Air Corridors: Moscow's immediate denuncia-
tion of reports that the United States will resume flights to
Berlin above 10,000 feet suggests that the USSR hopes to ex-
ploit differences among the three Western powers by warn-
ing that unilateral action would have an adverse effect on the
May summit meeting. A Soviet spokesman in East Berlin has
declared that, in the absence of an agreement with both the
USSR and East Germany, such flights would be regarded as a
"unilateral violation of East German air sovereignty" and ex-
isting four-power agreements. The statement was probably
intended to induce the Western powers to postpone such flights
and agree to technical discussions on flight procedures with
East German participation. (Page 1)
Communist China - USSR: The Chinese Communist press
and radio in contrast to other bloc media have virtually ig-
nored Khrushchev's trip through India, Burma, and Indonesia.
This sparse coverage supports other suggestions of a continu-
ing coolness between Peiping and Moscow and may reflect irri-
tation at Khrushchev's failure to support Peiping in its disputes
with India and Indonesia. Communist China could feel that the
trip, coming at a time when it had begun to make gestures toward
easing strains with these Asian countries, gives Khrushchev a
large measure of the credit Peiping had hoped to gain solely for
itself.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Baghdad radio on 1 March carried a statement by
Aziz Siarif, secretary general of the Peace Partisan movement,
announcing that a mass meeting of the Partisans in Baghdad dur-
ing late March would again, like last year's, be under Qasim's
toP
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patronage and would be addressed by the Iraqi premier.
Qasim's strategy seems to be to treat the Peace Partisans
as a nationwide nonpolitical movement in an attempt to un-
dercut Communist control of the Partisans, who have func-
tioned as the principal Communist front in Iraq. Last week
Qasim rejected the application of the orthodox Communists
for legal recognition as a political party.
(Page 2)
Watch Committee Conclusion - Middle East: In the Mid-
dle East present evidence does not indicate that ei er the
UAR or Israel is deliberately planning to initiate hostilities
in the near future. The disposition and readiness of UAR
forces and precautionary military measures by Israel continue
the risk that any local incidents could reach more serious pro-
portions
'Jordan-Israel: The food-grain crop in Jordan is in danger
of being totally destroyed by drought, and the government as
well as the public is becoming panicky over an already short
supply of drinking water. Similar but less critical conditions
exist in Israel: where drought is likely to result in large crop
and livestock losses. Jordan and Israel are likely to request
emergency American assistance.
*Jordanian Premier Hazza al-Majali issued a defense or-
der on 2 March requisitioning all water resources within Amman
and authorizing the Municipal Council to take all measures neces-
sary to secure Amman's water resources. The premier also
said that the cabinet has decided to waive all taxes on livestock
for this year. (Page 3)
Iran-USSR: Iranian Ambassador Ansari in Moscow, on 29
February, in response to a nessage from Foreign
Minister Aram, has reviewed the status of Iranian-Soviet rela-
tions and has concluded that there is no use in his having further
discussions with the Soviet Government. He says the USSR
maintains its position that normal friendly relations will not be
established until Tehran gives written assurances that military
3 Mar 60
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DAILY BRIEF ii
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bases, including rocket sites, will not be established in Iran,
after which the Soviet Union would be ready to fulfill Iranian
political and economic requests to the greatest extent possible.
The ambassador, who probably was sent to Moscow originally
because of his pro-Soviet sympathies, adds that he has made
the situation entirely clear to Tehran and suggests that Aram
may wisI- to renlaep him with someone more acceptable to
1
Moscow. (Page 4)
Afghanistan: Foreign Minister Naim� in a press interview
a few days prior to Khrushchev's arrival, said that President
Eisenhower's visit to Kabul had not resulted in any greater un-
derstanding on the part of the West. He also accused the United
States of .tying its military aid to membership in military pacts,
a condition unacceptable to Afghanistan. The Foreign Minister
expressed appreciation for American economic aid. However,
he reiterated Kabul's determination on the Pushtoonistan issue
and his intention to discuss economic aid with Khrushchev.
