CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03174712
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 1, 1961

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3.3(h)(2)
1 February 1961
Copy No. C 77
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos: No significant military developments reported,
but Soviet airlift continues.
(Page t)
2, Congo: Trend toward fragmentation continues. (Page t)
3. Sudan: "Secret organization" of army officers and
civilians planning a coup for early March.
Page it)
4. Israel: Prime Minister Ben-ourion resigns. (Page it)
5. Burma: Rift in military highlights dissatisfaction
over Prime Minister Nu's friendliness toward Com-
munist China. (Page it)
6. El Salvador: The new five-man junta has quickly con-
solidated its position. (Page tit)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: There have been no significant mili
ments reported during the past 24 hours.
e Soviet airlift into Laos continued through 31
January. The two AN-12s which flew round-trip to Hai-
phong from Canton on 29 and 30 January have been sched-
uled to fly to Peiping from Canton on 1 February. They
will probably return to the USSR from Peiping.
North Vietnam on 30 January issued the fifth in its
series of long memoranda detailing alleged warlike acts
in Laos of the US and "its most stubborn satellites." The
fourth memorandum was issued on 5 January. In bring-
ing its list of accusations up to date, Hanoi takes the op-
portunity to criticize "the new US authorities," charging
that they follow the Laotian policies of the previous admin-
istration. This line has been taken by Communist China
and North Korea, too, although it has been avoided by the
USSR. (Backup, Page 1)
� Congo: The trend toward further fragmentation of the o K
Congo is marked by the recent efforts of the leader of Equa-
teur Province, Jean Bolikango, to obtain military assist-
ance from President Dacko of the neighboring Central Afri- � s
can Republic (CAR). Reportedly Dacko promised help to
defend Equateur against Gizenga's troops and said he was
ready to slip his troops across the frontier in Congolese /
uniforms, if Bolikango would agree to a CAR-Equateur
er er Dacl_w's leadership. Bolikango, fr
Is also negotiating with /1
groups in the neighboring rencn Community Republic of
cerning a possible merger of territories.
(Backup, Page 2) (Map)
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Sudan:
a "secret organization" has been set up in
the Sudan and is planning a coup against General Abboud's
military rch,
The group report-
edly includes "army officers of various ranks and some
civilian intellectuals." the leaders
of the organization intend to have no contact with any for-
eign state prior to the coup, "so that the revolt will have
a purely nationalist stamp." The
Abboud regime has managed to survive chronic plotting
and three coup attempts in its slightly more than two years
of power; in recent months it has been faced with wide-
spread opposition among political and religious leaders
who are demanding immediate stens for a return to civil-
ian government. (Backup, Page 3)
. *Israel: Despite the resignation of Prime Minister Ben-
Gurion, one day after his coalition government defeated a
no-confidence motion growing out of the turmoil over the
"Lavon affair," his Mapai labor party is almost certain to
dominate any reorganized coalition in view of its overwhelm
ing plurality within the parliament. If Ben-Gurion does not
reconsider his decision, Levi Eshkol, long-time finance
minister and deputy to Ben-Gurion, probably would be the
tiMapai's choice as his successor.
Backup,
!Page 4)
Burma:L_Prime Minister Nu's current friendliness to -4
ward the Chinese Communists and his domestic maladmin-
istration have precipitated a pronounced rift within the Bur-
mese military leadership. This situation has been aggra-
vated by Army Chief of Staff General Ne Win's refusal to /�..,t,
Intervene in nonmilitary affairs. Brigadier Maung Maung, '
army director of training and adviser to General Ne Win, /.?-3
has submitted his resignation over Ne Win's charges that
he is too openly anti-Chinese and pro-American. Person-
ality clashes between these two strong-willed army leaders
1 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Gave also contributed to the rift. Maung Maung has
advocated the return of military rule in Burma,
�7,1 en Ne Win has resisted so far. His resignation is re-
portedly to be announced at the annual commanding offi-
cers' conference on 3 February and is expected to pre-
cipitate a sharp discussion of General Ne Win's army
leadership. A number of top military officers in Burma
are reported sympathetic to Maung Maun is viewpoint.
(Backup,
Page 5)
El Salvador: The five=man ruling Directorate has
quickly consolidated its position following the 25 January
military coup against a three-month-old regime that had
come under heavy Communist and pro-Castro influence.
Numerous Communists have been arrested, but sporadic
acts of violence against the new authorities are still prob-
able. Anti-militarist sentiment is strong in the university,
where Communist student leaders may be attempting to or=
ganize a student protest strike and acts of sabotage and
terrorism. The armed forces at present appear united be-
hind the new regime, but the detention of several high-
ranking and capable officers for their association with ex-
iled ex-President Osorio could lead to dangerous cleavages
in the future. The new government, which is conservatively
oriented, has repeatedly proclaimed that it will rule demo-
cratically and on 30 January announced the lifting of martial
law. The new leaders have also publicly expressed recog-
nition of the need for social reform and have said that the
era of "rich take all" is over in El Salvador. To date, only
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Spain have recognized the new
regime.
