CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/02/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172225
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: February 6, 1960

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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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6 FEBRUARY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet census reveals that fewer people
will enter working- and military-ago
groups during 1959-65 than we had es-
timated.
Absence of Chinese Communists at bloc
agricultural conference may have been
caused by a desire to avoid criticism on
communes.
0
Bloc-sponsored military training pro ram
for Guinea annears to be under way
II. MIA-AFRICA
Sudan, perturbed over limitations of US
aid and World Bank "stalling," says it will
apply for Soviet aid.
IChrushchev expected to offer substantial
credits for Indian Third Five-Year Plan. 0
III. THE WEST
()French cabinet changes show De Gaulle's
determination to implement his Algerian
policy.
0 Fidel Castro will probably accept Mi-
koyan's invitation to visit Moscow; re-
sumption of diplomatic relations between
USSR and Cuba also appears likely.
0 Cuba notifies UN of its candidacy for a
seat on Security Council.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
6 February 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: New data released by the USSR on its 1959 cen-
sus will affect some of our estimates on the composition of
the Soviet population. Fewer people will enter working- and
military-age groups during 1959-65 than we had estimated.
The number of people now in the working-age bracket (16-59)
is some 2,000,000 less than had been thought, and, of the total
population in this age group (125,600,000)2 a higher percentage
is already working. Opportunities to expand the labor force
are thus more limited than previously estimated. Khrushchev's
program to cut armed forces strength was probably based in
part on a desire to enlarge the labor force. (
USSR- China - East Europe: In view of the top-level par-
ticipation in the "agricultural conference" held in Moscow on
2-3 February, it is probable that the problems discussed went
beyond the routine agricultural matters dealt with in the 4 Feb-
ruary communiqu6. The absence of Chinese Communist rep-
resentatives suggests that the Chinese feared a discussion of
collectivization would involve the commune nrnhlem and would
be critical of their methods. (Page 1)
Soviet Bloc - Guinea: A bloc-sponsored military training
program for Guinea appears to be under way.
the "problem
oi the military trainees is now settled." In late 1959 a small
group from Guinea arrived in Prague and was met by a Czech
Air Force official. Early in 1959 Czechoslovakia delivered a
gift of military equipment, mostl sma
tr4ining mission to Guinea.
--T-OP-SEGREZ
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POPULATION OF THE USSR
15 JANUARY 1959
46.4
17.1
14.7
110.9
19.7
208.8
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II. AMA-AFRICA
1't�
Sudan: r-Vestern diplomats in Khartoum feel that the
nextUTWeeks will be crucial in determining the Sudanese
Government's alignment between East and West. Sudanese
officials, who had expected that the agreement they reached
on 8 November with the UAR on sharing the Nile waters
would quickly lead to a World Bank loan covering much of
the cost of their $100,0001000 Roseires Dam project, have
become convinced that the bank is "stalling' They are
also perturbed about limitations of the US aid program,
especially in view of the recent large Soviet loans to the
UAR and Ethiopia. Late last week the Sudanese foreign
minister told the French ambassador that he intended to
annlv fn thia T TQ.Q14 f rvr i rn
%Joan, wigiuy plca,eu Inman oniciais expect icnru-
shchev to offer substantial new credits for India's Third Five-
Year Plan (1961-66) during his visit beginning 11 February.
In July 1959, when the USSR extended $375,000,000 in its
initial commitment for the third plan, Soviet negotiators in-
dicated more would be forthcoming. The amount Khrushche
will offer is variously reported as $200,000,000 or $600,000,-
000 and includes aid for Indian agriculture as well as for in-
dustrial cievelnnmAnn
III. THE WEST
France: De Gaulle's ouster of Deputy Premier Jacques
Soustelle and other changes indicate De Gaulle's determina-
tion to implement vigorously his self-determination policy
for Algeria. Far-reaching administrative and possibly terri-
torial reorganization of Algeria now is probably under con-
sideration. Soustelle is likely to retain the support of some
elements of the Union for the New Republic which he founded.
He has announced that he will continue working for the "cause
of French Algeria." The appointment of the former French
6 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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SO'
West Africa high commissioner general/ Pierre Messmer,
to replace Pierre Guillaumat as minister of armed forces
provides De Gaulle with a vigorous personality to carry out
the expected shake-up in the army.
