CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/11/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03176911
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: November 10, 1956

r�-t,A1A"or.tRke)lale,EL:T/9.112/4
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
10 November 1956
SC No. 05745/56
Copy No. 1i2
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1. ..NASR "SUSPICIOUS" OF UN POLICE FORCE PLAN
(Ssszet,-NefMqn (page 3),
1/
2. SOVIET MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
.....liaternr(page 4).
3. JORDAN MOVING TOWARD CLOSER RELATIONS WITH
SOVIET BLOC (page 5).
4. BAGHDAD PACT POWERS SEEK GREATER INFLUENCE
IN MIDDLE EAST 4S-ectrelj (page 6).
SOVIET FORCES IN POLAND AND EAST GERMANY
(page 7).
6. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION (page 9).
7. YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS EXPLAIN ATTiTuDE TOWARD
SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (Secrff (page 11).
1. ASIAN CRITICISM OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN HUNGARY
GROWS (confidenttalr(page 12).
'9. EAST GERMANS OPENLY CRITICIZE SOVIET ACTION
IN HUNGARY (Seetset-felffn-li (page 14).
ANNEX: Memorandum, Chairman of the Watch Committee
to the IAC, 9 November
(page 15).
10 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET EIDER
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vow,
1. NASR "SUSPICIOUS" OF UN POLICE FORCE PLAN
Nasr told Ambassador Hare on 8 Novem-
ber that while he appreciated the necessity
for a prompt reply to UN secretary general
Hammarskjold's message on the formation
and activity of a UN force, he was a naturally "suspicious"
person and had a number of questions he intended to raise con-
cerning the UN plans. Nasr cited as examples such questions
as the duration of the UN force's stay and its deployment. He
also questioned the impact on the Egyptian public of the use of
Canadian forces which, in the popular mind, might not be
readily distinguished from British.
Comment General Burns is in Cairo to make arrange-
ments for the entry of the UN police force.
UN authorities in New York are attempting to arrange for a
landing in Egypt within a day or so of an advance contingent
composed of Canadians and Scandinavians.
Nases attitude, as revealed by this inter-
view as well as by his two-hour speech on 9 November "ex-
plaining" the events of the past two weeks, is one of revived
sell-confidence in his ability to parry Anglo-French action
and to play off one group of powers against another. This at-
titude is apparently shared by the Egyptian public, whose
morale has risen sharply since the allied air bombardment
stopped. and by popular opinion in other. Arab states.
Moslem sentiment
there reversed itself between 6 and 8 November; Nasr is now
(N
a hero and Port Said is being called the " alingrad of the
Arabs" by the Beirut press.
10 Nov 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 3
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2. SOVIET MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
The USSR remains opposed to a UN-
sponsored international police force
which does not include bloc forces.
Soviet UN delegate Kuznetsov on
7 November said the UN plan was an
"undisguised attempt" to solve the
Suez dispute in favor of Great Britain
and France, and charged that it was a
violation of the UN charter because
only the Security Council was compe-
tent to act in cases involving armed
forces0
at the United Nations, Soviet UN dele-
gate Sabolev told Arab delegates on
7 November that a conspiracy would
develop during the next two to three
weeks to impose on the Arabs a settle-
ment in line with two resolutions intro-
pneed by the United States on 1. November.
der the terms of these draft resolu-
Lions9 the General Assembly would es-
tablish committees to negotiate among the parties concerned
a settlement of the Suez Canal question and the entire Arab-
Israeli question. Sobolev's attempt to arouse Arab suspicions
of UN action may foreshadow an attempt by the USSR to have
Egypt reject the plan in its present form.
Since 29 October many families of the
Soviet bloc personnel in the Middle East have been evacuated,
and the files of the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv reportedly
have been burned.
