INDOCHINA PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03175922
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-00574
• Publication Date: April 6, 1973

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
6 April 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard T. Kennedy
National Security Council Staff
SUBJECT : Indochina Psychological Operations
1. Per our recent conversations, I asked my Agency
colleagues concerned with such matters to pull together
a summary of current and feasible future activity in the
psychological pressure field. Attached is the response to
my request, done largely by Jack Horgan. (Note, however,
that this was an internal Agency exercise, not something
done by PPOG.)
2. The final section ("Recommendations for Action")
is set up in "Approve/Disapprove" format for your
convenience. As you will see, we again raise the question
of using leaflets showing (separately or conjoined) pictures
of President Nixon being cordially received by Mao and/or
Brezhnev. We are not trying to be stubborn or obtuse. The
potential complications that would have to be considered
before use of any such leaflets was authorized are well
understood. The fact remains, however, that this particular
propaganda theme is known to have a devastating impact on
Vietnamese of all persuasions and, particularly,
Communist cadre at all levels. Thus if you want something
that will work in Indochina, here is a gambit with maximum
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impact. The decision on the relative weights of
potentially conflicting equities -- Indochina impact
versus non-Indochina considerations -- is obviously
one that has to be made at your end of the line, not mine.
Geor e A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
Memorandum - "U.S. Psychological Pressure Operations
Vis-a-Vis North Vietnam," dated 6 April 1973
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6 April 1973
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: U.S. Psychological Pressure Operations Vis-a-Vis
North Vietnam
I. OBJECTIVES AND CURRENT ACTIVITIES
I. The primary objective of all U.S. Government psychological
operations directed at North Vietnam from May 1972 until 28 January
1973 was to generate pressures for a peaceful settlement. With the
signing of the Paris Agreements, the primary objective shifted to that
of generating pressure for compliance with the Agreements. The tone of
these efforts during the 60-day prisoner release period has been
non-polemical and designed to encourage the DRV to approach the
implementation of the Agreements in a spirit of settlement. During
this non-polemical phase, however, contingency plans were developed
for taking a harder line after X+60 if the DRV's behavior so warranted.
2. Our current basic assessment is that the DRV has not
abandoned the idea of military conquest of the South and that further
psychological pressure operations are needed to complement other,
more overt, U.S. Government activities aimed at inducing the DRV to
comply with the spirit and letter of the Paris Agreements. Targets for
these operations are the population of North Vietnam, personnel in the
North Vietnamese Army wherever they are located, and the Pathet Lao
and Khmer Insurgents. There are indications that North Vietnamese
personnel outside North Vietnam are now particularly susceptible to
psychological messages that exploit their ardent desire to go home now
that the war has been officially concluded. The methods that we can
SECRET/S1,2NSITIVE
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use to communicate are radio broadcastine . leafleting,
The radio and leafleting
ettort can be carried out both unilaterally (i.e., by the U.S. alone)
and by working through the governments of South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia. Basic objectives of any intensified psychological effort at
the moment would include the following:
(1) Encouraging DRV adherence to the terms
of the Paris Agreements.
(2) Accentuating U.S. actions and statements
with regard to compliance with the Paris Agreements.
(3) Pressure for cessation of DRV infiltration
activity.
(4) Pressure for withdrawal of NVA forces to
North Vietnam.
(5) Buttressing the outlook that the DRV should
refrain from external aggression and concentrate on
constructive domestic pursuits.
(6) Creating pressures for a split between the
DRV and the VC, the Pathet Lao and the Khmer
Insurgents.
(7) Exacerbation of morale problems within the
Communist ranks, particularly among NVA troops
still stationed in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
II. CURRENT RADIO BROADCASTING ACTIVITIES
3. In the field of U.S.-controlled radio broadcasting, the Voice
of America is currently broadcasting 18 hours daily over its medium
wave Vietnamese-language service from transmitters located in the
Philippines and South Vietnam. Five hours of original programming
are carried daily. The Voice is one of the most effective media in reaching
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the DRV/NVA target. VOA's programming aims at bringing to the DRV's
attention news and information on basic U.S. policy. The VOA broad-
casts seven hours per week in Lao and five hours per week in Khmer.
Both of the latter programs could be improved.
