CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/04/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172430
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 15, 1959

Zfir/ZZAWZ/Z/ZZZ77/ZZ/777//irer.414(ZZZ/77///17./Z/Z/ZW
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
1 Ur FP-4111.1�1%,& I
mar wit
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
15 April 1959
Copy No., C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
'NT NO
� :
IQ: '
f DA 1E: to %will
1U-1DAT f_rniro REVIEWEF
4 t9/1-E
,d
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C0317243027/1///7//17 ZiA�
pproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
T."12e re,n, oar
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
- Approve-d�fo7�61e-i-se: 2020/02/21 C03172430
15 APRIL 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
East German rank and file apathetic
toward Soviet moves on Berlin and
German problem.
Khrushchev's grudging endorsement
of Gomulka seen posing long-range
alternative for Kremlin of crushing
Gomulka or permitting other satel-
lites similar "heresy."
Peiping appears concerned over strain
on Sino-Indian relations from Tibet in-
cident.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Intercepts confirm Tin jqarmina
Resistance Force.
Turkey, alarmed over growth of Com-
munist power in Iraq, probably revis-
ing earlier advocacy of all-out support
for Qasim.
Iran desires to improve relations with
USSR.
British airline seeks pooling agreement
with Indian international carrier.
crrrirrr"
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
'F/77/7//,',/,10v,f,,,Z1/7",/7/7Z,Z,7/70/7/1/717,1701FAVAMMIrt/f/0703,M7./,`","//,,,,,ww//7"-zcAwar/7/
OP
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
41p0 VI"
0
14
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
East Germany: [5_ast German party leaders have been
unable to evoke any enthusiasm for Moscow's policies con-
cerning Berlin and Germany among the populace and party
members. Even high party functionaries are convinced that
"Big Brother" will make all decisions and that any East Ger-
man action would be pointless:1
some party members are against a separate peace
treaty on tie Yr nu n cis that it would finalize the Oder-Neisse
boundary.
- ussii-Patanci:i uommentina on tne recent party congress
In Warsaw,
stated that Khrushchev's grudging endorsement of both
Gomulka and Poland's special brand of Communism is, in tim
bound to have an impact on Communists throughout the world.
Moscow may be faced eventually with the alternative of crush-
ing Gomulka or permitting other satellites the same de ree of
...gi
autonomy as Poland,. which would weaken Soviet control.
(Page 1)
Communist China - Tibet - India: Peiping's statements
and dealings with India have been increasingly cautious since
the Tibet revolt started last month. Communist China has thus
far made no formal protest concerning Indian Government state-
ments critical of the Communist handling of the revolt. Reflect
ing this policy, Peiping recently instructed the managing editor
t) of two Hong Kong Communist newspapers to "make no attacks
ft\ on Indiali

/:;;/W/ZZZ/Z,Zril/Z/ZZ,Z#Z,/aJEI'feE�ase: /21)20/02/21 C03172(3470W7/#11,
�Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
et,
II. ASIA-AFRICA
0
AV
d:7 1 v
71" .
_zz
_74
7/1
7/
7/i 4
. /47
r/4
1
1
,VJ
I
I
0
Iraq:
1
small arms have been issued to the Communist-
contr lied Popular Resistance Force. Priority is being given
units stationed near the Iraqi frontiers. However, the quan-
titi s and types of arms distributed suggest that the primary
purpose at this time is training. 1 (Page 2)
Turkey-Iraq-Egypt: 7op
Top officials are becom-
ing increasingly pessimistic over developments in Iraq, re-
flecting a significant change in Turkish policy toward that
country. Ank ra has agreed to c operate in any joint approach
to impress Qasim with the danger of Communist en lfment.
It continues to warn, however, that if Nasir gains in the Mid-
dle East:, the free world will be no better off, because Nasir
will "tumble" to the Communists whenever it suits hiri3
(Page 3)
�
Iran-USSR'
Soviet-Iranian negotiations may
be in the offing. t
0
to an agreement with us?"
apparatly is attempting to secure an agreement with Air India
. India: E3ritish Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC)
(Page 4) I
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in reply to the urging of the �
new Iranian ambassador that Soviet propaganda attacks be halted,
asked: "If these statements are stopped, are you willing to co:me
International providing for pooling of revenues and facilities.
Such an agreement would provide for equipping Air India with
po-
sition vis-a-vis US airlines. Air India officials state that they
British jet aircraft and would improve BOAC's competitive Al
,
are dubious of the value of the proposed British agreement.
