CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/02/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03173539
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: February 17, 1960

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0
NOSUSIENT
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 OULASSIFILO
CLASS. ONANOIS TOt TS S
NEXT REVIOW DAM A fy
NOM HO 704
6 JUN 1980
DAM NEVISWINt
17 February 1960
Copy No. C 67
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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17 FEBRUARY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's formula for solution of Ger-
man problem calls for signing of separate
treaties with two German states; Commu-
nists claim it would eliminate "objections"
to signing of single treaty.
Chinese Communists and Nationalists in
air clash above Taiwan Strait; Commu-
nists showing increased confidence in
ability to engage Nationalists.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Israel's boycott of UN Mixed Armistice
Commission meeting concerning fighting
along Israeli-Syrian border may lead to
UN Security Council consideration of bar -
der dispute.
Belgian Congo--Brussels' announcement
of 30 June independence for the Congo may
lead to substantial exodus of Congo's
100,000 Europeans.
Communists in Iraq receive another jolt
in cabinet shake-up.
la THE WEST
�US Embassy sees Castro's agreements
with Mikoyan as long step toward Cuba's
Joining Soviet camp.
LATE ITEM
�New Soviet proposal for temporary
standards for detecting underground
nuclear tests is designed to undercut
US proposal for limited test ban; USSR
still aims at ban on all tests.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 February 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Germany: pq the recent meeting of bloc leaders in
Moscow, Khrushchev is reported to have put forward a new
formula�subsequently outlined publicly by East German Pre-
mier Grotewohl on 10 February--calling for two basically sim-
ilar German peace treaties, one between the Western powers
and Bonn and the other between bloc governments and East Ger
many. Grotewohl explained that this procedure would "do away
with objections" to signing a single treaty with both German
states and lead to the "same results." Khrushchev may elab-
orate on this mod lcationaLtheiVIay summit meeting.
, the Soviet premier defended
his free-city proposal for West Berlin and reaffirmed his inten-
tion to sign a separate treaty with East Germany if the West
does not respond to the Soviet proposal to negotiate a German
tr eat...1g (Page 1)
Taiwan Strait: ekhe attack on a Chinese Nationalist routine
air patrol by Chinese Communist jet fighters over the Taiwan
Strait on 16 February was ordered by Communist ground control
and was carried out despite the fact that Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles are usually carried by the Nationalist aircraft. Side-
winders were fired but no aircraft were destroyed. Communist
aircraft have been active over the strait recently and have shown
Increased confidence in their ability to engage the Nationalists?
(Page 3)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
o141,,,r Commission meeting on 16 February, which dealt with recent
Israel-UAR-UN: Israel's boycott of the UN Mixed Armistice
fighting along the Israeli-Syrian border, may lead to UN Security
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Council consideration of the border dispute. Israel's antag-
onism is directed toward the UN Truce Supervision Organiza-
tion as well as the UAR in this case because both oppose Israel's
claim to sovereignty over the demilitarized zone in which the
fighting occurred. A clash with Syrian forces in the central sec-
tor of the zone on 12 February, when two Israelis were Mlle
hasagainraied the prospect of Israeli reprisal action.
(Page 4)
Belgian Congo: Brussels' recent announcement that inde-
pendence with full sovereignty will be granted the Congo on 30
June has caused widespread anxiety among the Congo's 100,000
Europeans, and may lead to a substantial exodus. Europeans
feel that Brussels is surrendering to virtually every African de-
mand in the current round-table talks, and fear that Belgium will
be unprepared to protect its nationals in the Congo during the
post-independence period, which may well be chaotic. The pre-
vailing feeling could strengthen secessionist sentiment in mineral-
rich Katanga Province, where the Europeans are politically well
organized. The Consulate General in Leopoldville observes that
an orderly transition period after 30 June will depend on the reten-
tion of a substantial cadre of Belgian civil servants. The mainte-
nance of the Force Publique at its present strength would also hp
essential. j
Iraq: A cabinet change announced in Baghdad on 16 Feb-
ruary appears to be a jolt for Communist influence in the Iraqi
Government. Following a struggle of some weeks over control
of the agrarian reform program, the anti-Communist minister of
interior, Brigadier Yahya, has been made acting minister of
agr Han reform in addition to his other duties, while the pro-
Communist former minister, Ibrahim Kubbah, has been relieved.
