CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172675
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 30, 1960

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30 November. 1960
Copy No. C 7
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOODUENT NO.
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30 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet officials apparently making con-
certed effort to lay groundwork for return
to high-level US-Soviet negotiations. 0
Soviet and Chinese leaders reportedly
have engaged in bitter exchanges at Mos-
cow world Communist meeting.
II. ASIA-AFRICA.
Japanese shipyards to provide USSR with
nine ships, including six tankers.
Congo--Lumumba supporters apparently
seeking material aid from Communist
bloc countries; Europeans in Orientale
Province threatened with expulsion.
The situation in Laos.
III. THE WEST
Haiti--Duvalier regime follows up dec-
laration of martial law with shake-up of
top military and economic officials; at-
tempt to overthrow President may follow.�
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
30 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR:E,Khrushchev and other high Soviet officials have
used recent private conversations with Ambassador Thomp-
son to emphasize their desire for an improvement in US
Soviet relations. These overtures appear to be a part of a
concerted effort, which began last September with Khru-
shchev's talks in New York with Prime Minister Macmillan,
to lay the groundwork for a return to high-level negotiations
after the new US administration is installed, and at the same
time to place the onus on the US for any failure to engage in
negotiations. Khrushchev told Ambassador Thompson on 24
November that he hopes to achieve a situation of real friend-
ship with the US and sought to create an impression of Soviet
flexibility in new negotiations for a Berlin settlement. These
gestures take on added significance in view of the protracted
discussions in Moscow dealing with Sino-Soviet differences
and suggest that Khrushchev continues to disregard Peiping's
arguments that his tactics vis-a-vis the West are detrimen-
tal to Chinese interests.
(Page 1)
USSR-China: As the Moscow conference of world Commu-
1.0A-b
nist leaders ends its third week of discussions, Soviet and Chi-
nese leaders continue to express their differences publicly. .b-t-v-t4-)
,t a reception in Moscow for Finnish President Kekkonen on -IP y
4 November, the Chinese ambassador was conspicuously os-
tracized, with only the Albanian and Bulgarian ambassadors
speaking to him] Both People's Daily and Pravda are engaged
In almost daily editorial disagreements,)
bitter exchanges
between the Russians and Chinese have taken place at the meet-
ing5) ) (Page 3)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Japan-USSR: Japanese shipyards will provide the
Soviet Union with four additional tankers of 30,000=35,000
dead-weight tons each under contracts already signed or
about to be concluded as part of a program which will sup-
ply nine ships totaling 256,000 dead-weight tons and costing
over $45,000,000. Of this total, two tankers of 40,000 tons
each have already been purchased by the USSR. The Jap-
anese shipbuilding industry is short of new ship orders and
has been eager. for Soviet contracts in the hope of becoming
a major supplier of ships for an expanded Soviet merchant
fleet The sale of these ships also will help reduce the Jap-
anese deficit in trade with the USSR. The Japanese Foreign
Ministry told the American Embassy on 29 November that it
is not possible for the Japanese Government to control or can-
cel contracts for tankers made under the existing trade agree-
ment.
L
Congo: [Two recent reports suggest that Lumumba's
supporters. in Stanleyville are presently seeking aid�pos-
sibly including arms--from one or more Communist bloc
nations. a Lumumba
emissary contacted the Soviet ambassador to Greece in mid-
November concerning an unidentified "shipment" scheduled to
transit the UAR And Sudan, presumably en route to Orientale
ProvineP
he was going "to certain Eastern bloc countries in his
capacity as deputy leader of the Congo National Movement in
Orientale Province:
In an order of T8 November, the Congolese district com-
missioner in Stanleyville instructed all police posts in Orien-
tale Province that any European expressing anti-Lumumba
sentiments would be expelled. The present whereabouts of
Lumumba remains unknown.
30 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Laos: iSouvanna Phouma has given assurances to the
Britrifi7id-Australian envoys that he will not order an at-
tack on Luang Prabang unless forced to do so or unless the
negotiations shortly to be undertaken in Savannakhet between
General Phoumi and a National Assembly delegation fail.
Souvanna's temporization has given the pro-Phoumi Luang
Prabang garrison time to organize its defenses, which the
garrison commander now considers adequate.7
five Soviet transport aircraft are
now en route from the USSR to Hanoi. The cargo of these
aircraft is unknown, but the planes themselves represent a
significant potential airlift caracity.
