CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/08/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169519
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: August 23, 1958

,
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
23 August 1958
Copy No. C 57
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
Bk`.1)':',..!%"..7.:.^.1T NO.
DIJEs
4013-SECRET-
/I/ /Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519717//// Z/Z/ZA
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
4.7�01.0 IA G. II
MM %I. AiIlk
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
1 %/I AJL01.411.1-a
10014
23 AUGUST 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communist jet light bombers
fly from Nanking to South China, where
_nalkomber_a_arn_nragently based.
USSR delivers MIG-17's and other arms
to Syria. UAR now seeks MIG-19's to
offset Israeli acquisition of French
Vautours.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nasir may exploit emphasis on Arab
League agreement in United Nations
to further his reported plans for re-
vived pro-UAR Arab League.
Egyptian source characterizes Sudan
as Nasir's next target. No timetable
indicated, and action now Would run
counter to present UAR pose of
moderation.
Iraqi regime now permitting more
open anti-Western statements and
activities.
-4-
� Israel continues military
preparations.
0 Pakistan prime minister's 21 August
speech invites Iraq to quit Baghdad
Pact.
0 There are an increasing number of
signs that Greek Government may re-
sign over Cyprus issue.
0 Japan plans to extend $20,000,000
credit to Burma.
Indonesian dissidents hampered by
defections and ammunition shortage.
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
, 'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO3169519
TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 August 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: At least five 1L-28 jet light bombers--
and possibly as many as five flights--subordinate to the Chi-
nese Communist 8th Air Division flew on 22 August from their
base in Nanking to Chingchiang, located about 55 miles south
of Nanchang' in East China. This may be the beginning of a
deployment of IL-28 jet light bombers to grmth (mina whA7
no r aircraft are presently based.
(Map) (Page 1)
Soviet arms for UAR: During the past six weeks, four
to five Soviet vessels have delivered to Latakia military
equipment including 55 to 60 T-54 medium tanks and more
than 150 artillery pieces, including antitank weapons. On
20 August a ship offloaded 18 large crates at Latakia. This
delivery and earlier Sightings of crates suggest that the
USSR has delivered a squadron of MIG-17 all-weather jet
fighters.
the UAR, aware that the Israelis nave new
French Vautour twin-jet aircraft, apparently has decided
to try to obtain MIG-19 jet fighters from the Soviet bloc.
(Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Middle East resolution: Nasir probably believes that the
Arab-sponsored resolution ,sercres his long-range interests.
" He may feel that the governments of Lebanon and Jordan will
TOP SECRET
AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519V
/
g
_ Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
%NO
come under his influence in due course and that a show of
moderation and a desire to cooperate with Hammarskjold at
this time are the most effective tactics for obtaining the
withdrawal of British and American forces from the area
and increasing Arab prestige. The resolution's emphasis
on agreements reached within the context of the Arab League
may be consistent with reported UAR plans for a revival of
the League as a pro-Nasir alliance.
*UAR-Suclan: Nasir is reported to have stated on 19 Au-
gust that the pudan will be the UAR's next target and has or-
dered preparations for a press campaign Against Khalirs gov-
ernment. He did not indicate any timetable for action. Nasir
has a strong personal animosity toward Khalil, but the launch-
ing of an aggressive propaganda campaign atthis' time�in ad-
dition to the UAR's present subversive program--would_run
counter to the overt line of moderation which the HAR has re-
cently assumed.
Iraq: The Baghdad regime, now less apprehensive of
Western military intervention, is permitting more open ex-
pression of anti-Western--particularly anti-American--senti-
ments which it had earlier tried to curb. While the present
leaders with some exceptions appear to be relatively moderate,
competition among factions may lead to still greater em-
phasis on anti-Western themes and possibly to early con-
sideration of such moves as oil nationalization.
(Page 3)
Israel-UAR: The Israeli Army appears to be continuing
its military preparations for any trouble arising out of the
situation in Jordan. There are indications that armor is
being concentrated near Beersheba in southwestern Israel.