(Page 2)
Cuba-USSR: Fidel Castro will probably accept Mikoyan's
public invitation to visit Moscow "in the near future." Re-
sumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR seems almost
certain. Mikoyan's delegation is heavily weighted with trade
specialists, and Cuba is expected to respond favorably to
any new Soviet economic overtures.
Cuba-UN: Cuba has launched its candidacy for one of
the two Latin American seats in the UN Security Council,
apparently without consulting the Latin American caucus
where such candidacies are usually agreed upon before pub-
lic announcement. Argentina will vacate its seat at the end
of this year. Cuba may siphon off Communist and some neu-
tral support in the UN from any candidate agreed upon by
the Latin American caucus. However, the wariness with
which many UN members reaard the Castro regime makes
Cuba's election unlikely.
6 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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%we Nare
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
� Bloc Agricultural Conference in Moscow
In view of the top-level participation in the agricultural
conference held in Moscow on 2-3 February, it seems like-
ly that the problems discussed went beyond the routine pro-
duction and technical issues reported. The subject matter
covered by the communiqu�ardly warrants attendance by
every Eastern European first secretary and premier, some
of whom left their own countries in the midst of meetings of
their own.
A reference in the communiqu�o the accomplishments
of the European countries in "the socialist reorganization of
the countryside" may be a clue to the absence of the Chinese.
This topic, if discussed at length, could hardly fail to involve
the communes. Absence of the Chinese at such a discussion
would underline their intention to maintain their own position
on this problem. The failure of the communiqu�o explain the
necessity of such high-level participation implies that Khru-
shchev wishes to give no more publicity than is necessary to
a serious difference of view within the bloc.
The absence of Chinese Communist representatives was
made conspicuous by the presence of representatives from
North Korea and Outer Mongolia "at their own request." The
Chinese did participate in two CEMA technical conferences
held during the same period, and in the meeting of the Polit-
ical Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on 4 Febru-
ary.
The decision to call a meeting of party representatives
rather than to use the forum of the Soviet bloc's Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)--whose meetings are
normally attended by Chinese observers--suggests that the
agricultural "experiences" discussed were more in the ideo-
logical than in the technical field.
-CONFIDENTIAL-
6 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
III. THE WEST
De Gaulle's Cabinet Changes Signal Extensive Shake-up
De Gaulle's determination to push his policy of self-deter-
mination for Algeria is indicated by his ouster of Deputy
Premier Jacques Soustelle and other 5 January ministerial
changes which emphasize the increasingly "technical" rather
than political character of the cabinet. Although Premier
Debrd reportedly opposed the use of force against the Euro-
pean settler insurgents last week, De Gaulle may have rea-
soned that replacing him at present would create too many
difficulties at a time when he wants to push his purge of those
who oppose his policies, particularly since the special decree
power granted the government would have to be renewed if a
new premier took over. Two other opponents to the use of
force�Information Minister Frey and Armed Forces Minis-
ter Guillaumat--who are technicians rather than political
figures, were relegated to positions under Debre.
Pierre Messmer, the former French West Africa high
commissioner general, who replaces Guillaumat: is a career
civil servant whose vigorous personality has probably recom-
mended him to De Gaulle as the man to carry out the expected
shake-up of the army. Messmer's combination of toughness
with a liberal record in the evolution of the French Community
is certain to alarm the rightists.
Soustelle's departure formalizes a long-existing split in
the "Gaullist" Union for the New Republic (UNR) which he helped
to found. His immediate announcement following his ouster that
he intends to continue working for "the cause of French Algeria"
suggests he will fight to retain the support of many UNR dep-
uties at odds with the "loyal" elements who seized control of
the party machinery at the annual congress last December.
Soustelle could serve as a dangerous focal point of opposition
to De Gaulle: in cooperation with the die-hard members of the
Independent party who demonstrated their sympathies with the
European settlers in Algeria.
In addition to the purge of civil and military hierarchies
which is now under way, De Gaulle also apparently intends to
CONFIDENTIAL
6 Feb 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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vale %NW
use the special decree powers to make some far-reaching
changes in Algeria. According to the American Embassy
in Paris, several parliamentary leaders have quoted De Gaulle
as indicating on 3 February that preparations must be made
for the eventuality of a federated state of Algeria. De Gaulle
reportedly suggested that the present departmental divisions
of Algeria needed revision, possibly alon et
CONFIDENTIAL
6 Feb 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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