CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03174709
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 26, 1960

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CENTRAL
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� 26 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Congo--UAR efforts to form pro-Ltunumba
"popular front" intensified.
Indonesia may plan further small-scale papa-
military activity in southwest New Guinea. L.2)
Jordanian-Lebanese relations worsen.
Situation in Laos.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 November. 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
C'oncYrr
a course of
action designed to enlist the support of other African and
Asian countries in stimulating a pro-Lumumba national-
ist front in the Congo.
such a coalition would be
able to call on foreign allies for material and military as-
sistance, "and it is inevitable that the Soviet Union must
bear most of it" He indicated concern, however, that "if
Mobutu and the imperialists emerge victorious," Mobutu
will expel the embassies of Guinea and the UAR and pos-
sibly those of India and Yugoslavia.
(Page 1)
Indonesia-Netherlands: A 23-man armed Indonesian
force--some of whom were captured by the Dutch shortly
after landing in southwest New Guinea about 15 November--
may be the first contingent in an accelerated Indonesian
paramilitary campaign to create dissension in the area.
tpjakarta apparently believes that such tactics would in-
crease international pressure on the Dutch for cession of
Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia.) Dutch fears of a
large-scale Indonesian invasion of New Guinea in the near
future appear unfounded. Page 2)
Jordan-Lebanon-UAR: Relations between Jordan and
Lebanon have become strained because of Jordanian sabo-
tage activities in Syria which have been directed from
Lebanon. The recent expulsion of the Jordanian military
attache in Beirut may have resulted from UAR pressure on
Lebanon. This move, together with possible further
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Lebanese curtailment of Jordanian intelligence operations,
will inhibit but probably not eliminate Jordan's contacts with
subversive elements in Syria through Lebanon.
(Page 4)
*Laos:C_The extent of the military threat to Luang Prabang
is stirriiiat clear. Aerial surveillance on 24 November re-
vealed what appeared to be a large truck convoy moving north-
ward toward Muong Kassy, on the Vientiane - Luang Prabang
road. A smaller convoy of approximately ten trucks was ob-
served apparently returning to Vientiane. At Muong Kassy
Ann" P rtarIrPd rilnIrc and 9nn +n 9gn were observed
a c6ffiroy of 25 vehicles would return from Muong Kassv to
Vientiane on 24 November.
LAn American Mimi. in Luang Prabang estimates that troops
there could successfully defend against a coordinated attack by
a force of up to three battalions. Forty percent of the troops in
Luang Prabang are headquarters and service personnel whorn
might be effective in defense of the city but would be of limited
value in a counterattack. The key factor in the defense of the
city, however, would be the will of the individual soldier to
troop
strength in the city was considered insufficient and requested
Savannakhet to send reinforcementa
LThere is as yet no reaction from the principals who would
be involved in Premier Souvanna Phouma's proposal for a Luang
Prabang meeting of political leaders to discuss the formation of
a national union government.
26 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF
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The Situation in the Congo
a course of action
designed to enlist the support of other African and Asian
countries in stimulating a pro=Lumumba nationalist front
in the Congo.
the representatives of Guinea, India, and Yugoslavia
agreed with him concerning the seriousness of the situation
and the necessity for grouping nationalist elements into a
united front. He stated that Baluba leader Jason Sendwe
may announce the formation of a new pro-Lumumba coalition
when the UN Conciliation Commission arrives in Leopold-
ville.
uch a pro-Lumumba coalition
would be able to call on foreign allies for material and mil=
itary assistance "and it is inevitable that the Soviet Union
must bear most of it." He speculated that recognition of a
new Congolese government by pro- Lumumba African states
could be followed by "the intervention in strength of the
Soviet Union and the Communist camp."