0Y"
new ircraft, and they have informally requested US aid to en-
They feel they cannot compete with BOAC unless they obtain
P
able them to purchase US aircraft]
(Page 5)
/
4Z,f,/Z/ZZZ,ZZZ/Z/Z/ZZ/zY/),,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031721/4Ar7/777/37/.4
15 Apr 59
DAILY BRIEF
11
(1/
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
I
0
0 ably abated and the upward trend of the stock market
is a significant indicator of confidence. There is still. 1
considerable apprehension about the confusion surround-
ing international debate on Berlin and all-German prolb-
les. Most West Berlin political leaders prefer the
status quo, despite its weaknesses, to any compro-
0;
mise. e/V
0 15 Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF iii
IA
TOP e d forRSeEleCasRe:g20/02/21C03172430WWW4WWWIA.
e -r//,/z/zzez/zzzz,ifzz,zJzj,zzzzzzz , i ri, Kir, zx,erez/z,zzjzzzzzzzzA rizzzzi/rezziwe
i Approved for Release:2020/02/21 C03172430
/
' 41101
I I I . CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
6-he USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with
SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that es-
timate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 19593i1
6. Evidence of preparations for evacuation of
Soviet control elements from Berlin continues to mount.
While the USSR will not turn over access controls to
the GDR in the near future, the physical transfer of ac-
cess controls could be accomplished with little or no
advance warnin-eA
There are no reliable indications of a bloc in-
tent in the near future to blockade Allied or West Ger-
man access to West Berlin or to seal off West Berlin
from the bloc. However, the USSR could take such ac-
tions with little or no warning. The recent completion
of new facilities at the Marienborn checkpoint suggests
that the East Germans may impose tighter controls on
railroad traffic between West Germany and Berlix---
3. There are as yet no clear indications of spe-
cific viet tactics at the forthcoming foreign minis-
ters' meeting in Geneva. Moscow is using propaganda
media and covert channels to play down East-West ten-
sions and attempt to soften Western positions on the
basic issues involve
It is still too early to determine what effect,
if any, Chancellor Adenauer's decision to seek the
presidency will have on Bonn's foreign polic9Z
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Possible Impact on the Bloc of Khrushchev's Endorsement
Of Gomulka
Anrusncnev's grudging endorsement of
Gomulka and Poland's own special brand of Communism is
bound in time to have its impact on the Communist world. In
the long run, Moscow may be faced with the alternatives of
having to crush Gomulka or of permitting certain other satel-
lites a degree of autonomy which would weaken its control.
khe truce between Khrushchev and Go ul a is based on
mutual necessity, As a Commu-
nist, Gomulka, in the final analysis, can look only to Moscow
for support and dares not defy the USSR openly. On the other
hand, trouble in Poland could mean only trouble for Khrushchev,
who does not want to risk another Hungary while he is so deeply
involved in important international political maneuveringg
bncern over the possible effect of the outcome of the Ber-
lin crisis on Poland's unique position in the bloc has been ex-
pressed to
if the United States
makes too many concessions to the Soviet Union in the current
crisis over Berlin, the USSR would regard its dominance in East-
ern Europe as assured and would no longer feel it necessary to
tolerate the Polish differences. As long as there is some un-
certainty in the USSR about the American attitude toward East-
ern Europe, it will maintain the status quo in Poland and in some
of the other countrie-s1
Currentl
many Poles, including Gomulka,
are concerned that the Soviet Union, despite Khru-
ev s assurances to the contrary, will make "territorial ad-
justments," stripping Poland of its highly prized western territo-
ries in order to effect a German settlement. While Poland would
prefer the Oder-Neisse border to be established for good, it fears
the possible results of negotiations over Germany and will se tie
for a continuation of the status qui:3
15 Apr 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003172430 Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
;se
II. ASIA-AFRICA
The Iraqi Situation
Rapid expansion of Iraq's Communist-controlled Popular
Resistance Force (PRF), presently estimated to number as
high as 50,000, is continuing, with new organizational and train-
ing centers being established throughout the country. As yet
there has been no general order to issue arms to the PRF, but
weapons are being furnished to PRF units stationed near the
Iraqi frontiers and to the training centers. On 10 April, Bagh-
dad ordered the issuance to the southern area PRF of 1,600
rifles, 60 Bren light machine guns, and 480 grenades, and
smaller quantities to the central area PRF. Observations by
American Embassy personnel indicate that in Baghdad PRF
members must turn in their arms when they come off night pa-
trol.
The growth of the PRF is probably causing concern among
some Iraqi Army elements. Whether or not such elements have
the capability to resist the steady expansion of Communist power
is problematical, especially in the wake of Qasim's sweeping
purge of high-ranking anti-Communist officers. Qasim's
speeches to military personnel in Baghdad on 9 April were
notable, nevertheless, for the great stress which he placed
on the danger stemming from "poisons of division" within the
army.
