CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172682
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 15, 1961

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15 May 1961
Copy No. C -
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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4-11 01:A.4�1.:( 1
15 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. LADS. (Page t)
2. Israel believes UAR military exercise may be part of
plan for action in Jordan. (Page tt)
3. Congo: Kasavubu's call for reopening of Congolese
parliament poses challenge to Gizenga. (rage it)
. Iran: Several high-ranking officers arrested. (rage tt)
5. Monrovia conference takes usual African nationalist
line on Angola and South Africa, cautious line on
Congo and Algeria. (rage tit)
6. Austrian Government expanding purchases from the
bloc. (rage ft)
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BURMA
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VIETNAM
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: In the formal cease-fire document signed at the
Ban Ta--7-no'ne truce site in Laos on 13 May, representatives
of General Phoumi, Souvanna Phouma, and the Pathet Lao
acknowledged the existence of a cease-fire, but recognized
some trouble spots and agreed to reissue cease-fire orders.
ki6J
The government representative signed the document, how-
ever, in a way equating the Boun Oum government with Sou-
vanna's "legal government." Phoumi does not expect con-
crete results from the scheduled political talks at Namone
but says it was necessary to start them to get a firm cease- P"It'
fire.
No major military operations have occurred, but enemy g4/
probing attacks have continued against Meo guerrillas in the
Pa Bong area. On 13 May enemy guerrillas were reported -1""-
to have attacked and occupied government-held areas 13 miles
southwest of Luang Prabang and 30 miles north of Vientiane.
Government troops about 15 miles north of Vientian�ere
reportedly attacked by an enemy company on 14 May.
Scheduled airlift activity for 14 May was at a low level.
Only two LI-2 sorties were scheduled and no flights were
scheduled into Laos. Airlift flights into Laos were sched-
uled for 15 May')
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Israel-UAR-Jordan:(
Israel be=
lieved the current UAR military exercise may be part of a
plan by Nasir to undertake some action in Jordan, where
opposition to King Husayn's recently reported wedding plans
appears to be increasing. Ben-Gurion said that Israel would
take a serious view of such a development, but added that
Tel Aviv's resnonse would be determined latel_D
No firm evidence of large-scale troop movements has
yet been received in connection with the UAR exercise.
that some company and battalion reinforcement units= as
with the "supply of men during battle"�were to be
formed before 19 May. (Backup,
Page 4)
Congo: Kasavubu's call for the reopening of the Congo-
lese Parliament poses a challenge to Gizenga, who has made
this his main condition for a reconciliation with the Leopold-
ville regime. The parliament presumably would attempt to
draft a new constitution, using as a basis the proposals now
being discussed at Coquilhatville. These proposals, which
envisage the creation of several tribally based states and
the establishment of a strong central regime at Leopoldville,
might be acceptable to Gizenga but probably would be re-
jected by the present separatist regime in Katanga. This
regime, however, probably would be willing to continue ne-
gotiations. Failure of Elisabethville representatives to
participate would further weaken the anti-Gizenga bloc,
whose position has already been undermined by the Stanley-
ville leader's assiduous cultivation of uncommitted legisla-
tors. (Backup, Page 5) (Map)
Iran: ormer Prime Minister Eqbal has been sum-
mon-al-Ty a government investigator for questioning in con-
nection with the rigging of last year's elections. OtheiJ
15 May 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Cd_evelopments appear to substantiate rumors which have been
circulating in Tehran for several days that a number of high-
ranking officers are to be arrested. A military police gener-
al sent to arrest General Kia, former chief of intelligence for
the Joint Staff, at noon on 13 May delayed for four hours after
Kia argued that noon was "not the proper time to arrest lieu-
tenant generals." Kia attempted to get in touch with the Shah
and the minister of the interior to have the arrest order re-
scinded. Subsequent press reports of his arrest suggest he
was unsuccessful. The former ministers of interior and of
finance as well as the former director of the fisheries ad-
ministration were also reported arrested. The fisheries ad-
ministration oversees the export of Iranian caviar and is,
therefore, a lucrative source of graft. Those arrested have
long been identified in the public mind with some of the more
flagrant abuses of position, and the Shah probably estimated
that the favorable public reaction would more than offset
their influence in the army or political circles. The arrests
also provide Prime Minister Amini with the first of the "spec-
tacular" moves he hopes to make to impress the public with
his determination to be effective
Africa: The conference in Monrovia of 20 moderate Af- 7
rican�i�tates ended on 12 May after agreeing to reconvene in
Lagos soon�possibly before the next UN General Assembly
session, where they intend to present a united front. The
meeting's final communique adopts the standard African na-
tionalist lines on Angola and South Africa;' however, since
many of the participants are sympathetic toward France and
Katanga, it takes a cautious line on the Congo and Algeria.
