CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/04/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177801
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: April 21, 1958

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21 April 1958
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Copy No. 140
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE fN SS.
DEICLASSIF:ED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: W6
FIEVIEVV DATE:
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41110
21 APRIL 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Ambassador to East Germany
Pervulthin summoned to Moscow;
"action may be tied to attacks on
Khrushchev opposition.
�
Bloc boycott of Yugoslav party con-
gress confirmed.
Bloc economic aid program to Yemen
totals more than $50,000,000; Imam
may be seeking more bloc economic
and military help.
ii. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesia - Unconfirmed reports of
stiffer resistance to Djakarta troops
in Sumatra, including rebel claim
that Padang retaken. Insurgent lead-
er in Celebes planning attacks on
Morotai and Halmahera.
British reinforce Aden in face of
threatened strike and signs of unrest
elsewhere in Arabian peninsula.
Kuwait rejects British suggestion to
join Arab Union; Iraqis propose pres-
sure on Lebanon to adhere.
0 Japanese elections set for 22 May; will
test Kishi's policy of close cooperation
with US.
I IL THE WEST
Iceland's foreign minister foresees
great damage to relations with US and
NATO arising from territorial limits
Issue at law of sea conference.
0 Bonn government wary of Mikoyan prop-
7 aganda on summit and nuclear issues
during 25-28 April visit to West Germany.
Soviet journal comments favorably on
possible return of French General de
Gaulle to power.
0 France - Choice of Bidault as pre-
mier-designate seen as stop-gap
measure; he may have some appeal
to 'rightists on North African policy.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 April 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Pervukhin to Moscow: Soviet Ambassador to East
Germany Pervukhin has been suddenly summoned to
Moscow probably to be briefed on First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan's forthcoming visit to West Germany from 25 to
28 April. Pervukhin is scheduled to return to Berlin on
24 or 25 April. There is a possibility, however, that
Pervukhin's recall is connected with recent vituperative
press attacks against the "antiparty group." Pervukhin
was reduced to alternate Presidium status last June when
the "antivartv" big threa_were purged.
Yugoslav-bloc relations: The expected lino-Soviet
bloc boyeoti-, of he IngosraTy party congress has been con-
firmed by Belgrade. The Soviet attack on the Yugoslav
party program was cast in terms of an ideological schism
between the Yugoslav party and the entire socialist camp.
The Yugoslays are unlikely to make concessions on their
basic ideological position, which would place them once
again in ideological isolation from the bloc.
Bloc aid program to Yemen: The Sino-Soviet bloc has
now committed a total of over $50,000,000 under its economic
aid program to Yemen. Projects include the construction of
a harbor and airfields. Nearly 150 bloc economic and mil-
itary technicians are now engaged in training and construc-
tion activities. In addition to economic aid being received
by Yemen, the Imam has accepted arms from the bloc worth
an estimated $30:000:000. As recently as March the Imam
was seeking further economic and military assistance from
Moscow. (Page 1)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
ed- *Indonesia: Late reports. (as of 0100),indicate govern-
3 4,4 a t ment troops are continuing their advance from Padang
--A toward the dissident capital of Bukittinggi but may be
meeting stiffer resistance. The insurgents' radio claims
Padang has been recaptured, but this is not confirmed
by any other source. The central government's offen-
sive in the North Celebes may be launched within the next
week. Meanwhile, dissident commander Lt. Col. Sumual
intends to attack the island of Morotai on 24 April and then
move against the port of Djailolo on Halmahara Island.
(Page 2) (Map)
-Yto
Aden-Yemen area: The British show of strength in
southwestern Arabia�including troops flown from the stra-
tegic reserve in East Africa and additional naval elements--
is intended in part to cope with a general strike in Aden Col-
ony threatened for 25 April. There has also been an in-
crease in terrorism inside Aden and in Yemen-Aden border
incidents
Signs of
post-Ramadan unrest in Aden may be linked with indica-
tions of trouble brewing in eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrein.