*Meanwhile, Phoumi began an offensive on 28 November
purportedly to clean out the area south of the Ca Dinh river
100 miles east of Vientiane. If successful, however, Phoumi
apparently hopes to cross the river and engage Vientiane forces
to the north. (Page 5)
III. THE WEST
*Haiti: The Duvalier regime has followed up its dec-
laration of martial law on 22 November with a sudden shake-
up of top military and economic officials and with intensified
repression of its opponents ranging from pro-Communist to
pro-clerical groups. The police excesses and the alienation
of the church following the 24 November summary expulsion
of the archbishop have increased and widened anti-Duvalier
feeling which was already strong in the capital. Although the
government appears at the moment to be controlling the situa-
tion, elements within the government and the army may seek
to capitalize on the President's growing unpopularity by attempt-
ing his overthrow.
30 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF
Ii
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Khrushchev Emphasizes Desire for Improved Relations
With US
r_Khrushchev and other high Soviet officials have used
recent private conversations with Ambassador Thompson to
emphasize their desire for an improvement in US-Soviet
relations. The Soviet premier took the ambassador aside
at the Soviet reception for Finland's President Kekkonen on
24 November and said that he hoped not only to improve re-
lations but to achieve real friendship. On another occasion
a similar expression of optimism was made by First Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, who indicated satisfaction with
Senator Kennedy's election but expressed concern over press
reports that the new US administration's first step would be
an increase in military expenditures. He urged the ambas-
sador to endeavor to convince the President-elect that the
USSR was not seeking to dominate the world by force or other
means and that both sides should seek to establish an atmos-
phere of trust and confidenceLl
Other Soviet officials have sought to promote this gen-
eral line. The chief of the American section of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry predicted to Thompson that relations would
soon improve. The minister for higher education made a
similar forecast and called for broadening the student exchange
program. The Foreign Ministry official also hinted that some
move on the release of the RB-47 crew members might be
forthcoming, provided the issue could be settled in the proper
"framework. 'r;
Khrushchev raised the Berlin problem and sought to
create an impression of flexibility in any future negotiations.
He indicated that the USSR was prepared for a "quiet explora-
tion" of the issue and would maintain an open mind on a solu.-
tion which would protect US prestige. He offered to considelj
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[any guarantees or a settlement--such as one by the united
Nations--but insisted on Moscow's fundamental condition
that any solution must recognize the existence of two German
state s
I These overtures are apparently part of a concerted tef-
fort, which opened last September with Khrushchev's talks
in New York with Prime Minister Macmillan, to lay the
groundwork for a return to high-level negotiations after the
new US administration is installed, and at the same time to
place the onus on the United States for any failure to engage
in negotiations. Khrushchev, for example, also sought out
the French ambassador at the 24 November reception and
expressed a desire for good relations with both Washington
and Paris.
--e
Such gestures take on added significance in view of the
protracted discussion in Moscow dealing with Sino- Soviet
differences and suggest that Khrushchev continues to disre-
gard Peiping's arguments that his tactics vis-a-vis the West
are detrimental to Chinese interests. Khrushchev apparent-
ly is seeking to underscore his determination to maintain his
"peaceful coexistence" strategy and to reject any concessions
to Chinese demands which would imply even a partial repu-
diation of his policy toward the West over the past three years1
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,Nore
Cold Atmosphere Surrounds Moscow Meetings
As the Moscow conference of world Communist lead-
ers ends its third week of discussions,. Soviet and Chinese
leaders continue to express their differences publicly,rand
disagreements at the meetings are reflected in the
strained atmosphere notea. in Moscow.