Kubbah has also been dismissed from his post as acting oil min-
ister, but in this case another extreme leftist, Minister of Plan-
ning Sbaybani, has taken over the portfolio on an acting basis.
17 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF Ii
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III. THE WEST
Cuba: rIlhe American Embassy in Havana believes that
the most serious results of Mikoyan's visit to Cuba are the
expressed intention of the Soviet and Castro governments to
collaborate actively in the UN and the offer of technical as-
sistance by the USSR. Embassy officials state that the Cuban
Government has taken a long step toward putting itself def-
initely in the Soviet camp, that there is little possibility that
the United States will reach a satisfactory relationship with
the present regime, and that "time is working against us" as
Castro's control over Cuban public opinion tightens/
(Page 6)
LATE ITEM
*USSR - Geneva Test Talks: he Soviet offer on 16 Febru-
ary to accept a set of temporary standards for detecting under-
ground nuclear explosions, provided the West agrees to Khru-
shchev's plan for a fixed number of on-site inspections each
year, is designed to further the USSR's objective of a treaty
banning all tests and to undercut the recent American proposal
for a limited treaty. An obvious move to divide the Western
delegations, the Soviet plan adopts suggestions along these lines
put forward by the British delegation on 15 January. An agree-
ment on temporary control measures, which would obtain during
the "approximately two- to three-year" period while a perma-
nent control system was being installed, would also include a
joint research program to perfect methods of detecting under-
ground explosions. Moscow probably believes that this new
concession, which in effect accepts the Western contention that
almost any unidentified seismic event should be eligible for an
on-site inspection, will make it increasingly difficult for the
United States to continue its opposition to the Soviet scheme for
an annual quota of inspections--a concept first advanced by Prime
Minister Macmillan.
17 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow Meeting of Bloc Leaders Discusses Pre-Summit Strategy
[Luring the recent meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow, Khru-
shchev reportedly made several proposals designed to strengthen
Soviet efforts at the summit to persuade the West to ne o ia
German peace treat
In a move to make
ess lTtastef�I to the West the standard Soviet proposal for a
peace treaty with both German states, the Soviet premier put for-
ward the formula�subsequently outlined publicly by East German
Premier Grotewohl on 10 February--calling for two basically
similar treaties, one between the Western powers and Bonn and
the other between bloc governments and East Germany. Grotewohl
explained that this procedure "would lead to the same result" and
"do away with objections raised by some governments." Pravda
emphasized these aspects of Grotewohl's speech on 11 Februaizi
v and 'Ulbricht are reported
to have agreed on a peace treaty which would legal-
ize the division of Germany as one of their basic objectives in
forthcoming East-West talks. Ulbricht was to take the initiative
in proposing that the four powers establish - A I" OMYYliAcilln frt ncirrn_
tiate a treaty.
Khrushchev plans no basic concessions on Germany or Berlin
at the summit, but will urge that the West agree to all-German
negotiation:sj
[Khrushchev took this approach in his talks with Italian Pres-
ident Gronchi. In defending his proposal for creating a free city
in West Berlin, Khrushchev termed his agreement to an interim
settlement a "real concession" to facilitate all-German talks. He
reaffirmed his intention to sign a separate peace treaty with East
Germany if the West did not agree to begin negotiations on a treaqjr.
