CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172660
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 18, 1960

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18 August 1960
Copy No. C 71
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT 40.
FlO MASI LO CLASS, [X
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U JUN 1930
DATE: REVIEWER
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18 AUGUST 1980
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Western observers in Peiping report see-
ing departure of large numbers of Soviet
personnel.
USSR prepared to double previous offer
of credit to Turkey.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
India and Pakistan agree on major provi-
sions of Indus River treaty.
Japan�Prime Minister Ikeda announces
elections to be held in fall.
Portuguese plan major increase in troop
strength in Mozambique and Angola.
Soviet Union attacks Hammarskjold's
stand on UN role in Congo.
The situation in Laos.
III. THE WEST
0 Cuba reportedly sending large amounts
of money to other Latin American coun-
tries to support campaign against OAS.
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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
18 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - Communist China: /
6g-
they have seen large numbers of Soviet personnel
leave the Chinese capital by rail for the USSR during the past
ten days the de-
partures were ordered by the USSR on short notice.
Soviet leaders on 28 July reached a decision that So-
viet specialists would be withdrawn from Communist China
within three months. However, no evidence of an abnormal
departure of Soviet personnel has yet been noted
Although present evidence is in-
adequate to confirm such a mass exodus, a large-scale with-
drawal would suggest that the Soviet Union has, apparently for
the first time, resorted to economic sanctions and that the Sino-
Soviet dispute has entered a new and more critical phase
(Page 1)
USSR-Turkey:tioviet Ambassador Ryzhov, prior to his de-
parture on g August for an extended home leave, told Turkish
Foreign Minister Sarper that the USSR was prepared to offer
Turkey more than double its previous proposal of a $200,000,000
line of credit. The offer, together with recent Soviet diplomatic
overtures to Turkish leaders and friendlier propaganda toward
Ankara, is intended to encourage neutralist tendencies in the new
regime. Sarper, in discussing the Soviet offer with Ambassador
Warren, emphasized that there has been no change in Turkey's
attitude toward the USSR. However, a minority view favoring a
more independent policy and acceptance of economic aid from any
source has emerged within the government7
(Page 3)
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4trarr# Noe
IL ASIA-AFRICA
India-Pakistan: Conclusion of the long-delayed treaty
dividing the waters of the Indus River basin now is probable
as a result of agreement on the most important disputed
points. Although negotiation of remaining details could cause
further delays, Nehru is scheduled to go to Pakistan to sign
the treaty about 20 September. While reiterating his willing-
ness to discuss other matters with Ayub, Nehru recently indi-
cated he is still not ready to take up the Kashmir dispute and
is not interested in joint defense proposals. The Nehru-Ayub
meeting could, however, lead to general exploratory talks at
a lower level to continue the improvement in relations desired
by both leaders. (Page 4)
Japan: Prime Minister Ikeda has announced that the Diet
is likely to be dissolved in November and elections held shortly
thereafter. In addition to his desire to satisfy the general feel-
ing that he should seek an early public mandate, Ikeda probably
is encouraged by impressive conservative victories in three suc-
cessive gubernatorial elections and by failure of the Socialist
parties to develop a popular issue for exploitation. Public opin-
ion polls also reveal unusually strong support for the new govern-
ment. (Page 5)
Portuguese Africa: Plans for strong reinforcement of Por-
tuguese security forces in Mozambique and Angola have been
reported to the US consul general in Lourenco Marques by a re-
liable source. A civil defense organization has been established
in Mozambique, and armed troops and police are much in evi-
dence. These measures reflect increasing Portuguese distrust
of the native population and a growing fear of subversion from
neighboring territories. (Page 6)
*Congo: As Secretary General Hammarskjold prepares for
the emergency session of the Security Council, he is seeking sup-
port for his interpretation of the UN's role in Congo, a position
already attacked by the Soviet Union. According to press reports
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from the UN, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov has
strongly objected to the secretary general's stand that the
9 August resolution bars UN intervention in� internal Congolese
disputes.
