WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03173549
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 82
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01252
• Publication Date: January 15, 1971

Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03173549
VW'
'Secret_
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
'fticret
15 January 1971
No. 0353/71
N2 45
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday ;routing by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyi.es significant
developments of the week through noon on Thy! rsday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strat2gic Research,.
and the Directorate of Science and Technology, topics requir-
ing more comprehensive treatment and therefore published sep-
arately as_Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.
WARNING
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information af-
fecting the national security of the United Stat-s, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
!Excluded from automatic
downgroding and
declassification
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 14 January 1971)
Page
FAR EAST
Cambodia: To the Rescue 1
Laos: A Victory in the South 2
Vietnam: An Eye on the Elections 4
Singapore: Five Power Defense Meeting Concludes 5
Soviet-US Relations Strained
Soviet Economic Reform Ends Not with a Bang but a Whimper
Poland's New Team Active at Home and Abroad
THE MACEDONIAN SYNDROME The Chronic Crisis
in Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
EUROPE
5
. 7
8
Syria Under Asad
14
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SECRET.�
Guatemala: Some Success Against Terrorists
OAS to Meet on Terrorism
India: Electoral Developments 15
Jordan: This Week, the Stick 16
Iraqi Forces Leaving Jordan 17
Greece: Papadopoulos Proclaims Primacy 18
Persian Gulf
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
19
Chilean Developments 21
Bolivia: Leftist Pressure on the Government Expected to Increase . 22
23
24
Tupamaros Return to the Offensive in Uruguay
NOTES: USSR-Berlin;
Ethiopia; Brazil; Haiti
24
ihigoslavia; Middle East; Egypt; Turkey;
-greKLET__
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FAR EAST
Cambodia: To the Rescue
South Vietnamese forces have moved deep
into the southwest to revive Phnom Penh's stalled
campaign to reopen Route 4. The inability of the
Cambodian Army (FANK) to break the Com-
munists' hold over stretches of the strategic high-
way has caused petroleum stocks in Phnom Penh
to dwindle rapidly.
Two separate South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) task forces went into action at midweek
and began a two-pronged drive on the enemy-con-
trolled Pich Nil pass area on Route 4. The first
group consists of three Marine battalions, sup-
ported by one artillery battalion and some FANK
units. It met no opposition as it advanced to
within ten miles of the north side of the pass. At
the same time, a second and larger task force in
Kampot Province began pushing toward the
southern approaches to the pass. This contingent
is composed of a number of South Vietnamese
armored, ranger, and artillery battalions, as well
as five FANK battalions. Lead elements of this
force claimed they killed 30 Communists in their
initial contact with enemy troops north of Veal
Renh.
This is the second time in the past month
that ARVN forces have been called in to help
clear a major highway. If the Communists hold to
past tactics, they will not seriously contest this
operation, preferring to husband their resources
in the expectation that the ARVN will eventually
withdraw.
The reopening of Route 4 can come none
too soon. With the government's only refinery at
Kompong Som cut off for the past two months, a
serious shortage of civilian stocks of fuel oil and
kerosene has developed in Phnom Penh. The re-
gime apparently will restrict the use of petroleum
products to ensure the operation of electrical
generating plants and other essential facilities,
pending the arrival of fresh supplies. Military
stocks contain a two-week supply of aviation gas
and about one-month's supply of gasoline for
vehicles.
Although the major oil companies recently
have been making emergency deliveries from Sai-
gon to Phnom Penh by river, it remains to be seen
whether crews and ship owners can be persuaded
to risk further runs up the Mekong in view of
recent heavy Communist attacks. They may be
Communist-controlled
550826 1-71 CIA
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reassured, however, if plans are carried out to
increase air support for future river convoys and
to mount intensified ARVN-FANK ground opera-
tions along the river banks. Overland resupply
efforts from Saigon via Route 1 are also con-
templated, but it is not likely that enough can be
moved in the near future because of the shortage
of tanker trucks and the continuing security prob-
lem along the road. Although such contingency
plans should be able to meet Phnom Penh's basic
needs, the shortages will make the war more im-
mediately felt in the capital.
In addition to their steady harassment of
scattered Cambodian positions near Route 4, the
Communists have simultaneously kept up the
pressure on several other main roads. Enemy at-
tacks and mines inflicted moderate casualties on
government soldiers operating on Routes 6 and 7
in western Kompong Cham province.
The use of Route 5 has become increasingly
dangerous because of enemy attacks between Bat-
tambang city and areas south of Kompong
Chhnang city. One portion of Route 5, in western
Pursat Province, is now impassable to all but light
traffic. The Communists are clearly trying to dis-
rupt the movement of rice from the northwest to
Phnom Penh.
Press Censorship to Ease
The government has taken a prudent po-
litical step by agreeing to abrogate a controversial
decree calling for prior censorship of all news-
paper articles and editorials. The censorship
decree, which was in part intended to stop critical
stories about the mistakes of ARVN troops, ran
into stiff opposition from the press, students, and
intellectuals. The regime's willingness to soften its
stand should reassure these elements, but it may
be politically embarrassing to Deputy Prime
Minister Matak, its architect.
� � �
Laos: A Victory in the South
The action has picked up in south Laos with
enemy attacks against recently strengthened gov-
ernment positions in both the northern and east-
ern areas of the Bolovens Plateau. The Commu-
nists suffered one of the heaviest setbacks in some
time, however, as freshly introduced guerrilla
forces took the measure of North Vietnamese
veterans.
The Communists threw an estimated three
battalions against two newly deployed irregular
battalions near Ban Houay Sal north of Paksong.
The attack was beaten back with the support of
tactical air. Only one irregular was killed, while
136 enemy bodies were found. The attack may
have been carried out by elements of the North
Vietnamese Army 9th Regiment, which moved
onto the northern portion of the plateau last
month.
This action could have been designed to test
the combat effectiveness of the new government
troops at Ban Houay Sal. The size of the assault
force, however, suggests that the Communists
may intend to press southward. Their objective
presumably would be either to threaten Paksong
in the expectation that the government would
pull back from bases along the eastern rim of the
plateau or to attack those bases from the west.
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Nome
Nwasor
The government made some fresh gains on
the eastern edge of the plateau last weekend. Two
irregular battalions moved back into Site 38, a
large base that fell to the Communists in late
November. Government troops regained the posi-
tion without a fight, but continuing enemy
probes suggest that the North Vietnamese may
try to prevent the government from re-
establishing the base. The government also retook
several other smaller positions on the southern
and eastern edges of the plateau. The Communists
continued their harassing attacks on Site 22, the
last major government base in the area.
New Operation Launched
A new government harassing operation has
been launched against the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Four government irregular battalions plus
three special-action teams and an intelligence
team were airlifted on 12 January into an area
about 15 miles south of Muong Nong and five
miles east of Route 9213 in eastern Savannakhet
Province. They hope to interdict this newly com-
pleted road�an alternate to heavily bombed sec-
tions of routes 92 and 96�as well as to destroy
enemy supply depots and installations in the area.
So far, government forces have encountered
no enemy resistance. Heavy truck traffic has been
spotted on Route 9213, however, and the govern-
ment troops were able to call in US air strikes.
This operation is the government's farthest east-
ward interdiction effort in this area in recent
years, and the third major effort in the heart of
25 50
Miles
DEMILITARIZED ONE
Cdivfnunist
controlled
terqtory
oNomny
Alto
CAMBODIA
5508241-71 CIA
SOUTH
VIETNAM
the Communist infiltration corridor this dry
season. One earlier operation managed to get into
the Communist supply center at Tchepone for
three days, while a second, in the Ban Bac area,
ran into heavy resistance in its attempt to harass
Route 96.
The Communists are likely to react vigor-
ously to the government operation. There are,
however, no known major Communist combat
units in the immediate area, and a significant
counterattack may be slow to develop.
� � �
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Vietnam: An Eye on the Elections
Although the deployment of some Com-
munist units back to South Vietnam, reported
last week, means that enemy military activity is
likely to be more intense and may include attacks
in battalion strength, most reports suggest that
the Communists will continue to emphasize the
generally low-key tactics they have used for well
over a year. The enemy is putting heavy stress on
political agitation and subversion, and is diverting
valuable personnel for such nonmilitary tasks.
the Communist authorities have
directed their apparatus in Tay Ninh Province to
go all out to penetrate antigovernment organiza-
tions and foster peace movements. The Viet Cong
believe that the time between now and next fall's
presidential elections is especially propitious for
this effort. If a peace group should run candidates
in Tay Ninh, the Communists plan to consider a
deal to back its ticket.
This is one more sign that the enemy is
keeping a close eye on this year's elections and is
hoping to exploit any rise in antigovernment sen-
timent. Although the Communists at this point
still seem to have only a limited capability to
manipulate the political process in most areas,
several authoritative enemy statements since last
fall have suggested that Hanoi is counting rather
heavily on gaining some advantage from political
developments in South Vietnam this year. As a
result, Communist officers in many parts of the
country have received similar instructions to
develop the political struggle.
Some Changes in the Provinces
President Thieu is replacing more province
chiefs, presumably to strengthen his political sup-
port for next fall's elections. New chiefs are slated
for Go Cong, Long Khanh, Gia Dinh, Hau Nqhia,
and Long An provinces.
Inflation Slows
End-of-the-year figures provide good evi-
dence that the South Vietnamese Government's
economic policies are helping to slow down the
inflation that had become serious enough last
spring to spark significant unrest against the gov-
ernment, particularly among salaried military and
civil service personnel. Initial reports indicate that
retail prices rose 30 percent in 1970, but accord-
ing to USAID's retail price index, the increase was
only five percent during the second half of 1970.
If this rate could be maintained and prices rose at
an annual rate of only ten percent, inflation
would be held to a level tolerable for most South
Vietnamese.
