WEEKLY SUMMARY - 1967/12/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172610
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172610
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Se t
47
3.5(c)
15 December 1967
No. 0320/67
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3.5(c)
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SE T
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 14 December 1967)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
The Communist "winter-spring" offensive has en-
countered a series of costly reverses and there
is evidence that enemy main force units hope to
evade major contact with allied forces on sweep
operations. On the political scene, the new Thieu
government has shown few signs so far of developing
promising new programs for the country
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Europe
SECRET
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FAR EAST
Hanoi has again rejected United Nations com-
petence to deal with the Vietnam question. In its
first comment on US soundings concerning renewed
debate in the Security Council, Hanoi denounced
this step as an attempt to make the UN serve US
policy and to "scrap the 1954 Geneva agreements."
The National Liberation Front also denied that it
had tried to send representatives to the UN despite
U Thant's statement that such an approach had been
made.
In a move to emphasize its ability and deter-
mination to continue the war without concessions,
Hanoi publicized a renewed pledge by Foreign Min-
ister Chen I of Chinese support "until complete
victory" has been won.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Dec 67
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VEETNAM
The Communist country-wide
"winter-spring" offensive has re-
cently encountered a series of
costly reverses.
The largest action occurred
last weekend when a three battal-
ion enemy force engaged two bat-
talions of the South Vietnamese
21st Division in the Mekong Delta
province of Chuong Thien. Such
a concentration of enemy troops
is unusual in the delta where the
enemy for more than a year has
operated primarily in company-size
formations, and has launched only
occasional battalion-size attacks.
The encounter reportedly cost the
Viet Cong some 450 killed. Sixty
South Vietnamese were killed and
102 wounded.
Large-scale fighting con-
tinued in the rice-rich coastal
flatlands of northeastern Binh
Dinh Province near Bong Son where
elements of the 22nd Regiment, a
subordinate of the North Vietnam-
ese 3rd Division, have been at-
tempting to fight their way out
of an Allied encirclement. This
engagement�known as the "Battle
of Tam Quang"--has thus far re-
sulted in more than 500 enemy
soldiers killed since it began
on 6 December. The fighting sug-
gests that the North Vietnamese
3rd Division forces, which have
suffered serious losses since
early 1966, have been reinforced
and resupplied.
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There continues to be evi-
dence that some Communist main
force units hope to evade major
contact with allied forces on
sweep operations.
Elements of the North Viet-
namese 2nd Division also continue
to avoid major confrontation with
US sweeps in central I Corps.
This division, which reportedly
is beset with morale and leader-
ship problems, has suffered heavy
losses in the Quang Tin - Quang
Nam province area in recent
months.
.South Vietnamese Political
sTEUaTiCal
The new government of Presi-
dent Thieu after a month and a
half in office has shown few signs
of developing promising new pro-
grams for the country. Thus far,
the government seems to be mainly
concerned with its own internal
organization and relationships.
There are indications that the
unsettled feud between Thieu and
Vice President Ky may be compli-
cating the whole process of work-
ing out future programs. Although
not deliberately sabotaging Thieu's
efforts, Ky appears content to
adopt a wait-and-see attitude in
the apparent expectation that the
President will commit serious po-
litical errors which will enhance
Ky's own future political pros-
pects.
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Complaints have been voiced
by persons close to the govern-
ment about what they call Thieu's
dilettante approach to the day-
to-day problems of governing.
Moreover, Thieu is evidently not
providing adequate guidance to
Prime Minister Loc who appears to
be waiting for cues from the Pres-
ident before moving ahead. Loc's
cabinet, composed largely of tech-
nicians, has yet to come up with
any significant new programs. It
appears particularly reluctant to
take any bold steps in the eco-
nomic sphere which might draw
criticism from influential circles.
In addition to the internal
pressures which are contributing
to the government's lack of de-
cisiveness, Thieu is reportedly
faced with a rising tide of re-
sentment from certain military
officers who fear they may lose
their prerogatives under the ci-
vilian government. Such attitudes
among the military, which must
still be taken into consideration
by the new administration, seem
to be delaying the government's
anticipated reorganization of the
military establishment, and may
further hinder its promised re-
forms of the civil administration,
including the anticorruption
drive.
Neither house of the National
Assembly is yet in a position to
enact legislation, and no legis-
lative proposals have yet been
placed before it. Both the Upper
and Lower houses are still preoc-
cupied with their own internal or-
ganizations--a process which may
continue into early 1968. So far,
members of both houses have been
content only to present resolu-
tions calling the government to
task for its manpower mobiliza-
tion decree and its handling of
political prisoners.
Certain antigovernment ele-
ments, particularly in the Lower
House, may be expected to continue
such efforts which are mainly de-
signed to embarrass the government.
Although a majority in each house
appears basically inclined toward
cooperation with the government,
National Assembly members gener-
ally seem eager to demonstrate
their independence of the execu-
tive branch and to ingratiate
themselves with their constituents.
Hanoi Again Rejects UN
Jurisdiction
In its first comment on the
possibility of renewed UN con-
sideration of the Vietnam ques-
tion, the party daily, Nhan Dan,
on 12 December charged that the
US was up to its "old tricks" of
making the UN serve its "aggres-
sive plan against Vietnam" and of
"scrapping the Geneva agreements."
It reiterated Hanoi's contention
that the UN has "no jurisdiction
whatsoever" in the Vietnam prob-
lem. The article insisted once
again that the Geneva Conference
is the only international body
with any responsibility for the
Vietnam problem and that the UN
has the duty to respect it./
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