WEEKLY SUMMARY - 1968/01/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172629
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03172629
yr.ret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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et
45
12 January 1968
No. 0002/68
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3.5(c)
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 11 January 1968)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Page
1
VIETNAM 2
There has been no Hanoi follow-up to Foreign Minister
Trinh's statement of 30 December on the possibility
of talks with the US. Viet Cong local forces were
unusually active this week, particularly in the Sai-
gon area. In the northern border areas, Communist
main force units continued threatening maneuvers.
Photography reveals the probable presence of cruise
missiles in North Vietnam. In Saigon, Vice President
Ky has reportedly added his voice to the growing
criticism of President Thieu's lack of positive lead-
ership.
ET
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SE
FAR EAST
Hanoi is seeking to exploit the impact of For-
eign Minister Trinh's statement that North Vietnam
"will hold talks" with the US after an unconditional
cessation of bombing and other "acts of war." The
North Vietnamese have claimed that this statement
has been warmly welcomed throughout the world and
have denounced President Thieu for blocking open-
ings to peace and for rejecting a coalition govern-
ment with the Liberation Front.
These moves have stimulated widespread uneasi-
ness in South Vietnam regarding the US attitude
toward talks and a coalition settlement. Saigon
leaders have reiterated their opposition to a coa-
lition and the National Assembly has rejected any
dealings with the Liberation Front. The South Viet-
namese Government reportedly suspended a newspaper
because it indirectly advocated the idea of a coa-
lition.
A series of Viet Cong attacks last week within
a 30-mile radius of Saigon and in the Hue and Da Nang
areas probably were aimed in part at aggravating
political unrest and uncertainty in the South by
demonstrating the government's inability to protect
these heavily populated areas.
SE ET
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QE
0
VIETNAM
Foreign Minister Trinh's as-
sertLon on 30 December that North
Vietnam "will" talk with the US
if all war acts against North
Vietnam are stopped uncondition-
ally has provoked wide specula-
tion on possible changes in the
North Vietnamese policy. So far,
however, Hanoi has not chosen to
elaborate on this statement. The
Communists have carefully con-
strued it as a reiteration of a
long-standing position and not
as a concession.
Although the modification in
Hanoi's official position set
forth in the Trinh statement seems
motivated primarily by a desire
to end the bombing and stall any
major US escalation, it may also
have been promoted in part by a
desire to probe both for US nego-
tiating terms and for signs of US
willingness to modify its objec-
tives in Vietnam.
The Communists may, for ex-
ample, believe they detect modi-
fications in the US position on
dealing with the National Libera-
tion Front. Hanoi has not com-
mented explicitly on US state-
ments about possible representa-
tion of the Front in future peace
negotiations, suggesting that the
Communists see these statements
as a sign of greater US flexi-
bility.
Meanwhile, rumors generated
by the North Vietnamese state-
ment have sparked widespread un-
easiness in South Vietnamese
circles that the US might be pre-
paring to open negotiations with
Hanoi or to accept a coalition
government in the South that
would include the National Libera-
tion Front. Both houses of the
National Assembly have addressed
themselves to this question dur-
ing the past week.
High Saigon officials, more-
over, have recently reiterated
their opposition to any coalition
government with the Front. Al-
though the concern will probably
not reach a level at which it be-
comes a critical factor in GVN-US
relations, it could begin to af-
fect the Vietnamese response to
US initiatives on pacification
and other nation-building activi-
ties in South Vietnam.
The Communists lost little
time in capitalizing on the po-
litical unrest in South Vietnam.
On 7 and 8 January, Hanoi radio
and the Liberation Front condemned
South Vietnamese President Thieu's
opposition to a coalition govern-
ment and attempted to contrast
his negative attitude with the
Front's more positive approach to
the concept. While endorsing the
coalition idea in general terms,
the Front has not been very forth-
coming in spelling cut the details
of an acceptable coalition ar-
rangement.
