CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/03/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03176568
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 16, 1952

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SECURITY1NFORMATION
16 March 1952
Copy No.4 c)
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TO a C.;
NEXT tiEVIEW DTF.
AUTH: HR 70-
DATE12,141 ...REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECUIU INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Sino-Soviet negotiations on Korea and Formosa reported (page 3).
2, Koenig may sic leed De Lattre in Indochina (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Egyptian Government threatened by increasing domestic problems
(page 4).
4, British Cabinet defines concessions to be offered Egypt (page 4).
5. Pakistan offers to delay presentation of Tunisian issue (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Spanish reported pessimistic on inclusion in Western defense (page 6).
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FAR EAST
1. Sib-Soviet negotiations on Korea and Formosa reported:
3.3(h)(2)
Sino-Soviet negotiations' on poli-
cies for Korea and Formosa, which began on
15 February, were still in progress on 1 March.
The USSR is said to desire that the Korean talks
be delayed indefinitely, so that India and other Asian states can press for
UN or Big Three discussion of the Korean question and all Asian problems,
The Chinese, who consider the conquest of
Formosa their primary objective, reportedly fear that an attempt to invade
Formosawould provoke fife United States to extend the war into China. The
USSR prefers that the Formosa operation be postponed pending a Big Three
meeting.
Comment: The USSR has made several attempts
to transfer the Korean talks to the UN Security Council, where decisions
would be subject to Soviet veto. The USSR made several feelers during
1951 regarding a Big Power meeting, but there have been no new overtures
in recent months.
Peiping's propaganda has frequently demanded
control of Formosa as a condition for a Korean settlement and has often
called for an international conference to settle outstanding Asian problems.
Many sources have reported that Peiping still hopes to acquire Formosa
as part of a general Asian settlement
2. Koenig may succeed De Lattre in Indochina:
the posts of High Commissioner and Commander
in Chief of French Forces in Indochina are
again to be held jointly by a military man, probably General Pierre
Koenig, Gaullist deputy in the National Assembly.
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3.3(h)(2)
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Koenig's appointment to this post would be
acceptable to French civilian and military authorities in Indochina.
Comment: Chairman of the Assembly's Na-
tional Defense Committee, Koenig was formerly Chief of French Forces
in Germany, where he succeeded De Lattre on the Allied Control Council.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Egyptian Government threatened by increasing domestic problems:
the Wafd 3.3(h)(2)
Party has ordered a revival of student agitation
and a renewal of the so-called "Liberation
Battalion" operations against Rritisti military
forces in the Suez Canal zone. former 3.3(h)(2)
Premier Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wald, and Ali Maher, Prime Minister
Hilali's immediate predecessor, have agreed to join forces against King
Farouk.
King Farouk,
has been compromising Hilairs efforts e eLlmlnaLe govern nentaior-
ruption by trying to obtain cabinet appointments for two "corrupt and un-
scrupulous" palace favorites.
Comment: The American Ambassador in Cairo
has pointed out that Hilali has little support other than that of the palace,
and that even this is of questionable value. During the past few weeks the
Wafd Party has apparently been reorganizing for a showdown with the
Premier.
3.3(h)(2)
4. British Cabinet defines concessions to be offered Egypt:
The British Cabinet has authorized Ambassa-
dor Stevenson to offer the Egyptian Government
the progressive withdrawal of all British
combat troops from the Canal zone in return for
Egyptian participation in a Middle East defense organization.
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3.3(h)(2)
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A proposed joint communique would commit
both governments in principle, leaving the implementation of the agree-
ment to subsequent negotiations which would include other interested
powers. Stevenson is given discretion to promise that, if conditions with-
in Egypt permit, some British forces will be evacuated as soon as formal
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations get under way.
With regard to the Sudan, Britain will propose
that the Governor General form a "Sudan Council of Ministers and Parlia-
ment," whose interim decision on the issue of King Farouk's "symbolic
sovereignty" over the Sudan will be accepted by the United Kingdom.
Foreign Secretary Eden has told the US Am-
bassador in London that he feels the Cabinet has made what for the moment
are its maximum concessions to Egypt.
Comment: The British and American Ambassa-
dors in Cairo have both insisted that nothing short of Britain's recognition
of King Farouk's new title will induce Egypt to begin negotiations for a
general Anglo-Egyptian settlement.
For reasons of general prestige the British
Cabinet has been very reluctant to take any action which could be inter-
preted as a repudiation of previous pledges to make no constitutional
changes affecting the Sudanese without consulting them.
5. Pakistan offers to delay presentation of Tunisian issue:
3.5(c)
According to a Pakistani Foreign Office 3.3(h)(2)
spokesman, his government informed France
that it would delay presentation of the Tunisian
issue to the Security Council provided France were
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willing to release the mprisoned nationalists and stop repressive
measures.
�tle added that Indonesia is actually the prime
mover in presenting the Tunisian problem, although Pakistan has assumed
the chairmanship.
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Comment: The French Foreign Office is at-
tempting to dissuade Pakistan from presenting the issue, but continues
to insist that, before nationalist leaders can be released, the Tunisian
Government must withdraw its petition for Security Council arbitration
of the French-Tunisian disagreement. 3.3(h)(2)
Pakistan is
not an enthusiastic sponsor in this instance, but agreed to act in order to
improve its position as a leader of the Moslem world. Iraq, not Indonesia,
is the most active supporter of the Tunisian cause.
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Spanish reported pessimistic on inclusion in Western defense:
3.3(h)(2)
on Spanish press charges that France will veto
any effort by the United States to include Spain
in NATO, states that optimism initially created
by Portuguese support during the NATO meeting
in Lisbon has 'given way to a "profound depression." Ile attributes the
change to the silent reception given the Portuguese Minister's plea for
Spanish participation and to a recent announcement of increased US mili-
tary and financial aid to France.
Comment: With the fall of the British Labor
government, France became the chief target of Spanish attacks for allegedly.
obstructing Spain's participation in Western defense. Anti-French feeling
has reached such heights since the Lisbon meeting that the rearmament of
France is now characterLed as a tai.eat to Spain.
The Madrid government may, therefore, be
preparing to press n the forthcoming US-Spanish negotiations for a tri-
partite military agr,�ement among the United States, Spain, and Portugal,
based on the Pyrenees line.
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