An earlier report that the USSR had asked
Turkey for permission to send five warships through the Dar-
danelles has been denied by the Turkish government. (.NAferga)
10 Nov 56
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MeRLE-T
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J-Lrt"i115-1
yore Nimed
3. JORDAN MOVING TOWARD CLOSER RELATIONS
WITH SOVIET BLOC
Pressure is increasing rapidly in
Jordan for establishment of diplomatic
relations with the USSR, and negotiations
to this end are reported to have been be-
gun by the government with the Soviet em-
bassy in Damascus. Many Jordanian or-
ganizations and prominent individuals on
7 November sent telegrams to King Hussain
and Prime Minister Nabulsi urging estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations with the
USSR, abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian
treaty, and conclusion of a union with Syria.
military
New efforts to obtain heavy Soviet b1
eautoment for the Jordanian army are nrohable
7
he USSR has been asked for 200,000
rifles and machine guns to assist Jordan.
10 Nov 56
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FrntET
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4. BAGHDAD PACT POWERS SEEK GREATER INFLUENCE
IN MIDDLE EAST
The insistence by Turkey, Iran, Iraq
and Pakistan that the United States im-
mediately join the Baghdad pact reflects
their desire to maintain their influence
in the Middle East and to appease popular anti-British sen-
timent in their own countries. Other moves made by these
four members of the Baghdad pact in their 5-9 November
meeting in Tehran suggest that in the future they will seek
to use the Baghdad pact organization not only for defense
planning against the USSR but as an instrument for contest-
ing Egypt's bid to dominate the Middle East.
In an effort to increase their own influ-
ence in the Arab world, the four nations are seeking credit
for persuading the British to withdraw from Egypt. A
British Foreign Office spokesman stated on 8 November that
the demand of its Baghdad pact allies "weighed heavily in
the decision to bring an end to military action in Egypt!'
London probably, however, primarily intended the state-
ment to counter Soviet claims that the USSR had forced the
cease-fire by its threats of force.
Iraq's attempts to expand its influence in
Jordan by sending troops there have been blocked by Jordan's
close association with Syria and Egypt, which desire to con-
tinue Iraq's isolation from the rest of the Arab world.
10 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
SEeRLET
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5.
sewm-wr nru-ap.s TNT POLAND AND EAST GERMANY
military operations
in the Soviet Northern Group of Forces
in Poland parallels
the period 19 to 24 October.
Comment The communications activity in Poland
probably reflects a high degree of alert
for these forces rather than their actual employment.
about 25 twin-
transport aircraft have moved to Proskurov, an Aviation of
Airborne Forces base in the southwestern USSR, from the
Lake Baikal region of east central USSR. Only a few of these
aircraft have been active since their arrival in the European
USSR. On 8 November at least one and possibly seven of the
transports based at Proskurov were noted en route to Szymany,
an airfield in northeastern Foland not previously visited by
Aviation of Airborne Forces transports. While the purpose of
the reinforcement and the flights to Poland is not clear, they
may be related to the unusual alert status of the Northern
Group of Forces.
During the Polish crisis of 19-20 Octo-
ber large elements of Soviet forces in Germany moved to the
10 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
TOP SECRET
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Itirimor Nrmoid
Polish border. The bulk of the units in GSFG are now back
at their home stations conducting ordinary training activi-
ties in a semi-alert status. Normal troop rotation continues.
10 Nov 56
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TOP SECRET
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*Amor' Nome
6. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION
No Soviet troop movements in Hungary
have been reported. since the withdrawal
of a number of Soviet tanks and motorized
equipment from Budapest on the evening
of 8 November. The situation in the Hun-
garian capital remained tense as Soviet
soldiers continued a house-to-house search
for insurgents who, reportedly, were hold-
ing out because of uncertainty as to whether
or not they would be shot alter surrender.
The status of fighting in the provinces is
unclear. No rebel radios have been heard since early on 8
November. Press reports indicate continued fighting�possi-
bly of a guerrilla warfare nature--in at least southern Hungary
near Pecs.
The legation reported on 8 November that
numbers of people were in the Budapest streets searching for
food, in disregard of the Soviet-imposed curfew. The regime-
controlled Budapest radio has indicated that extensive loot-
ing of storage depots, textile and furniture stores as well as
food shops has taken place.