In his 14 April speech to the Communist-front Peace Par-
tisans rally in Baghdad, Qasim again warned against "divisive
and reactionary elements." He aligned himself with the "demo-
cratic forces" who embody the "main inclination" in Iraq and
whose objective is "to safeguard and preserve this immortal
republic' but indicated there was room for "all parties of
various inclinations if the objective of their leaders is to serve
the country, freedom, and peace."
15 Apr 59
i-CkITD A I IkITCI I irt=kirr RI III FT11�1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
Ifte '44W.1
Turkey Takes Harder Line on Iraq
gti contrast to Turkey's past attitude, which minimized
the possibility that Iraqi Premier Qasim would fall entirely
under Communist influence, Prime Minister Menderes in-
formed the American ambassador on 10 April that both he
and President Bayar now are alarmed and concerned over the
Communist danger in Iraq. Menderes further said Turkey is
prepared to participate in any concerted Wester�plomatic
activity to impress on Qasim the danger he faces
Menderes stressed the continuing danger that UAR Pres-
ident asir will return to close relations with the USSR, re-
flecting the previous Turkish contention that the UAR rather
than Iraq is the greater menace to the West. Turkish For-
eign Minister Zorlu has consistently minimized the Commu-
nist dan er in Iraq and has sought to avoid putting pressure
on Qasimi
aktrkey made only mild protests over the Kirkuk dis-
orders last October in which Iraq's Turkish-speaking minority
was involved. In March 1959 Zorlu made the gesture of offer-
ing Qasim transit facilities in Turkey in order to assist the
Iraqi Army to put down the Mosul rebels. Despite these initia-
tives, the Turkish ambassador to Baghdad, who is being re--
placed, has apparently been unsuccessful in his efforts to
reassure both Qasim and the Iraqi public of his country's
friendly attitud.n.
15 Apr 59
CFMTDA I IKITPI I irtrmr= RI III rTIKI
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
Iran Seeks to Improve Relations With USSR
The new Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Abdol Hosein
Masud-Ansari, tried during an interview with Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko on 12 April to set the stage for improved
Iranian-Soviet relations
Gromyko responded to Masud-AnsarPs complaints
over Radio Moscow's anti-Iranian propaganda with the query,
"If these statements are stopped, are you willing to come to
an agreement with us?" In response to Masud-Ansari's re-
tort, "Let us not use coercion, and let us not ask to be re-
warded for stopping a bad action," Gromyko said, "But we
do not want to use coercion." The Iranian ambassador re-
quested Tehran to note "in the next few days" whether this
friendly interview results in any modification of the hostile
tone of Radio Moscow. No substantial change in the Soviet
broadcasts beamed to Iran has been noted by American moni-
tors.
Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Hekmat informed
Am assador Wailes in Tehran on 13 April that Iran hopes
the Gromyko interview will re-establish a friendly atmos-
phere, and is prepared to discuss outstanding problems with
the USSR Ambassador Wailes believes Hekmat intended to
indicate that Iran may be planning further negotiations of some
type with the USSR]
Iran's relations with the Soviet Union have been strained
since negotiations for a nonaggression pact broke down on 10
February. Tehran's conclusion of a defense agreement with
the United States on 5 March, despite a strenuous Soviet cam-
naian to forestall it, has caused additional strains.
15 Apr 59
f�CkITD A I INTC1 I irt=kirr RI II I PTIKI
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
Page 4
Approved for Release: iOZ/02/21 C03172430
BOAC Seeks to Pool Resources With Air India
11-3ritish Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) is attempt-
ing to secure an agreement with Air India International provid-
ing for pooling of revenues, according to an Air India official.
The agreement would also provide for sharing of terminal facili-
ties, maintenance operations, and booking offices, and would in-
volve a realignment of routes of the two airlines between London
and Tokyo via India. It would result in India's giving BOAC pref-
erence over other airlines on routes through India. BOAC has
also offered to purchase Air India's Super nstellations and to
supply it with Comets to modernize its fleet
sir India officials, who claim they must make a decision
by 1 June, say they fear such an agreement would cost their
airline its independence. They feel, however, that they cannot
compete with BOAC and other airlines unless they obtain new
aircraft. They are not impressed with the Comet and would prefer
Lockheed Electras or Boeing 720s to supplement the three Boeing
707s now on order. For this reason, they have informally request-
ed US aid in financing the purchase of US aircraft
15 Apr 59
rFKITPAI INTFI LIC;ENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
CAirvr 1 I
Nue NW7
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172430
7/14/71271711.7.4017,0#7/7/4/14097/K