CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172665
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 24, 1960

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24 August 1960 3.3(h)(2)
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24 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Molotov appointed to nonpolicy post
In Vienna.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Somali Republic plans to seek US arms
aid.
New South Korean Government lacks
firm base.
III. THE WEST
West German call for nuclear weapons for
NATO may be attempt to embarrass Ade-
nauer's political foes.
Dominican gestures toward bloc designed
to bring pressure on US.
LATE ITEMS
The situation in the Congo.
The situation in Laos.
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South Korea: The new government which Prime Minister
Chang Myon has formed, largely from his faction of the Dem-
ocratic party, is not strongly based. Chang controls slightly
less than half of the ruling party's members in the House of
Representatives, and his opponents, having rejected his offer
of cabinet posts, have announced their intentions to form an op-
position party�presumably with the objective of forcing the new
cabinet from power. The factional conflict is basically the re-
sult of personal rivalries rather than policy differences, and
continued maneuvering for personal advantage could undermine
confidence in the post-revolution leadership.
(Page 2)
III. THE WEST
West Germany:
Chancellor Adenauer played a leading role in the 19 August
publication of the German armed forces memorandum calling
for equipping of NATO shield forces--including Bonn's�with
nuclear arms. The chancellor may thereby hope to embarrass
the opposition Social Democrats (SPD), whose military policy
has been indecisive, and force them either to accept the prin-
ciple of nuclear weapons or lay them open to charges of refus-
ing to support an adequate defense effort. The memorandum has
been criticized in the French press, and the SPD press has called
It a major intrusion of the military into German politics.
, (Page 3)
Dominican Republic: The Dominican radio El Caribe an-
nounced on 23 August that it has opened negotiations for the
� services of TASS in order to help counter "imperialist interests
opposing the Dominican people." The Dominican radio's bitterly
anti-US and sometimes pro-Castro and pro-Soviet diatribes are
almost certainly threats by dictator Trujillo in an attempt to
bring pressure on the United States. Although Trujillo is appar-
ently attempting primarily to convince the United States that any
24 Aug 60
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alternative to his control would be a pro-Castro regime, he is
believed capable of attempting to align his regime with Castro
or even with the Soviet bloc. Moscow is likely to be very cau-
tious in responding to such overtures, especially in view of the
unanimity of Latin American opinion against the Dominican
Republic as expressed in the OAS. (Page 4)
LATE ITEMS
*Republic of the Congo: Katangan President Tshombe
has seized upon Lumumba's retreat from his attacks on the
UN to express "confidence" in the UN and to reiterate the
independence of Katanga. Tshombe probably regards the
Security Council consensus as strengthening his hand with
respect to Lumumba; his statement that he has "consulted"
with anti-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congolese con-
federation suggests that he still favors confederation as the
most acceptable resolution of the ICatanga crisis.
According to press reports from Elisabethville, the
566-man Mali UN contingent in northern� Katanga have become
Involved in fighting apparently stemming from activities by pro-
Lumumba, anti-Tshombe tribesmen. Should tribal violence
spread, the position of the Tshombe government would be
badly undermined.
Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia reportedly will take favorable
action on an anticipated Congolese request for several hundred
secondary schoolteachers. Two senior leaders of the Belgian
Communist party are expected to arrive in Leopoldville on
29 or 30 August where they will work for the establishment of
a party apparatus in the Congo. (Page 6)
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*Laos: Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General
Phounnader of the counter-coup forces, appear to have
agreed on 23 August to a set of broad principles which will
govern their efforts to reach a settlement.
they agreed that neither
group at present constituted the legal government of Laos, that
they would work for the reunification of the army command
structure, and that the National Assembly would reconvene in
Luang Prabang to decide on the fate of the rival regimes. The
success of the delicate negotiations still required for a definitive
settlement will depend in large part on the ability of General
Ouane and other senior army officers to bring Captain Kong Le
under control. To date, their efforts in this direction have met
with little success. �There is a report, moreover, that Kong Le
was unmoved by Ouane's warning against using Communist Pathet
Lao forces in the defense of Vientiane against any attack by
Phoumi's forces.