ET
rage 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 Jan 68
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SEGRT
The Front's current political
program, for example, offers to
accept into the Front's ranks al-
most anyone willing to support its
objectives. This has been a long-
standing policy, however, and one
designed more to broaden popular
support than to present a precise
proposal for a "coalition govern-
ment" with disaffected Saigon of-
ficials. The new program recom-
mends a future government estab-
lished after general elections,
but it is deliberately vague about
the steps to achieve this. It
does not commit the Front to ne-
gotiations with the present Saigon
leadership for the purpose of
forming a coalition government.
Although recently captured
documents indicate that the idea
of a coalition has been discussed
extensively within the Communist
movement for several months,
these discussions are also vague
on details and timing.
Page 3
A new problem facing the
Thieu government is the proffered
resignation of General Nguyen Duc
Thang, deputy chief of the Joint
General Staff in charge of Revo-
lutionary Development cadres.
Thang's wish to resign apparently
stems from what he considers foot-
dragging on the part of the gov-
ernment in instituting vital re-
forms, including a reorganization
of the armed forces, which would
strip the corps commanders of
much of their power base. Al-
though Thang's resignation has
been rejected, it still could
prove to be a source of embarrass-
ment if the press--which has li-
onized Thang--becomes aware of
his resignation attempt and the
reasons behind it.
Increased Military
Activity in the South
Viet Cong guerrilla and lo-
cal forces were active this week
throughout South Vietnam.
A flurry of large-scale,
enemy-initiated attacks occurred
within a 30-mile radius of the
center of Saigon. During a five-
day period, four major actions oc-
curred near the capital city, in-
cluding two bold assaults on nearby
towns. Most of these actions saw
extensive enemy use of mortars,
both preceding and during ground
attacks. Vor example, some 600
mortar rounds were fired as part
of a Communist attempt to overrun
the capital of Hau Nghia Province.
ET
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Intense enemy mortar and
rocket barrages were also di-
rected at strategic US and al-
lied military installations else-
where during the week. A US
Marine supply base near Da Nang
was struck by a 122-mm. rocket
bombardment in a close follow-
up of last week's heavy rocket
attack on the Da Nang airfield
itself. An attack on the US
air base at Kontum in mid-week
inflicted moderate casualties
and extensive damage to aircraft
and associated equipment.
This phase of the Communist
winter-spring campaign has been
marked by unprecedented enemy
losses--a record 2,868 Communists
were killed last week--as well
as by an extremely high level of
enemy aggressiveness throughout
South Vietnam. It is possible
that the enemy is attempting a
particularly heavy show of force
to gain the maximum psychologi-
cal advantage with the populace
prior to the Tet holiday that
begins on 30 January. Communist
military preparations, however,
appear to foreshadow a resump-
tion of major offensive action
after Tet.
Communist main force units
continue to pose a major threat
in three border areas: western
Quang Tri - DMZ, western high-
lands, and northern III Corps.
Page 5
ET
Enemy reconnaissance activities
and probing attacks against
many allied outposts in these
areas have increased. Such ac-
tions may signal full-scale as-
saults on some of these outposts.
Possible Cruise
Missiles in DRV
North Vietnam may have ac-
quired short-range, surface-to-
surface missiles intended for
coastal defense. Possession of
such weapons, if confirmed, would
pose a significant threat to US
warships conducting shore bom-
bardment operations along the
DRV coast.
Early January analysis of
photography revealed two posi-
tions just south of Thanh Hoa
which contain camouflaged equip-
ment, including one object
identified as probably an SS-N-2
missile and several possible
rail-type launchers. This mis-
sile has a range of about 20
miles and was the weapon used
by the Egyptian Navy on 21 Octo-
ber 1967 to sink the Israeli
destroyer Eilat. The suspected
sites were bombed repeatedly by
US Navy aircraft on 5 and 6 Jan-
uary, but there is no firm evi-
dence from photography or pilot
reports that either site was oc-
cupied at the time of the at-
tack.
ET
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