CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/08/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169523
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: August 28, 1958

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28 August 1958
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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28 AUGUST 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists mount inten-
sive barrage on smaller islands iii
Chinmens; local Nationalist com-
mander expects assault this week-
end.
Direct Cairo - Soviet bloc air service
to be established soon.
USSR considering request to furnish
UAR with IL-18 four-engine turbo-
props for commercial use.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese rebel leaders reaffirm
their defiance of governmental au-
thority. I UAR as-
sistance to opposition continues.
Moroccan Government may be re-
shuffled shortly; fighting between
Istiqlal party factions posaible.
III. THE WEST
0 Panama - Political instability heading
for climax around 1 October, with
moves to oust President de la Guardia
possible at any time.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 August 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Taiwan Strait situation (as of 0100 EDT, 28 August):
A heavy concentration of Chinese Communist artillery fire on
Tatan and Erhtan in the Chinmens (Quemoys) on 27 August
has led Chinese Nationalist officials to expect an attempt to
seize these smaller islands soon. Chiang Kai-shek is seriously
disturhpd about "creening nterdiction" of the offshore islands.
Preparation for increased Chinese Communist naval
narticioation in the Taiwan Strait situation
(Page 1) (Maps)
Watch Committee conclusion--Sino-Soviet bloc:
A. No Sino -Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hos-
tilities against the continental US or its possessions in the im-
mediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately
to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad,
US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate
future, except as noted below.
NOTE: It is likely that the Chinese Communists will continue
artillery barrages along with intensified air and naval inter-
diction of supply lines to the offshore islands. Air attacks on
the offshore islands are probable but initially would be probing
to determine Chinese Nationalist and US reactions. Chinese
Communist seizure of one or more of the smaller offshore is-
lands is expected. The Chinese Nationalist and US reactions
to these moves will largely determine whether or not attempts
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will be made to seize the large islands of Chinmen (Quemoy)
and Matsu. The Communists probably do not intend to initiate
major offensive military action against Taiwan and the Pesca-
dores in the immediate future
Bloc air service to UAR: Direct air, service between
the Soviet bloc and Cairo is to start,on 2.September. On 18
August a Czech jet transport (TU-104) flew from Cairo to
Prague in what may have been the final test flight for a weekly
i- nrrnQnn warvirtp hpfweran the two capitals .I
USSR- UAkt: The Ubbli is now LAJilbiuuting letiucot. tA,
provide the UAR three of its new IL-18 four-engine turboprop trans-
ports for commercial use. After several months of negotia-
tions, the USSR states it is ready to deliver to Egypt 10 IL-14
transports modified for paratroop operations and five IL-14 trans-
ports for c1viLair use. A joint Egyptian military and civil
air mission is to arrive in Moscow on 2 September, apparently
to conclude financial arrangements for these aircraft and a
civil air agreement. (Page 4)
IL ASIA:-AFRICA
Watch Committee conclusion�Middle East:
C. Although a deliberate initiation of open hostilities
In the Middle East is unlikely in the immediate future, the sit-
uation remains highly unstable throughout the area, particularly
where US and UK interests or commitments are involved, and
incidents and coups could occur at any time.
NOTE: The survival of the Jordanian regime is imminently
threatened. If the regime in Jordan collapses, action by Israel
and other neighboring countries to take control of Jordanian
territory is likely.
28 Aug 58
DAILY BRIEF
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Lebanon: A meeting of rebel leaders on 25 August un-
derscored their unwillingness to make any meaningful move to-
g normal security and economic conditions.
cus has ordered a rebel "popular resistance"
force to be created in southern Lebanon for use "when neces-
sary." Cairo has sent the equivalent of $84,000 to rebel leaders
in Beirut. Page 5)
Morocco: Premier Balafrej may be replaced and the
moderate government reorganized within the next two months
in an effort to counter the growth of extremism within the dom-
inant Istiqlal party. Armed clashes between rival factions within
the party are feared since the expulsion on 13 August of three
left-wing members of the political committee from all party of-
fices. Two party factions are reported to be trying to obtain
arms as rapidly as possible. (Page 7)
III. THE WEST
Panama: There are indications of a student-led uprising
about 1 October, when the legislature convenes. The ostensible
goal of the students is to curtail the power of the National Guard.
�This student movement is being actively abetted by, if not led by,
the leaders of the political opposition, whose real aim seems to
be the overthrow of President de la Guardia. It receives the sup-
port and encouragement of the Communists. Some opposition
elements might act considerably sooner than October.
(Page 8)
28 Aug 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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--TOP-SEGREZ
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation (as of 0100 EDT, 28 August)-.
Intense artillery fire was delivered by Communist bat-
teries against Tatan and Erhtan on 27 August resulting in the
demolition of all observation posts and communications facili-
ties. The shelling has the characteristics of a "softening up"
operation. Chinese Nationalists on Tatan reported that the Com-
munists were "aiming at our first line of defense," that personnel
shelters had been destroyed and that there apparently was no
cover for the troops. The commander of the Chinmen (Quemoy)
Defense Command believes an attack on Tatan and Erhtan will
occur between 29 and 31 August. The Nationalists on Chinmen
planned a large scale counter-bombardment early on the even-
ing of 27 August.