Meanwhile, Prince Souphannouvong, leader of the pro-
Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat party, has issued an appeal over
the Pathet Lao radio for all Laotians to support the Souvanna
regime. (Page 8)
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Somali Republic to Request US Arms
Prime Minister Abdirascid of the newly independent Somali
Republic informed the American ambassador on 20 August of his
intention to request US arms following a recent intensification of
armed clashes between Somali tribesmen and Ethiopian security
forces. The most serious of these clashes involved concentrated
reprisal attacks by Ethiopian troops�allegedly equipped with arms
supplied by the US under Mutual Security arrangements�against
Somali tribesmen believed to have derailed an Ethiopian train in
early August.
Public opinion in the republic is running high against Ethiopia
and also against the US for supplying arms to Ethiopia while refus-
ing to provide military assistance to the Somali Government.
Somalis are particularly incensed over the recent delivery to
Ethiopia of US jet fighter aircraft, which are rumored to have
been involved in the recent attacks on Somali tribesmen. A re-
port from Addis Ababa, however, indicates that Swedish-made
piston aircraft were involved in the strafing missions against So-
mali villages.
Nevertheless, the Communist-influenced Greater Somalia
League (GSL) and other extremist groups as well as several
members of the National Assembly--are planning imminent pro-
test demonstrations against the American Embassy and the Ethi-
opian Consulate General. The pro-Western Somali police com=
mandant believes the demonstrations will be kept under control,
and the minister of interior has indicated he will attempt to limit
them to Ethiopia's estab lishment. The American ambassador, how-
ever, believes that the Abdirascid government--despite its pro-
fessed pro-Western orientation--will permit a demonstration and
possibly lead it in order to protect itself from opposition attack.
24 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Nose
New South Korean Cabinet
The new South Korean Government, which Prime Minis-
ter Chang Myon has formed largely from his faction of the
Democratic party, is not strongly based. Chang controls
slightly less than half his party's two-thirds majority in the
House of Representatives, and his factional opponents, having
rejected his offer of cabinet posts, have announced their in-
tention of forming an opposition party�presumably with the
objective of forcing the new cabinet from power. However,
the prime minister's constitutional authority to dissolve the
lower house and call new elections after a vote of no confi-
dence may act as a restraining influence on the opposition.
The factional conflict in the Democratic party basically
is the result of personal rivalries rather than policy differ-
ences. Most of the new cabinet members are long-time sup-
porters of Chang and, like him, are believed to be friendly to-
ward the United States. The new minister of finance, however,
has on occasion been critical of American aid and other poli-
cies in South Korea. The new defense minister, who presum-
ably will be responsible for carrying out the Democrats' cam-
paign pledge to cut back military manpower, already has been
criticized for his lack of experience in military affairs.
',Prolonged factional strife for personal power could under-
mine public confidence in the post-revolution leadership and
eventually result in expressions of resentment against the United
States, Many South Koreans appear to expect an increase in Ameri-
can aid as a mark of Washington's approval of their new leaders. At
the same time, there has been a marked increase in local press
criticism of alleged attempts by the United States to interfere
in South Korean domestic affairs. Some politicians may attempt
to further their own personal interests by exploiting such issues
as aid and Seoul's long-time desire for a status-of-forces agree-
ment with the United States.
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711.1011
� Adenauer Injects Nuclear Arms Issue Into Election Campaign
Chancellor Adenauer may have played a leading role in
the publication on 19 August of the German armed forces' mem-
orandum calling for equipping of NATO shield forces--includ-
ing Bonn's- -with nuclear arms.
the chancellor is seeking to embarrass the opposition Social
Democratic party (S:PD), whose military policy has been inde-
cisive. Adenauer apparently hopes to force the SPD either to
accept the principle of atomic armaments or to leave itself
open to charges of refusing to support an adequate defense ef-
fort.