Several factors contributed to the improve-
ment. A very good rice crop helped keep the price
of food down. Moreover, reforms affecting the
rate of exchange and other official requirements
for importing commodities had helped stabilize
the price of imported goods by early last fall. As a
result, a substantial pay raise for government
employees did not produce any significant in-
crease in prices.
As President Thieu looks ahead to the presi-
dential elections, he will try to ensure that these
recent gains are not lost in a new wave of infla-
tion. The high cost of the war, land reform, and
veterans' benefits, however, are likely to cause
continued inflationary pressures, and it will be
difficult to hold the annual rate of price increases
to ten percent.
� � �
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Singapore: Five Power Defense Meeting Concludes
A working-level meeting of the Five Power
Defense Arrangement, composed of Singapore,
Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK,
was concluded in Singapore on 8 January. Little
was accomplished during the session except that
it broadly outlined terms under which the Ar-
rangement will replace the Anglo-Malaysian De-
fense Agreement.
Relations between the two Asian states are
the thorniest problem to be resolved in Five
Power planning. Both Kuala Lumpur and Singa-
pore are not only at odds over various bilateral
problems, but they are also suspicious of the
degree of commitment on the part of the other
members of the group. During the meeting, how-
ever, both Malaysia and Singapore seemed to
bend over backward to avoid a clash in front of
their non-Asian colleagues.
Soviet-US Relations Strained
At present, the Arrangement is a very lim-
ited one.
\ Up to this point, however, the five
have arrived only at a loose agreement to hold
periodic meetings, and to consult should either
Malaysia or Singapore be threatened. Such con-
sultations, however, are unlikely because of the
absence of an external threat to Malaysia and
SingaporeJ
Thus, there may be
little Five Power integration outside of the techni-
cal aspects of air defense.
Another meeting, this at a ministerial level,
will be held in April. Plans for joint exercises and
other token signs of cooperation will probably be
raised at that time
� � �
EUROPE
Although there have been no reprisals
against US Embassy officers in the USSR since 10
January, the character of Soviet harassment and
the seriousness of Moscow's grievances over anti-
Soviet demonstrations in the US indicate that the
Soviets will try more drastic counteraction if
demonstrations continue.
Foreign Minister Gromyko delivered a very
strong official protest of anti-Soviet demonstra-
tions in the US to Ambassador Beam on 8 Janu-
ary, and he accused Washington of failing to take
the necessary measures to stop them. His remarks
presaged a weekend of reprisals against American
diplomats, journalists, and businessmen, which
represented Moscow's answer to the bombing of
the Soviet Embassy's information and commercial
offices in Washington on the eighth. Gromyko
also warned, however, that if the US did not
ensure safe conditions for Soviet officials, the
Soviet people might do something that the US
would "not want and may not expect."
-Sre-RET__
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Private remarks remarks of Soviet officials suggest
that Moscow seriously believes the US could halt
these anti-Soviet demonstrations if it so desired.
The USSR wants a stop put to the destruction of
its property and to the intimidation of its offi-
cials, and is especially annoyed that no demon-
strator has yet been prosecuted. The chief of the
Foreign Ministry's USA section, who was the So-
viet rapporteur during Gromyko's session with
Beam, mentioned this fact, and a Soviet journalist
explained to the US cultural counselor that it is
the absence of prosecutions that has really
aroused Soviet feelings. Moreover, the Soviets
now realize that commuting the death sentences
of the Leningrad Jews only gave the Jewish De-
fense League (JDL), the militant Zionist organiza-
tion apparently responsible for the violence, cause
to step up its activities.
This is not the first time that the Soviets
have warned the US to take a more active role in
stopping the activities of the JDL, although their
previous efforts were delivered in lower key. As
far back as 29 August, the government newspaper
Izvestia warned that Soviet-American relations
would suffer in the event of further JDL "provo-
cation," and on 1 October�the Jewish New
Year�a Soviet Government statement protested
the "inaction of the American authorities"
against the "unbridled anti-Soviet campaign" by
"Zionist organizations." Again, the Soviets
warned that such inaction would have "unfavor-
able consequences" for relations between the two
sides. Ambassador Dobrynin's protest on 4 Janu-
ary also raised the specter of retaliation against
US establishments in the Soviet Union.
Despite the reprisals and sharp accusations,
however, the Soviets have made no attempt to
interfere with any upcoming US-USSR discus-
sions. Moreover, Soviet press reporting of the
incidents has been strictly factual. With the ex-
ception of Ambassador Dobrynin's return to the
USSR on 10 January "for a brief period," the
only Soviet political gesture against the dem-
onstrations in the US has been the cancellation of
this year's US tour by the Bolshoi opera and
ballet theater. Even this cancellation may have
had as much to do with several recent defections
of Soviet performing artists as with the actions of
the JDL. Meanwhile, bilateral discussions are still
scheduled regarding the Law of the Sea, cultural
exchange, and fishing rights. Nevertheless, further
anti-Soviet demonstrations in the US may
convince the Soviets that more drastic action is
called for, and in that case Moscow may decide to
postpone talks in some of these areas. I
� � �
USSR-BERLIN: Selected allied military vehicles
were halted on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn on
11-12 January as a result of Allied failure to
accept Soviet demands for changes in presently
used travel documentation. The detained vehicles
were finally permitted to proceed late on 12
January, but the Soviets continue to maintain
that the altered documentation will be required in
the future. This action may have been intended to
demonstrate the "reality" of Soviet control over
land-access routes to Berlin prior to the resump-
tion of four power talks the next day and to test
Allied readiness to accept minor alterations in
established procedures.
� � �
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Niro
Soviet Economic Reform Ends Not with a Bang but a Whimper
The Soviets have noted that the economic
reform "is essentially complete," but enterprises
that produce more than six percent of all indus-
trial output still are not included. There has been
a general decline in enthusiasm for the reform as
well as dissatisfaction with its results. Attention
now seems to be turning to more specific eco-
nomic experiments, especially in the field of man-
agement and administration, but even here the
leadership does not appear united on an ap-
proach.
The economic reform, promulgated by
Premier Kosygin at the plenum in September
1965, was originally scheduled to be introduced
in the industrial sector during 1966-68. The com-
pletion date was delayed several times, but in
March 1970 Gosplan deputy chairman Bachurin
promised that "within this year all industrial en-
terprises in the country will be switched to the
new system." The Soviet press recently admitted
that this goal was not fulfilled. By the end of
1970, 42,000 enterprises, representing 86 percent
of the total number of industrial enterprises and
employing 92 percent of the industrial work
force, were working under the reform. The failure
to maintain the timetable apparently stemmed
from ministerial foot-dragging and difficulties in
converting small and unprofitable enterprises to
the new conditions.
The main features of the 1965 reform�re-
duction in the number of economic indicators set
from above, greater emphasis on profitability and
sales, and expansion of decentralized invest-
ment�were heralded as devices to give enterprise
directors more freedom and the workers more
incentive to raise output. A failure to change the
basic operating principles of the Soviet economy,
however, seriously limited any chance for success.
To be effective, the reform should have been
accompanied by more rational and flexible prices,
less central control over the allocation of materi-
als, and relief from the chronic shortage of most
materials. The leadership has given no indication
that the radical changes necessary will be intro-
duced.
Another unfulfilled objective of the reform
is to raise efficiency by accelerating the introduc-
tion of new technology. The leadership attaches
great importance to achieving this goal because of
the USSR's large technological lag behind the
West. The regime apparently has not decided on
any grand new strategy for dealing with the
reform problem in general but instead is toler-
ating experimentation with the present administra-
tive apparatus and principles of management. A
hint that it is taking such an approach is evident
in Finance Minister Garbuzov's speech to the
Supreme Soviet meeting in December. He men-
tioned the reform only briefly but advocated a
wider adoption of two innovations�the Shche-
kino experiment and production associations.
The Shchekino experiment attempts to in-
crease labor productivity by dismissing surplus
workers. The total wage fund remains unchanged,
and the wages of the fired workers are distributed
among those remaining. The production associa-
tions, called by some economists a second stage
of the reform, are designed to reap the benefits of
large-scale production. They combine enterprises
into a conglomerate under one director. Their
advocates claim that such associations will be able
to use new technology more effectively, espe-
cially when they include research institutes. Con-
troversy surrounding these measures, presumably
extending to the top leaders, continues to hamper
their widespread introduction.]
+ � �
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� � �
YUGOSLAVIA: Under the watchful eye of Presi-
dent Tito, the coordinating commission of the
Federal Assembly is working out the final draft of
Yugoslavia's pending constitutional changes. In an
effort to avoid unnecessary bickering and to meet
a 26 January deadline, the deliberations, which
began earlier this week, are taking place at Tito's
Brioni Island retreat, where he is currently "vaca-
tioning." When completed, the amendments that
deal with the proposed collective presidency and
the "new" relationship between the federation
and the republics will be submitted to the As-
sembly for dissemination and debate. Final As-
sembly approval and adoption will take place by
17 April, and will be effective one month later,
when President Tito's current term ex-
pires.
� � �
Poland's New Team Active at Home and Abroad
The Gierek regime is moving rapidly to re-
examine past domestic policy shortcomings and
to deal with still-recalcitrant workers in a new and
open style. This self-examination, results of which
have been promised to a central committee
plenum later this month, will have to produce a
theoretical explanation of how and why economi-
cally aggrieved workers succeeded in overthrow-
ing the leadership of a "workers state." This ques-
tion probably is disturbing to all ruling Com-
munists. At the same time, the new regime is
reassuring both its Warsaw Pact allies and the
West that Poland's present foreign policies will be
continued.
Unusually frank and often heated exchanges
between workers and party functionaries charac-
terized a flurry of local party meetings this week.
These meetings underscore Gierek's commitment
to re-establish the communication, rapport, and
confidence lost by the Gomulka regime. Along
the Baltic coast, party discussions are still largely
devoted to healing lingering bitterness. Sit-down
work stoppages apparently continue in some
establishments in the area, but so far Gierek ap-
parently has not acceded to reported demands by
the workers for the release of their arrested col-
leagues and he has made no personal appearance
to hear their grievances. Gierek and his
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spokesmen have also been holding meetings with
representatives of various nonparty organizations
and special interest groups.