1 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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North Vietnam Issues New Laos Memorandum
� North Vietnamese charges of US "aggression" in Laos,
detailed in a long memorandum on 5 January, have now been
updated to include criticisms of the "new US authorities."
The fifth and latest addition to this growing series of mem-
oranda was issued in Hanoi on 30 January.
The US and its "most stubborn satellites"--South Viet-
nam, Thailand, and Nationalist China in this instance--are
"still striving to extend the aggressive war in Laos," the
latest memorandum begins. The memorandum then winds
Its way through a chronological listing of accusations taking
into account virtually every recent US statement or action
which could even remotely be connected with Laos. The
last item in the list is a charge that a group of non-Commu-
nist Asian nations were plotting a "secret military alliance"
in Manila on 18 and 19 January.
Having carried their compilation of charges to the clay
before the US inauguration, the North Vietnamese then stated
that "despite statements by the new US authorities about their
desire for an independent, free, and unaligned Laos, military
intervention by the US warmongering clique continues." While
this memorandum is the first North Vietnamese effort to link
the new administration with the Laotian situation, it is not
Hanoi's first critical commentary. On 20 January, the North
Vietnamese stated that President Kennedy's inaugural address
brought before the world "a program aimed at threatening
peace."
Communist China and North Korea also have taken a crit-
ical position on the new administration. Both Pyongyang and
Peiping have said they expect no change in US policy- -North
Korea ventured its opinion that no US administration c n
"possibly change the doom of USimperialism." Moscow, how-
ever, has maintained a cautious approach in its pro
since the new US administration assumed office.
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Republic of the Congo
Brazzaville
L' I
Leopoldville
�
Matadi Thysville
Luanda
Atlantic
Ocean
�
Gemena
Conn.
Stanleyville
Coquilhatville
Bukavu
Lake
Albert
�to, Usumbura
1 FEBRUARY 1961
UNCLASSIFIED
STATUTE MILES
31534
Port Francqui
�
Luluabourg
Bakwanga
luputa.
.Kamina
Kongolo
Albertville
Manono
�
Elisabethville
Lake
Tanganyika
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Situation in the Congo
The Leopoldville government i seeking ways to in-
crease its military effectiveness. On 28 January Kasa-
vubu made a plea to Ambassador Timberlake for prompt
and direct assistance in obtaining arms to permit loyal
troops to take the initiative against Gizenga's forces,
claiming that "half the soldiers have no rifles." Kasa-
vubu suggested that the US might buy arms in Belgium,
as these would be identical with those now in use by the
Congolese Army and difficult to trace. Kasavubu did not
reply directly when asked if his government had actually
inventoried the arms on handn
Equateur Province's leader Bolikango, Kasavubu's
information minister, is an intelligent and dynamic man
who has made previous approaches, notably to the Por-
tuguese ambassador in Leopoldville, for assistance in
setting up an independent state in Equateur Province.
He probably controls the Bangala
tripe oi IdAquateur province, which forms a sizable part
of the Congolese Army. His approach to the Central
African Republic was followed on 28 January by a re-
quest to Ambassador Timberlake that the US extend him
at least indirect aid. His separatist intentions were evi-
dent in his proposal to use the requested aid to raise a
force of Bangalis to protect Equateur Province from
Gizenga's Stanleyville regime. Ambassador Timberlake
comments that this attitude is another example of the un-
willingness of local Congolese leaders to submerge their
aspirations in order to preserve unity.
There is little doubt that the French cabinet's 25 Jan-
uary criticism of the UN role in the Congo reflects De
Gaulle's views. t the UN, the French representatives
have said that the French African states, disillusioned
with Kasavubu, are eager to work with Nigeria or even
Ghana to prevent chaos and a Communist take-over in the
Congo which would havp a disaqtrnns reffilet nn npicr boring
state9
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Anti-Regime Maneuvering in the Sudan
The Abboud milit ry regime has been under intermittent
pressure from political and religious leaders for a return�
to civilian government. In November a group headed by the
leader of the powerful Ansar religious sect presented a peti-
tion to the government demanding that the army "go back to
the barracks." The Supreme Military Council--the regime's
top governing body--was split over what action to take against
the signers; it finally determined to ignore the petition of-
ficially, and contented itself with mild measures to chastise
some of the signers. The opposition, which is by no means
unified itself, has not tried to bring about a showdown; it ap-
pears, however, to be gaining important new adherents among
leaders of the trade unions that now are being permitted to re-
organize after having been suspended for more than two years.
It seems unlikely that the new plotting organization is in
a position to control key military units. Lin recent months
Major General Hasan Beshir Nasr, deputy commander of the
armed forces, has strengthened his hold on the army by en-
suring that loyal officers man all key postJ3 He has indicated
in the past that he would resist any attempt to displace the
military regime.