Page 4) (Map)
Arab Union: The Ruler of Kuwait has rejected a Brit-
ish suggestion that Kuwait adhere to the Iraqi-Jordanian
Arab Union (AU), apparently out of fear of pressure from
Cairo and pro-Nasir feeling inside Kuwait. This negative
reaction may already be known to the Iraqi Government,
which has suggested that the United States and Britain now
urge Lebanon to join the AU: (Page 5)
Janane,,e elections: Prime Minister Kishi and leaders
01 the rmgera..-2:ei.,ocratic party have decided to hold
elections to the lower house of the Diet on 22 May. The
elections will be Kishi's first popular test as prime minister.
21 Apr 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
TO ECRET
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Although the Conservatives are likely to retain their Diet
majority, the size of the majority will affect Kishi's con-
trol of the government and conservative party as well as
his policy of close cooperation with the United States.
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Iceland: Foreign Minister Gudmundsson states that
incalculable harm may be done to Icelandic-American re-
lations and to Iceland's attitude toward NATO because of
the United States' position in the Geneva conference on the
law of the sea. The Icelandic delegate to the Geneva meet-
ing states that his country would not be able to keep a single
US soldier Or to maintain the NATO base.
(Page 7)
Mikoyan visit to West Germany: Bonn expects Soviet
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan during his 25-28 April
visit to exploit German public opinion on behalf of the So-
viet view of a summit conference and to play up the dangers
inherent in Bonn's decision to rearm with nuclear weapons.
West German government officials fear his activities may
stimulate the current Socialist campaign against nuclear
armament and are trying to curtail his activities after the
signing of the German-Soviet trade and repatriation agree-
ment. (Page 8)
Soviet comment on de Gaulle: A Soviet journal, the
Literary Gazette, has Carried the first favorable comment
from Moscow on the possibility of General de Gaulle's re-
1'6 2---turn to power in France. It states, "Many cannot but be
attracted by the fact that de Gaulle stands for a more inde-
pendent foreign political course, for a sober approach to
colonial problems?' The French Communists have publicly
opposed de Gaulle's return, but the USSR probably hopes that
it could exploit de Gaulle's desire to follow a more independ-
ent course.
21 Apr 58
Page 9)
DAILY BRIEF iii
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*France: President Coty's selection of Popular Repub-
lican Georges Bidault to make the first attempt to form a
cabinet is probably largely an effort to give the appearance
of action while the necessary compromises between the non-
Communist left and the right, which will be time-consuming,
can be worked out. Coty probably felt that the selection of
of Soustelle would complicate the situation by benefiting the
extremists who are demanding the return of de Gaulle.
Antoine Pinay, leader of the more moderate Independents, is
reported already to have turned down an informal request
from the president, presumably because he thought his
chances would improve later on.
Biclault's position on North Africa has evolved well to
the right of the rest of his party�only he and one other of
its 75 deputies voted against Gaillard--and he therefore may
have some appeal to the rightists. The Popular Republicans
have generally geared their policies so as not to move too
far away from the Socialists who have shown signs of aban=
donin Mirister for Algeria Lacoste's strong line on Algeria.
21 Apr 58
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid to Yemen
Sino-Soviet bloc economic aid commitments to Yemen
now total over $50,000,000. Soviet commitments amount-
ing to $35,000,000 provide for the construction of a harbor
at Ras al-Khatib near Al Hudaydah and three large airfields,
in addition to other projects.
Communist China signed a technical aid and loan agree-
ment with Yemen in January worth about $16,000,000, under
which the Chinese will build a road network for Yemen and
other projects.
The European satellites also are engaging in economic
activities in Yemen, but the total cost of these projects and
how they are financed are not known. At present almost 90
bloc economic advisers and technicians are involved in the
projects being carried out by the Sib-Soviet bloc in Yemen.
Over and above the economic aid being received by
Yemen from the Sino-Soviet bloc, the Imam has accepted
substantial amounts of military aid and has admitted at
least 60 military technicians from the USSR and Czechoslo-
vakia. The cost of this aid to the Yemeni Government has
not yet been determined, but the value of the arms already
received may be as much as $30,000,000.
Despite the magnitude of bloc aid already obtained, the
Imam instructed Crown Prince Badr in March to request an
additional loan of $102000,000 in foreign exchange from Mos-
cow and to seek further arms aid--allegedly amounting to
anota-r-$20,000,000.