The new party boss must seek the middle
ground of encouraging popular participation
while demonstrating strong party control over the
flow of events. His problems are the same as those
faced by his predecessor, but he must show that
pragmatic leadership can sell even unpopular
policies. It is the unresponsive style of rule under
Gomulka that is likely to be singled out at the
plenum for most of the blame for the "December
events." Denunciation of specific personalities,
including Gomulka himself, cannot be ruled out,
but journalists reportedly have been instructed to
avoid personal references to the old leadership for
the time being.
In foreign policy, Gierek has clearly assigned
priority to establishing the credentials of his new
team in the Soviet orbit. Following their initial
trip to Moscow earlier this month, Gierek and
Premier Jaroszewicz visited East Germany this
week to underscore the importance they place on
Warsaw's ties with Pankow and to try to remove
some of the political and economic friction long
plaguing Polish - East German relations. Ranking
party emissaries have also been sent to touch base
with Poland's other East European allies.
High Polish officials are resuming contacts
with their opposite numbers in the West; Deputy
Foreign Minister Winiewicz has predicted that,
unlike the austere Gomulka, Gierek will soon be
prepared to meet with foreign diplomatic repre-
sentatives. Poland has expressed an interest in
improving relations with the US specifically,
especially in the economic area. There are also
signs pointing toward a dialogue with the Vatican,
which would meet with a warm nnpular response
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� � �
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
MIDDLE EAST: UN mediator Jarring's state-
ment that his meetings with Israeli Premier Meir
and Foreign Minister Eban in Jerusalem last week
were "productive" keeps alive at least a faint
glimmer of hope for continuing talks. Jarring
received proposals from the Israelis that appear to
have allowed for no concessions on Israel's basic
requirements for security. Jarring is now seeking
Cairo's views on the Israeli positions, and it seems
likely that he will receive similarly inflexible
initial counterproposals from that side. Cairo,
whose recent statements have shown no move-
ment from its previous demands, may feel com-
pelled to seek a Security Council meeting on the
matter.
� � �
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Syria
Syria Under Asad
Most on-the-scene observers of Syrian poli-
tics cautiously conclude that Prime Minister
Asad's new regime is taking a fair hold, is working
toward eventual closer relations with the West,
and has started a trend toward an "easier" life for
Syrians that will be hard to reverse.
The US Embassy in Beirut asserts that visi-
tors from Syria report public approval of Asad's
"provisional" leadership as well as a general ex-
pectation of better things to come. One embassy
source says that Asad is initiating policy rather
than allowing circumstances to dictate a Syrian
reaction. This same source believes that Asad's
real aim in foreign policy is positive neutrality
between East and West. Nevertheless, the essential
relationship with the Soviets will not be changed
and any move toward the West will be cautious,
with the first step possibly a toning down of
anti-Western propaganda attacks. Any dramatic
new development in the Arab-Israeli dispute,
however, could quickly lay such plans to rest.
At the same time, the prime minister almost
certainly has not heard the last from his Baath
party enemies. He probably has some selling to do
among the doctrinaire party members before the
convening of a Syrian regional party congress to
install a "permanent" party leadership. His op-
ponents will be plotting to prevent any complete
take-over of the party machinery by the Asadists
and will be exerting every effort to remove him
from his present position.
� � �
EGYPT: Egyptian officials this week engaged in
talks with Soviet President Podgorny, who was in
Cairo for the formal dedication ceremonies of the
Aswan high dam. Podgorny's five-day visit in-
cluded not only formal appearances but, accord-
ing to Egyptian radio, "important discussions...on
the Middle East situation and the bolstering of
unilateral relations." Egyptian leaders have also
(b)(3)
been preparing for the convocation on 20 January
of the next periodic summit meeting of the
leaders of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan. Syrian
officials will attend the summit for the first time
since Damascus announced its intention to join
the embryonic alli
ber.
� � �
(b)(3)
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Nue 6Et
'Noe
India: Electoral Developments
The week-old electoral coalition seeking to
challenge Prime Minister Gandhi in the March
elections now includes four of the principal anti-
administration parties. On 8 January, the pro -
free enterprise Swatantra Party, India's second
largest opposition group, joined the two other
right-of-center and the one leftist party that had
formed the original coalition. These four parties,
which held a total of 150 of the 523 seats in the
recently dissolved lower house of parliament, in-
tend to support a single, agreed candidate in each
consti tuency.
Meanwhile, the pro-Soviet Communist Party
of India (CPI) has accused Mrs. Gandhi's Ruling
Congress Party of adopting a "high and mighty
attitude" by refusing to form an electoral alliance
with the CPI and other leftist forces. The CPI�a
frequent supporter of Mrs. Gandhi's government
in the last parliament�had earlier called for such
a move, but Mrs. Gandhi subsequently declared
that her party would form no country-wide al-
liances and would run its own candidates for all
520 elective seats. Her position, however, does
not preclude ad hoc cooperation in individual
contests, and the CPI may still be hoping for such
a development. There is also a strong possibility
that the Ruling Congress will make cooperative
electoral arrangements on the state and local level
with regional parties and with the more moderate
of India's two socialist parties.
The government has taken several steps to
strengthen its position in the border state of
Kashmir. It has declared the opposition Plebiscite
Front illegal and has ordered Sheikh Abdullah,
long-time leader of the Front, and two of his
chief lieutenants to remain outside the state until
after the elections. At least 350 of the Front's
supporters reportedly have been arrested. The
Front advocates giving Kashmiris a choice be-
tween independence, remaining with India, or
joining Pakistan, and would probably make a
strong showing if allowed to contest the elections
freely. This would embarrass New Delhi, however,
which regards the inclusion of Kashmir in India as
a settled, nonnegotiable matter.
As the campaign gets under way, the ob-
jective of the Ruling Congress is to obtain an
absolute majority in the new parliament, which
would require a gain of at least 34 seats. The
party's prospects are bolstered by Mrs. Gandhi's
nationwide popularity, based on her image as a
strong-willed progressive, and by the party's
financial strength. On the other hand, the party
will be hindered by its organizational weakness on
the local level in several important states. The
outcome would seem to hinge on the degree to
which Mrs. Gandhi can succeed in appealing to
the people over the heads of traditional, locally
dominant groups.
� � �
ETHIOPIA: Addis Ababa is attempting to im-
prove the counterinsurgency effort in Eritrea,
which has lagged since martial law was imposed
there nearly a month ago. Former governor-gen-
eral Asrate Kassa, an opponent of the emergency
measures, has been replaced by army commander
Debebe. General Debebe should be able to bring
local commanders�who have tended to act in-
dependently and sometimes at cross-purposes�
back into line, and a more effective campaign
against the rebel Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
should follow. This may keep the ELF off bal-
ance, but it is unlikely to suppress the rebellion or
to stop the infiltration of arms to scattered ELF
bands. Moreover, indiscriminate and heavy-
handed security measures are already antagoniz-
ing Eritreans not now sympathetic to the
ELF.
� � �
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Jordan: This Week, the Stick
The relative peace that had prevailed in Jor-
dan since September was broken last week by
renewed fighting. A widespread lack of discipline
among the fedayeen triggered the subsequent
train of events; commando leaders were unable to
control radical activist groups, such as the Ahmad
Jabril organization, which have sought inde-
pendence and notoriety through acts of pointless
terrorism. Army leaders, seizing on fedayeen
banditry near Jarash and sabotage plots in
Rusayfah as pretexts, set in motion large-scale
military operations in both areas on 8 January.
The combat area soon spread to the hills
west of the Amman-Jarash road and, by 11 Sep-
tember, to Amman itself. Rusayfah was purged in
a day, but the other army operations in the north
continued, as did clashes in Amman. On 14 Janu-
ary, a second cease-fire was announced after an
earlier one had failed. It now remains for com-
mando leaders to convince troublemakers that
they must accept normal discipline; otherwise,
the entire movement could be forced into another
general and probably unequal confrontation with
the revamped Jordanian Army.
The current round of fighting was welcomed
by the army, which has adopted the hard-nosed
policy of cracking down on the fedayeen when-
ever feasible.
It has aimed at dislodging
the fedayeen from tactical strongpoints in the
countryside, where army operations receive min-
imum publicity while obtaining maximum ad-
vantage from tanks and artillery firepower.
The fedayeen, on the other hand, have re-
mained weak and disorganized since September.
Their leaders did not seek an all-out armed
contest, and Jordanian authorities believe that
internal Palestinian politics are responsible for the
current rash actions of a few hundred commando
diehards. The chief weapon of the fedayeen now
is their highly efficient propaganda machine,
which is usually able to rally Arab propagandists
abroad
The machine was cranked up to a high
pitch following the army's initial successes. The
resultant hue and cry inspired President Sadat's
call for an Arab meeting in Amman (which has
not materialized) and Kuwait's move to suspend
once again its $39-million annual subsidy to
Jordan.
In Amman, clashes proliferated on 11 Janu-
ary, and continued the following day as a new
cease-fire was ignored.
The fedayeen leaders clearly
recognize that the actions of the diehard few
threaten the immediate future of the entire
Palestinian military organization in Jordan. If
they and the government cannot get this point
over to the maverick organizations and to the
hard-core terrorists, the stage will be set for the
army�this time with the full backing of the
regime�to move against the remaining fedayeen
strongpoints in the capital and to reduce the
Palestinian contingents in the countryside to the
level of roving bandits.
� � �
-greR-gx_
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-mew' 'Noe
Beirut
fit r nean
ISR EL
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West
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f-7,`
LEBANON
*Damascus
! Golan
Heights
IrbiA
Ma fra.,.
