CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172659
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: August 17, 1960

.4to
0.%
17 August 1960
Copy No. C&-
CENTRAL
BU
LLETI\
DOCUMENT NO.
NO MANGE IN CLASS. Ar
DECLASSiFIED
CLASS. el!AGED TO' t$ S.� 0
NEXT L.:VI-4W Mil 0(040
ALITHt kiii 704
DATE? JUN 1983 REVIEWER'
.���������������
ror-R;lja;eT2616/677g60i1 726591
Approved for Release: 2016/07/75"�C03172659
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
r
f
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
SEC/RF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4
17 August 1960 (b)(4
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
North Korea - South Korea: Premier Kim Il-sung on
14 August proposed a loose federation of North and South
Korea in an apparent effort to take the propaganda initiative
from the new South Korean regime, which has indicated sup- 4
port for UN-supervised elections to reunify the peninsula.
Khrushchev can be expected to dramatize Communist propos-
als for a Korean settlement when he visits Pyongyang in early
October. The Communists will attempt to use South Korea's
rejection of the federation idea as grounds for charges that
Seoul is responsible forrn the continued division of Korea.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
The Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has
rebuffed Lumumba's demand for withdrawal of non-African U
contingents from the Congo, is calling an early meeting of the
Security Council. He is expected to request a council rulin
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659/
A
'Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031726597
e
SEeRE.1_
concerning his opinion that the UN force cannot be used on
Lumumba's behalf to subdue Katanga. The action by Leo-
poldville police on16 August in detaining for investigation
several hundred Europeans�including UN personnel�sug-
gests that as he develops his own police force Lumumba may
attempt even greater harassments in dealing with the UN and
his political opponents. Later on the 16th Lumumba decreed
martial law over the entire country for a period of six months.
(b)(1
(b)(3
17 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF
Ii
�
1TeRIEr
4Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031726591
A
-
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
,
SEtREZ
*South Korea: Newly elected South Korean President Yun
probably will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for
prime minister following the House of Representatives' rejection
of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post. How-
ever, the narrow margin of Kim's defeat�three votes less than
the simple majority necessary for confirmation--suggests that a
government headed by Chang would have tenuous support. Chang,
titular chief of the majority Democratic party, controls a little
less than half of his party's two-thirds majority in the powerful
233-seat lower house.
17 Aug 60
itf
DAILY BRIEF iii
(b)(
(b)(
1)
3)
AApproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031726591
A
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
CONFTDENTLAL_
Kim Il-sung Calls for Federation of North and South Korea
Keynoting a "liberation day" celebration in Pyongyang, North
Korean Premier Kim Il-sung on 14 August attempted to take the
propaganda initiative on Korean reunification from the new South
Korean Government, which has indicated support for UN-supervised
peninsula-wide elections.
Kim called for elections "without outside intervention" and sug-
gested an interim North-South federation in which a "supreme na-
tional committee" with representatives from both sides would work
out economic and cultural cooperation. Such cooperation, Kim said,
would help to solve South Korea's "economic catastrophe." Kim also
suggested that North and South Korea each reduce its troop strength
to "100,000 or less." Implicit in the premier's speech was Pyong-
yang's usual insistence on withdrawal of US forces from South Korea
before "peaceful unification" can be achieved.
A South Korean Democratic party spokesman has publicly re-
jected the North Korean proposal, and on 15 August acting Prime
Minister Huh Chung termed it "another rehash of a worn-out prop-
aganda tactic." Pyongyang probably now will attempt to exploit this
rejection in efforts to make Seoul appear responsible for continued
division of Korea.
Ithrushchev, who has accepted an invitation to visit Pyongyang
in early October, can be expected to provide dramatic publicity on
Communist proposals for a Korean settlement. He also may use
this visit to amplify Moscow's position in the current Sino-Soviet
dispute, just before a high-level meeting of Communist parties which
may be held in Moscow in conjunction with the USSR's Bolshevik Rev-
olution celebration.
CO
17 Aug 60 � . r�rr.t l�w�lk 14041.0 rt II I r�rik
`-'[Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Page 1
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Nair' SECREZ___
The Situation in the Congo
Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has rebuffed Lu-
mumba's demand for the withdrawal of non-African UN con-
tingentsfrom the Congo, is calling an early meeting of the Se-
curity Council. rle has indicated that should Lumumba formal-
ly request the withdrawal of non-African contingents he would
recommend the withdrawal of the UN force in its entire_D
paammarskjold has interpreted the UN resolution of 9 Au:
gus s meaning that the UN command in the Congo could not
be used on behalf of the central government, as in any move
to subdue Katanga. He will request a ruling on this interpreta-
tion at the Security Council meeting
The action by the Leopoldville police on 16 August in de-
taining for investigation several hundred Europeans�including
UN personnel--suggests that as he develops his own security
forces Lumumba will increase his harassment of both the UN
and his political opponents. An estimated 400 to 500 Europeans
were detained for document checks after Lumumba charged
that Belgian officials still in Leopoldville were avoiding arrest
by wearing UN arm bands.
Meanwhile, Ghanaian President Nkrumah�who together
with Guinea's Sekou Toure has warmly supported Lumu.mba's
cause--may be moving to dissociate hirnself somewhat from Lu-
mumba's extreme position regarding Katanga.
According to Ghana radio, Nkrumah
is giving "active consideration" to an invitation from Presi-
dent Tshombe to visit Katanga and see conditions there. In
Monrovia, President Tubman has stated that Nkrumah now
agrees with him that an African "summit" meeting scheduled
for Leopoldville from 25 to 30 August is not required, and
that any meeting there could be held on the ministerial level.
-SEC-REX_
17 Aug 60 (ATP p-EoV ci for: TOi-6707/0V60-3-1.2659
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
(b)(1
(b)(3
)
)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
oftre 1,.(JA.F77:1N-V444.,L
Selection of South Korean Prime Minister
Newly elected South Korean President Yun Bo-sun probably
will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for prime
minister following the House of Representatives' rejection on 17
August of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post.
Under the constitution, if the President's second nominee is re-
jected, the lower house selects the prime minister whose election
then requires only a plurality of votes. The President must announce
his second choice within five days .\and the house must act upon his
recommendation in not less than 24 hours and not more than 48 hours.
Kim's defeat by a narrow margin of only three votes suggests
that a government headed by Chang would have a tenuous majority.
Chang, titular chief of the Democratic party, controls slightly less
than half of the party's two-thirds majority in the powerful 233-seat
lower house. Kim, leader of the party's right-wing faction, has
strongly opposed any compromise with Chang's followers and at times
he has appeared to favor a party split.
Chang has stated that if he becomes prime minister he would
select a broadly representative cabinet, which would include members
of both factions and presumably independents. Early press reports
indicate that Kim was defeated after a group of independents rejected
his answers to a list of questions which they submitted to him and
Chang. Should most of the 44 independents in the lower house act
as a unified group they might exercise the balance of power betwe(b)(1)
the nearly evenly divided pro- and anti-Chang factions of the (b)(3)
majority party.
17 Aug 60
CFKITRAII IKITFI I impkirp RI III FTIKI page 7
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
CaVIDENZIAL,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
-CONFIDEN-TIAL
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659
''� [7/ /1 7 �31:1