CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172669
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 16, 1960

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16 November 1960
Copy No. C 75
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO /1
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16 NOVEMBER 1960
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
New Soviet arms shipment arrives in
Guinea; USSR to train personnel for
Guinean Navy.
Situation in the Congo; Katanga trying to
Import arms through Portuguese Angola.
Situation in South Vietnam.
Situation in Laos.
III. THE WEST
El Salvador-- Military preparing counter-
coup to oust pro-Communist and pro-
Castro civilian members of ruling junta;
latter reportedly planning peasant militia. 0
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OP MCRET
Nue
II
South Vietnam: President Diem's intentions remain
uncertain in the wake of last week's coup attempt, whose
leaders have fled to Cambodia. He may proceed to carry
out a government reorganization, but there has been no
formal announcement of cabinet changes. allem is said to
have consulted with loyal military staff officers and lead-
ers of his semiclandestine Can Lao political clique, with
the latter reportedly pressiilg him to crush all known and
potential political opponents i Reports of civilian arrests
and a temporary suspension of newspapers which published
rebel communiques suggest the possibility of reprisals
which could lead to popular unrest.
lactiTh u._ne increasea tension Drougnt aoout py tne re-( coy)
cent coup in Luang Prabang, which brought that area over
to the side of Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee, �
has given rise to persistent rumors of impending military ac-
tion to be taken by General Phoumi's forces, by the Pathet
or by the Vientiane garrison. The upshot of King Savang's sep-a,
arate talks in Luang Prabang on 14 November with Phoumi
and former Premier Phoui Sananikone is that Savang is still
reluctant to initiate the formation of a new government until VA
Souvanna Phouma either resigns or is oustedD-
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
El Salvador: A struggle for power among military groups
and the pro-Communist and pro-Castro civilian faction of the
six-man civil-military junta that replaced the Lemus regime
on 26 October appears to be nearing a showdown. The leftists
continue to entrench themselves in the provisional government
and reportedly are making plans to organize and arm a peas-
ant militia in order to defy any attempt by the armed forces
to dislodge them. Many military officers appear to believe
16 Nov 60
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that the junta must be overthrown promptly. (However, there
are divisions within their own ranks which could nullify prep-
arations now under way or cause a delay that might 'eo ard-
hances for a successful countercoupj
(Page 5)
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Guinea ReceiMi' g More Military Aid From USS'Ir
A second shipment of arms and ammunition from
the USSR is being unloaded in Conakry under stringent
security precautions by Guinean military personnel.
this
most recent shipment, which arrived aboard the Soviet
vessel Serge Botkin, totals 2,188 tons--nearly 500 tons
more than the cargo delivered in late September by the
Soviet freighter Firyuza. Both ships took on their
Conakry consignments at the Black Sea port of Nikolaev,
the usual port of origin for Soviet arms shipments. The
size of the two cargoes suggests that Moscow's arms aid
is not limited to small arms and ammunition but probably
includes heavier infantry weapons, such as machine guns
and mortars.
These first known major arms deliveries from the
Sino-Soviet bloc to Guinea since March 1959, when the
Czechs provided a substantial gift of arms, were appar-
ently arranged during President Toure's visit to Moscow
last September
$1,5013,000 of a $21,500,000 "supplementary credit" extended
by the USSR had been earmarked for military equipment. It
is possible, however, that some of the recently arrived ma-
teriel may be intended for transshipment to neighboring Mali,
which has sought arms from the US and Israel and presum-
ably from the bloc.
Meanwhile.
80 Guineans who had been in
the USSR�apparently since last winter--for military training
at Tashkent had completed their program and were due to de=
part for home late last month. At the same time,
a "grant" of 166 "scholarships" un-
der which other Guinean trainees could begin studies in Jan-
uary, apparently "for the navy." This is the first indication
that the Toure regime may be thinking of developing a naval
force for Guinea.
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The Situation the Congo
Mobutu's
position within the Congolese Army had been "greatly strength-
ened" and that "he is in fact in control of most of it." With
Mobutu during the conference, was "the
commander of the Congolese forces in Thvsville." Dresum -
ably Lt. Col. Boboso.
impressed
by a show of unity between moPutu and 13oboso, since as re-
cently as late October Boboso had been rumored to be the
choice Of a major army faction to depose Mobutu.
meeting with Mobutu suggests that the
latter enjoys for the moment the support of most army ele-
ments, continued political instability and mounting economic
hardships in the Congo render such support uncertain. Mobutu
continues to be at a political disadvantage with respect to La-
mumba because the UN continues to provide Lumumba with
physical protection and to regard his participation as indis-
pensable to any olitical solution in the Congo.