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OR DAN
SYRIA
50
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IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
Former
Pipeline a pumping station Road
Iraqi Forces Leaving Jordan
Iraqi troop levels in Jordan are down to
somewhat less than 10,000 from a high of some
25,000 in the fall of 1970 and apparently are
continuing to decline. Following the Jordanian
civil war last September, King Husayn demanded
that Iraq get its troops out of his country or place
them under Jordanian command. The Eastern
Arab Command had been dissolved and the King
contended there was no longer any reason for
Baghdad to have armed forces in Jordan. Al-
though Iraq publicly refused to comply with the
King's demands, Baghdad apparently began to call
its troops back in early November. By mid-De-
cember the Iraqis had evacuated Azraq Air Base,
the airfield used by Iraqi forces. Jordanian forces
immediately occupied the base with the intention
of staying permanently.
The Iraqi troop withdrawals, however, seem
only indirectly related to the King's demands.
Baghdad's decision probably has more to do with
its fear that the Jordanian Army might move
against the Iraqi troops, the low morale of Iraqi
-SreR-E.1_
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bJC,U/t1S-1-__
troops, and renewed concern in Baghdad over
increased activities by the Kurds in northern Iraq.
Whatever the cause, a diminished Iraqi presence is
much to King Husayn's advantage.
Although the Iraqis did not openly intervene
in the Jordanian civil war last September, the
threat of that possibility hung heavily over the
Jordanian Army during its attempts to battle
both the fedayeen and the Syrian invasion.
Not the least of the King's present con-
cerns, therefore, is to stabilize his own position
by pressing for a continued reduction of the Iraqi
troop levels, particularly while the Jordanian
Army is still battling the fedayeen.
A decrease in the Iraqi forces much beyond
the present level, however, would make any
meaningful mi!itary intervention by Baghdad in
Jordanian affairs in the future rather difficult.
Any uninvited military entrance into Jordan sub-
sequent to such a reduction in its forces would
amount to an Iraqi invasion and probably would
trigger retaliation by the Jordanian Army, a force
the Iraqis are presently in no position to challenge
alone. Despite these considerations, as well as the
urgings of both Egypt and Syria that Baghdad
halt the withdrawals, Iraqi troops continue to
leave Jordan. Baghdad, however, may stop short
of a complete withdrawal and leave at least a
token force positioned not far from Mafraq, if
only to maintain Iraq's anti-Israeli credentials in
Arab councils. The Iraqi troops still in Jordan
seem to be soread out between Mafraq and
H-4.
� � �
G reece: Papadopoulos Proclaims Primacy
For the past four months, Prime Minister
Papadopoulos has been attempting to outmaneu-
ver those of his colleagues who have objected to
his penchant for making unilateral decisions, and
he now appears to have succeeded.
Papadopoulos' statements during tne non
day period�when he publicly proclaimed his pre-
eminence over his revolutionary associates�seem
to imply that he no longer sees any serious threat
to his position.
Additionally, he announced a moratorium
on further implementation of the constitution
during 1971. The moratorium was probably
meant to assuage the fears of those members of
his regime who are disturbed by the prospect of
ending martial law, allowing the King to return,
and holding general elections. The accomplish-
ment of any one of these steps would greatly
endanger the influence these men have enjoyed as
a result of their role in the 1967 coup. It seems
unlikely that the prime minister's partners will
challenge his declaration that he alone would
decide when the time had come to end the mora-
torium and to make any changes in the form of
his regime, as long as he abides by his promise to
keep the constitution dangling for another year.
At the same time, Papadopoulos seems
intent on presenting to Greece's allies the image
of a stable government in the turbulent eastern
Mediterranean area. Although his success in
blunting domestic criticism may enhance this
image somewhat, the regime's reluctance to
return to democratic rule will almost certainly
increase the activities�if not the effectiveness�of
opposition groups abroad.
� � �
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�msle'
Persian Gulf
The complexity of the situation in the
Persian Gulf is frustrating attempts to ensure the
security of the area, and no speedy solutions are
in sight.
In January 1968, then Prime Minister Wilson
announced that Great Britain, as part of its policy
of reducing commitments east of Suez, would
terminate its political and military relationships
with nine Persian Gulf sheikhdoms by the end of
1971. The election victory of the Conservatives in
mid-1970 has led to a review of that decision, but
it is improbable that it will be fundamentally
altered. As yet, no alternative to the stabilizing
influence of the British presence in the gulf has
been found, and several territorial disputes could
provide opportunities for exploitation by radical
Arab movements.
Plans for a nine-member federation of Arab
amirates, promoted by the UK, have apparently
collapsed because of bickering over the location
of a capital and representation in a legislative
council. The small, lower gulf sheikhdoms fear
domination by more populous and sophisticated
Bahrain, which is expected eventually to proclaim
its independence and to seek UN membership.
Some support for a seven-member federation
of the Trucial States has been voiced, but tradi-
tional rivalries among their ruling families appear
to have doomed this proposal. Nevertheless, a
joint Saudi Arabian - Kuwait delegation will tour
the lower gulf this month, urging formation of
such a union. The Saudis and Kuwaitis fear that
unless a federation is created, the tiny sheikh-
doms will be subverted by radical Arab elements.
Saudi Arabia's ability to act as sponsor and pro-
tector of any federation of gulf amirates is seri-
ously impaired, however, by its 30-year border
dispute with Abu Dhabi, currently involving con-
trol of the Buraimi oasis and the newly discovered
Zarrarah oil field.
Iran, which hopes to become the dominant
Persian Gulf power, is embroiled in a dispute with
two sheikhdoms over ownership of several small
islands. Fearful that Great Britain's departure will
generate leftist coups in the area, Iran is eager to
establish a military presence on the islands, which
it considers essential to its national security.
Tehran has threatened to seize the islands and to
oppose the creation of any gulf federation unless
the issue is resolved to its satisfaction. Military
action by Iran would make Arab-Iranian coopera-
tion in the gulf very difficult. Iran has sought the
assistance of the British and Saudis in reaching an
agreement with the two sheikhdoms, but neither
Great Britain nor Saudi Arabia wishes to provoke
an accusation by radical Arabs that it is en-
couraging the bartering away of Arab terri-
tory.
� � �
TURKEY: Tighter security precautions and Pres-
ident Sunay's personal initiative to find a solution
to Turkey's urgent problems apparently have
brought a temporary lull to student unrest and
mounting political storms. Leaders of the diver-
gent internal forces are now awaiting the outcome
of Sunay's current talks with top political, aca-
demic, and labor figures as well as of the National
Security Council meeting scheduled for 22 Janu-
ary and the ensuing presidential report to the
nation. Thus far, these widely publicized talks
appear to have produced little more than a re-
iteration of differing views.
� � �
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf Area
KUWAIT
*Riyadh
Shall al
Arab
u%it
Mina' al
Ahmadi
.Gachsaran
Bush ire
PERSIAN
Ras Tanura
-sian Gulf islands in dispute
b, weer Iran and the Trucial States
T, Turns :ontrniled by Ras al Khaimah
:lairnari by Iran
At Musa ,:ontrolled by Sharjah
!aimed by Iran
o TME (;;\
TUNISK../
Alb MUSA Renal
Khaimah
Umm al QAm
aiiwanain
ATAR
0 DSuhbaadia h Cit
PROP ED FEDERATION OF ARAB AMIRATES I
aim Qatar, and the *even Trucial States1
Doha
�
TATES
f
Abu Dhabi 4.-
*
� �*-,
N
AB1J DHABI
ultr,flft 0
Strait of
Hormuz
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SEtlit-E42�
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Chilean Developments
Economic
As a further step in the complete nationali-
zation of US copper interests in Chile, the Al-
lende government plans to assume control by 1
April of world-wide sales by the companies it
already owns jointly with Anaconda. This move
indicates that the administration expects its con-
stitutional amendments�with ramifications far
beyond the brusque acceleration of copper na-
tionalization�to be enacted by Congress in the
next few months. Most of these copper sales are
in Western Europe and the Far East, with only
about 12 percent to the US.
This is one of several recent indications that
Chile intends to take a more aggressive role to
direct and diversify its international economic
relations. One major benefit that officials expect
from the recent establishment of relations with
Communist China is a substantial increase in di-
rect sales of copper as well as of Chile's excess
supply of natural fertilizers. A $42-million Soviet
credit, unused in the four years since it was nego-
tiated with the Frei government, will be drawn on
to build a fishing port, probably at Valparaiso,
according to an official announcement. In addi-
tion, commitments are being made for prompt
shipments of Cuban sugar in amounts large
enough to fill most of Chile's needs, displacing
purchases from some of its supplier partners in
the Latin American Free Trade Zone.
Political
Until recently, President Allende's rapid but
smooth redirection of Chile had elicited very little
open criticism. Now the two main opposition
parties have begun to attack the government on
specific issues such as interference in the judicial
system and the growing power of the Communist
Party in labor and � the economy. The deep re-
sentment between the Christian Democratic and
the conservative National parties, however, has
precluded the effective coordination necessary for
any successful opposition to Allende and to the
governing Popular Unity (UP) coalition in the
legislature and in the municipal elections to be
held in April.
In two recent speeches, Allende has lashed
out strongly against his opposition, charging them
with a variety of sins ranging from misappropria-
tion of bank funds to collaboration in an "inter-
national campaign" to distort the image of his
administration. At the national assembly of the
UP last weekend, he asserted that "antipatriotic"
elements would inevitably come into conflict
with the armed forces and the national police,
both of whom he praises frequently as essential
and loyal elements in the revolution that he is
bringing Chile.
Allende's efforts to reassure the military
have apparently been particularly successful in
the army. One former critic, soon to be promoted
to command of a division, asked a US official on
5 January how anyone in the army could criticize
a Chilean president who has brought about so
many needed social reforms. He added that as
long as Allende "does what benefits the interests
of Chile and does not break the law or try to
rearrange the constitution to his own advantage,"
the army will support him. The officer also said
that the army must be modernized along with the
country without becoming involved in politics.