Lumumba, in Leopoldville, continues to take repressive
measures against both UN personnel and Belgian interests. On
17 August he threatened to confiscate all Belgian assets in the
Congo if Brussels did not quickly return Conzolese funs depos-
ited in Belgium several months ago. (Page 7)
*Laos: supporters of General Phoumi in Luang Prabang are
endeViOring to forestall King Savang's approval of the Souvanna
Phouma government. In addition to casting doubt on the legitimacy
of the Souvanna regime, a delay would buy time for Phoumi to try
to marshal. his counterrevolutionary forces and, through his emis-
saries, persuade the King to declare himself openly in favor of
the counterrevolution.
21 August may be the
target date for the contemplated attack on Vientiane.i
Souvanna has in effect held out the olive branch to Phoumi over
Vientiane radio, but the King is probably the only figure with enough
prestige and authority to impose negotiations on the mutually dis-
trustful Kong Le and Phoumi forces. Although Kong Le has announced
that all "administrative powers" have been returned to the Souvanna
government, there is no indication he has relaxed his military grip
on Vientiane. (Page 9)
o
III. THE WEST
Cuba:
the Castro
regime is sending large amounts of money to various other Latin
American countries to carry on Cuba's campaign against the OAS
and perhaps to bribe delegates to the OAS foreign ministers' meet-
ing now under way in Costa Rica. This money may be part of the
$8,000,000 in 100- and 50-dollar bills which Cuba is known to have
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imported from the US since May. eanwhile, the Cuban delega-
tion has threatened to withdraw from the OAS conference in pro-
test of its treatment by Costa Rican security forces. Cuba might
then demand that the UN Security Council resume consideration
of the Cuban complaint aeainst the US which the council referred
t9 the OAS in mid-Julf.
7 IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the immedi-
ate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate 6
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies,
or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
C. The following developments are susceptible of direct ex-
ploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could
jeopardize the US in the immediate future:
Although the Kong Le revolutionary faction has succeeded
In. setting up a new government with approval by the National
Assembly (but not yet by the King), the situation in Laos re-
mains confused. General Phoumi intends to defy the new
government. He apparently controls enough troops to retake
Vientiane, provided he can obtain sufficient money, supplies,
and transport. The Pathet Lao has not yet intervened effec-
tively but has the military capability of further complicating
the situation. There is still no evidence of any Chinese Com-
munist or North Vietnamese intentions overtly to intervene.
Nevertheless the situation remains favorable to Communist
ex � loitation.
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USSR Reportedly Withdrawing Technicians From Communist China
during the past ten days large
numbers of Soviet specialists have left the Chinese capital by rail
for the USSR.
Soviet authorities ordered the departure on short notice.xugos ,av newsmen in Peiping first reported such an exodus,
Soviet leaders
had reached a decision on ZU July that Soviet specialists would be
withdrawn from Communist China within three months.
No evidence of an abnormal departure of Soviet personnel has
vet been noted
Since the Bucharest Congress last June, Moscow appears to
have taken the offensive in the Sino-Soviet dispute, presumably in
order to win Peiping's adherence to the Soviet point of view prior to
the forthcoming November conference of all Communist parties in
Moscow.
meetings have been held to alert Italian party
cadres to the seriousness of the Sib-Soviet dispute which, in view
of Peiping's refusal to alter its position, has made it inevitable that
"the disagreement will have to be carried through to the end."
the Soviet party's
22nd congress, originally scheduled for early 1961, has been ad-
vanced to December 1960 because of the need for a settlement of
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
It is estimated that, as of last month, there were between 1,000
and 2,000 Soviet technicians in China, most of whom presumably are
associated with Soviet-supported industrial projects called for under
agreements signed between February 1950 and February 1959. These
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agreements committed the Soviet Union to assist China in the
construction of 291 major industrial projects which make up the
core of China's industrialization program. About half of these
projects have been completed or at least have begun production;
equipment for the remainder is scheduled for delivery between now
and 1967. A cessation or significant slowdown in deliveries would
cripple China's future program for industrial development.