In an effort to speed the restoration of or-
der, Budapest police headquarters announced on 9 November
the creation of special guard groups, composed in part of
armed workers. The regular police have proved completely
inadequate and the regime has appealed to the civilian popula-
tion as a whole to help prevent the looting.
Premier Kadar and other members of his
cabinet continue to echo a soft line in domestic policies. Kadar,
according to Budapest radio on 9 November, said that the "peace-
ful demonstrations of 23 October placed correct and justified
10 Nov 56
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Nome
demands before the party and the government!' Implying
� that Nagy's government was not itself a counterrevolution-
ary force, Kadar stated that Nagy tried to eliminate the
counterrevolution through political maneuvers and in a
peaceful manner, but achieved diametrically opposite re-
sults. AgErRE-T-NOTOTTNIT
10 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
3L-�9REZ
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7. YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS EXPLAIN ATTITUDE TOWARD
SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS
Yugoslav officials believe Ithrushchev's
policies remain in effect and cite Suslov's
October Revolution speech as evidence.
They believe they must seek to retain
influence with the Soviet leaders "at no
matter what cost," presumably to sus-
tain Khrushchev's more liberal policy.
They claim that serious efforts are be-
ing made by French, Italian, Bulgarian,
and even Soviet Communists to blame
Yugoslavia for Moscow's recent trouble
in Poland and Hungary.
Foreign Secretary Popovic has said that
although Ka,dar's Hungarian government was carried to
power on Russian bayonets, he still was not convinced that
the Kremlin would disavow the "many roads to socialism"
concepts to which it had agreed in the Yugoslav-Soviet
communiqu�n June. A Yugoslav diplomat expressed the
view, however, that Yugoslav ideas on relaxation of con-
trol had been "set back two years in the last week." He
claimed that if the "schedule" had not been interrupted by
the Hungarian catastrophe, there would have been changes
in Czechoslovakia within a few weeks.
Belgrade blames the Soviet leaders for
failure to push "democratization" and "national Communism"
in Hungary fast enough to avoid trouble. The Yugoslays also
blame Nagy for being weak and indecisive, thus allowing
events to get out of hand to the point where "Horthy adherents"
were exercising some power and a fascist man-hunt of Com-
munists was going on. Popovic stated that Nagy's conces-
sions had also been exploited by foreign intelligence agencies
and by Radio Free Europe, but he approved of US modera-
tion in its statements on Eastern Europe.
10 Nov 56
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viignipe
8. ASIAN CRITICISM OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN
HUNGARY GROWS
India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia are
now trying to correct the impression
created by their abstention on the UN
General Assembly's resolution of 4 Novem-
ber condemning the USSR's aggression in
Hungary and calling for a withdrawal of
Soviet troops.
Nehru has strongly condemned the Soviet
move and requested an explanation from
Premier Bulganin. Krishna Menon on
8 November emphasized in the General
Assembly that India's abstention did not
imply "unconcern or lack of interest."
Ba Swe at the Asian Socialist conference
in Bombay condemned the Soviet actions in Hungary as the
"most despicable form of colonialism." A Burmese Foreign
Ministry communiqu�nnounced on 8 November that the
Soviet ambassador had been informed of Burma's deep con-
cern and was asked to convey to Moscow Burma's request
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
The Ceylonese prime minister told a
press conference on 7 November, "I feel that the steps
taken by the Soviet Union in Hungary are to be deplored."
The government of Indonesia on 8 Novem-
ber issued a communiqu�tating its regret that Soviet troops
interfered with the process of democratization in Hungary.
The communiqu�dded that this is not in accord with the
spirit and principles of the Bandung conference.
In India, Ceylon and Indonesia, growing
popular pressure has been at least partially responsible for
10 Nov 56
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CONFIDENTIAL
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official criticism of Russian action in Hungary. It is un-
likely, however, that the Hungarian issue, in which the
Asian-African bloc is not directly involved, will arouse
feelings as intense as those expressed on the Suez problem.