17 Feb 60
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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the Soviet leader linked this threat
specifically to the results of the May summit meeting. In his
previous public and private warnings, however, Khrushchev has
carefully avoided tying unilateral action on a peace treaty to the
May sumini
17 Feb 60
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Taiwan Strait Air Clash
An attack on a routine Nationalist air patrol by Commu-
nist jet fighters over the Taiwan Strait near the China mainland
on 16 February
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles were carried by the National-
ist aircraft-.1
L4ppproximately 18 Communist aircraft were in the area of the
engagement, although only four of these were seen by the four
F-86 pilots of the Nationalist patrol.. One of the Nationalist air-
craft attempted to fire Sidewinders but was unable to because of
malfunctions; another fired two, but missed. An F-86 was
slightly damaged by enemy fire and one of the Communists ap-
peared to have been hit, but apparently no aircraft were destroyed)
Ellhe large number of Communist flights over the Chinmens
and over the Taiwan Strait, along with the 16 February battle,
suggests that the Communists now feel that they can cope with
air-to-air missiles, and hence are less reluctant to engage the
Nationalist F-86s-.]
4'he Nationalists fly this route twice daily, and this patrol
appeared to be normal in every respect. The Chinese National-
ists have carefully observed their pledge to American officials
on Taiwan to avoid any provocative actions, and probably will
continue to exercise restraint as long as they believe unilateral
action would hurt relations with the United States.]
.L4t a recent briefing for Hong Kong Communist newspaper-
men, a Communist editor stated Peiping's current line is to
"carefully refrain" from creating military tension in the strait
because the Communists feel this might increase US influence
on Taiwan to the detriment of "peaceful liberatiQn.")
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Israeli-Syrian Border Dispute May Go to UN Security Council
Israel's boycott of the meeting on 16 February of the Is-
raeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) to consider
recent fighting in the demilitarized zone along the Israeli-
� Syrian border may lead to UN Security Council consideration
of the dispute. LIIN Secretary General Hammarskjold has ex-
pressed readiness, if necessary, to call a council meeting
on his own authority. Prior to such a meeting, however,
there probably would be a "reaffirmation" of the UN position
regarding the status of the demilitarized zone, perhaps in
the form of a stern letter from Hammarskjold to Israel and
the UAR:j
The Israeli claim to sovereignty over the demilitarized
zone has become a central issue in the dispute and was the
reason for Israel's refusal to attend the MAC meeting. The
Israelis deny that the MAC has any authority to discuss an
issue involving Israeli sovereignty. The UN and the LTAR,
as well as the US Government, hold that the 1949 General
Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria left the sta-
tus of the zone in abeyance pending a final Arab-Israeli set-
tlement.
Israel has offered to meet separately with the Arab in-
habitants of Tawafiq, the focal point of recent fighting with-
in the zone, to discuss measures to enable them to cultivate
the land they claim. The Israelis also have said they are
willing to meet the Syrians "anytime and anywhere" to dis-
cuss peace and means of preserving order along their com-
mon border, while insisting that there be no discussion of the
demilitarized zone.
A clash on 12 February in the central sector of the de-
militarized zone, 25 miles north of Tawafiq, has again
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raised the prospect of Israeli reprisal action. The Syrians
apparently fired first, and two Israelis reportedly were
killed in the two-hour fight. Israeli Chief of Staff Laskov
is quoted as threatening new reprisals if the Syrians "start
anything else."
CONFIDENT IA L
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III. THE WEST
Cuban-Soviet Relations
ttie American Embassy in Havana believes that the most
significant results of Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's
trip to Cuba are the expressed intention of the Castro govern-
ment to collaborate actively with the USSR in the UN and the
offer of Soviet technical assistance in the building of Cuban
factories. The commercial agreement may eventually be
proved disadvantageous to Cuba, but meanwhile it adds to the
propaganda benefits the USSR is deriving from the visitn
Rhe new rapport with the USSR has apparently received
enthusiastic support from the majority of Cubans. However,
considerable booing of Mikoyan's appearance on theater news-
reels indicates that opposition exists,]
['Embassy officials believe that the closer ties with the USSR,
viewed in conjunction with other recent Cuban developments, are
a long step toward putting the Castro government in the Soviet
camp. They feel there is little possibility that the United States
can reach a satisfactory relationship with the present regime and
that, as Castro's control over Cuban public opinion tightens, the
possibility of agreement will become even more remote.
[iiiplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR will nrnh�
ably be resumed shortly.
Castro is also making overtures toward diplomatic relations
with Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
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Nolle
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Aaministration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs'
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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