These projects include complete sets of factory equipment for
large, modern, industrial plants--steel mills, a large petroleum
refinery, aircraft and truck factories, and machine-building plants--
and electric power installations. Soviet assistance has included,
In addition, geological surveying, designing and supervision of the
construction and equipping of factories, and assistance in the pro-
duction process of new plants. China, however, is carrying out
more and more of these tasks itself as it becomes increasingly self-
sufficient.
All Soviet assistance to China's industrial program is being
paid for by Chinese exports, largely of raw materials, on a pay-
as-you-go basis, and China has become the USSR's largest trading
partne; with total trade between the two countries now amounting to
$2 billion annually.
A large-scale withdrawal of Soviet technicians from Commu-
nist China, if confirmed, would suggest that the USSR, apparently
for the first time, has resorted to strong economic sanctions in an
effort to force a settlement of the dispute. Such a drastic action
would mean that the conflict has entered a new and more critical
phase.
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the USSR would double its earlier $206,000,-
000 offer of credit to Turkey, and if that were not enough, Mos-
cow "could make it $450 000 000 or S500 000 000 " Thp erocr,
would carry an interest rate of 2.5 or 3 percent with
payment over a 15-year period.
Following the military coup in Turkey in late May, Mos-
cow took a cautious attitude toward the provisional government,
expressing hope for improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations
while at the same time repeating standard Soviet warnings of
the danger to Turkey from its Western alliances and foreign
bases on its territory. Since early July, concurrent with So-
viet overtures�including two personal letters from Khrushchev
to Gursel�Moscow's propaganda toward Ankara has grown
more friendly in tone.
As part of their efforts to encourage neutralist tenden-
cies in the new regime, top Soviet leaders, in talks with the
new Turkish ambassador who arrived on 6 August, have stressed
the USSR'S desire that Turkey return to the neutralist, good-
neighbor policies of the Ataturk regime. They have specifical-
ly urged exchanges of visits by leading political figures and by
scientific and commercial delegations.
Turkey's attitude toward the Soviet Union re-
mains unchanged, but commented that the Turks do not wish to
"provoke unnecessary reactions" from the USSR.
Turkey had "expressed appreciation" for the offer with-
out accepting it. He added, however, that when Ryzhov returns
"we will see how things develop."
The economically hard-pressed regime in Turkey may be
more receptive than its predecessor to low-interest credit or
loan offers. In addition, there is apparently a faction within
the government which favors a more independent approach in
foreign policy and economic relations, and rper has confirmed
that there' is some anti-American sentiment in the government.
While the new regime may use the USSR's aid offers primarily
in order to encourage an increase in American assistance, seri-
ous consideration may be given to unqualified Soviet offers if
they appear to have no adverse political implications.-1
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India and Pakistan Near Final Agreement on Indus
Waters Treaty
The way now seems clear for conclusion of the much-de-
layed treaty between India and Pakistan on the division of waters
in the Indus River basin. While quibbling over remaining de-
tails could cause further delays, International Bank Vice Presi-
dent Iliff informed Ambassador Rountree on 15 August that dur-
ing his recent talks in New Delhi and Rawalpindi, both govern-
ments hadagreedto a compromise of the most important points
still in dispute.
President Ayub confirmed publicly on 17 August that Nehru
will visit Pakistan on 19 to 20 September to sign the treaty.
Ayub reiterated that he hoped to discuss "all questions" of
mutual interest with Nehru, including the dominant Kashmir
dispute. The Pakistani President recalled in a broadcast on
13 August that he had made every conceivable effort to solve
Indo- Pakistani problems even though the reaponse from In-
dian leaders had been "very tardy indeed." He apparently
feels the next move .is up to Nehru. Ayub, concerned over
growing domestic criticism, probably will exploit Nehru's
visit as a foreign policy success. He is unlikely at this time,
however, to risk further adverse reaction at home by mak-
ing any substantial concessions.