He reiterated the hope, also expressed by other
officers, that relations with the US military will
remain friendly and that US equipment and train-
ing will continue to be available.1
� � �
SreRE-1_
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Bolivia: Leftist Pressure on the Government Expected to Increase
President Torres' response to an abortive
military coup has strengthened leftist hopes that
the government will institute immediate radical
steps.
The revolt early on 11 January, instigated by
a small number of junior officers, was overcome
without the use of significant force. In less than
eight hours the rebels gave up their futile attempt,
which had brought on none of the widespread
public disturbances that surrounded former presi-
dent Ovando's fall from power in October.
Torres reacted with a pre-dawn call for labor
and student support. Most of the statements
made by these groups did not mention backing
for Torres or his government but were couched in
terms of overcoming "fascism" and preventing
the defeat of the "Bolivian revolution." This dis-
tinction reflected the general dissatisfaction of
most of the Bolivian left with the slow pace of
the government's "revolutionary" program.
Torres' speeches to two large rallies repeated
some of the rhetoric he used when he seized
power in October. Before several thousand
miners, many of them armed, and laborers, he
promised popular participation in the government
and referred to the early promulgation of an
unspecified "revolutionary measure." Shortly
thereafter the government canceled the conces-
sion of a US-owned company that processes the
wastes of government tin mines.
On Tuesday, Torres addressed a large "anti-
fascist" demonstration and promised to extend
the revolution "to the limits the people desire."
Torres said he would begin immediate discussions
with students, workers, and representatives of
popular organizations to form a "popular as-
sembly" of the government. This is in line with
workers' demands that the government establish a
form of "popular parliament" in which students
and workers could initiate decrees and oversee
government operations. Torres again promised
that unspecified "revolutionary measures" will be
taken.
The President also said that the activities of
"some international agencies" are being investi-
gated. This statement is at least a sop to leftist
demands that some US agencies be expelled from
the country.
The government has moved swiftly against
military officers involved in the plot and other
disaffected persons. Seventeen middle-level and
high-ranking officers have been removed from the
armed forces, several have taken asylum in foreign
embassies, and the press now is reporting more
than 100 arrests. Torres' arrest list of as many as
240 persons includes many who are not known to
have been involved in the current plot. The fact
that no members of the moderate faction of the
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement are included
may mean that the government hopes to reach an
accommodation with that group, perhaps by in-
cluding some of its members in a new cabinet.
The support provided by the left was not
crucial in the government's halting of the abortive
coup. Torres' statements and actions, however,
have given labor and students an exaggerated idea
of their own importance and the degree to which
the government depends on their support. This
will probably lead to a new militancy on the part
of the left. Torres, by strengthening their position
and seriously weakening that of the right, is in-
creasingly putting himself in a position where he
must accept the demands of the leftists.
� � �
-"SreRgi.
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Guatemala: Some Success Against Terrorists
Leaders of the Guatemalan Government are
elated by recent successes against subversives and
are optimistic about their ability to strike a decisive
blow. Although past performances cast doubt on
the capability of the security forces to follow up on
the gains made, the authorities have clearly attained
some momentum and have even tempered their
earlier abrasive methods, which the general public
found offensive and threatening.
Dozens of persons peripherally associated with
the extreme left have been rounded up and some-
times brutally killed since the government assumed
emergency powers two months ago. The few leaders
of any importance caught in the security net appar-
ently failed to disclose information important to
their own terrorist organizations and at least one
managed, to be released, possibly through bribery
or influence. Now, however, Guatemalan authori-
ties have seized voluminous documents that they
believe are the central files of the Communist Par-
ty's action arm, wh
by security forces
The government's responsiveness to the public
outcry against the abuses of authority that char-
acterized the security crackdown in its early stages
has earned some popular approval. Last weekend,
for example, all roads out of Guatemala City were
sealed off while the army made intensive house-to-
house searches. Even though the public was in-
convenienced, the courtesy and consideration
shown by the search parties drew favorable com-
ment. Also, the removal of weapons from the
residences of figures closely identified with the
Arana government should ease fears in leftist circles
of rightist immunity from the government's secu-
rity program.
Whether the increased finesse and success of
the counterterrorist activity have really done more
than expand Arana's supporting constituency
should become clear over the next several months.
Present indications are that damage has been done
and is yet to be done to the Communist Party, but
that the more aggressive and irrational Rebel Armed
Forces could still be in fairly healthy�and perhaps
dangerous�shape. Both groups so far have con-
tinually demonstrated their ability to bring off
spectacular hit-and-run terrorist acts. Nevertheless,
although the insurgents retain this capability, for
the first time in many years the government is
hopeful of success. I
� � �
BRAZIL: The government has flown 70 prisoners
to Chile in exchange for Swiss Ambassador Bucher.
The group is larger than the total of prisoners
released in the three previous kidnapings of foreign
officials. These are the first Brazilian prisoners to be
sent to Chile; previous groups went to Mexico and
Algeria. Algeria refused to accept these because
Brazil would not ask that it be done "on humani-
tarian grounds."
� � �
SECRET
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oat% SECR�E4:.
OAS to Meet on Terrorism
The third special session of the OAS General
Assembly will convene in Washington on 25
January in an attempt to formulate a unified
stand on terrorism in the hemisphere. The recent
abductions in Brazil and Uruguay will add im-
petus to the deliberations.
The meeting, expected to attract the major-
ity of Latin foreign ministers, will consider a draft
proposed by the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee (IAJC) in an effort to put teeth into last
year's OAS resolution repudiating acts of terror-
ism. The IAJC draft classifies certain acts of ter-
rorism, including kidnaping, as common crimes
rather than as crimes of a political nature that
would exempt perpetrators from extradition. The
meeting therefore will have to deal with laws on
asylum�a jealously guarded and widely used right
in Latin America.
Despite widespread consultation among OAS
members, no consensus on the draft has yet de-
veloped, and the success of the conference re-
mains in doubt. Some countries, such as Brazil,
favor a wide-ranging resolution applicable to all
crimes of terror, including acts that have only
domestic aspects. Nations such as Chile and
Mexico are shying away from any strongly
worded resolution and might prefer no resolution
at all.
Discussions in Latin American capitals still
reveal a deep division on a tangential issue�policy
toward Cuba. A declaration publicized this week
by four Central American foreign ministers
strongly supported the continuation of economic
and diplomatic sanctions voted against Cuba in
1964 for its support of insurgency. The de-
claration apparently was issued in an effort to
head off discussion of the topic by the OAS.
Nonetheless, a significant number of OAS mem-
bers have recently made known their feeling that
at least a discussion of the subject, and perhaps an
outright change in policy, is overdue. \
� � �
Tupamaros Return to the Offensive in Uruguay
The bold daylight kidnaping of the British
ambassador last week was an effort by the
Tupamaros to regain the initiative in their struggle
against the government. As expected, however,
the abduction has had no effect on the adminis-
tration's long-standing refusal to negotiate. A
guerrilla communique early this week suggested
the Tupamaros are willing to persevere in their
waiting game with an equally stubborn govern-
ment.
The Tupamaros now hold three hostages�
British Ambassador Jackson, US agronomist Fly,
and Brazilian consul Gomide. The terrorists had
repeatedly scaled down the major demands they
made for the release of Fly and Gomide last
August but were stymied when President Pacheco
refused any concessions whatsoever. In their com-
munique this week, the Tupamaros finally with-
drew their latest offer to release Fly and in addi-
tion made no ransom demands for the British
envoy. Instead, they called upon the government
to take up "the rejected road of negotiations."
The government's response has instead been
typical of its stance in the half dozen previous
kidnapings by the Tupamaros, dating back to
mid-1968. Government spokesmen reiterated past
policy; the President approved an increase in the
reward for the kidnapers to $40,000 and also,
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iusie
3Ectk.E.T.
with congressional approval, instituted a 40-day
limited state of siege. A similar extension of in-
creased powers�permitting raids without war-
rants and the extended detention of suspects�was
granted last August, but police were still unable
to locate the hostages. This has apparently made
the Tupamaros confident they can continue to
elude the dragnet.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
� � *
HAITI: President Duvalier's decision to designate
his son Jean-Claude as his successor has been
greeted with effusive declarations of approval
from military and government officials, "pop-
ular" demonstrations of support, and legislative
willingness to amend the constitution to permit
Jean-Claude to become president. Duvalier
has not yet revealed how
the transfer of power is to be made. Judging from
the proposed amendments, Duvalier is likely to
name Jean-Claude to a seat in the legislature and
perhaps assign him an executive function.
Jean-Claude Duvalier
(Prior to 1969)
-3Et`RET-
The speed and vigor
with which the President
has acted indic
his powers are still
ormidable. He can also
be expected to take
steps to safeguard his
present position�some-
what imperiled by the
mere existence of suc-
cession plans�and Jean-
Claude's future
one.
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""St'el?c�Ei.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Macedonian Syndrome-The Chronic Criri s
In Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations
Stcret�
NQ 4 0
15 January 1971
No. 0353/71A
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IAL REPOR1 S are supplements to the 1.:urrent Intetil-
ee Weeklies issued by We Of bee of ( urre.i t InteLligence.
:Special Reports are published separately I permit more
iprefiensive trelo mem of a subiect. they a e prepared by
iNc ice of Current intelligence. me Office 01 Economic Re-
-,earch, the Oilice oi Strategic Kest-co-Cir. and tht Directorate ol
letIce anti leChn(Aogy. Special Rt:ports are .200rdi11a1ed as
Appropriate among die i)irectoiuc u (IA hut, except for the
4,,trinal substantive exchan2e with other agencies at the working
tevef, have not been cooldwated outside U A un ess specifically
I
Yhe SPECIAL REPORT contains elissilied info ination ct-
cc the national deLAnse 01 the United States, Hun the mean-
cc fide 18, se.Ations /9,3 and /94, or th US Code, as
;inlet-life& Its fransnhssion or reveiation ui its cc itents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is ploinbited by iaw.