4. Another effective USG-sponsored voice aimed at the DRV
target is the "Voice of Mother Vietnam" -- a Saigon Station-supported,
South Vietnamese-managed radio established last summer. Over a short
period of time this has become a high-impact medium. The radio currently
broadcasts 49 hours daily with three hours of original programming
over three short wave transmitters and one medium wave transmitter
located in South Vietnam. The radio's main target is North Vietnam
proper; but its in-country South Vietnamese capability is currently
being expanded. By the end of April, a new medium wave transmitter
will be activated that will target Communist forces in the Military
Regions 3 and 4 of South Vietnam. This radio is currently emphasizing
what the cease-fire agreement promises for the people of Vietnam in
human and individual terms.
5. The Saigon Station currently broadcasts a black radio titled
"Voice of the Sacred Sword Patriot's League." This radio purports to
originate with a group of dissident North Vietnamese Communists who
oppose the aggressive and self-serving policies of the Lao Dong Party.
It urges national reunification by peaceful means and a greater effort
to develop the North Vietnamese economy. One hour of fresh programming
is broadcast daily for a total of seven hours per day over two high frequency
transmitters. The Station also plans to develop another new black radio
which will attempt to cause rifts between Southern and Northern Vietnamese
Communists. This black radio, which will purport to originate with
an element of the PRG/NLF , will voice the growing discontent of the
PRG/NLF with the policies of the DRV/LDP and air real or notional
differences developing among Vietnamese Communist elements. We
plan to commence broadcasting this program in late April if 40 Committee
approval is obtained.
6. The three non-Communist countries of Indochina each carry
radio programs aimed at the NVA/VC. For example, in South Vietnam,
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the principal concentrations of NVA forces are within easy range of
seven GVN transmitters. Programming reflects the GVNTs concern
with having NVA forces withdraw; though the GVN consumes most of
its energy in propagandizing its own population with themes that are
not effective against the DRV . The GVN's radio efforts have considerable
room for improvement, as do those of the RLG and the GKR.
III. CURRENT LEAFLET OPERATIONS
7. Although active in Cambodia, the U.S. Government is currently
not engaging in leafleting activity in North Vietnam, South Vietnam and
Laos. South Vietnam and Laos have their own leaflet programs. Both
programs could be made more effective.
8. The Laos picture is somewhat clouded at the moment. RLG
leafleting is continuing within the limited capabilities of the government's
assets, and we hope to increase the RLG leafleting capability through
extending greater U.S. support, primarily in themes.
9. In Cambodia, there are two U.S. leaflet programs still
in operation. One is strictly a unilateral U.S. leaflet program aimed
at North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. The leaflet themes in this
program are designed to promote adherence to the Paris Agreements and
foster a desire to return home on the part of the NVA. The second on-
going effort involves the printing and delivery of GKR-prepared
leaflets aimed at the Khmer Insurgents. The themes in this GKR program
emphasize Cambodian nationalism and unity against foreign (Vietnamese
Communist) influence and promote the view that the NVA/VC aggressors
keep the Cambodian nation separated in violation of the Paris Agreement's
provisions that call for the departure of foreign forces from Cambodia.
IV.
10.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
(1) Structuring close cooperative working
relations with the governments of South Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos in order to bring their programs
(radio and leaflet) more in line with U.S. objectives.
Approve
Disapprove
(2) Examination of patterns of radio
propagation in Indochina of all friendly radios to
assure that the maximum coverage of the
Communist target is achieved.
Approve
Disapprove
(3) Leaflets depicting President Nixon and
Chairman Mao and President Nixon and Brezhnev
with an appropriate non-polemical message were
employed by the GVN for a short time in 1972
before they were discontinued at U.S. request.
There is ample evidence indicating that these
leaflets were particularly effective. Even the
most dedicated Communist cadre are deeply
disturbed by the thought of Sino-American and/
or Soviet-American rapprochment and all that
that implies for the Vietnamese revolution.
We recognize that there are wider ramifications
for our world-wide position in the use of
such leaflets. Nonetheless, from the limited
perspective of what would be certain to have
a great impact on the Vietnamese Communists,
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we would propose that the GVN be allowed
to resume the use of such leaflets over its
own territory.
Approve
Disapprove
(4)
(5)
Approve
Disapprove
Approve
Disapprove
(6) Increase overt and covert efforts
through leafleting and radio broadcasts to
exacerbate tensions between the North
Vietnamese and the Viet Gong, the Pathet Lao
and the Khmer Insurgents.
Approve
Disapprove
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Approve
Disapprove.
(2)
Approve
Disapprove
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Approve
Disapprove
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