On several occasions recently Nehru expressed his will-
ingness to go to Pakistan, probably realizing that some re-
ciprocal gesture on his part is necessary now if the improve-
ment in relations is to continue. He denied in Parliament on
1 August that he had refused to talk with the Pakistanis, and
said he would take the opportunity of a visit to discuss "what-
ever matters" are raised. Nehru made it clear that he was
not interested in Ayubis joint defense proposals, and his later
comments on Kashmir suggest he still is not prepared to ne-
gotiate a settlement of this 13-ye.r-old dispute. The Nehru-
Ayub meeting may nevertheless lead to exploratory talks on
these and other questions at a lower level in order to further
the rapprochement both leaders desire.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Japanese GoverniiienVillan1WisilTest
Prime Minister Ikeda announced on 15 August that the
lower house of the Diet would probably be dissolved in early
November and that general elections would be held soon there-
after. An official spokesman in the prime minister's office
indicated later that dissolution and elections might be held
even earlier.
Ikeda is anxious to satisfy public expectations that he
will seek an early popular mandate in order to dissociate his
administration completely from the Kishi government. In ad-
dition, he has been encouraged by decisive conservative vic-
tories in gubernatorial contests in Aomori, Saitama, and Gum-
ma prefectures. In these elections, the Socialist party failed
to arouse public opinion against the US-Japanese security treaty,
and apparently suffered because of its strong-arm tactics in the
Diet and encouragement of mob action outside. Like the Social-
ists, the more moderate Democratic Socialist party is short of
funds and lacks an exploitable issue.
Ikeda has promoted popular support by announcing his in-
tention to reduce some taxes and expand social welfare serv-
ices, including financial assistance for retraining and relocat-
ing unemployed workers. Ikeda may also be consolidating his
control of the conservatives, a cardinal element in his efforts
to achieve political stability in Japan. He has an able, if not
well known, cabinet supported by most LDP factions. A threat
by Ichiro Kono, a bitter intraparty rival, to form a new con-
servative party in order to preclude "despotic rule" by Ikeda
thus far has not been supported by other LDP factions and may
actually be an acknowledgment of Ikeda's strength.
Nationwide polls conducted in August by the large Asahi
and Mainichi newspapers indicate that the LDP has regained
the public support it lost during the May-June political crisis
and that both Socialist parties have less support. Results of
the Asahi poll indicate that the Ikeda cabinet now has public
support second only to that accorded the Yoshida cabinet which
was in office at the time the peace treaty was signed in 1951.
In both polls, almost two out of every three persons who re-
sponded indicated a preference for the LDP. They also reveal
that all but a small, active minority of the Japanese populace
continues to be politically apathetic toward the security alli-
ance with the United States.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Portugal Increases Security Precautions in African Territories
Portugal apparently is making strenuous efforts to in-
crease its defense capability in its overseas provinces of
Mozambique and Angola. Plans for large-scale reinforce-
ment of the security forces�which might ultimately add 40, -
000 men--mainly Portuguese--to the 5,000 Portuguese and
15,000 native troops now in the two territories--have been re-
ported to the American consul general in Lourenco Marques.
Several small contingents of Portuguese soldiers have recent-
ly arrived in both territories, armed troops and police are
much in evidence, and an ambitious civil defense program
emphasizing the protection of isolated settlers has been set
up in Mozambique.
The increased vigilance comes after numerous indications
that African nationalists in adjoining territories have begun to
direct their attention toward the Portuguese possessions. An-
golan exiles in Leopoldville have recently become more active,
and there have been reports of nationalist attempts to enter
Angola from the Congo. Agitators apparently have infiltrated
northern Mozambique from Tanganyika and reportedly have had
some success in fomenting anti-Portuguese demonstrations.
Portuguese officials have repeatedly stated that Portugal
has no intention of yielding to African nationalism, and the se-
curity forces have kept native movements dispersed and im-
potent. At the same time, doubts over the reliability of the
native population are apparently growing in Lisbon. The strin-
gency of the security controls in Portuguese Africa can be ex-
pected to increase as nationalist influences from neighboring
territories become more effective.
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The Congo Situation
Secretary General Hammarskjold, under severe attack
from both Congo Premier Lumumba and the USSR, is taking
the chaotic Congo situation back to the Security Council in or-
der to obtain council support for his position. He maintains
that the UN forces are not authorized to intervene in internal
Congolese disputes despite the demands of Lumumba that the
UN crush the rebellious Katanga government.