GROUP I
,titidatd from cmtomatic I
4.4.1.�groainig and
declassificotion
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E OH 14 ti 4
THE MACEDONIAN SYNDROME�The Chronic Crisis in Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations
During the past four years Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have exchanged a torrent of
invective over a seemingly obscure historical issue�the ethnic and linguistic ancestry of the
peoples of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Yugoslays claim that all the clamor,
when stripped of its academic pretensions, reveals a strident irredentism on the part of the
Bulgarians.
For Sofia, the Macedonian question is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is
exploited for domestic Bulgarian consumption, affording the regime the only safe outlet for
Bulgarian nationalism without fear of intervention by Moscow. Not even the Yugoslays
believe that Sofia, at the present time, intends to retake Yugoslav Macedonia by force. On
the other hand, it is equally clear that the Bulgarian leadership will be alert to any
opportunity to loosen Belgrade's hold over Macedonia in the post-Tito era, and it has
already prepared the way with strong claims of inherent rights in Macedonia.
Yugoslavia looks on Bulgaria's refusal to recognize the existence of a separate Mace-
donian nationality as a potential threat to Yugoslav territorial integrity. The Yugoslays have
also recently become uneasy over what they consider the Kremlin's tacit approval of Sofia's
claim that Macedonia is inhabited by Bulgarians. In Belgrade, for example, it has been noted
that Bulgarian pressures in Macedonia have at times peaked when tensions have been
unusually high between Belgrade and Moscow, as when Yugoslavia voiced its opposition to
the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The intensity of the Yugoslav reaction to the argument over Macedonia must be viewed
against a backdrop of serious internal economic problems and the pending major govern-
mental reorganization. There has been no attempt to hide the seriousness or magnitude of
Special Report
1 15 January 1971
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550776 1-71 CIA
Special Report
Yugoslavia
VARDAR MACEDONIA
(Macedonian Socialist
Republic)
Skopje CAPITAL
9,928 AREA (sq. mi.)
1,641,000 POPULATION
(1970 est.)
YUGOSLAVIA
Bulgaria
PIRIN MACEDONIA
(Blagoevgrad Okrug)
Blagoevgrad
2,504
301,000
(1965 est.)
7.6 3.7
Official Bulgarian sources
describe the Pirin population
PERCENT OF REGION as only one-half of one per-
71.2 ETHNIC cent Macedonians ... "the
MACEDONIANS remainder consider themsel-
ves Bulgarians."
- 2 -
PERCENT OF
NATIONAL
POPULATION
15 January 1971
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the problems that confront Yugoslavia, and Tito's age adds a note of urgency to the
situation. In many respects, therefore, the Macedonian problem and Bulgaria's vague threat
to regain the region are an intrinsic part of the succession problem. The Yugoslays, most of
whom wish to hold their federation together after Tito, are keeping an eye on the potential
for political instability and disintegration that could come with Tito's passing, which
Bulgaria might try to exploit.
To the Yugoslav leadership the dispute is not without its positive aspects. By over-
dramatizing the immediate threat, Belgrade apparently hopes to minimize internal dis-
sension and rally support for the new federal system, as well as to keep world attention
focused on Yugoslavia and on the "implied" Soviet threat.
Actually, the ebbs and flows of the Macedonian problem have not always reflected the
status of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Party and government boss Todor Zhivkov provoked the
present crisis in late 1967 at a time when Belgrade and Moscow were on fairly good terms.
Historically, the Macedonian question has always had something of a life of its own,
reflecting traditional Balkan hostilities and Bulgarian and Yugoslav internal requirements, as
well as the prevailing winds in the Eastern European political arena.
Through 1967 and early 1968, Bulgaria took the initiative in the dispute, promoting its
claims to Macedonia. But in mid-1968, because of festering problems in the Kremlin's
relations with Eastern Europe, the Soviets became active in the confrontation. Then, in late
1969, when both Moscow and Sofia desired a temporary abatement in the intensity of the
dispute, the beleaguered Yugoslays verbally threw down the gauntlet to their two antago-
nists and have been on the propaganda attack ever since. Thus the future direction of the
Macedonian conflict depends now on the preferences of Belgrade.
1912�One of five wars in modern times over Macedonia
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Background
Bulgaria's campaign questions the Yugoslays'
right to sovereignty over Macedonia, one of the
Yugoslav federation's six republics. Sofia claims
that all Macedonians are really ethnic Bulgarians
cut off from the motherland. This position pre-
dates the Communist era in Bulgaria. In 1878, the
Treaty of San Stefano gave the modern Bulgarian
state control of the lands of Macedonia for the
first time. A few months later this territory was
expropriated by the great powers and given to
Serbia (now part of Yugoslavia). Most Bulgarian
governments since then have continued to lay
claim to this province, although since 1878, Sofia
has held the land for a total of only four years.
Belgrade's commitment to a separate Mace-
donian republic within the Yugoslav state dates
from the postwar establishment of the Commu-
nist regime. Tito's personal involvement in Mace-
donia goes back at least to January 1943. At that
time he appealed to the Macedonians in Yugo-
slavia to fight for their independence and to seek
national identity through self-determination, i.e.,
through the establishment of a Macedonian Re-
public in union with the Yugoslav peoples. Fol-
lowing World War II, Tito put his words into
action and a separate Macedonian Republic was
created in 1944 as an integral part of the Yugo-
slav federation. This republic did not include Pirin
(Bulgarian Macedonia).
The Communists' seizure of power in both
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia seemed to mark the end
of the Macedonian issue as a point of contention
between the two countries. Bulgarian party lead-
ers condemned the actions of past Bulgarian gov-
ernments in Macedonia and proclaimed the prov-
ince an integral part of Yugoslavia. Belgrade and
Sofia�stressing reconciliation�agreed in 1947
that, in the long run, a reunion of the Macedonian
peoples might be possible.
The charismatic Yugoslav leader, however,
had plans for a "greater" Macedonia. He pressed
the concept of a larger Yugoslav-Bulgarian con-
Special Report
federation headquartered in Belgrade. Sofia was
receptive to the idea of forming a federation of
"Southslays" in the Balkans�the Dimitrov Plan�
but balked at the suggestion that Pirin Macedonia
be initially joined to its Yugoslav counterpart as a
separate republic. For a time, Macedonians from
Yugoslavia were even allowed to open schools and
bookshops in Pirin, and the Yugoslav Mace-
donian-language newspaper was freely sold in
Bulgaria.
Even after Tito's break with Stalin in 1948,
when Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations also took a
turn for the worse, there was no resurrection of
past claims to Macedonia. This, however, may
have been due to the fact that in the period
between the executions of the Bulgarian national
Communists in the 1950s and the emergence of
the Zhivkov clique in the early 1960s, any expres-
sion of nationalism was looked upon with great
suspicion in Bulgaria and the USSR.
There was some minor fencing over Mace-
donia between Belgrade and Sofia in the late
1950s, when the Bulgarians again began to remon-
strate over the loss of this province after San
Stefano. This vocalizing was usually limited to
academic circles in both countries. Scholarly
articles on Macedonia were exchanged by social
scientists, who debated the true cultural and his-
torical heritage of the people. In the course of the
Tito-Zhivkov talks in 1963 and 1965, as well as in
Zhivkov's discussions with Yugoslav Macedonian
chief Crvenkovski in 1967, it was agreed that
"these differences" should not be used as an
excuse for polemics; rather, "experts should dis-
cuss them and establish the historical truth about
them."
The Macedonian issue was revived in a cam-
paign, not very well thought out, that Zhivkov
launched in early 1965. The idea was to develop
an ethos of patriotism and national spirit in the
youth of the then emotionally stagnant country.
The dispute over Macedonia became a kay means
of building national pride, which had been stifled
by the Bulgarian Communist Party's subservience
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Selected Boundary Changes,
1878-1970
Independence from Turkey with Russian aid
(Treaty of San Stefano, March 1878)
Victory in First Balkan War
(Treaty of London, May 1913)
BULGARIA
�SOFIYA
NOTE '5.1hwestern
boundoty not defined
by Treaty
Gains for siding with Germany in World War I
BOLO/kRI
�SOFIYA
Gains for siding with Germany in World War ll
550777 1-71
Special Report
.13U.LGAR14
SOFIYA. - �
Signing of Treaty of San Stefano, March 1878
to the Soviet Union. Studies were launched "ana-
lyzing" the past relationship of the Macedonian
people to Bulgaria. The party re-evaluated its past
stand on the Macedonian issue and concluded
that it had taken an incorrect and "non-Leninist
position" by dropping Bulgarian claims to Mace-
donia. The party then reasoned that "in doing so,
Bulgaria had accepted foreign rule for an area that
had a predominantly Bulgarian population." The
head of the Bulgarian Writers' Union went so far
in the autumn of 1966 as to deny the existence of
a separate Macedonian language, concluding that
it really was a variant of Bulgarian (a statement
with which many Western linguists would agree).
During the same year, a leading ethnographer
publicly took exception to an article in a Soviet
journal treating the Macedonians as a separate
nation or people.
San Stefano Revived
By 1967 many Bulgarian academicians and
politicos were engaged in turning out books and
articles supporting the contention that Macedonia,
belonged ethnically, historically, and spiritually
to the Bulgarian nation. Long-dead irredentist
authors and their works were "rediscovered" and
republished.
In January 1967, Sofia celebrated the birth-
day of Gotse Delchev, a departed Macedonian
patriot declared for the occasion to be a "Bul-
garian patriot." In December, an article in the
party newspaper by an eminent historian�com-
menting on the upcoming anniversary of the
treaty of San Stefano�concluded that the pact
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was based on "generally recognized ethnographic
frontiers of the Bulgarian people at that time." In
Zhivkov's Theses on Youth, also published in
December 1967, a whole chapter was devoted to
the need for an expansion of patriotic education.