By emphasizing in the memorandum the close tie between
conscriptionandanadequate defense, Strauss may also be lay-
ing the groundwork for a request to extend the tWelve-month draft
period for German recruits. Although the SPD now accepts
the need of conscription, it will strongly oppose any extension
of the length of service. In fact, the SPD press has called
this memorandum a major intrusion of the military into Ger-
man politics, as was done during the Weimar era. The mem-
orandum has been criticized in the French press as a "danger-
ous innovation."
The memorandum's main point of stressing the need for
atomic arms for the German armed forces is not new, since
such arms were formally authorized for German forces by a
resolution of the Bundestag in March 1958. Implementation
has been blocked by the domestic political controversy, So-
viet threats, and political opposition within NATO.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Reaction to OAS Sanctions Against Trujillo Regime
Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo has reacted with character-
istic vindictiveness to the OAS foreign ministers' vote to apply
diplomatic and economic sanctions against his regime. He is
permitting the controlled press and radio to attack the United
States, which he blames for the OAS action. Some of this prop-
aganda is clearly pro-Castro and pro-USSR.
The Dominican radio El. Caribe announced on 23 August that
it has opened negotiations for the services of TASS in order to
help counter "imperialist interests opposing the Dominican peo-
ple." There are also indications that Trujillo may be seriously
considering an attempt to align his regime with the Soviet bloc.
Moscow would probably respond to any Dominican overtures with
caution, especially in view of the unanimous Latin American con-
demnation of the Trujillo regime. A leading dissident in the Domin-
ican Republic told the American Embassy on 22 August that the dic-
tator's son, now in Europe, wants to visit Moscow, and a Dominican
consul in Europe expects Trujillo to ally himself with Castro.
Although Trujillo appears to be primarily attempting to con-
vince the United States that any alternative to his control would be
a pro-Castro regime, he also seems determined that if he falls
he will have revenge on the United States by leaving a heritage of
anti-US, pro-Castro strength in the country. His toleration of a
small pro-Castro opposition party, which has been very active in
recent weeks, suggests that Trujillo may expect that group to be
the only functioning party in the country if he should be forced out.
Middle-class professional groups, strongly anti-Castro, have
borne the brunt of opposition to Trujillo, but have been ruthlessly
suppressed.
Elsewhere in Latin America, initial reaction to the OAS deci-
sion on the Trujillo regime has been to consider it a major triumph
for the OAS. Leftist as well as Communist press at least in Cuba,
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Venezuela, and Chile--saw the resolution as a victory not only
over Trujillo, however, but also over the United States.
� Mexico and Chile responded immediately to the OAS resolu-
tion by breaking diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic,
although each had been reported prior to the San Jose meeting
as reluctant to follow such an OAS directive. Panama and
Guatemala have also broken diplomatic relations with Ciudad
Trujillo. Even prior to the meeting, Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Honduras, Uruguay, and Costa Rica
did not maintain normal relations with the Trujillo regime. Other
Latin American governments may be waiting until after the re-
quired OAS notification to the United Nations of the proposed
sanctions.
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The Situation in the Congo
Katanga President Tshombe has taken advantage of Lu-
mumbais retreat from his attacks on the UN to express "con-
fidence" in the UN and to reiterate the independence of Ka-
tanga. Tshombd probably regards the Security Council con-
census in favor of Hammarskjold as strengthening his hand
with respect to Lumumba; his statement that he has "consulted"
with anti-Lumumba Congolese concerning a Congo confedera-
tion suggests that he still favors this means of resolving the
Katanga crisis.
Albert Deconinck,
the Belgian Communist party leader responsible for Congo
affairs, now is planning to arrive in Leopoldville on 29 or 30
August. He will be accompanied by Jean Terfve, the princi-
pal Belgian Communist adviser to the Congolese. Both men
have had extensive contacts with the principal Congolese lead-
ers, especially Lumumba. They may hope to play a leading
role in advising the Congolese, as well as to establish a party
apparatus in the Congo_0,1
The Belgian party has systematically followed up its ini-
tial contacts with Congolese leaders. After making numerous
contacts among Congolese delegates to the round-table con-
ference in Brussels last January, and at the economic confer-
ence last April, the party concentrated on infiltrating Congo-
lese political parties and encouraging close Congolese coopera-
tion with the Soviet bloc. Trips to Moscow and Prague were
granted numerous Congolese for "study purposesn
In Leopoldville, Lumumba continues concerned over pos-
sible unrest. Congolese officials reportedly suspect collusion
between Tshombd a:nd elements in the former French Congo.