Naim seemed to reflect the opinion that the US should be able
to exercise some control over Pakistani propaganda.
(Page 5)
Laos - Thailand - South Vietnam: ahai and South Vietnam-
ese intent to interfere in preparations for the Laotian election
this April may complicate the difficult task of developing a uni-
fied slate of candidates to compete with the Communists. Thai
Premier Sarit is reported to be extending covert financial assist-
ance to the reformist CDNI-military clique, while the Diem gov-
ernment tends to support the old guard conservative faction of
former Premier Phoui. Alleged Thai and South Vietnamese inter-
ference in the power struggle in Laos last fall aggravated the bit-
terness between the old guard and the reformists:1
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Sweden: The US Embassy has described Foreign Minister
'Linden's speech of 29 February as a thinly veiled attack on the
Western position in the Geneva talks on nuclear testing. Unden
3 Mar 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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expressed the belief that the USSR is ready to accept an agree-
ment "which from the point of view of control is still imperfect,
but which is nonetheless relatively satisfactory." He concluded
that such an agreement would "be better than none at all or an
agreement which leaves the field wide open for underground tests
of quite considerable effect." Undent remarks, although focus-
ing on the need for an international agreement, may stem in
part from domestic political considerations. The governing So-
cial Democratic party is deeply divided on the issue of acquir-
ing a nuclear weapons capability, which Unden opposes, and an
international agreement would enable the party to avoid a deci-
sion.
3 Mar 60 DAILY BRIEF iN4
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Denounces Reported US Plan to Conduct High-Altitude
Flights Into Berlin
Moscow's prompt and strong reaction to press reports
that the US will resume flights in the Berlin air corridors
above 10,000 feet suggests that the Soviet leaders view this
as an opportunity to test Western unity in the pre-summit
period and, if possible, to inject the East Germans into any
technical discussion on flight procedures. At the time of the
last such flight, in April 19592 the British attitude was that
the flights unnecessarily endangered the prospects for the
Geneva foreign ministers' talks. Moscow's propaganda and
official statements now imply that resumption could have an
adverse effect on summit negotiations.
In discussions preceding the Western decision to resume
such flights, the British argued against making an open com-
mitment to early action because of the sensitivity of the British
public to any seemingly provocative action before the summit.
In the initial editorial response, the pro-Conservative Daily
Mail on 1 March protested against the "provocative" chacter
of flights at this time and wondered what difference waittiz a
few weeks would make.
The warning by a Soviet spokesman in East Berlin that
flights above 10,000 feet in the absence of an agreement with
both the USSR and East Germany would be regarded as a "uni-
lateral violation of East German air sovereignty" and existing
four-power agreements probably is aimed at inducing the West-
ern powers to postpone such flights and agree to technical dis-
cussions on flight procedures with East German participation.
Moscow will probably attempt to increase pressure for negotia-
tions, as it did in 1959, by hinting that possible "incidents"
might result. On the flights in the spring of 1959, American
C-130s were harassed by Soviet aircraft.
..92.NEIDENTTrir
3 Mar 60
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IL AMA-AFRICA
The Iraqi Situation
Prime Minister Qasim has agreed to continue his role of
patron of the Iraqi Peace Partisans, possibly in an effort to
transform this important Communist-front group into a non-
political nationwide movement. Following his ambiguous state-
ment of 23 February when he declared, among other things,
"Henceforth, there will be no society of Peace Partisans,"
Qasim was visited by Peace Partisan leader Aziz Sharif. On
1 March, Baghdad Radio broadcast a statement by Sharif to
the effect that, again this year, a mass meeting of Partisans
will be held in late March under Qasim's patronage and ad-
dressed by him.
This new endorsement of the Partisans may be a stratagem
of Qasim to forestall criticism from the orthodox Communist
group by throwing them a sop, while at the same time working
to dilute the Partisans' leadership with his own supporters.