Bulgarians, he said, do not make "sufficient use
of our glorious historic past in order to educate
the youth in a patriotic spirit." The Yugoslays
consider that the present Macedonian crisis dates
from the winter of 1967, and accrued from these
Bulgarian actions.
The dispute was raised to the level of official
bilateral relations on 29 January 1968, when the
Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade was advised by
the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry of the "harm"
Sofia's pursuit of the Macedonian issue could
have on relations between the two countries.
Nevertheless, on the 90th anniversary of San
Stefano, in February 1968, the Bulgars held a
massive ceremony in Sofia, during which the par-
ticipants lamented Bulgaria's loss of Macedonia.
After the San Stefano celebrations, neither
side showed an inclination to let the issue drop;
instead, outside events heated the quarrel to seri-
ous dimensions. The occupation of Czecho-
slovakia in 1968 increased Belgrade's suspicion of
Soviet-Bulgarian collaboration on Macedonia. As
Yugoslav support for the Dubcek regime con-
tinued throughout the spring and summer of
1968, the Kremlin became increasingly unhappy
with Belgrade. At the same time, the Bulgarian
communications media mounted a loud assault on
the policies and programs of the League of Yugo-
slav Communists, and the threat of Bulgarian ir-
redentism became real to Belgrade. In mid-1968,
the Bulgarian military newspaper, echoing the
Brezhnev Doctrine, announced that it was the
"duty of the Warsaw Pact to help every country
where socialism" was "in danger," implying that
what was true for Czechoslovakia could also be
true for Yugoslavia. In August, after the Czecho-
slovak invasion, a Bulgarian deputy minister of
defense (who had fought alongside Tito as a par-
tisan) pointedly reiterated the threat, stating that
Bulgaria was ready to go "anywhere else" to
rescue socialism.
Special Report
Zhivkov Gives Speech Fostering Bulgarian Nationalism
An objective analysis of historical fact shows that
Macedonia has never existed, ethnically or nationally, as a
separate state. Macedonia is a geographical region, just as
are Thrace, Moesia, Dobruja, and others. The name
Macedonia is a geographical term which has undergone
many and momentous changes. . . .
The Bulgarian Communist Party and the People's
Republic of Bulgaria recognize the existence of the Social-
ist Republic of Macedonia as a component part of the
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and strive to
strengthen their friendly ties with it. But the BCP and our
country cannot ignore the fact that a stubborn policy of
forceful denationalization of the Bulgarian population is
being implemented in the Socialist Republic of Mace-
donia. Feelings of nationalist and great-nation chauvinism
are being incited, for the purpose of turning the people in
Macedonia against the Bulgarian nation.
The Macedonian Problem: Historical-Political
Aspects Historical Institute, Bulgarian Academy
of Sciences Sofia, November 1968
* * *
Our foreign policy in the Balkans is based on the
fundamental idea that there should be no controversial
questions among the Balkan countries, inherited from the
past, which could not be solved peaceably by way of
negotiations and protection of mutual interests. It is our
position that emphasis must be placed on positive things
which the Balkan countries have in common and which
unite them, and not on the things which divide them.
Todor Zhivkov
April 1969
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Tito's open criticism of the events of August
1968 apparently prompted Zhivkov�undoubt-
edly with Soviet endorsement�to adopt an even
stronger propaganda and diplomatic campaign
against Yugoslavia. The polemics were primarily
based on the Macedonian issue but they also
contained hostile references to Yugoslav political
and economic practices, emphasizing the social
and economic problems of the county. It was
naively hoped that the Bulgarian campaign would
put enough pressure on Belgrade to distract the
Yugoslays from events in Prague and moderate
their response to the invasion.
In November 1968, the Bulgarian Academy
of Sciences, under party direction, issued a pam-
phlet claiming that Macedonia had never existed
ethnically, nationally, or linguistically as a nation
apart from Bulgaria. The publication stated that
all Macedonians, even those in Yugoslavia, actu-
ally were Bulgarians. It denounced Belgrade for
forcing the integration of the Macedonian people
with the Yugoslays, who were accused of wishing
also to lay claim to the "Macedonians" living in
Bulgaria. It said that Bulgaria would continue to
seek a "constructive solution" to the Macedonian
problem that would let Macedonia "freely deter-
mine and express its nationality and its national
feelings," implying, of course, that these "na-
tional feelings" were Bulgarian. This tract was
widely distributed in Bulgaria, was broadcast to
Yugoslavia, and was circulated in Eastern Europe.
Belgrade later reported that several people were
arrested in Yugoslav Macedonia for distributing
this "irredentrst pamphlet."
The following month, in a further sign of
their antipathy, Bulgarian leaders boycotted
Yugoslav national day celebrations in Sofia, and
rumors began circulating in Moscow that Pact
maneuvers would soon be held in Bulgaria near
the Yugoslav border. These stories inspired in-
creased tensions in Yugoslavia. Polemics became
vitriolic,
Special Report
A contemporary dimension
- 7 -
was added to the dispute by Bulgaria's claims that
it had liberated Macedonia in 1944�a claim Bel-
grade categorically denied but viewed as an im-
plied threat.
In September 1969, it appeared that some
progress might be made in the Macedonian dis-
pute. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko
first visited Yugoslavia, and the President of the
Yugoslav National Assembly's Chamber of Na-
tionalities, Mika Spiljak, then went to Sofia.
Whether there was any connection between the
two journeys is not known, but with things in
Czechoslovakia then quiet, the Soviets apparently
desired an aura of tranquility in East Europe. If
so, little was accomplished, and the Spiljak mis-
sion proved a failure. The Yugoslays, as they had
in the past, demanded an end to the Bulgarians'
campaign, but Zhivkov declared that he would
discuss outstanding problems only with Tito.
Spiljak, originally hopeful of compromise after
the Gromyko trip, left Sofia "disgusted with the
platitudes and generalities" into which the meet-
ing had degenerated.
Despite the fiasco, the Bulgarians showed a
willingness to discuss the problem. A meeting
between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian foreign min-
isters at the UN, however, led to a disastrous visit
by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev to Belgrade
in December 1969. This incredibly undiplomatic
trip revealed that neither side was ready to mod-
erate its stand. The talks nearly ended before they
started when Bashev let it be known that Bulgaria
was willing to renounce all territorial claims on
Yugoslavia if Belgrade would admit that the
Macedonians were ethnically Bulgarians. The pro-
posal, which was of course rejected, only con-
firmed Belgrade's suspicion of Bulgaria's sinister
designs on Yugoslav Macedonia.
Bulgarian Twists and Turns
In general, the old-line Bulgarian apparat-
chiks, who had severed rather close ties to the
Yugoslav party in 1948, are still nervous about
their independent neighbor and the residual
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The Greek Macedonia
(according to 1961 official figures
of 1%-41,017�of the Greek Population)
Athens acknowledges the existence of a few
"south Slays" in its northern border areas, but con-
siders the Macedonian minority problem "non-
existent." Yugoslavia claims that a Macedonian mi-
nority does exist in Greece, and periodically makes
reference to its suppressionand forced assimilation by
the national majority. Since the Athens-Sofia detente
of 1964 Bulgaria has made no mention of the Mace-
donian minority in Greece, and apparently considers
the issue closed.
common interests that might still prove attractive
to some nationalistic Bulgarian party members.
Sofia has never been comfortable about having
Yugoslavia, an unorthodox yet successful Com-
munist country, on its border, especially because
of the sharp contrast it affords with Bulgaria's
economic and political stagnation.
The Macedonian issue thus seems to have
been contrived by the leadership partly to keep
Yugoslavia and things Yugoslav at arm's length,
and at the same time to rekindle a spirit of
Bulgarian nationalism that could be useful to the
regime. The nationalism campaign of 1966 fizzled
out in two years, but the Macedonian issue has
always had a character of its own, and has from
time to time been exploited by Moscow. Cer-
tainly, Bulgaria's Macedonian policy was de-
veloped haphazardly and has moved ahead in an
erratic fashion. Some of this can be ascribed to
fluctuations in Soviet policy, but some of it must
also be related to Sofia's political vicissitudes and
ineptitudes in the pursuit of traditional Bulgarian
foreign policy goals.
The vehement diplomatic and public re-
sponses from Yugoslavia over the Macedonian dis-
pute�particularly after the Czechoslovak crisis�
caused Sofia to hesitate and re-evaluate the direc-
tion and force of its Macedonian policy. This was
Special Report
so partly because by early 1969 the Soviets were
interested in reducing tensions in Eastern Europe.
In March an editorial in the Bulgarian party news-
paper disclaimed any territorial desires in Yugo-
slavia. This was followed by a public statement by
First Deputy Premier Zhivko Zhivkov that his
country "did not have any interest in land expan-
In April 1969, in a talk with Austrian jour-
nalists, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev said
Macedonia remained a "historical legacy" but
concluded that it was not a "topical political
matter." He accused unnamed "imperialist"
circles for "fostering nationalist passions" in the
Balkans.
For Belgrade, nevertheless, such platitudes
were not reassuring, and Yugoslav propaganda
continued to hammer away at the issue. In re-
sponse, Bulgaria ended its moratorium on polem-
ics in June 1969, though without making Mace-
donia the direct issue. Sofia's antipathy toward
Tito's regime again surfaced, but it was directed
at "revisionism" in Yugoslavia rather than at
Macedonia. On 28 June, for example, the Bul-
garian army paper stressed the "anti-Soviet"
nature of Tito's programs and policies. A week
later Zhivkov delivered an anti-Yugoslav speech in
a similar vein. In July Yugoslav-Bulgarian rela-
tions took a further turn for the worse when
Sofia restricted the traditional free movement of
people from Yugoslav and Bulgarian border vil-
lages across the frontier.
Yugoslav Reaction
On 12 February 1969, Belgrade sent its
second diplomatic note of protest within one year
peppering Bulgaria for "fomenting an atmosphere
of disquiet and tension in the Balkans." That
same day acting Yugoslav Foreign Minister Miso
Povicevic gave a speech in the Federal Assembly
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-- Two examples of Bulgarian Macedonian propaganda published
in 1969. The first, a photo from BULGARIA TODAY, is from a
story on how "the Bulgarians liberated Macedonia during the
Second World War." The Yugoslays call this a "transparent lie."