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Indonesia
Central government forces continue to advance from
two directions on the dissident capital of Bukittinggi. The
force which took Padang is moving on Bukittinggi from the
south, but a 36-hour government blackout on news of this
group suggests it may have been engaged in heavy fighting.
Djakarta forces coming through Tapanuli from the north
are within 40 miles of the city. Elements advancing from
the east have stalled about 75 miles from l3ukittinggi, how-
ever; and recently came under dissident attack. The in-
surgents' radio is claiming the recapture of Padang but no
other source has reported such a development thus far.
It is more likely that small number of dissident troops have
reentered the town to attempt harassing tactics.
In his planned attack on the island of Morotai, Lt. Col.
Sumual, dissident commander in North Celebes, intends to
use one battalion, which will leave Bitung, the port for
Menado, on 22 April. The troops will be transported in lo-
cal ships and will arrive off Morotai on 24 April. Small
boats and rafts will be used to move the troops from the
coastal vessels to the landing beach. Air cover support is
scheduled to be used for the landings.
Sumual's aim in securing Morotai and the port of
Djailolo on the west coast of Halmahara is presumably to
deny their use as government bases against North Celebes.
He may also hope to disrupt the central government's time-
table; he fears an amphibious invasion by Djakarta forces
from Kendari in South Celebes within a week. Both Morotai
and Halmahara are veryr lightly held by central government
forces.
Lt. Col. Rukmito, Indonesian army G-3, was recently
designated to lead the central government's operations against
North Celebes, and is now in Palu apparently making further
plans for the offensive.
TOy, E" rE 7
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SAUDI ARABIA
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11EIHAN
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WESTERN ADEN PROTECTORATE
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EASTERN ADEN
PROTECTORATE
/ FRENCH 100"
� SOMALILAND C U L F Miles
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Recent dissident air attacks on Makassar and Balikpapan
led the central government's chief of staff for the navy on
15 April to order the dispersal of ships at the Surabaya naval
base.
Indonesia and Communist China have exchanged notes
whereby Indonesia will receive $11,400,000 worth of rice
and textiles on a credit which will run for ten years at 2.5-
percent interest. The use of an exchange of notes to cover
this transaction rather than a formal agreement is believed
to be a device to defer the necessity for parliamentary rat-
ification.
TCS3�EC'T
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Arabian Peninsula Tension
A general deterioration in the security situation in
Aden Colony and Protectorate and on the undefined Aden
Yemen frontier has induced the British to move additional
troops to Aden from the recently reinforced strategic re-
serve in Kenya, and to augment naval elements in Aden
waters. The reinforcements, which probably number a
few hundred, join about 1,400 British forces and 2,400
British-led native troops engaged in assisting tribal forces
in maintaining order in a subversion-ridden area larger
than the United Kingdom.
The show of strength is intended in part to cope with
a general strike in Aden Colony threatened for 25 April.
Two companies of British troops have been sent into the
Sultanate of Lahej, which extends from Aden Colony to the
Yemen frontier, to arrest certain anti-British nationalist
leaders plotting with the Sultan to break with Britain and
affiliate with the Yemen- UAR federation. Another ma-
jor subversion problem exists in a neighboring sultanate
where the ruler's son defected with tribal funds and troops,
and is attempting with Yemeni support to rally other tribes
against the British,
the ruler of the remote Beihan territory, apparently
hesitant to embrace a British proposal for federation of all
Protectorate states, is negotiating with Saudi authorities for
protection against Yemeni pressure.
Yemeni authorities
instigated several serious terrorist incidents against Brit-
ish personnel and the large oil refinery in Aden Colony dur-
ing March. the sabotage ma-
terials were obtained from Egypt. London expects further
UAR-inspired trouble in the near future in the Protectorate
and along the disputed Yemeni frontier.
Indications of post-Ramadan labor unrest in Aden coin-
cide with signs of similar disturbances which are expected
among oil workers in eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrein.
