CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03175070
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 19, 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03175070
Nape kid"'
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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central Intelligence Bulletin
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C
1 S' ';:;J
19 December 1967
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TiNFSegret
(:oqtroiled Dissem
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may he designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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v.i INAL:i
19 December 1967
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Communist China: Efforts to reopen the schools
are breaking down in many areas. (Page 3)
Rumania-USSR: Ceausescu visit does nothing to
improve relations. (Page 6)
Yemen: Premier's resignation may reflect Egyptian
pressure. (Page 7)
USSR - Eastern Europe: Support of Arabs (Page 8)
Dahomey: Weak new government (Page 8)
TOP RET
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THAILAND
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68996 12-67 CIA
19 Dec 67 C A T TATIT1 T TrIVNT laTTT .T .P.TIN map
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I Nor
*South Vietnam: A captured enemy document indi-
cates that the North Vietnamese may undertake a ma-
jor military effort this winter in the heavily populated
coastal sections of I and II Corps.
The enemy document also suggests that the North
Vietnamese may launch diversionary attacks in the Con
Thien area; however, the principal thrust will occur
farther south in the enemy's Military Region 5 and the
Tri-Thien-Hue military region.
A recent build-up of enemy units south of Quang
Tri city, the movement of elements of the 304th North
Vietnamese Division into the Laos panhandle west of
Khe Sanh, and the movement of the 31st North Vietnam-
ese Regiment into the A Shau Valley southeast of Hue,
lends some credence to the strategy alluded to in the
captured document.
If such is the enemy intention, the design would
be to bring the war closer to South Vietnam's popula-
tion centers and to create yet another battle sector in
which to pin down allied forces and disrupt pacification
efforts.
Diversionary military activity in the Demilitarized
Zone area probably would consist for the most part of
rocket and artillery fire against allied strongpoints as
the weather improves in January and February.
In the highlands area
at least two elements of the Nortt
,
Vietnamese B-3 Front have moved southward to Darlac
and Phuoc Long provinces near the Cambodian border.
The units involved have not yet been identified.
They could be logistics units sent to help infiltrate men
and materials to points farther south, or they could be
19 Dec 67 1
TO' :CRET
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fighting units shifting from the western highlands to
northern III Corps. The North Vietnamese 88th Regi-
ment moved to III Corps from the highlands late last
summer.
19 Dec 67 2
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--X-C-, I L) J._1'._) J_N. 1.1 -L SOIV
Communist China: The regime's recent efforts to
reopen schools have broken down in many areas.]
With few exceptions, schools at all levels were
cicAed in June 1966 to release students for full time
participation in the Cultural Revolution. In Septem-
ber and October 1967 the regime tried a variety of
programs to get students to curb their disorderly "re-
volutionary" activities and return to school.
few schools actually have resumed classes.
'.Some major institutions, such as the large elite
universities in Peking, show no signs of even attempt-
ing to resume classes.
Many schools which did try to reopen were soon
forced to close because of fighting among Red Guard
factions. For example, the important Huanan Tech-
nical College in Canton opened on 28 November, but
was closed nine days later when army troops were
called in to stop student clashes. The same thing hap-
pened at the Wuhsi College of Light Industry in East
China in mid-November.
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It is now apparent that Peking, in ordering schools
to reopen, failed to provide specific guidance on cur-
riculum, textbooks, qualifications for new students, and
authority of teachers. There has not even been an at-
tempt to restore vandalized school facilities in many
areas. As a result, the real situation contrasts sharply
with Peking's propaganda, which tries to convey the im- _
pression that classes are gradually resuming everywhere.,
19 Dec 67 3
'1042--SECIZET
(continued)
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The chances are slim that the Peking leadership
can impel warring student factions to resume class-
work before settling its own problems. The regime's
failure to follow through on last fall's educational pro-
gram suggests that top leaders are fully occupied with
more pressing issues.
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19 Dec 67 CFNTR AT. TNTFT,T,TGENCF, BULLETIN Photo
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Noy' ..1-4444-'etrCall., 1 sraid
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5
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E. 1
Rumania-USSR: Major differences remain be-
tween the two countries in the wake of the official visit
to Moscow on 14-15 December of Rumanian party and
state chief Ceausescu.
The communique' ending the visit noted that the
two merely "exchanged opinions" on the implementa-
tion of existing economic and trade agreements, one
of the major issues believed to be dividing them. At
the Rumanian national party conference on 6 Decem-
ber, Ceausescu, alluding to the USSR, charged that
long-term economic agreements are sometimes not
fully carried out in practice.
On other topics, such as Vietnam and Germany,
the communique's language did not commit the Ruma-
nians to support specific Soviet positions. In addition,
the communique failed to mention the Middle East or
an international Communist meeting, suggesting dif-
ferences continue on these matters.
The only agreement apparently reached was that
a Soviet party and government delegation will pay an
official visit to Rumania "in 1968."
19 Dec 67
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Yemen: Premier al-Aini, who had been absent
from the country for some weeks, is reported to have
resigned yesterday.
He has recommended that General Hasan al-Amri,
the chief of staff, be asked to form a new cabinet. The
resignation may reflect Egyptian pressure, since Nasir
has long disliked al-Aini. A former ambassador to
Washington, al-Aini is considered a liberal as well as
an intellectual in Yemeni circles. His resignation will
give conservative military and tribal elements a freer
hand in the republican government.
Meanwhile, there has been little change in the mili-
tary situation, and sporadic royalist pressure on a
number of republican positions continues.
19 Dec 67 7
DaP�FrEletrET
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NOTES
USSR - Eastern Europe: The meeting of European
Communist foreign ministers in Warsaw today is the
fourth such attempt to put on a show of unified Commu-
nist support for the Arabs since the June war. The
Soviets, who welcome any such opportunity to draw their
European allies together, probably arranged the gather-
ing. Moscow may want to stiffen the resolve of some
of the European states who are only lukewarm toward
backing the Arabs, particularly with material support.
Soviet involvement in Yemen, a new element in the pic-
ture since the last meeting in September, will be the
most topical of the current issues under discussion.
Dahomey: The new provisional government headed
by Major Kouandete seems likely to be weak and inef-
fectual. The eight military men who dominate it have
no political experience and probably will soon split along
regional lines. Lt. Col. Alley, who was detained briefly,
probably remains a power and may continue as chief of
staff.
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