The UAR has complained publicly this week that Israeli pa-
trols had crossed its frontier in this area.
23 Aug 58
DAILY BRIEF
Ii
0/
/
"
t://
/
/
'//
, , ,
/ .0/ //
zz
//
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519/
,
V / 11
, I
wov/ // z - , ///
77 , FZ/7
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
�
Pakistan: Prime Minister Noon's statement on 21 August
that "we do not want Iraq to stay with us in the Baghdad Pact;'
may have been designed to encourage Iraq to make a formal
break. Pakistani leaders have long believed that Iraq's in-
volvement in Arab affairs created problems for the other Bagh-
dad Pact members and that closer cooperation would be pos-
sible without Iraq. (Page 4)
Greece: There are an increasing number of indications
that the Karamanlis 4overnment may resign over failure to
settle the Cyprus controversy. Any successor government,
while basically pro-Western, might feel compelled to adopt
a me neutralist policy. (Page 5)
Japan-Burma: Japan intends to grant a $20,000,000
credit to Burma as part of a campaign to expand economic
ties with free Asian countries. This loan will offer competi-
tion to the bloc economic offensive in Burma; the USSR has
granted credits of $37,000,000. Tokyo has already extended
a $50,000,000 credit to India and is studying similar action
for Ceylon and Pakistan. (Page 6)
Indonesia: Dissident troop defections apparently are
proving a significant factor in the government's progress in
subduing the insurgents in North Celebes. In North Sumatra,
the dissidents' shortage of ammunition, following intensive
action earlier this month, has forced at least a temporary
cessation of guerrilla activities there.
(Page 7)
23 Aug 58 DAILY BRIEF
111
,
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 c031 6951 9% -
ri%r
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
=Iwo'
000 Communist troop
strength
nn,r) Nationalist troop
strength Ground-attack
MI SELECTED MAJOR AIRFIELDS
4 Piston fighter
4- Jet fighter
+ Piston light bomber
4_ Jet light bomber
UGUST 19
Hengyang es/
ang
1
Nanchang
Chingchiang
68,000
NG KONG
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Hangchow
Chuhsien�
Fooch
NAN
Shanghai
4
NINGPO
LUCHIAO*
Wenchow
AN
INOYANG
14.1� CHIANG
QUEMOY IS
86,000
�
PESCAD0f2ES IS.
16,000
SANTU BAY
IS.
3 000
��
to
CHOU SHAN I.
EAST CHINA SEA
o
ISTATUTE MILES 300
80806 80823
-Ter SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
I. THE COMMUNIST BItt
Chinese Communist Military Situation
At least five IL-28 jet light bombers subordinate to the
Nanking-based Chinese Communist 8th Air Division flew on
22 August from their base to Chingchiang, located about 55
miles south of Nanchang in East China,
These bombers could have been flight
leaders for five flights of IL-28es.
These planes may operate from Chingchiang, which is
about the same distance from the Taiwan Strait as Shanghai,
up to this time the southernmost jet bomber base in Commu-
nist China. However, if the 8th Air Division--equipped with
about 90 IL-289s--is being deployed to South China, Commu-
nist offensive capabilities in the Taiwan Strait area would be
greatly increased.
lcontacts between Shanghai-based naval bombers and
tactical controllers who may be in Southeast China.
Numerous unconfirmed reports indicate that Communist
ground forces in East China are being reinforced. Although
these reports may be exaggerated, it is probable that addi-
tional troops are being moved in.
Since 16 August, the number of Chinese Communist naval
patrol craft operating in the Amoy :and Santu ,_Bay areas has
about tripled, and the level of naval communications in East
China has been above normal since 13 August. This activity,
together with the movement of four naval vessels now ten-
tatively identified as motor torpedo boats into Santii-_, Bay on
17 August, suggests preparations for interdiction operations
against the offshore islands.
