CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/17

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03172659
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
March 16, 2022
Document Release Date: 
August 5, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2014-02699
Publication Date: 
August 17, 1960
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PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[14877452].pdf399.39 KB
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.4to 0.% 17 August 1960 Copy No. C&- CENTRAL BU LLETI\ DOCUMENT NO. NO MANGE IN CLASS. Ar DECLASSiFIED CLASS. el!AGED TO' t$ S.� 0 NEXT L.:VI-4W Mil 0(040 ALITHt kiii 704 DATE? JUN 1983 REVIEWER' .��������������� ror-R;lja;eT2616/677g60i1 726591 Approved for Release: 2016/07/75"�C03172659 The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with representatives of departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable, the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep- resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi- fication in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 r f Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 SEC/RF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 17 August 1960 (b)(4 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC North Korea - South Korea: Premier Kim Il-sung on 14 August proposed a loose federation of North and South Korea in an apparent effort to take the propaganda initiative from the new South Korean regime, which has indicated sup- 4 port for UN-supervised elections to reunify the peninsula. Khrushchev can be expected to dramatize Communist propos- als for a Korean settlement when he visits Pyongyang in early October. The Communists will attempt to use South Korea's rejection of the federation idea as grounds for charges that Seoul is responsible forrn the continued division of Korea. IL ASIA-AFRICA The Congo: Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has rebuffed Lumumba's demand for withdrawal of non-African U contingents from the Congo, is calling an early meeting of the Security Council. He is expected to request a council rulin Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659/ A 'Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031726597 e SEeRE.1_ concerning his opinion that the UN force cannot be used on Lumumba's behalf to subdue Katanga. The action by Leo- poldville police on16 August in detaining for investigation several hundred Europeans�including UN personnel�sug- gests that as he develops his own police force Lumumba may attempt even greater harassments in dealing with the UN and his political opponents. Later on the 16th Lumumba decreed martial law over the entire country for a period of six months. (b)(1 (b)(3 17 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF Ii � 1TeRIEr 4Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031726591 A - Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 , SEtREZ *South Korea: Newly elected South Korean President Yun probably will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for prime minister following the House of Representatives' rejection of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post. How- ever, the narrow margin of Kim's defeat�three votes less than the simple majority necessary for confirmation--suggests that a government headed by Chang would have tenuous support. Chang, titular chief of the majority Democratic party, controls a little less than half of his party's two-thirds majority in the powerful 233-seat lower house. 17 Aug 60 itf DAILY BRIEF iii (b)( (b)( 1) 3) AApproved for Release: 2016/07/05 C031726591 A Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 CONFTDENTLAL_ Kim Il-sung Calls for Federation of North and South Korea Keynoting a "liberation day" celebration in Pyongyang, North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung on 14 August attempted to take the propaganda initiative on Korean reunification from the new South Korean Government, which has indicated support for UN-supervised peninsula-wide elections. Kim called for elections "without outside intervention" and sug- gested an interim North-South federation in which a "supreme na- tional committee" with representatives from both sides would work out economic and cultural cooperation. Such cooperation, Kim said, would help to solve South Korea's "economic catastrophe." Kim also suggested that North and South Korea each reduce its troop strength to "100,000 or less." Implicit in the premier's speech was Pyong- yang's usual insistence on withdrawal of US forces from South Korea before "peaceful unification" can be achieved. A South Korean Democratic party spokesman has publicly re- jected the North Korean proposal, and on 15 August acting Prime Minister Huh Chung termed it "another rehash of a worn-out prop- aganda tactic." Pyongyang probably now will attempt to exploit this rejection in efforts to make Seoul appear responsible for continued division of Korea. Ithrushchev, who has accepted an invitation to visit Pyongyang in early October, can be expected to provide dramatic publicity on Communist proposals for a Korean settlement. He also may use this visit to amplify Moscow's position in the current Sino-Soviet dispute, just before a high-level meeting of Communist parties which may be held in Moscow in conjunction with the USSR's Bolshevik Rev- olution celebration. CO 17 Aug 60 � . r�rr.t l�w�lk 14041.0 rt II I r�rik `-'[Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Nair' SECREZ___ The Situation in the Congo Secretary General Hammarskjold, who has rebuffed Lu- mumba's demand for the withdrawal of non-African UN con- tingentsfrom the Congo, is calling an early meeting of the Se- curity Council. rle has indicated that should Lumumba formal- ly request the withdrawal of non-African contingents he would recommend the withdrawal of the UN force in its entire_D paammarskjold has interpreted the UN resolution of 9 Au: gus s meaning that the UN command in the Congo could not be used on behalf of the central government, as in any move to subdue Katanga. He will request a ruling on this interpreta- tion at the Security Council meeting The action by the Leopoldville police on 16 August in de- taining for investigation several hundred Europeans�including UN personnel--suggests that as he develops his own security forces Lumumba will increase his harassment of both the UN and his political opponents. An estimated 400 to 500 Europeans were detained for document checks after Lumumba charged that Belgian officials still in Leopoldville were avoiding arrest by wearing UN arm bands. Meanwhile, Ghanaian President Nkrumah�who together with Guinea's Sekou Toure has warmly supported Lumu.mba's cause--may be moving to dissociate hirnself somewhat from Lu- mumba's extreme position regarding Katanga. According to Ghana radio, Nkrumah is giving "active consideration" to an invitation from Presi- dent Tshombe to visit Katanga and see conditions there. In Monrovia, President Tubman has stated that Nkrumah now agrees with him that an African "summit" meeting scheduled for Leopoldville from 25 to 30 August is not required, and that any meeting there could be held on the ministerial level. -SEC-REX_ 17 Aug 60 (ATP p-EoV ci for: TOi-6707/0V60-3-1.2659 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 (b)(1 (b)(3 ) ) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 oftre 1,.(JA.F77:1N-V444.,L Selection of South Korean Prime Minister Newly elected South Korean President Yun Bo-sun probably will nominate former Vice President Chang Myon for prime minister following the House of Representatives' rejection on 17 August of Kim To-yun, the President's first selection for the post. Under the constitution, if the President's second nominee is re- jected, the lower house selects the prime minister whose election then requires only a plurality of votes. The President must announce his second choice within five days .\and the house must act upon his recommendation in not less than 24 hours and not more than 48 hours. Kim's defeat by a narrow margin of only three votes suggests that a government headed by Chang would have a tenuous majority. Chang, titular chief of the Democratic party, controls slightly less than half of the party's two-thirds majority in the powerful 233-seat lower house. Kim, leader of the party's right-wing faction, has strongly opposed any compromise with Chang's followers and at times he has appeared to favor a party split. Chang has stated that if he becomes prime minister he would select a broadly representative cabinet, which would include members of both factions and presumably independents. Early press reports indicate that Kim was defeated after a group of independents rejected his answers to a list of questions which they submitted to him and Chang. Should most of the 44 independents in the lower house act as a unified group they might exercise the balance of power betwe(b)(1) the nearly evenly divided pro- and anti-Chang factions of the (b)(3) majority party. 17 Aug 60 CFKITRAII IKITFI I impkirp RI III FTIKI page 7 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 CaVIDENZIAL, THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director -CONFIDEN-TIAL Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03172659 ''� [7/ /1 7 �31:1