CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/11/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177761
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: November 15, 1957

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WI- .1.
15 November 1957
Copy No.
138
3.5(c)
CURRENT
/ INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO,
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DATE "I!1.26S1 REVIEWE
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
11Q
1. SOVIET ARMS ARRIVING REGULARLY IN THE MIDDLE
EAST (page 3)0
06 2. SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION
(page 4).
6/53. FRENCH REACTION TO TUNISIAN ARMS ISSUE
(page 5).
ON. FRENCH GOVERNMENT ENDANGERED BY RIGHTIST TAX
OPPOSITION (page 6).
A105. INDONESIAN CAMPAIGN FOR "RETURN" OF NETHERLANDS
NEW GUINEA (page 7).
6 k6. RESIGNATION OF NEPALESE PRIME MINISTER
(page 8).
6
7. DALAI LAMA NEGOTIATING FOR A SECOND VISIT TO INDIA
(page 9).
A. SOUTH KOREA ACCEPTS US STAND ON CLAIMS AGAINST
JAPAN (page 10).
) LAJMMUNlb IS MAY MAKE POLITICAL GAINS IN GUATEMALA
(page 11).
ANNEX--Conclusions of the W?frh FliAnnrt nf th Intellicrence
Advisory Committee
(page 12).
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1. SOVIET ARMS ARRIVING REGULARLY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
Comment on:
Soviet ships carrying cargoes of arms
for Syria, Egypt, and Yemen continue
to pass from the Black Sea to the Med-
iterranean.
During the first week of November, two
Soviet vessels are known to have delivered military equip-
ment at Alexandria. Although only military vehicles were
observed on these vessels, arms were probably included in
their cargoes. Deliveries to Egypt may be stepped up in the
near future; it has been reported that the Egyptian
commander in chief, now in Moscow, is discussing the pro-
curement of additional arms from the USSR.
At least four shiploads of military cargoes,
including vehicles and aircraft--presumably additional jet
fighters purchased under the new Soviet-Syrian arms contract
concluded in August--arrived at Latakia in October. Regular
deliveries to Syria are expected to continue during the next
few months as a result of this new arms contract.
The arrival of two more Soviet vessels in
Yemeni ports in the past three weeks--one apparently carry-
ing crated aircraft�indicates that Yemen has concluded a
second arms agreement with the bloc. The original arms
agreement, is believed to have
been completed in September, following the delivery of 11
shiploads of military equipment.
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2. SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION
Comment on:
Insistence by Syrian Communists on partic-
ipating on a basis of parity with the Baath
in municipal elections originally scheduled
for 15 November has resulted in a split be-
tween the two groups. Rather than accede
to the Communist demand, the Baath joined more moderate
elements in inducing the cabinet to postpone the elections. The
more pro-Soviet ministers, including Defense Minister Azm,
insisted upon holding the elections as scheduled, while Baathist
and moderate ministers and President Quwatli urged postpone-
ment.
The new alliance between the leftist Baath
and moderates points to a continuing struggle between propo-
nents of stronger ties with the Soviet bloc and those who advo-
cate a more neutral role for Syria. The absence of Communist
leader Khalid Bakdash from the recent celebrations in Moscow
suggests that the struggle is sufficiently serious to require his
presence in Syria.
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3. FRENCH REACTION TO TUNISIAN ARMS ISSUE
Anti-American and anti-NATO senti-
ment in France is likely to increase
sharply as a result of the announcement
of a token shipment of arms from the
United States and Britain to Tunisia.
On 13 November, Premier Gaillard had
threatened that a "grave crisis in West-
ern solidarity" could arise out of the arms
question. His coalition cabinet is already split over the gov-
ernment's proposed tax program, and he may seek to shore up
its domestic position by dramatizing his nationalistic stand on
the arms issue through some move to emphasize France's dis-
pleasure.
Paris maintains that arms supplies for
Tunisia will eventually end up in the hands of Algerian rebels,
and the Gaillard cabinet is opposed to any shipments from non-
French sources. Under the Bourges-Maunoury government,
the issue evoked strong opposition and played an important role
in its overthrow. French rightists and the nationalist press may
again be expected to use the issue to buttress their demands for
the maintenance of a strong Algerian policy.
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4. FRENCH GOVERNMENT ENDANGERED BY RIGHTIST
TAX OPPOSITION
Growing rightist hostility to increased
taxes may block National Assembly ap-
proval of Premier Gaillard's proposed
austerity program. The Independent
minis e cabinet are reported to be about to renege
in their pledge of support, and their assembly group has in-
dicated it might desert the government when the assembly
votes on his request for sweeping economic powers on Sat-
urday or Monday. The reason for this switch is apparent in
the vigorous protest the French Employers Association has
lodged against the proposed tax features.
lithe Independents do not support the gov-
ernment, the Socialists and Popular Republicans have threat-
ened to duck any responsibility for a program that might re-
sult in price increases and a wage freeze. Living dosts
have been rising sharply, and a 24-hour strike SchedulecL
for next week by more than 1,200,000 government employees
may lead to a new wave of labor disorder. Gaillard has already
turned down labor demands for higher wages, which he believes
would trigger similar requests from the nearly 1,000,000 em-
ployed in the nationalized industries.
The government's financial difficulties have
been compounded by the precipitous drop in the value of the
franc from 476 to 507 on 13-14 November.