LAt a reception in Moscow for Finnish President Kek-
konen on 24 November the Chinese ambassador was con-
spicuously ostracized by Soviet bloc representatives, with
only the Albanian and Bulgarian ambassadors and minor
Soviet officials speaking to him. In contrast, Khrushchev,
Mikoyan, and other top Soviet leaders made a point of seek-
ing out Ambassador Thompson for conversation. In reply to
Ambassador Thompson's remark that he hoped in the last ten
days the Soviet premier "had gotten in some good blows for
peace," Khrushchev smiled and said he had, adding that "nu-
clear war was unthinkable:'
Khrushchev's message to the Chinese leaders thanking
them for their October revolution greetings, while stressing
the need for bloc unity, was significantly cooler than those of
earlier years. Both People's Daily and Pravda in the last few
days have continued their editorial disagreements, with Peiping
emphasizing the need for continuous "struggle against imperi-
alism-colonialism" and Moscow warning of the danger of "dog-
matism and sectarianism." The People's Daily editorial for
27 November opened with Mao's dictum that wri-othing reaction-
ary will topple unless you strike it down," and Pravda on the
same day hailed Engels' "passionate and uncompromising strug-
gle. . . against revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism. . . ."
there have been bitter exchanges between the Soviet
and Chinese delegates. He reports that a committee of 26 coun-
tries had prepared a resolution for adoption at the meeting thre22
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Nis?
Niue
weeks before the conference started. Since the resolu-
tion was based on Soviet positions, the Chinese refused
to accept it and claimed that there can be no equality if
the international Communist movement is directed by one
party3
[The Chinese asserted that their position was right and
that they were determined to follow it. The Chinese insisted:
"Let history be the judge." On 14 November they, submitted
a report which reiterated views they expressed at Bucharest
In June 1960 and which held that the Soviet Union was "de-
stroying international solidarity and reinforcing revisionism."
Liu Sha.o-chi
gave a four-hour speech at the conference on 22 November in
which he attacked Khrushchev personally, as had the Chinese
delegate at the Bucharest conference in June 1960.3
Although the atmosphere surrounding the meeting is
strained, the length of the talks suggests that the USSR, while
unwilling to accept any of the Chinese positions, is also un-
willing to abandon its efforts to find language for a declara-
tion of "unity" which wouldbe acceptable to the Chinese. Both
sides continue to support the declaration, worked out in 1957
and reaffirmed at Bucharest, which is quoted by each side in
support of its own views. No real resolution of the differences
appears likely, however, and the disagreements can be ex-
pected to continue and deepen.
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The Situation in Laos
rPremier Souvahna Phourna has given assurances
that he will
not order an attack on Luang Prabang unless "forced to do
so" or unless the National Assembly delegation led by former
Premier Tiao Somsanith fails in its attempt to negotiate a
settlement with General Phoumi. The Somsanith delegation
flew to Savannakhet for the talks with Phoumi on 29 November.]
LT'
here have been no reports of further movement by the
troops scheduled to participate in the attack on Luang Pra-
bang; they apparently remain for the most part in the Muong
Kassy area, about 55 miles south of Luang Prabang on the
road to Vientiane. Souvanna's temporization in ordering the
attack has given the pro-Phoumi Luang Prabang garrision
time to organize its defenses. The commander, General
Boun Leut, is apparently satisfied that he possesses adequate
strength to hold the town, and in addition is reportedly bring-
ing in about 300 Meo tribesmen to ambush the Vientiane forces
if they move further up the Vientiane - Luang Prabang roadj
1 Another factor casting doubt on Vientiane's ability to
take Luang Prabang is the reported sympathy for Savannakhet
of the commander of one of three columns which would take
part in any attack. In view of these considerations, Souvanna
may find some other pretext for further postponing the at-
tack, if the Somsanith delegation meets With its expected fail-
urep
CSouvanna is reportedly concerned lest Somsanith and the
six other deputies who accompanied him may defect to Phoumi
or be forced under duress to lend themselves to maneuvers to
secure a no-confidence vote in the assembly against th2i
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Nov
Epouvanna government. Their defection would bring the number
of deputies outside of Vientiane to 28, only six short of the
number reportedly needed for a quorumj
Meanwhile, Phoumi began an offensive on 28 November
purportedly to clean out the area south of the Ca Dinh river
100 miles east of Vientiane. If successful, however, Phoumi
apparently hopes to cross the river� and engage Vientiane forces
to the north. I
Moscow
may be preparing to follow up its offer to send small quan-
titites of relief supplies to Laos as a gesture of its support
for Souvanna. Five Soviet 1L-14 transport aircraft now
en route from Irkutsk to Hanoi via Peiping may be carrying
supplies for Laos as proferred by the Soviet ambassador on
23 November.
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'ift�I CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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