On the night of 21-22 August, Chinese Nationalist aircraft
overflew Anhwei, Chekiang, and Kiangsu Provinces on the
China mainland, dropping leaflets and "relief parcels" con-
taining rice, towels, needles, and thread. The Nationalists
have carried out many missions of this type in the past, but
this is the first since the Communist occupation of the coastal
airfields. The Nationalist Air Force says that all aircraft re-
turned safely despite Chinese Communist interception attempts.
-TOP-SECRET
23 Aug 58
f^GAITO A I IkITCI I inckir= cei III PTIM
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Soviet Arms Shipments to Syria
A Soviet vessel offloaded 18 large crates at Latakia
on 20 August, These
crates and those which have been sighted earlier probably
contain the squadron of MIG-17 all-weather jet fighters
scheduled for shipment to Syria in July. The UAR arms
purchasing mission in Moscow informed Damascus in June
that the UAR officers being trained on these aircraft in the
USSR would have completed their courses by the end of July.
the UAR, aware
tnat me Israelis nave new French Vautour twin-jet aircraft,
apparently has decided to try to obtain MIG-19 jet fighters
as well from the Soviet bloc. Four to five shiploads of So-
viet military equipment, probably including 55 to 60 T-54
Medium tanks, have been delivered to Latakia in the past
six weeks. Since the USSR resumed major arms shipments
to Syria in July, more than 150 artillery pieces�possibly
including radar-controlled 57-mm. and 100-mm. antiair-
craft guns--have been delivered to Latakia. These arms,
along with large quantities of small arms and ammunition,
were contracted for by the Syrians under an agreement con-
cluded on 20 February 1958.
In addition, several Soviet vessels transported numerous
motor vehicles and other equipment to the Syrian region dur-
ing this six-week period. A recent British report claims
that JS-3 heavy tanks were offloaded at Latakia early in Au-
gust, but the report does not specify whether these tanks
were supplied by the Egyptian re ion or the Soviet Union.
TOP SECRET
23 Aug 58 CFKITRAI ItsITFI I inksirp R111 I FTIN page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
f2CfnaLIP
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
vigor'
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Regime Moving Toward More Anti-American Policy
Although Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim and certain other
ministers have given repeated assurances of friendship to-
ward the US, the government is relaxing curbs on anti-West-
ern�particularly anti- American- - actions.
Among the disquieting signs of this trend are the rabble-
rousing speeches of Vice Premier Arif, who harps on the
"evils of imperialism"; the emphasis on "imperialist plot-
ting against Syria" in the current "treason trials" for former
military leaders; am attempt to "nationalize" the American
Mission Hospital at Amara; and a refusal to allow reopening
of the USIS and Military Advisory Assistance Group offices
andinterference viiththe work of Point IV technicians. Other
irritants are restrictions on diplomatic pouches and diplo-
matic visas as well as on the communications and movements
of the American counsul at Kirkuk.
Public hostility toward Americans has been reflected
in the spitting on and stoning of embassy officers, a rash of
Iraqi student withdrawals from "imperialist" Point IV scholar-
ship, and charges that Point IV has been used to organize
"anti-Communist cells" for carrying out sabotage. Iraqi
friends of Americans are afraid to be seen talking with them
in public. Western contractors are experiencing labor troubles
on the large development projects and some have intimated
that they will accept no more new contracts, a move which
might induce the Iraqis to look to the Soviet bloc for technical
help.
Should the current Baathist- Communist struggle or other
factional fights for influence assume wider proportions, indi-
vidual members of the regime may feel compelled to voice in-
creasingly anti-Western propaganda lines in order to retain
their positions. It is likely that demands for denunciation of
the Baghdad Pact and for "nationalization" of the nation's oil
will be favorite themes, as well as the opening up of develop-
ment contracts to the Soviet bloc.