On 26 and 27 August the Communists fired on Chinmen,
concentrating on the airstrip. US officials in Taipei believe that
the Communist intention with regard to the main island of Chin-
men is primarily to interdict supply and communications. Propa-
ganda leaflets fired at Chinmen on 26 August warned defenders
"Chinmen is isolated."
The Chinese Nationalists have lost an LCM to artillery fire.
The vessel apparently was hit while unloading supplies at Liaolo
Beach on the southern side of Chinmen.
There has been no new information on the deployment of
naval units into the Santa Bay area except for an indication that
there may be more ships involved
28 Aug 58
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Pt+ Piston fighter
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strength
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strength P+ Ground-attack
SELECTED MAJOR AIRFIELDS
LJGUST 19
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The motor torpedo boats which participated in
the actions near Chinmen on 24 and 25 August now are known to
have moved undetected to Amoy from Shanghai about 2 August,
suggesting that other undetected naval units could be in or near
the Taiwan Strait area.
Chinese Nationalist Attitudes: Chiang Kai-shek appeared
obsessed with the danger of "creeping interdiction" of the National-
ist supply lines to the offshore islands during a conversation with
American officials on 26 August,,, Jle �,Vessed the threat posed by
Communist use of motor torpedo boats (PT's), and intimated that
the Nationalists would need help in keeping the lines to the islands
open. Chiang said that if the Communists could keep up the pres-
ent level of shelling, bombing, and sea action, the islands would
soon be cut off, and the morale of the defending forces would be-
come depressed to the point where seizure of Chinmen would be
"no problem".
Some Ministry of National Defense officials, however,
are more optimistic than Chiang about the ability of the offshore
islands to withstand interdiction. They believe that resupply can
continue by conventional methods with air and sea support and
with sLane losseN at least until the Communists establish full
air superiority. They admit privately that stockpiles on both the
Matsus and Chinmens are far in excess of MAAG authorization
and records.
Ranking Nationalist air force officers are reported pleased
with the performance of their pilots in recent air actions. The
engagement between eight F-86's and eight MIG 17's on 25 August
resulted in the shooting down of two Communist planes with ap-
parently no Nationalist lossee,
Peiping Radio on 27 August continued to pick up comment
on "US-Chiang"-instigated tension in the Taiwan Strait from bloc
and Asian neutralist newspapers which only briefly report Chinese
Communist "retaliation."
References in bloc propaganda to Peiping's possible par-
ticipation in international councils are increasing. A 26 August
TOP SECRET
28 Aug 58
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Peiping broadcast, in referring to the West's recent offer for
a nuclear test-ban agreement, quoted the Manchester Guardian's
comment that France and Communist China are left out: "Where
will the West place China?" In the past, Peiping has been
virtually silent on its possible participation in a test-ban agree-
ment.
The official newspaper of the Polish Communist party,
Trybuna Ludu commented on 27 August that Asian countries be-
lieve it is "high time" for the US to recognize Communist China
and addlit it to the United Nations. On the same day, Prime Min-
ister Nehru stated that India would again raise the question in the
UN of Communist China's admission.
-TOP -SE
28 Aug 58
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No, �41.01
USSR May Provide UAR With Late-Model Passenger Aircraft
Moscow is now considering a request from the Egyptian
civil airline, Misrair, for three IL 18 (Moskva) four-engine
turboprop passenger aircraft and five IL-14 twin-engine piston
transports. Soviet-Egyptian negotiations concerning the IL-
18's were first noted in February when three of these aircraft
were listed among the Egyptian air requirements for 1958.
An Egyptian Air Force mission went to Moscow in March to
discuss the purchase. Just before Nasir's visit to the Soviet
Union in May, Misrair considered purchasing TU-104 twin
jet transports. Egyptian air officials, however, were not
sufficiently impressed with the plane, and Nasir submitted an
extremely low purchase offer which was refused.
When the Soviet air chief, Marshal Rudenko, visited
Cairo in July, he reportedly offered to provide late-model
Soviet-built jet airliners to the UAR. Early in July, however,
the Egyptians repeated their original request for the IL-18,
and,on 25 August, Cairo notified Moscow that a delegation
would arrive on 2 September apparently to conclude an agree-
ment for the purchase of aircraft.
At least eight IL-18's had been produced in the Soviet
Union as of mid-May, and series production of the aircraft has
begun. Moscow now has an estimated 30 IL-18's on, hand. In
the past, the Soviet Union has offered to sell IL-18's to Czech-
oslovakia and Austria--in the latter instance for less than
$2,000,000 per plane.