The session may be of crucial importance because Lu-
mumba, backed by the Soviet Union, is increasingly critical
of Hammarskjold and has threatened to demand the withdrawal
of all European elements of the UN force an action which Ham-
marskjold has said he would reject in favor of urging the with-
drawal of the entire emergency force. Either course would
remove present restraints from Lumumba and provide a wide
opportunity for exploitation by opportunistic African govern-
ments as well as Communist bloc countries.
In Leopoldville, Lumumba continues to take repressive meas-
ures against Belgians and to harass UN personnel. Subsequent to
the widespread police checks of personal documentation on 16 Au-
gust in Leopoldville, Congolese troops on 17 August set up ma-
chine guns at the airport and interfered with plane landings. The
premier threatened to seize all Belgian assets in the Congo if
within two weeks Brussels has not returned Congolese funds, in-
cluding gold, which were sent to Belgium several months ago.
Je also reportedly has given the UN one week to take "satis-
factory" action in regard to Katanga or he will send Congolese
troops into that province. It is estimated that Lumumba has nine
infantry and six gendarmerie battalions scattered throughout the
five provinces, exclusive of Katanga, five of which are in Leo=
poldville Province. Gendarmerie battalions have no support weap-
ons or transport, while all battalions are short of supplies, trans-
port, and trained officers.
Tshombe, on the other hand, is believed to control about 2,000
troops of the former Force Publique organized into four battalions.
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(she troops up to and including the rank of captain are Congolese.
Some senior officers are still Belgians. Tshombe has also re-
cruited some 2,000 young warriors with no previous military ex-
perience. His force is reported to be very well armed, with corn-
plete modern battalion weapons and plenty of transport. In addi-
tion, 250 automatic rifles and ammunition have been issued to tribal
chiefs to help defend Katanga.
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The Situation in Laos
Elupporters of General Phoumi in Luang Prabang are en-
deavoring to forestall King Savang's approval of the Souvanna
Phouma government, which was confirmed by the National As-
sembly in Vientiane on 17 August. In addition to casting doubt
on the legitimacy of the Souvanna regime, a delay would buy
time for Phoumi to marshal his counterrevolutionary forces
and to persuade the King to declare himself in favor of the
counterrevolution. To this end, the first military region com-
mander, whose headquarters is in Luang Prabang, reportedly
refused to grant clearance for a plane which was presumably to
have brought the government to the royal capital for the oath-
taking ceremony.
500 infantrymen
from Pakse are now encamped not far from Phoumi's headquar-
ters at Savannakhet. They are equipped with new carbines and
have told a representative of the American Program Evaluation
Office that they expect to be in Vientiane by 21 August. This is
the first indication of the timing of Phoumi's planned attack on
Vientiane.
Thailand has reportedly provided Phoumi with a radio trans-
mitter to enable him to propagandize his cause to the Laotian
people. There are also reports that the Thai have given him a
small number of motor vehicles. Phoumi's supply and financial
positions remain extremely poor, however.
Communist Pathet
Lao insurgents in northern Vientiane Province were moving to-
ward the Mekong River to hinder the movement of troops down
the river. ordered security measures to
be taken in cormection with the movement of the troops who left
Luang Prabang on 16 August.
Although Captain Kong Le has announced that all "adminis-
trative powers" have been returned to the Souvanna government,
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there is no indication that he has relaxed his military grip on
Vientiane. Meanwhile, General Ouane's resignation as armed
forces commander and his apparent capitulation to Kong Le have
deprived Laos of an important mediatory influence between the
mutually distrustful Kong Le and Phoumi groups. Souvanna in
effect held out the olive branch to Phoumi in a broadcast over
Vientiane radio in which he appealed to "all parties and mem-
bers of the armed forces to come to Vientiane to exchange views
and settle all problems." The King, however, is probably the
only figure with enough authority and prestige to impose negotia-
tions on the opposing parties.
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PtDfNTL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense .
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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