The participating countries have agreed in principle that at
the next meeting in Lagos they will set up an "African co-
operation organization" which would include machinery for
settling disputes among members. The conference also
agreed to establish a body for economic and cultural coopera-
tion. The refusal of the radical African states--Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR--to attend has strength-
ened the trend on the continent toward division into moderate
and radical blocs.
15 May 61 DAILY BRIEF
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Austria -USSR: The Austrian Government has been ex-
panding its purchases from the Soviet bloc at the insistence
of Austrian manufacturers who are eager to increase their
sales to the bloc. Soviet propaganda does all it can to en-
courage and strengthen this pressure for more trade with
the bloc. The main areas of discrimination against US im-
ports appear to be in certain agricultural imports and coal
�products which are controlled by state trading companies
or state monopolies. (Backup, Page 7)
15 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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*�FOP SECRET Nal"
Situation in Laos
General Phoumi told Ambassador Brown in Vientiane on
14 May that he believes no internal political solution can be
reached in Laos until the great powers have agreed on an in-
ternational framework for Laos at Geneva. Phoumi said he
had no early plans to attend the Geneva Conference and no
indication that Souvanna Phouma did either.
Souvan
officials of the Internationa Control Commission (ICC) in
Xieng Khouang on 15 May.
In a joint declaration to ICC Chairman Sen, broadcast
on 12 May, Souvanna and Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong
stated that "summit meetings" with Phoumi would be pre-
mature for the time being but that after prior military and
political negotiations, such a meeting would be "fruitful."
The statement declared that "it would be better to avoid
meeting each other in a foreign country and to meet in
Namone, where the ICC is also present." In the 13 May
meeting at Namone, Souvanna's representative attempted
to undercut Vientiane's position, in effect acting as the
meeting's chairman and in the role of the "legal govern-
ment" trying to harmonize recalcitrant factions.
Moscow quotes the Pathet Lao radio as broadcasting
on 14 May a statement by Souvanna declaring that his troops
and the Pathet Lao had liberated three-fifths of the country
and outlining his program of action. This called for the
early formation of a provisional coalition government, based
on Souvanna's "government," together with representatives of
the Neo Lao Hak Sat and other "patriotic forces" and "repre-
sentatives of the Savannakhet group... if they approve the
political program." A subsequent broadcast by Souphannou-
vong for the Neo Lao Hak Sat endorsed the statement.
it would not be use-
ful to send commission teams to trouble spots at this time.
skirmishes were bound to occur until an agree=
ment was reached defining the location of troops on each
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Ti`fl'OP SECRET
side and arrangements made for supplying forces inside one
another's main lines.