28 Aug 58
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Niamoo
II. ASIA -AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
A meeting of Lebanese opposition leaders in Beirut on
25 August underscored their unwillingness and, perhapg, in-
ability to make any meaningful move toward restoring normal
economic conditions and security in the country. Affirming
their "solidarity and unity of purposes" the leaders demanded
that American forces withdraw immediately and the UN group
also be withdrawn. They renewed a demand that the next
cabinet be formed from opposition elements, and refused co-
operation with any Chamoun supporters.
The meeting, held under General Shihab's sponsorship
and protection, was marked by the absence of extremist
Moslem leader Adnan Hakim, whose Najjadah organization is
believed to be carrying out the current wave of bombings and
assassinations in Beirut. The break between Beirut rebel
leader Saib Salam and Hakim has resulted in attempts by Salam
to have Hakim arrested,
General Shihab is said to be displeased with the refusal to
end the general strike which has paralyzed the Lebanese econ-
omy since last May. Rebel leaders Abdullah Yafil Salam, and
Husayn Uwayni are credited with the tough stand taken at the
meeting.
The UAR meanwhile continues to provide material and
financial support to the opposition. On 25 August UAR au-
thorities in Syria gave their consent for the formation of
"Popular Resistance" groups in southern Lebanon, "in prep-
aration for usln them when necessary." Rebel leader Ma'ruf
Sad in Sidon
ordered that $84,000 be sent "to Beirut," apparent-
ly to prop up opposition elements for continuance of the gen-
eral strike. Cairo remitted $70,000 on 25 July, probably for
the same purpose. On 11 August a Syrian military plane
dropped propaganda leaflets in the Biqa Valley condemning
the election of General Shihab and claiming that it was held
under "foreign duress."
--T-012-sEetEr
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Egyptian intelligence is said to be convinced that a
new Lebanese revolution will break out as soon as it can
be "proved" that General Shihab will follow a pro-Ameri-
can policy. The new struggle, according to the report,
will seek a quick victory by the nationalists over Shihab's
"pro-West policy." It had been reported previously that
the Egyptians, during Saudi Crown Prince Faysal's trip
to Cairo, showed him "documents" on Shihab's unpopularity
in Lebanon. This campaign to discredit Shihab may be in-
tended as pressure on him for further concessions to the
rebels.
TOP SECRET
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SEC11.0
Novo
Moroccan Government Counters Threatened Violence
The Moroccan Government is considering an expansion
of the army and police forces within the next two months in or-
der to cope with anticipated armed clashes between factions
within the dominant Istiqlal party. Moderate Premier Ahmed
Balafrej is expected to be replaced, perhaps by Abderrahim
Bouabid, an able and energetic leader of the party's left wing.
The prolonged cleavage within the party widened on 13 August
with the suspension or expulsion from all party positions of
three left-wing members of the party's political committee
who failed to attend a political committee meeting. This dis-
ciplinary action was later upheld by the party's executive com-
mittee and approved by the King.
The three members expelled are Mehdi ben Barka, act-
ing secretary general of the Istiqlal party, a member of its ex-
ecutive committee, and president of the Moroccan Consultative
Assembly; Mahjoub ben Seddi, anti-American head of the Mor-
occan labor union (UMT) and vice president of the Consultative
Assembly; and Mohamed Basri, a leader of the irregular Mor-
occan Army of Liberation. A resistance group headed by Basri
and another controlled by party demagogue Allal el-Fassi, who
Is reported to be attempting to obtain arms as rapidly as pos-
sible, are the factions which may clash.
Moderates within the party and government plan to re-
organize the Moroccan labor union to weaken Ben Seddik's pos-
ition. Earlier reports stated that Ben Seddik and former Min-
ister of Labor Abdullah Ibrahim were about to form a labor
party which they hope would attract the Istiqlal left wing.
28 Aug 58
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Now'
III. THE WEST
Serious Unrest Mounting in Panama
There are indications that at least some segments of
the Panamanian opposition now may be determined to attempt
to oust President de la Guardia prior to the political crisis
generally expected in October. Militant student groups are
spearheading a campaign to weaken the unpopular National
Guard, Panama's only armed force. The government is de-
pendent for its existence on the continued loyalty of the Na-
tional Guard, and� with its maneuverability thus limited, its
current efforts to reach a compromise with the students seem
unlikely to succeed.
The stude,nts have been preparing for almost three
months for the climax of their efforts which, if it does not
come earlier, Is almost certain to occur in October when
the National Assembly is expected to act on their demands.
The students are armed and, in view of bitter racial and
class tensions, particularly in Panama City's slums, dis-
orders could get out of control and might spread into the
Canal Zone.
Although the students' main target is the National
Guard, their grievances go much deeper. They bitterly
resent the established social order, which involves control
of the government by a small, thoroughly corrupt oligarchy.
Ultranationalism is also an important element in the stu-
dents' thinking, and they have been in'the forefront of the
campaign for US concessions in the Canal Zone. The weak
Communist party is attempting to exploit student grievances,
and some Communists have become influential student lead-
ers.
SECRET-
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Nord
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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