New rumors of support for Tshombe from President Youlou
in Brazzaville appear to have been stimulated by the forced
landing in Luluabourg of a Belgian airliner en route from
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lope
Brazzaville to Elisabethville with a group of anti- Lumumba
Congolese.
Elsewhere there are press reports that General von Horn,
who commands UN forces in the Congo, may be replaced by
Finnish General A. E. Martola. Von Horn has been under se-
vere criticism by Premier Lumumba and by some Western ob-
servers; his removal, following the replacement of UN repre-
sentative Bunche, would indicate that Harnmarskjold plans a
major reorganization of the UN group in the Congo. General
Martola was active in organizing the UN Emergency Force
during the Suez crisis.
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Situation in Laos
Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi,
leader of the counter-coup forces, appear to have agreed on
23 August to a set of broad principles to guide their efforts to
reach a settlement. After his two-hour meeting with Phoumi
in Savannakhet, Souvanna in characteristic fashion announced
that "all" political and military problems were settled and that
the situation would soon return to "normal."
it was agreed that neither
group at present constituted the legal government of Laos.
The first order of business would be the reunification of the
military command structure, after which the National Assem -
bly would reconvene in Luang Prabang to decide upon the fate
of the rival regimes:J.-
The forthcoming negotiations between the two sides will
be extremely delicate and could break down over any of a
number of points. he proposed reunification of the military
command structure poses particularly difficult problems. Not
only must the status of Kong Le be clarified, but also the rela-
tive power positions of the army's major leaders, including
Phoumi, must be redefined. It is by no means certain that
Phoumi will accept any diminution in the preeminent role he
played in army affairs prior to the coup by Kong Le, a demand
likely to be made by Kong with the su ort of General Ouane
and other senior officers in Vientiane.
The ability of Ouane and his associates to bring Kong Le
and his paratroopers under control will be of critical importance
if a negotiated settlement with Phoumi is to be reached. His
efforts in this direction have to date met with little success.
IKong Le is reported, moreover, to have been unmoved by Ouane's
warning against the use of Communist Pathet Lao in the defense
of Vientiane against any attack by Phoumi. Kong Le is said to
have rejoined, "I have never seen a Communist. I have only
seen Lao. "J
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The Souvanna-Phoumi "understanding" came amidst indi-
cations of growing tension in Vientiane. The arming of local
partisans, instigated by Kong Le, was continuing and may even
have been accelerated by reports reaching the capital that two
of Phoumi's battalions had reached Paksane, abot000 miles
from Vientiane on the road from southern Laos. LKong's para-
troopers were proceeding with their establishment of a defense
perimeter, and there are unconfirmed reports that the Pathet
Lao were taking over outlying posts evacuated by army ele-
ments loyal to Kong which were possibly being pulled back into
the paratroopers' defense perirnet, The effect, if any, of
the Souvanna-Phoumi accord on these preparations is as yet
undiscernible.
The American Embassy in Vientiane believes that Souvanna's
decision to meet Phoumi in Savannakhet may have been moti-
vated by the realization that the situation was deteriorating and
that the Pathet Lao were appearing to be the only beneficiaries.
The embassy further believes that Souvanna may have come to
the conclusion that he needs Phoumi as much as or more than
Phoumi needs him if the country is going to hold together.
Prince Souphannouvong, titular leader of the pro-Communist
Neo Lao Hak Sat party, has broadcast an appeal over the clandes-
tine Pathet Lao radio calling for full national support of the regime
of his half-brother, Souvanna. This is Souphannouvong's first
known public statement since his escape from jail last June.
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President�
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL.
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