CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/03/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03176553
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: March 27, 1951

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27 March 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
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NEAR EAST
7. US Embassy Moscow comments on possible Soviet expansionist
moves in Iran (page 7).
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9. Widespread Soviet activity reported in Albania (page 8).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Austria acting to reduce Communist police strength (page 9).
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GENERAL
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7. US Embassy Moscow comments on_possible Soviet expansionist moves
In Iran:
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In reporting heav3� Soviet propaganda ern-3.3(h)'(2)
phasis on US "in olvement" in Premier Raz-
mara's assassination and on alleged US efforts
to supplant UK domination in Iran, the 1:78
Embassy in nose= points out that the USSR, by thus blaming all dis-
*Obances that may occur in Iran on the ',US, could be paving the way for
an even more vigorous policy toward Iran. The Embassy suggests that
such a policy mi.& involve invoking the 1921 Iranian-USSR treaty and
intervening militarily in Iran in order to "defend" that country from
foreign domination. As to the possibility that the USSR will achieve its
goal of playing a paramount role in Iran without invoking military mea-
sures -- and thus without risking a major war -- the Embassy notes how
welcome to the USSR is the movement to nationalize the tranian oil indus-
try. In the Embassy's opinion, the USSR will increase its pressure on Iran
at the present critical juncture.
Comment: The USSR is reportedly conducting
spring maneuvers on the Ira.nian border, and several references to the
1921 treaty have been noted in Communist propaganda While these un-
doubtedly will be utilized by the USSR as part of its war of nerves against
Iran, there is no evidence that the USSR is contemplating military action
at this time.
Present Soviet press attention to develop-
ments on the oil question, and earlier reports of possible Soviet prepara-
tions (at the USSR-Iranian trade and financial talks) for reopening the
issue of oil concessions, suggest that the USSR may now renew its efforts
to gain a measure of control Over Iranian oil fields. 3.3(h)(2)
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9. Widespread SovietAtctiyity *ported in Albania:
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the presence of Soviet officials in
every branch of the Albanian Government
and industry, but reports no Russian troops in the country with the ex-
ception of about 50 instructors, , the 3.3(h)(2)
other Satellites are required to furnish food and miscellaneous materi-
als to support the new Albanian Five Year plan, while the USSR sends
about 5 Liberty-type ships monthly, loaded with oil machinery, electri-
mal eqUipment and pipeline, into Durazzo harbor. 3.3(h)(2)
the general economic condition of the country has im-
Droved during the last six months, particularly in oil production. 3.3(h)(2)
, the only foreign air traffic permittedinto
the country is one Soviet aeroflot plane weekly, while two new YAK-9
fighter planes patrol Tirana, reportedly in order tO stop clandestine
overflights. The attache reports that heavily armed guards patrol the
blacked-out streets at night.
� Comment: Available information on Soviet
and Satellite shipments to Albania tends to confirm the reported empha-
sis on economic aid, with the probable aim of shoring up the stability
of the Albanian regime. The Yugoslav Gpvernment still allows some
Soviet overflights orAlbania, but makes such permission contingent on /
each plane's landing in Belgrade.
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WESTERN EUROPE
10. Austria acting to reduce Communist police strength:
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Austrian Interior Minister Helmer has
assured US High Commissioner Donnelly
that the Austrian Government will take im-
mediate steps to remove Communists from
the police forces; beginning with the discharge of 400 members of the
Vienna administrative police. Helmer said that other purge operations
would be conducted more slowly because of Soviet opposition and the
absence of legislation enabling the government to dismiss police officers
on the grounds of pro,-Communist sentiments. Helmer added that he has
sent a reliable police officer to Graz (second to Vienna in Communist
infiltration) to eliminate those responsible for Communist success there.
Donnelly comments that the USSR will strongly resist any measures
calculated to reduce Communist representation on the police force and
that these developments may bring a "tightening of the general situation"
In Austria.
Comment: The surprisingly strong pro-
Communist vote in the recent Vienna police union elections prompted a
US-UK survey of Austrian police, which revealed that Communist strength
In the police organization is much greater than responsible Austrian
officials ha reviously indicated since then, the US High Commissioner /
has pressed the Austrian Minister of Interior for remedial action.
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