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5. INDONESIAN CAMPAIGN FOR "RETURN" OF
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
Comment on:
Another mass rally in support of
Indonesia's claim to Netherlands
New Guinea is scheduled to be held
in Djakarta on 15 November, and
both President Sukarno and former Vice President Hatta
have been asked to speak. The invitation to Hatta was is-
sued undoubtedly to give the anti-Dutch campaign greater
respectability and to point up progress toward the re-
establishment of the Sukarno-Hatta partnership. If Hatta
accepts the invitation, he will further disillusion dissident
provincial leaders as to his capacity to lead an anti-Com-
munist, anti-Sukarno movement.
A steady stream of official and semi-
official statements continue to warn that Indonesia will
confiscate local Dutch property if its claim to New Guinea
fails to win the support of the UN.
a special brigade has been formed with
government approval to conduct guerrilla warfare against
the Dutch in New Guinea.
Djakarta is seriously considering accelerating
its paramilitary activity in the area. The first deputy army
chief of staff recently told the American assistant army at-
tach�hat Indonesia has the capability to increase the number
of small raiding parties it has been sending to the area.
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6. RESIGNATION OF NEPALESE PRIME MINISTER
OM
e resigna ion on 14 November of
Dr. K. I. Singh, leader of NepaVs
sixth government in seven years, and
the promulgation of direct rule by
King Mahendra "for the time being"
return Nepal to the state of political confusion which ex-
isted prior to Singh's entry into office on 26 July. Singh's
increasingly autocratic actions apparently antagonized the
King.
Unstable conditions in Nepal are likely
to provide Peiping with increased opportunities for strength-
ening its influence. New Delhi can be expected to move quickly
to throw its support to a government oriented toward Indian in-
terest. It may back continued royal rule in the hope that its
influence and pressure on the King offer the best means of pro-
tecting India's paramount position in Nepal.
The King may prolong his direct rule for
an indefinite period, since the renewed competition for power
among Nepal's rival political factions may block the formation
of a new government. Despite the adverse reaction among po-
litically conscious Nepalese to his methods, Singh probably
will retain his popularity among the masses and will provide
powerful opposition to whatever government follows.
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7. DALAI LAMA NEGOTIATING FOR A SECOND
VISIT TO INDIA
The Dalai Lama apparently is consid-
ering making a second trip to India.
Peiping informed Chinese
officials in Lhasa, however, that the Dalai Lama would have
to be watched "night and day" by Chinese Communist diplo-
matic personnel.
The Dalai Lama probably wants to
strengthen his hand in the running conflict between Chinese
and Tibetan authorities. His state visit to New Delhi last
year was followed by a relaxation of Chinese Communist con-
trol, and Tibetan leaders may believe that a second trip would
help produce further gains in independence. Peiping is clearly
suspicious, however, and might block plans for such a trip--
possibly on the grounds that the Indians have not yet returned
the Tibetan state visit.
15 Nov 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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8. SOUTH KOREA ACCEPTS US STAND ON CLAIMS
AGAINST JAPAN
Comment on:
President Rhee on 13 November agreed
to accept without reservation an Amer-
ican memorandum on Korean claims
against Japan. He also instructed the
Korean mission in Tokyo to conclude and sign a preliminary
agreement with the Japanese looking toward reopening a
formal conference to settle outstanding issues, provided Tokyo
accepts certain minor changes which Rhee made in the draft
agreement. The American interpretation of the Japanese peace
treaty holds, in effect, that when the Koreans took over Jap-
anese property in Korea in 1945, their claims against Japan
were largely canceled out.
Months of informal negotiations, stimu-
lated by Tokyo's desire for the release of Japanese fishermen
detained at 'Pusan, have been stymied by Rhee's previous re-
jection of the US formula. In these talks the Japanese have been
willing to waive their own property claims against Korea and to
withdraw derogatory remarks about Korea made by a Japanese
negotiator in 1953.
While a formal accord or even relatively
friendly discussions of outstanding issues, such as the fisher-
ies question, are still distant, Seoul has apparently become
impressed with US arguments that Japan has made all the con-
cessions it can possibly make and that time is now against Korea.
It is entirely possible, therefore, that Rhee's decision to modify
his stand on claims will lead to the release of the some 900
Japanese detainees at Pusan and more than 1,400 Koreans at
Omura, paving the way for formal Korean-Japanese talks.
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9. COMMUNISTS MAY MAKE POLITICAL GAINS
IN GUATEMALA
Comment on:
Anti-Communist political and military
forces in Guatemala have yet to recover
from the divisive effect of the violence
which led to the annulment of last month's
elections. New elections, for which candi-
dates have not yet been named, are set for
19 January, and the Communists are likely
to gain politically lithe leftist Revolutionary
party (PR), which they have infiltrated and which is probably
the country's strongest single party, wins significant represen-
tation in congress. The party candidate may even win the
presidency.
Ambassador Hill in Mexico emphasizes that
the return of a pro-Communist regime to Guatemala would be
especially damaging to the United States' position in Mexico,
where a large and influential pro-Communist element is becom-
ing more active.
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ANNEX
Watch Report 380, 14 November 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostil-
ities against the continental US or its possessions in the
immediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral
to the orbit in the immediate future.
C. Although major Turkish forces continue to be deployed
near the Syrian border, the deliberate initiation of hos-
tilities is unlikely in the immediate future. However,
intensified propaganda attacks against King Hussayn, to-
gether with continuing unstable conditions in Jordan, con-
tinue to create possibilities for conflict in the Middle East.
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