7
Meanwhile, the threat to "independent" Katanga posed by
the activities of dissident Baluba tribesmen in the interior h s
contributed to increased friction within the Tshombd govern-
ment. According to one report, a faction of Tshombe's cabi-
net led by Interior Minister Munongo wants to expel all Balu-
bas from Katanga as' soon as possible. Pro-Lumumba, anti-
Tshombe elements in Orientale Province have attempted to
capitalize on the tribal warfare in Katanga, and are believed
to have prompted the recent proclamation by Baluba le ders of
a separate Baluba province in northern Katanga.
the
Katanga minister of commerce, accompanied by two Belgian
officers, visited Angola in early November to request per-
mission to import arms and ammunition to Katanga by way of
Angola,
such imports might be permitted, "provided that official-
everything passes as articles of regular commerce" such
as machinery parts.
16 Nov 60 CENTRA1 INTFI I InFKICF RI III FTIKI
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The Situation 1Laos
[increased tension resulting from the shift of Luang
Prabang to the side of General Phoumi's Savannakhet
Revolutionary Committee has given rise to numerous
rumors of impending military action by the Pathet Lao,
by forces loyal to Souvanna Phouma, by Captain Kong Le,
or. by Phoumi against variously reported objectiveiTS
[The Pathet Lao have been rumored ready to march
on Luang Prabang or Vientiane, although their ability to
take either town unaided is open to question. Souvanna has
told Ambassador l3rownte intends to retake Luang-Prabang by
force, but he denied that Pathet troops would be used in
such a venture. His ability to take the royal capital, how-
ever, would seem to have been considerably reduced by
the apparent capitulation of General Ouane�Souvanna's
armed forces commander�to the Savannakhet group.
Ouane had previously been reported to be north of Luang
Prabang gathering troops to retake the town. Phoumi has
denied rumors that his forces intend either to attack Vien-
tiane or to engage Second Paratroop Battalion elements
southeast of Pak Sane. He claims, however, that the para-
troopers may be preparing to resume their offensive:]
Cmany of these rumors may have been deliberately circu-
lated by the contending groups as part of a war of nerves in
support of their political maneuvering. In the present state
of tension, however, clashes are entirely possibl1
CPhoumi, during his 14 November visit to Luang Prabang,
apparently consolidated his control of the First Military Re-
gion. He reportedly plans to establish military headquarters
in Luang Prabang, with General Bounleut as his commander
in chief. Ouane and the former First Military Region com-
mander, Col. Hournpanh, have been flown to Savannakhet. A
new regional commander will eventually be appointed to re-
place Houmpanh; in the meantime, Major Bountheng,
16 Nov Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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aeized control of Luang Prabang on 10 November, will serve
as acting chief of the First Military Regioii3
an the political realm, little apparent progress was made
in separate talks the King held with Phoumi and former Pre-
mier Phoui. Phoumi reportedly tried to persuade the King to
withdraw his support from Souvanna and announce the forma-
tion of a new government, but was rebuffed. The King insisted
he must act within the constitution. On the other hand, the
King showed little hope that a meeting between Souvanna, Phoui,
and Phoumi would produce a political settlement.'
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Countercoups Being Planned to Oust Leftist Regime in
El Salvador
A showdown seems near in a struggle for power in El
Salvador among military groups and the pro-Communist,
pro-Castro civilian faction of the six-man civil military
junta that replaced the Lemus regime on 26 October. The
three civilians on the junta and several cabinet members
suspected of being Communists or Communist sympathizers
have continued to entrench themselves in the provisional
government by putting pro-Communists and suspected Com-
munists in numerous posts from subcabinet level down
through third-echelon ministerial and administrative posi-
tions, especially in the ministries of justice and labor.
The US Embassy in San Salvador reported on 15 Novem-
ber that leftists have taken over the regime's information
and propaganda network and are continuing their drive to
place their men in the country's nerve centers without any
significant opposition yet from the military members of the
junta. There are strong indications that the leftists are
planning to organize and arm a peasant militia in order to
defy any attempt by the armed forces to dislodge them.
Many military officers believe the junta must be over-
thrown promptly. Ex-President Oscar Osorio, who was
behind the ouster of Lemus, may be planning a countercoup.
owever, he appears to have lost much of his popularity
mong the armed forces, which expected him to keep leftist
nfluence under control. �4. group of high-ranking officers
ho were closest to Osorio and another group of younger
nd more junior officers who distrust Osorio and the older
fficers seem to be planning separate coups. Either group
would probably establish a pro-US regime with a reform
program designed to alleviate the country's deep-seated
social and economic problems. However, these divisions
within the military's ranks could nullify preparations now
under way or cause a delay that might jeopardize chances
for a successful countercoup.'?
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NEP" *IOW
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFMENTIAI_
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