The second example, a poem, is by a long dead Macedonian
poet whom the Bulgars have brought back to "life" as a Bul-
garian literary figure.
Macedonia, wondrous land,
Greek you shall never be;
For forests and woods and mountains,
Thy very stones,
Birds, and fish in the Vardar River,
All things on this earth
Will rise to their feet to declare
To the whole of Europe, the whole world:
"Bulgarian 'tis what I am,
And it is Bulgarians who inhabit this land."
Minstrel at a County Fair, by
Rako Zhinzifov (circa 1850)
in which he said Bulgarian policy could not be
"understood any different than as the feeding of
territorial pretensions toward integral parts of
Yugoslavia." The League of Yugoslav Commu-
nists' newspaper expressed the fear that the
Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty"
would be used as a justification for an invasion. In
March 1969 over 2,000 people demonstrated in
the Macedonian town of Ohrid, protesting against
the Bulgarian "anti-Yugoslav campaign." By May,
the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister spoke of a
"Balkan confrontation," accusing the Bulgars of
territorial aspirations, interfering in Yugoslav in-
ternal affairs, subversive propaganda, and plan-
ning to hold military maneuvers in border areas.
The minister also reiterated the charge that a
"third country" was influencing Bulgarian policy
toward his country.
In the years since the occupation of Czecho-
slovakia, the Yugoslays have become convinced
that Moscow has a role in the Macedonian con-
troversy. This was graphically illustrated in an
Special Report
article of 25 November 1970 entitled "Ghosts of
the Past," which appeared in both Belgrade's
Borba and the Macedonian republic daily Nova
Makedonija. The article accused Bulgaria of re-
viving bourgeois territorial claims to Macedonia
(and parts of Serbia) as they existed under the
treaty of San Stefano. 'Tsarist "Russia" is the real
culprit, according to the two journals, because it
"created the fiction of San Stefano Bulgaria."
The Yugoslays, however, have admitted that So-
viet officials, in private discussions, have never
supported Sofia's position on Macedonia.
Into the Seventies
For a brief period in the spring of 1970, the
Bulgarian media gave Yugoslavia more positive
treatment ,1
Indeed, something new did seem to
be in the offing, and in late June the Bulgarian
press talked of all-Balkan cooperation and of im-
proving relations with its neighbors, including
Yugoslavia.
For the Yugoslays, however, there could be
no improvement until Sofia officially changed its
stance on Macedonia. While Sofia talked of de-
tente, the Macedonian government announced it
had uncovered "increased foreign activity" of a
hostile nature in the republic. Contrary to Sofia's
expectations, the Yugoslays interpreted Bulgarian
statements on Balkan cooperation as a maneuver
to embarrass them and to give the appearance
that Belgrade was dragging its feet.
Nonetheless, in early July, Belgrade provoca-
tively tested Bulgaria's "new" good will. Three
normally routine documents�a 1971-75 eco-
nomic protocol, a radio-TV protocol, and a bor-
der traffic agreement�were presented in the
Macedonian language for Sofia's signature. The
red-faced Bulgarians refused to sign, whereupon
the Yugoslav press jumped on the issue, labeling
the refusal "a revival of greater Bulgarian (claims)
to sovereign Macedonian territory." In early
August, the widely read Yugoslav weekly, NIN,
- 9 - 15 January 1971
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accused Bulgaria of spreading Stalinist propa-
ganda in Yugoslavia, as well as offering highly
paid jobs to Bulgarians living in Serbia in an
attempt to lure them across the border. The situa-
tion went from bad to worse; in September the
Macedonian party central committee called home
all Yugoslav-Macedonian students studying in
Sofia because of hostile Bulgarian propaganda
activity among them.
Three times during 1970 Bulgarian Premier
Zhivkov requested a face-to-face meeting with
President Tito to discuss major points of dif-
ference, but when representatives of the two
countries finally met on 9 and 10 November in
Sofia to lay the groundwork for such a meeting,
the results were disastrous. As they had for the
past year, the Bulgarians came to the meeting
determined to achieve a facade of agreement by
discussing noncontroversial subjects. But the
Yugoslays declared Macedonia the only major is-
sue and stipulated that it be the core of any
negotiations. Party Secretary Velchev, the chief
of the Bulgarian delegation, then pulled a paper
from his briefcase that had been prepared for
such an eventuality. The Bulgarians were willing
to concede that "a Macedonian state" had
emerged after the second World War, but they
rigidly insisted that the Macedonian people of this
state were ethnically and culturally Bulgarian and
that its territory was not conclusively defined.
Velchev then declared that, although the present
Bulgarian government now was ready to settle the
Macedonian problem, he was not certain that the
next generation of Bulgarians would be as willing.
The chief of the Yugoslav delegation replied that
this Bulgarian position negated a policy estab-
lished by Bulgarian hero Georgi Dim itrov and the
COM INTERN. Velchev's admission that this was
so ended the discussions, and Yugoslav press
polemics sharply increased. Furthermore, Yugo-
slav Macedonians�with government encourage-
ment�began expressing their support for the "na-
tional aspirations" of their brothers in Bulgaria.
In spite of this dismal turn of events, there
are indications that the two countries may yet
Special Report - 10 -
President Tito
Macedonian Chief
Crvenkovski
"Further progress has been made in our relations with our
neighbors, except with the People's Republic of Bulgaria,
with which, despite our efforts, regretfully, no such pro-
gress has been recorded."
Yugoslav President Tito in a foreign policy report
submitted to all chambers of the Federal As-
sembly on 18 November 1970
"In order to be better able to understand what is hidden
behind the resuscitation of the vampire of Bulgarian
revanchism, we must ask ourselves what the Bulgarian
claims are based on. There are three explanations: First,
the internal crisis from which it is necessary to divert the
attention of the public by making territorial claims against
Yugoslavia. Second, the belief that the Yugoslav Federa-
tion will disintegrate and that this is a unique opportunity
for Bulgaria to profit and third, that somebody else is
hidden behind the Bulgarian claims, that is that the leader-
ship of the neighboring country relies on somebody else's
support.... Time will show how justified our doubts are,
but, on the basis of everything that we now know, one
should not expect any future change for the better in
Bulgaria's policy toward Yugoslavia."
Noted Croatian commentator Mill/ca Sundic in an
interview with the Zagreb Domestic Service on
27 November 1970.
"The ghosts from the past must be buried forever�(in
other words) tendencies which until now have frequently
been encouraged by other Balkan forces.... I believe that
soon a perspective of a more progressive, modern Balkans
will open up, a Balkans in which there will be full
tolerance and complete respect for every national in-
dividuality."
Macedonian Party Executive Bureau member
Krste Crvenkovski in an 18 December 1970 inter-
view in the Yugoslav (Albanian language) pub-
lication Rilindia.
15 January 1971
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come to terms.
Since then, Yugoslav press attacks on Bul-
garia have subsided somewhat, although party
meetings throughout the country continue their
well-orchestrated denunciation of Bulgarian
policy. Furthermore, Yugoslav party luminaries
have, in the past month, spoken in a conciliatory
manner about improving relations with their east-
ern neighbor.
This possibility was thought to
have moved another step forward on 23 Decem-
ber, when President Tito interrupted his vacation
on Brioni to receive the Bulgarian ambassador.
But the Yugoslays now say nothing productive
came from these talks.
Since October the BuIgars have virtually ig-
nored any invective coming from Yugoslavia and
have continued to play for a meeting with Tito to
codify some agreement to disagree. Recent public
statements of the Sofia leaders have been pep-
pered with calls for a Balkan rapprochement. In a
probably related development, the most vocifer-
ous of the Bulgarian newspapers on the Mace-
donian problem, Narodna Armiya, published by
the Defense Ministry, was ordered discontinued as
a daily and converted to a weekly in late Decem-
ber. The paper, however, has continued to appear
on a daily basis, with no explanation of the sud-
den reversal in publication schedules. This could
indicate some disagreement within the Sofia lead-
Special Report
ership over the present trends in Bulgarian policy
on the Macedonian question.
Zhivkov with Tito in Belgrade-1967
Last Talks�on Kremlin Wall�November 1967
Prospects for 19 71
To do r Z hivkov's present self-abasement
shows an uncommon willingness to improve the
atmosphere. The Bulgarians have made so many
concessions that about the only card they have
left to play is to agree to a settlement or quietly
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to let the issue die�if the Yugoslays will allow it.
This suggests that perhaps the Yugoslays are
partly correct in assuming that the Soviets now
have taken a hand in the matter, if only to try to
cool the situation. It is difficult, however, to
foresee formal repudiation by Bulgaria of its past
Macedonian stand. Rather, a settlement could
provide for a tempering of the more provocative
elements of Sofia's position and a change in the
tone and emphasis of Bulgarian propaganda to
stress points of agreement between Belgrade and
Sofia.
Belgrade now insists that prior to any rap-
prochement, Sofia must specifically recognize the
existence of an ethnic Macedonian nation within
Yugoslavia, demonstrate a willingness to allow
Special Report
free expression of Macedonian national identity
in Bulgarian Pirin, and publicly repudiate its posi-
tion since 1967. If Zhivkov is serious about im-
proving relations with Tito, he will have to accept
the first of these terms. If Tito wishes to recipro-
cate, he probably will have to drop the last two
demands.
Of course, such an arrangement would con-
stitute no more than a return to the tacit arrange-
ment that existed prior to 1967, and it would be
quite embarrassing to Zhivkov at that. If such an
agreement does take shape, it may be due more to
a Soviet desire to avoid involvement in a Balkan
territorial squabble than to a lessening of Sofia's
nationalistic passions.1
- 12- 15 January 1971
SECRET
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