"This does not mean that we would enter the battle on the
side of the Eastern bloc, but that the Eastern bloc is the
one which would intervene to assist the independent nations
in their policy toward the Congo."
notwithstanding their grandiose
plans, Lumumba's African allies were concerned over the
course of events in the UN, in Leopoldville, and in Orien-
tale Province. After reporting that the position of pro-
Lumumba forces in Stanleyville had "improved greatly,"
he noted that Lumumba and his followers now are inter-
ested in "transferring their activity" to areas of the Congo
interior other than Orientale Province. He warned that
"if Mobutu and the imperialists emerge victorious," Mobutu
will expel the embassies of Guinea and the UAR and possibly
those of India and Yugoslavia.
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� Indonesia May Accelerate Paramilitary Campaign
In New Guinea
A 23-man armed Indonesian force--some of whom were
captured by the Dutch shortly after landing in southwest New
Guinea about 15 November--may be the first contingent in an
accelerated Indonesian paramilitary campaign to create dis-
sension in the area. Lpjakarta believes such tactics would
� increase international pressures on the Dutch for cession of
the area to Indonesia.D Captured members of the force claim
other infiltration teams will follow.
_he New Gui-
nea landing mention supply problems and an operation sched-
uled for 27 November.
The Dutch administration in New Guinea has reported at
leas a dozen infiltration attempts since 1952. However,
Indonesia apparently did not evolve a lcing-term'planior the
infiltration and eventual accession of New Guinea until some
time after its last defeat on the issue at the United Nations in
November 1957. An apparently authentic Indonesian document
dated December 1959 gives details of a three- to five-year plan
which calls for infiltration of "territorial cadres" into New
Guinea, eventual guerrilla operations, and finally a resort to
diplomacy�presumably an appeal to the UN--and possibly to a
sea and air offensive3Indonesia's army chief of staff told Par-
liament last February that an intensified struggle to "reclaim"
New Guinea must be waged on all fronts�economic, political,
and military�and that it must be carried on both inside and
outside the territory.
Reports that a large-scale rebellion is taking place in the
area apparently are inspired by Djakarta, and Dutch fears of an
Indonesian invasion of battalion size or larger in the near future
appear unfounded.
The Dutch now have about 3,000 troops in New Guinea and
are sending approximately 1,000 more army and air force
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personnel. In addition, the territorial mobile force, which
functions under the civil administration, comprises some
200 Europeans and 1,400 native Papuans.
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Lebanon Expels Jordanian Military Attache
� Jordanian sabotage activities in Syria, which have
been arranged and directed in Lebanon, have strained
relations between Jordan and Lebanon. A Lebanese ar-
rested in Damascus, who subsequently was extradited
to Lebanon, reportedly confessed that he had been sent
by the Jordanian military attache in Beirut to plant ex-
plosives in Syria. UAR pressure on the Lebanese Gov-
ernment resulted in an announcement on 23 November by
Lebanese Foreign Minister. Tagla that the Jordanian at-
tache, Major Gha.zi al-Khatib, had returned to Jordan at
the request of the Lebanese Government and would not be
allowed to return to Beirut. 'The Lebanese also are impos-
ing more stringent controls on the activities of Syrian polit-
ical exiles in Lebanon.
King Husayn
was considering withdrawing most of the Jordanian
Embassy staff in Beirut following the summoning of Khatib
by Lebanese authorities for questioning. Husayn apparently
feels that the present Lebanese Government, led by pro-
Nasir Prime Minister Saib Salam, is so susceptible to UAR
pressure that Jordan cannot hope for much "cooperation"
from it."
Khatib's expulsion together with possible further Lebanese
curtailment of Jordanian intelligence operations will inhibit but
probably not eliminate Jordan's contacts through Lebanon with
subversive elements in Syria.
Khatib has directed
sabotage operations in Syria, including three explosions in
Damascus on 25 October, and has attempted to arrange the
assassination of Abd al-Harald Sarraj, president of the Syrian
Executive Council. The Jordanians believe Sarraj was respon=
sible for the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli
on 29 August.
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Nu, CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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