While he has licensed certain political parties and associa-
tions,Qasim has refused to license the Peace Partisans, claim-
ing that "all Iraqis" are for peace. Thus, the Peace Partisans
will not have legal st tus as a party or as a society and accord-
ingly exist at Qasim's sufferance. However, Qasim probably
envisages the Peace Partisans as a gre t mass organization
which can be manipulated much like Nasir's National Union in
the UAR.
The Communist bloc press and radio, while refraining from
any direct criticism of Qasim, have implied dissatisfaction with
his handling of the licensing of Iraqi political parties. Moscow,
has given considerable publicity to newspaper attacks by the or
Communist group on the Sayigh splinter group which Qasim
licensed as the "Communist Party of Iraq." A quasi-clandestine
bloc station has gone even closer to implying criticism of Qasim
with a broadcast of 27 February to Turkey charging "reactionary
elements" in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior--headed by Qasim's
close associate Brigadier Ya.hya--with responsibility for refusing
to license the orthodox Communist group.
ME-NT
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Drought ThiNekens Jordanian and Israeli Crtlist
Jordan is threatened with the loss of its entire grain crop,
unless rain falls within the next week. There has been no rain
since 3 February and the cumulative rainfall this season is the
lowest on record. After three years of drought, many springs
are drying up, cisterns and reservoirs are far below normal,
and a severe shortage of potable water is imminent.
The Jordanian Government and public are becoming panicky.
Jordanian officials estimate that even if there is rain this week,
this year's shortfall will be 153,000 tons of wheat, 50,000 tons of
barley, 8,000 towat sorg,hur% and 11,000, ton sat v ch.
Crop conditions in Israel are similar, but less critical. The
Israeli Ministry of Finance estimates now that at least 60,000 tons
of feed grains and 30,000 tons of wheat will be needed to supple-
ment domestic production. If the drought continues through March,
these estimates will have to be revised upward.
Complicating the drought in the Levant area is the annual
locust threat. Although it is too early in the season to estimate
potential locust damage, large swarms have been observed in
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon. The Desert Locust Informa-
tion Center in London states that infestation may spread to Israel,
Iraq, Kuwait, and possibly Syria and Turkey. The locust threat
extends as far as Libya, particularly in the Fezzan where all crops
were destroyed. Lesser damage has occurred in the coastal re-
gions of Tripolitania and Cyre.naica.
Jordan is likely to request emergency aid soon, and requests
from Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Libya may also be forthcoming.
Israeli Minister of Agriculture yan, who will be in the US this
week for an Israeli bond drive, intends to discuss possible drought
relief with Secretary of Agriculture Benson,
8 Mar 60
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Iranian AmbVsador Sees No Hope for Improvowved Iranian-
Soviet Relations
Iranian Ambassador Masud-Ansari in Moscow,
reviewed his unsuccessful
efforts to improve Iranian-Soviet relations and concluded that
there was no use in discussing the subject further with Soviet
officials. He said the Soviet Union maintains that "normal
friendly" relations could be re-established only if Tehran
would give a written assurance that no military bases or mis-
sile sites will be established in Iran. Masud Ansari concluded
by saying that perhaps he should be replaced by someone more
acceptable to the Soviet Union.
The USSR's propaganda assaults on the Shah and Iran's pol-
icies are continuing, despite Deputy Foreign Minister Pavlov's
statement to Ansari on 9 February that Khrushchev had ordered
Radio Moscow to stop its "offensive statements." Soviet officials
suggested in late February through a neutral diplomat that if the
Iranian Government would take the initiative in proposing an ex-
change of high-level visits, the "improved atmosphere" could
enable Moscow to stop its radio propaganda. Khrushchev had
accused Iran of interpreting earlier Soviet concessions as a sign
of weakness.