The plotters may be hoping to use the occasion of the
yearly rotation of troops to launch.their coup attempt. This
brings substantial numbers of troops from the regional com-
mands into the Khartoum area, as army units are rotated be-
tween the northern and southern provinces. This year the
rotation is scheduled to begin in February, and probably will
not be completed before sometime in March.
Relations between the Sudan and the UAR have been warmer
under the Abboud regime than they were under its predecessor.
However, very recently the UAR has become irritated over
Abboud's refusal to permit UAR supplies for pro- Lumumba
forces in the Congo to transit the Sudan, either by air or surface.
Accordingly, Nasir wouldprobably welcome a new Sudanese
regime which might be more cooperative with his efforts to
supply the Gizenga forces in Stanleyville.
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Ben-Gurion's Resignation
In view of Ben-Gurion's past utilization of resignation
as a political tactic, his present move could be a maneuver
designed to exert maximum pressure on his own Mapai party
�to expel Pinhas Lavon as a condition for Ben-Gurion's re-
sumption of party and government leadership. He said that
he resigned because he could not accept the cabinet's exon-
eration of Lavon of responsibility for an abortive intelligence
operation in 1954. Ben-Gurion had advocated that a judicial
inquiry, rather than a cabinet committee, investigate the ev-
idence bearing on the controversy.
Ben-Gurion's resignation seems primarily to be an ab-
dication of leadership of Mapai in protest against its failure
to settle the Lavon affair�essentially an intra-party contro-
versy�on Ben-Gurion's terms. These terms probably in-
cluded the expulsion of Lavon from the party and his removal
as secretary general of the Histadrut, Israel's labor federa-
tion in which Mapai has the dominant voice. Ben-Gurion has
accused Lavon of stating "falsehoods and slanders about the
defense establishment" which Lavon headed at the time of the
abortive intelligence operation in 1954�the central issue in
the current controversy. The operation reportedly involved
the planting of bombs in USIA libraries in Egypt with the aim
of damaging Egyptian-US relations. The conspiracy was un-
covered by the Egyptians, and several Israeli agents were
executed early in 1955. Lavon subsequently was charged by
an Israeli government investigating committee with respon-
sibility, for the affair--on the basis of falsified evidence, ac-
cording to testimony of last year which reopened the contro-
versy. Ben-Gurion also accuses Lavon of attempting to trans-
fer responsibility for the operation to Ben-Gurion and two of
his proteges, Shimon Peres, who was director general of the
Defense Ministry under Lavon, and Moshe Dayan, who then
was chief of staff. The implication in Lavon's recent state-
ments is that he was "framed" by Peres and Dayan. Ben-
Gurion is said to be deeply disturbed over Lavon's criticisms
of the defense establishment. Ben-Gurion claims Lavon has
undermined confidence in the Israeli Army, with which Ben-
Gurion has been intimately associated since the period of the
Palestine Mandate.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Political Discontent May Cause Open Rift in the Burmese
Army Command
From the time of General Ne Win's decision in August
1959 to return the Burmese Government to civilian control
through national elections, there have been rumblings of
discontent among senior army officers. They have argued
that the Burmese people are not prepared to choose intelli-
gently in national elections, and that the sweeping army-
sponsored reforms had not been adequately established in
Burmese society. The overwhelming victory of U Nu's
Union party in the parliamentary elections of February
1960, with the ensuing elimination of the army's reforms
and deterioration of the government's administrative effi-
ciency, has increased the army's discontent. Brigadier
Maung Maung, with the support of the deputy chief of staff,
Brigadier Aung Gyi, and a number of the senior officers,
has urged General Ne Win to intervene forcefully for the
reform or ouster of the Nu government. Although Ne Win
promised his army colleagues to act against Nu "if neces-
sary," he has thus far withstood their demands. His refusal
has been based on a personal distaste for political office and
a shrewd estimate that civilian politicians would not willingly
accept a second military government under present circum-
stances. The major leaders of both the government and op-
position have been reported prepared to form an all-party
government to forestall any, military take-over.
ahe immediate cause for Maung Maung's resignation
from the army was a running argument with Ne Win over
Nuis current rapprochement with Peiping. Although Ne Win's
suspicion of the Chinese and his anti-Communism are as deep-
rooted as Maung Maung's, he will tolerate no action which
might interfere with demarcation of the Sino-Burmese bor-
der, which he estimates cannot be completed before April.
In the heat of argument on 21 January, Ne Win charged
Maung Maung with personal responsibility for introducing
too many American personnel and excessive amounts of US
equipment into the army and thus providing the Chinese a
basis for criticizing Burma
The outcome of the commanding officers' conference is
uncertain despite the support for Maung Maung. Although
--SECPE'r-
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Sol
Ale Win's prestige in the army may have slipped,
over the past year, he
could not be displaced without disrupting the unity of the
army�the only united and disciplined base of power in
Burma.
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�....".../1�1 1 L.FLi.LV I 1 1-1. Li
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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