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The Arab Union and Kuwait
The Ruler of Kuwait has rejected a British suggestion
that his oil-rich sheikhdom ,loin . the Arab Union recently
formed by Iraq and Jordan, lie fears that such a move
would provoke trouble among the majority of Kuwaitis, who
are strongly pro-Nasir, and would provide an opportunity
for the United Arab Republic to undermine him. Kuwait's
population, which includes a significant number of Palestin-
ian Arabs, is especially hostile to the Nun i Said "absolutist"
regime in Iraq, while the Kuwaiti ruling clan has tradition-
ally feared Iraqi territorial designs on Kuwait.
Kuwait's great wealth has been regarded by the Arab
Union leaders as a means by which they could compensate
for the weakness of the Jordanian economy.
Since Kuwait's rejection of the Arab Union bid, Iraqi
Foreign Minister Jamali has asked the United States and
Great Britain to urge Lebanese leaders to adhere to the
union on the grounds that Lebanon's membership would
strengthen the union and stabilize the Lebanese internal
situation. To add such an inflammatory issues to. the exist-
ing controversy in Lebanon over President Chamoun's am-
bition to legalize another term for himself probably would
touch off more widespread strife there.
SEQKET
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Kishi Decides on May Elections
Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and leaders of the
ruling Liberal-Democratic party have decided to dis-
solve the lower house of the Diet about 25 April and hold
national elections on 22 May. The elections will be the
first popular test for Kishi and of his policy of close co-
operation with the United States.
Most political observers believe the Socialists, who
hold approximately one third of the 467 seats in the power-
ful lower house, will make some gains. If the Socialists
gain as many as 15 or 20 seats, this would erode 10.shi's
control of the government and of his conservative party,
result in renewed factionalism among the conservatives,
and force the prime minister into a stronger stand against
the US on some issues, notably Okinawa, and into closer
relations with the Communist bloc.
In large part, Kishi's control of the conservatives may
be determined prior to elections when he attempts to limit
the number of conservative candidates in Japan's system
of multi-seat districts. His failure to achieve this objec-
tive probably would split the conservative vote and allow
the Socialists to win additional seats.
Although Kishi has failed to develop into a popular
figure, he has a record of considerable achievement in
office, and he may believe that his government's handling
of the controversial private trade agreement with Commu-
nist China, the fishery talks with the USSR, and the nego-
tiations with South Korea, have created a favorable election
climate for the conservatives at this time. Final solutions
of these problems have not been reached, however, and ad-
verse developments prior to 22 May could strongly influ-
ence.,the voters.
CO TIAL
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II L THE WEST
Iceland Threatens Drastic Action on Territorial
Limits Issue
Anti-American and neutralist sentiment may heighten
in Iceland as a result of the US position taken at the Geneva
conference on the law of the sea. The United States has
proposed that territorial waters be extended to six miles,
with fishing rights in a six-mile strip beyond largely re-
served to the littoral state. Iceland, whose economy is en-
tirely dependent on fish, desires a 12-mile limit with the
possibility of further extension in special circumstances.
The foreign minister has vigorously protested to the
United States Embassy that the public is so inflamed that
incalculable harm may be done to Icelandic-American rela-
tions and to Iceland's attitude towards NATO. He also stated
that in the event the outcome of the conference is unsatisfac-
tory Iceland would extend its territorial waters to the 12-mile
limit and would attempt to enforce it.
The US Embassy confirms the gravity of public reac-
tion, citing press emphasis on the US "stab in the back"
theme. Under the stress of emotion the chauvinistic Ice-
landers are capable of interfering with the smooth func-
tioning of the US-manned NATO airbase at Keflavik and
blocking further cooperation in defense matters. They might
even reopen negotiations, discontinued in December 1956,
on the withdrawl of US forces. The Icelandic delegate at
Geneva has on several occasions told the American dele-
gate that unless Iceland's problem got sympathetic consid-
eration, the United States "would not be able to keep a
single soldier or maintain the NATO base on Iceland."
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Mikoyan Visit to West Germany
The Foreign Ministry in Bonn appears apprehensive
lest Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan use his 25-28
April visit to influence West German public opinion on
controversial East-West issues. Mikoyan, who in the
past has proved an effective spokesman on foreign as well
as economic policy, probably will make a vigorous bid to
increase German popular support for the USSR's pre-summit
campaign and for continued bilateral negotiations on outstand-
ing Soviet-German differences. He will play up the dangers
of Bonn's rearming with nuclear weapons and endorse the
Socialist thesis that basic German-Soviet differences can
be resolved by reasonable discussion.