10 Nov 56
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Noir, limo/
9. EAST GERMANS OPENLY CRITICIZE SOVIET
ACTION IN HUNGARY
Residents of Dresden, particularly
workers and students, have reacted
vigorously to the ruthless Soviet crush-
ing of the Hungarian revolution,
On 4 and 5 November,
groups of people were discussing events in Hungary and
condemning Soviet actions in very strong terms, regard-
less of who might be overhearing them.
Dresdeners are particularly disturbed
by Communist assertions that the East German people sup-
ported the Soviet action in Hungary. They are disturbed
also by the failure of the West to give active support to the
Hungarian rebels. The prevailing opinion in Dresden is
that the outcome of the Hungarian revolution proves the
futility of any attempt to overthrow the hated East German
regime.
Comment Efforts of the East German regime to
convince the people that the Hungarian
revolt was a fascist putsch engineered by "Horthy emigres"
with the objective of restoring "reactionary capitalism" have
failed. High party and government officials, aware of the
tension and anti-Communist sentiment within the country,
are making vague promises of better working and living con-
ditions, but they have indicated they will make no real conces-
sions or fundamental changes in policy and will ruthlessly
suppress any antiregime activity. (NOFORN)
10 Nov 56
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SECRET
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ANNEX
Following is the text of .a memorandum from the
Chairman of the Watch Committee to the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee concerning a special
meeting of the Watch Committee:
1. The Watch Committee, between 1030 and 1315 hours,
9 November 1956, reviewed the many reports, rumors and
indications of Bloc military and diplomatic moves bearing
upon the question of Bloc intent to conduct military opera-
tions outside the perimeter of the Bloc.
2. Ground force activity is such as to indicate position-
ing to deal with internal Bloc requirements or to improve
their military defensive and offensive posture; however, the
scale of activity is not indicative of an intention to act offen-
sively.
3. Air activity has been at a rather reduced rate but
not so low as to indicate a standdown for purposes of prepar-
ing for large-scale offensive activities.
4. Naval and merchant marine activity similarly do
not show a pattern of an intention to act offensively.
5. Evidence does not as yet support the actual arrival
of any Bloc or volunteer forces in the Middle East. Reports
continue to come in concerning offers and recruiting of volun-
teers in many areas. Particular attention is being focused by
the Watch Committee upon efforts to detect specific plans to
introduce Bloc forces or other aid in the Middle East, or actual
arrivals.
6. The volume and nature of the various reports concern-
ing military and diplomatic moves in Europe and the Middle
East could reflect deception measures.
7. The Watch Committee has reviewed its conclusions of
7 November and does not consider that changes are warranted.
� The Committee points out, however, that an outbreak of hostili-
ties between Israel and Jordan or Syria would increase the like-
lihood of deeper Soviet involvement.
* * * * * * * *
� The conclusions of the Watch Committee at its 7 Novem,
ber meeting are reprinted on the following page.
10 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin
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minproi Norio�
A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against the continental US or its possessions in
the immediate future.
B. 1. Recent Soviet activities reflect an effort to improve
the Soviet military posture and readiness to deal
with the critical world situation.
a. Soviet troop movements, alerts and other
military activities in the Satellites and the
USSR do not indicate intentions to initiate
hostilities in the immediate future against
non-Bloc territory in Europe, including
Turkey, or US forces abroad.
b. As a result of its own statements and ac-
tions, the USSR is under much political
pressure to come to the aid of the Arabs.
There are many indications that the So-
viets are preparing to provide volunteers
and equipment, particularly in the form of
pilots and aircraft, to Syria and some
other Arab states in as yet unknown quan-
tities. There are no known Soviet mili-
tary moves which conclusively reflect a
Soviet intention to intervene unilaterally
in the Middle East.
2. An unprovoked North Korean attack on South Korea
is unlikely at the present time. Nevertheless,
President Fthee, encouraged by tensions elsewhere,
has launched a propaganda campaign for the reuni-
fication of Korea by subversion or force. This
campaign, accompanied by subversion or force,
could lead to a major incident between North and
South Korea. (TOP SECRET NOFORN)
10 Nov 56
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TOP SECRET
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