Ij
a group of 50 Pathet Lao
troops on 12 May about 20 miles north of Vientiane. The
leader of the group reportedly refused to withdraw to the
neutral zone south of yang Vieng and stated that his orders
were to "remain under any circumstances in the villages
where we now are,T3
� gi former Buddhist monk who had joined Kong Le's forces
is reported to have told leftist acquaintances in Vientiane that
he had been sent for three months to study "political science"
in Moscow. He is reported to have stressed the benefits that
Laotians were receiving from Communist China, North Viet-
nam, and the Soviet Union, and predicted that fighting would
eventually be resumed, with the Pathet Lao taking over the
country in two weeks. He added that the Pathet Lao would
probably move the capital of Laos to Xieng Khouang, which
is on the supply line from Vinh in North Vietnam, whereas
Vientiane is subject to blockade and other harassment by
Thailand-)
Of a total of 12 airlift sorties scheduled for 13 May, two
Soviet LI-2s and one North Vietnamese AN-2 were reflected
in flights to Laos. The Soviet AN-12 which arrived at Pei-
ping from Irkutsk on 13 May has been delayed at Peiping be-
cause of adverse weather. It was scheduled to fly on to
Hanoi via Canton on 14 May
(At least one of about 40 Chinese aircraft�probably
IL-2-8-s--which flew into the Changsha/Leiyang area between
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TOP SE
Cp April and 1 May, flew on 13 May to Suihsi in South Chi-
na, where their effective range into Southeast Asia is ex-
tended. Whether this presages a movement of a larger num=
ber of these aircraft to the Buihsl area cannot vet be deter-
mined, but such a movement is a possibility.)
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TOP SECRET NIS
Ben-Gurion Warns of Danger in Jordan
CBen-Gurion said that the UAR's entire armed forces were
being mobilized and that Israel is certain Syrian Army units
were being told they may be readied for an invasion of Iraq,
which Israel feels could be a cover for an operation in Jordan.
Ben-Gurion's contentions are unconfirmed by any evidence now
available)
CI'he situation in Jordan, however, is ripe for exploitation
by opponents of King Husayn's regime, including pro-Nasir
elements. Some of Husayn's stanchest supporters reportedly
have concluded= in view of the almost unanimous opposition
to his engagement to an English woman--that the King must
abdicate if both he as an individual and Jordan are to survive.
These supporters envisage the establishment of a regency
council with Husayn's youngest brother, Prince Hasan, as king
one stage, when the Jordanian cabinet threatened to
resign as an expression of disapproval of the marital plans,
Husayn said he would abdicate instead, according to one re-
port. He apparently is in a disturbed state of mind and is
said to be desirous of seeing only those who praise his act
as bold and imaginative. He may be in growing danger of
assassination as a result of increased subversive activity
and the government's allegedly deteriorating capability to
keep track of dissidentiD
Meanwhile, the UAR is accusing Israel of attempting to
create a false atmosphere of tension in the area preceding
Ben-Gurion's scheduled visit to Canada and the US later this
month, which Cairo calls a "backdoor" meeting with Presi-
dent Kennedy. A Damascus newspaper on 13 May remarked
that the visit coincides with an effort by the "trumpets of Is-
rael" to raise a bogey of UAR strength and its threat to Is-
rael. On the preceding day, Israel's chief of staff spoke in
Tel Aviv, urging the mobilization of all Israel's potential
and warning of the UAFt's "hostile intentions."
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trri_
Brazzaville
Banana, Mat�
\ Kitona
610504 2
LIBERIA
200
Scattered Forces iBurna-
3400 MOBUT.0 I Bassrk
800
EQUATEUEe
INDIA
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
MOBUTU
7,200 Scattered Forces
poIdvHt
ysvdle
� Gernena
Lisal Akett
MOBUTU
GHANA
1600
Ikela
MALAYA
470
ETHIOPIA
1,500
KIVU
Bukavu
-
K A I -- Xongolo
,Luluabourg . LIBERIA .--,1 Kabalo
Bakw1a 230 ETHIOPIA Albertville'
� 800 I NIGERIA
900
MALAYA �
300 Manono
..-/
Approximate area nominally contro led by:
7-1 Kasayubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Ei Kalonji
Tshombe
ET United Nations Forces (Service Forces
Selected road not included)
STATUTE MILES
4010
Luputa
NIGERIA
Usumbura
TSHOM BE
7,000
Elisabethville
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SECRET
Situation in the Congo
Kasavubu plans to ask the UN to provide protection for
the reconvened legislature and thus reduce the intimidation
which characterized the last session. Nevertheless, most
of the legislators remain motivated primarily by personal
ambition and have little understanding of parliamentary pro-
