CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/07/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03176561
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 1, 1951

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Nor 1 Ur ,q00,
1 Xuly 1951
Copy No, C...3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. UN not to be involved in cease-fire negotiations (page 3
NEAR EAST
3.5(c)
Iranian Prime Minister remains intransigent (page 3).
. Iranian Government reportedly not united on its attitude toward t13.3(h)(2)
International Court (page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
French Communists appeal ban on 15 July rally (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
3.3(h)(2)
7. Panama to cancel registration of ships destined for North Korean or
Chinese Communist ports (page 7).
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L.L7.1 .1
GENERAL
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1. UN not ta be involved in cease-fire negotiations: 3.3(h)(2)
Commenting to the US UN delegation on a
Korean cease-fire, UN Secretary General
Lie supported the procedure being followed
by the US and stated that he hoped for a
meeting of military commanders in the field. Lie said that the Unified
Command would have full authority to act for the UN. Assistant Secre-
tary General Zinchenko, a Soviet national who supposedly consulted
Malik, reportedly told Lie that the North Korean commander would
probably have several Chinese Communist advisers. " The US dele-
gation comments that the Soviet maneuver and Malik's refusal to see
UN General Assembly President Entezam werec.designed to bypass the
UN Good Offices Committee.
Comment: The US Ambassador in Moscow
also commented that preliminary negotiations preferably should not
be undertaken by the UN since the present Soviet attitude toward the
,UN's position in the Korean affair'is not clear.
NEAR EAST
2. Iranian Prime Ministv remains intransigent:
The Iranian Prime Minister stated, after
representations by the US Ambassador,
that he would withdraw the anti-sabotage
law at the next session of Parliament on
1 July. The US Ambassador, however, made it clear that he could
not guarantee that this would ensure that Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
employees would remain in Iran.
3.3(h)(2)
The Prime Minister, moreover, rejected
the consideration of any modus vivendi with the AIOC,i even for a short
time, on the grounds that the nationalization law abolished the AIOC
in Iran and made the oil the property of the Iranian Government. Hence,
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J.viusei. Li \Sri
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there could be no question of tanker receipts made out to both the Iranian
Oil Company and the AIC. The Prime Minister stated that if the old
customers would not buy the oil, there would be new ones; he mentioned
an Indian company, and implied that the Russians would be desirous of
getting oil. In reply to the AmbOssador's statement that any new cus-
tomers would not have transportfadlities, the Prime-Minister replied
that Iran's freedom meant more to it than anything else, and that Iran
would see the whole industry closed down before conceding any point
that would violate the nationalization law.
Comment; While the Prime Minister's state-
ments occur before the ,release of a US proposal for a "moratorium,"
which is now under consideration, thley appear to doom this last hope to
failure. He has been so consistent in advocating the letter of the nation-
alization law, that it would appear futile to hope for any compromise.
3. Iranian Government reportedly not united on its attitude toward the
International Court: 3.3(h)(2)
Iran has sent a formal statement to the Inter-
national Court of Justice reiterating that the
coprt lacks jurisdiction in the oil dispute.
Although the three-man Iranian delegation
that left for The Hague on 29 lune has no authority other than to deliver
Iran's written statement, the US Ambassador in Tehran reports sharp
differences of opinion within the government on the 'ratalier handling"
of this matter.
3.3(h)(2)
Comment; Despite Iran's categorical re-
jection of British efforts to bring the oil dispute before the International
Court, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has in recent weeks concerned it-
self with this problem.
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3.3(h)(2)
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3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
6. French Communists a rtipeal ban on 15 July rally;
3.3(h)(2)
The National Council for the Communist-
dominated World Peace Movement has an-
nounced that it will request the French Gov-
ernment dizeke its ban on the rally
scheduled for 15 July in Paris. The organization's communitlue declared
that the government's decision to impose the ban was taken on the false
pretext that the rally is "Communist." Preparations for the rally will
continue.
Comment: The French Government is ap-
parently determined to maintain its. ban on the rally, and meticulous police
precautions will be taken to prevent a formal meeting. The French Com-
munist Party can be expected, however, to make a maximum effort for
this long-planned event, which is of special importance for the party's
prestige in Moscow, as a test of its "peace" propaganda capabilities in
Western Europe. Nevertheless, no French Communist peace demon-
stration in the past two years zhas had mass.pupport, largely because
the bulk of pro-Communist voters in France respond only to Communist
Party appeals on domestic issues.
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LATIN AMERICA
Panama to cancel registration of ships destined for North Koreali or
Chinese Communist ports: 3.3(h)(2)
The Panamanian Foreign Office has advised
that thel registration of a Panama flag vessel,
which was involved in transshipment violating
the UN embargo, has been canceled. The
Foreign Office promised that the US Consul General in Calcutta wcjld'
be authorized to pick up and hold for Panamanian Government action the
registration of any Panamanian flag vessel that may in the future call
at Calcutta enroute to North Korean or Chinese Communist ports, The
Panamanian Government is now considering a public announcement that
its registration will be withdrawan from any ship destined for one of the
above ports.
Comment: In view of the large number of
vessels that have registered in Panama, Panamanian support is essen-
tial to the effectiveness of the UN embargo. Withdrawal of registry is
the only penalty that the Panama Governement is capable of enforcing.
The promptness of Panama's action in this instance indicates a 4igh:
degree of cooperativeness of the part of the new Arosemena administration.
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