Mikoyan's trip will coincide with the West German So-
cial Democratic campaign against "atomic death" and may
help the Socialist appeal against Bonn's decision to equip the
German army with nuclear weapons.
The West German Foreign Ministry is trying to circum-
vent Mikoyan's activities by arranging a crowded schedule
of visits to industrial plants, museums, theaters, and uni-
versities. The government has rejected a Soviet request
for an extensive, free-wheeling tour which would include
Communist strongholds in north German port and industrial
areas, in_ favor of a trip through central and southern Ger-
many to Stuttgart, via Frankfurt and Heidelberg, where feel-
ing/on the nuclear issue is probably less intense.
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Soviet Journal Comments Favorably on de Gaulle
A long article in the Soviet journal Literary Gazette,
describing the current governmental crisis in France,
declares: "Many cannot but lbe attracted by the fact that
de Gaulle stands for a more independent foreign political
courses for a sober approach to colonial problems."
The French Communists publicly oppose de Gaulle's
return to power, avowedly on the grounds that he would
demand broad powers at the expense of the Assembly.
Privately the party may hope that de Gaulle's assumption
would strengthen the prospects for Communist-Socialist
cooperation as well as furthering Soviet foreign policy
objectives.
Soviet diplomats
in Paris have been saying privately that France needs a
stronger regime which would act more independently of
NATO. Although it must act cautiously to avoid accusa-
tions of interfering in French affairs, the USSR may use
both public and private channels in coming months to try
to persuade the French that a more independent foreign
policy, perhaps under de Gaulle, would be more advanta-
geou to France than sole reliance on its existing alli-
anc s.
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CENfRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 April 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Pervukhin to Moscow: Soviet Ambassador to East
Germany Pervukhin has been suddenly summoned to
Moscow probably to be briefed on First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan's forthcoming visit to West Germany from 25 to
28 April. Pervukhin is scheduled to return to Berlin on
24 or 25 April. There is a possibility, however, that
Pervukhint.recall is connected with recent vituperative
press attacks against the "antiparty group." Pervukhin
was reduced to alternate Presidium status last June when
the "antiparty" big three were purged.
Yugoslav-bloc relations: The expected Sino-Soviet
bloc boycott of the Yugdslai party congress ?Gas been con-
firmed by Belgrade. The Soviet attack on the Yugoslav
party program was cast in terms of an ideological schism
between the Yugoslav party and the entire socialist camp.
The Yugoslays are unlikely to make concessions on their
basic ideological position, which would place tl_en:Lonce_-
----,-= -Alain in ideoio_gical isolation from the bloc.
inkoyan visit to West Germany: Bonn expects Soviet
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan during his 25-28 April
visit to exploit German public opinion on behalf of the So-
viet view of a summit conference and to play up the dangers
inherent in Bonn's decision to rearm with nuclear weapons.
West German government officials fear his activities may
stimulate the current Socialist campaign against nuclear
armament and are trying to curtail his activities after the
signin an-Soviet trade and repatriation agree-
ment. (Page 8)
*France: President Coty's selection of Popular Repub-
lican Norges Bidault to make the first attempt to form a
cabinet is probably largely an effort to give the appearance
of action while the necessary 'compromises between the non-
Communist left and the right, which will be time-consuming,
can be worked out. Coty probably felt that the selection of
of Soustelle would complicate the situation by benefiting the
extremists who are demanding the return of de Gaulle.
Antoine Pinay, leader of the more moderate Independents, is
reported Already to have turned down an informal request
from the president, presumably because he thought his
chances would improve later on.
Biclault's position on North Africa has evolved well to
the right of the rest of his party�only he and one other of
its 75 deputies voted against Gaillard�and he therefore may
have some appeal to the rightists. The Popular Republicans
have generally geared their policies so as not to move too
far away from the Socialists who have shown signs of aban-
doning Minister for Aleeria Lacoste' s strong. tine on Algeria.
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