The Shah, for his part, has expressed a willingness to give
Moscow written assurances not to permit foreign long-range or
intermediate-range missile bases. However, he does hope to
get defensive ground-to-air missiles and would not agree to a
blanket ban on all missiles. Tehran is apparently convinced that
an immediate improvement in relations is unlikely. It has re-
sumed its Russian-language bro dcasts from Tehran for the first
time in 18 months and has reactivated the National Defense Organ-
ization to organize anti-Soviet demonstrations throughout the coun-
try.
Masud-Ansari was sent to Moscow in late 1958,apparently in
the hope that he would be able to improve Iranian-Soviet relations
because of his well-known pro-Russian sympathies--he spent his
childhood in Russia and his first wife was Russian. He has been
described as a cautious, uncourageous man who is incapable of ob-
jective 'udgment when the USSR is concerned.
3 Mar 60
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Afghan-US Relations Are Affected by Pakistani
Propaganda Attacks
The Afghan Government is adopting a cooler attitude
toward the United States as a result of the increasingly un-
friendly propaganda now being aimed at Afghanistan by
Pakistan. In response to Kabul's Pushtoonistan propaganda
campaign, Karachi has stepped up its radiobroadcasts to the
same level of virulence often found in the Afghan output.
These attacks produced a strong reaction in Kabul, as
shown by Foreign Minister Naim's recent statements in a
press interview. Nairn said his January meeting with Pres-
ident Ayub merely convinced him that Pakistan intends to
maintain a hard line toward Kabul. He noted that Pakistani
propaganda and "subversive activities" have recently increased,
and he complained that President Eisenhower's visit to Kabul
last December has not resulted in any greater understanding by
the West of Afghan problems.
Naim reiterated Kabul's long-standing complaint that US
military aid to Pakistan has upset the regional balance of power.
He pointed out that the United States has given no military as-
sistance to Afghanistan,and he added that "political conditions"
attached to US military aid would make it unacceptable in any
event. The Afghan foreign minister probably hopes such crit-
icism will persuade the United States to put strong pressure on
Pakistan to adopt a less hostile policy.
3 Mar 60
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Thai and Sftth Vietnamese Intrigue in Laos'�'
he apparent plans of Thailand and South Vietnam to give
financial support to non-Communist candidates in the 24 April
parliamentary elections in Laos may complicate the Laotian
Government's difficult task of developing a unified slate. Such
support might also contribute to a new flare-up of bitterness
between the reformist Committee for Defense of National In-
terests (CDNI) and former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao
People (RLP), which are now jockeying for preferred treat-
ment in the selection of a government-approved slate. Alle-
gations'of Thai interference on the sde1 of the CON! and South
Vietnamese support of the RLP aggravated the bitter dispute
between the two groups which led to the fall of Phoui's govern-
ment last December:I
Premier Marshal Sarit is reported to be giving co-
vert financial support and tactical advice to the CDNI through
his nephew General Phoumi, the Laotian defense minister and
perhaps the most influential a the CDNI's leaders. Sarit
hopes that Laos will eventually establish a military dictator-
ship, like the one in Thailand, and he probably feels that by
helping CDNI-supported candidates he can retain and perhaps
increase his influence over Phounai and other military mem-
bers of the CDN_ID,
..Illeanwhile, the RLP is reliably reported to have approached
the South Vietnamese Embassy in Vientiane for financial sup-
port for 59 candidates. Many of these candidates will presum-
ably be dropped from the government-approved slate, but Phoui
may hope to run them as "independents" if funds for their cam-
paign are forthcoming. This would run counter to the govern-
ment's scheme for avoiding vote-splitting among anti-Communist
candidates and would probably invite CDNI recriminationAJ
ffbe South Vietnamese Embassy is reported reluctant to
give all its support to one party, but may well be told to do so
by Saigon. President Diem has tended in the past to place
more confidence in the RLP than in the CDNI, who
he considers inexperienced and somewhat bras:217
3 Mar 60
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil arid Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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