cedure or constitutional theory. Their votes will be based
on a mixture of bribery, tribal loyalties, and individual
whim, with factional allegiance running a poor fourth. Gi-
zenga has been more energetic than the Leopoldville regime
In taking advantage of this situation. Although he lacks Lu-
mumba's crowd appeal, he has inherited the relatively strong
organization of the late premier's National Congolese Move-
ment (MNC), which, together with Gizenga's own African
Solidarity party, at least nominally controlled 48 seats in
the 137-member Chamber of Deputies and 19 in the 84-seat
Senate. Lbeath and defections cut the Gizenga bloc to about
25 in the Chamber and 16 in the Senate by early April; since
then, however, Gizenga has attracted several -wavering dep-
uties to Stanleyville by placing them in lucrative positions,
with the result that his strength in the lower house now may
be about 40. If his fortunes should appear to be rising, this
total would increase furtherTj
Relations between the UN and the Katanga regime con-
tinue to improve in Tshomb6's absence. The ruling trium-
virate in Elisabethville, headed by Interior Minister Munongo,
apparently has agreed to allow the disbandment of the white
mercenary units in the Katanga armed forces. Munongo may
not only feel that he is removing a potential source of armed
opposition to his regime, but may also want to maintain good
relations with the UN at a time when pressure from Leopold-
ville for reintegration with the rest of the country is increas-
ing.
Renewed tribal warfare in southern Kasai rovince has
) forced the UN to evacuate much of that area. Leports from
Leopoldville indicate that the Ghanaian UN troops are to be
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[concentrated along the rail line through the provincj Bak-
wanga, capital of Albert Kalonji's "south Kasai state," now
is unguarded. A few UN civilians apparently remain in the
area.
Kasavubu has asked the UN to request Stockholm to assign
two Swedish generals to the Congolese Government. The
two officers, both of whom served previously on a training
mission in Ethiopia, apparently would be asked to try to re-
organize the army. The last attempt
to train the Congolese forces, by a 130-man Moroccan mis-
sion, ended in failure last December.
Hamrnarskjold reportedly told a Western official re-
cent y that he intended to appoint Rajeshwar Dayal an under
secretary general, in line with a recent recommendation
that the number of such posts be increased. This appoint-
ment presumably would preclude Dayal's return to the Congp
as Hammarskjold's representative)
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Ned
CONFIDENTIAL
Austrian Trade Discrimination Favors Soviet Bloc
Because of the essentially barter nature of the trade with
Eastern Europe, the volume of trade between Austria and the
Soviet bloc is dependent ultimately on the volume of bloc sales
in Austria. Austrian trade with the bloc has increased stead-
ily over the last five years, but in 1960 seemed to level off at
about 15 percent of total trade. Austrians have long hoped to
expand this figure to 20 or 25 percent. Khrushchev raised
Austrian hopes during his visit to Austria last year by stating
that he was prepared to buy everything Austria produced pro-
viding Austria was willing to buy an equal amount from him.
Austria recently placed grain imports under a state trad-
ing system in the belief that grain is one of the few products
it needs which the bloc can readily supply. In September 1960
a contract for 45,000 metric tons of corn was awarded by this
semiofficial Grain Board, which, in contrast to previous prac-
tice, stipulated the Soviet Union as the sole source of supply.
Subsequent contracts, with the same stipulation, were placed
for 50,000 metric tons of corn and 30,000 metric tons of bar-
ley. At the same time, feed corn could have been bought from
free world sources including the United States at prices
14 to 18 percent lower.
The US share of the Austrian tobacco market, a state
monopoly, has been declining, while leaf tobacco imports
from the bloc have increased from 6 percent of Austria's
tobacco imports in 1958 to 14 percent in 1960. US coal im-
ports have also been declining, while bloc exports have risen
from 37 percent of Austria's bituminous coal imports in 1958
to 52 percent in 1960.
The embassy has reason to believe that the Austrian
Government does request and exert pressure on private busi-
ness organizations to purchase certain commodities from the
bloc rather than from free world sources. This pressure on
private firms, as distinguished from nationalized firms, is
exercised through import licensing controls.
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' CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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