-SEGRET_
23 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
%aro
rielnkr_
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Nirr?
Pakistani Prime Minister Calls for Iraq to Leave
Baghdad Pact
Pakistani Prime Minister Noon said in a speech on 21
August that Iraq should leave the Baghdad Pact, that Pakistan
believes Arab unity under the leadership of Nasir would lead
to greater. Islamic unity, and that Pakistan would be willing
to enter a federation with Iran and Afghanistan. In contrast
to his 8 March speech in which he threatened to leave all de-
fense pacts if Western support for Pakistan on the Kashmir
issue was not forthcoming, the recent speech was not anti-
Western and explicitly defended the concept of collective se-
curity arrangements.
While Noon's statement may have been timed to impress
public opinion prior to elections, Pakistani leaders have long
believed that Iraq's involvement in Arab affairs created prob-
lems for the other Baghdad Pact members and that closer coopera-
tion would be possible without Iraq. Pakistani leacfers are un-
likely, however, to approve his remarks on Arab unity because
of their distrust of Nasir and his willingness to cooperate with
the USSR. While recognizing that an accommodation with
Arab nationalism is necessaryp they probably hope that Arab
unity will 'take the form of a loose'federation rather than a
united state.
Noon's offer to federate with Iran and Afghanistan may
heighten Afghan suspicions of Pakistani intentions, as the
Afghan leaders have already stated that they are not interested
in such a federation. His remarks on Islamic unity may cause
increased apprehensions in India, which has supported Arab
nationalism but is fearful of the emergence of a pan-Islamic
bloc..
SECRET
23 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
ry ,r1 r rur
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Greek Government May Resign Over Cyy_rus Dispute
Extreme pessimism regarding recent and anticipated
future developments in the Cyprus controversy has been
voiced by pro-Western Greek government leaders, and the
cabinet has discussed resigning. Prime Minister ICaraman-
lis has earlier said that he 77ould have to reign if adverse
developments in the Cyprus :.ispute continued.
Greek frustration over Cyprus reached a new high with
London's 15 August announcement that it intended to begin im-
plementation of amodifiedversion of the British seven-year
"Partnership" Plan for Cyprus. Provision for Turkish repre-
sentation in the proposed Cyprus government and the general
acceptance of "organic partition" between the two communities
on the island made the plan unacceptable to Greek Cypriot
Archbishop Makarios. His immediate rejection of the plan
made eventual rejection by Athens a certainty.
The Cyprus issue is only one of many factors in a grow-
ing estrangement between Greece and the West which may lead
Greece to dissociate itse1f----,pos8ibly even withdraw--from
NATO. Large segments of the public and the government be-
lieve that Greece has been abandoned by the US in the Cyprus
controversy and that Washington discriminaths in favor of Tur-
key politically, economically, and militarily. In addition,
cordial relations between Greece and the UAR have resulted
in widespread condemnation in Greece of recent Western moves
in the Middle East.
If the present government resigns, it will probably be
followed by a weaker coalition of non-Communist parties--
possibly Lander conservative leader Panagiotis Kanellopoulos.
It is doubtful, however, that such a government could do more
than its predecessor to reach a settlement of the Cyprus issue,
.pdrticularly if Makarios refused to acquiesce in such moves.
23 Aug 58 CPKITDAI IKITPI I inpkirr RI II I PTIKI Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
NNW'
eir�wilrytIrtriNITI A I
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Namil
Japan Approves Economic Credit for Burma
The Japanese Government on 22 August approved a
Burmese request for a $20,000,000 credit to be used for
purchasing Japanese products, probably machinery and
other industrial products. The crddit wotild be in addition
to reparations payments to Burma and is part of a Japa-
nese campaign to expand its own economic ties and counter
Communist bloc penetration in the area.
Japan thus far has extended a $50,000,000 credit to India
and is studying similar action on requests from Ceylon and
Pakistan. The credit to Burma would tend to counter a Sino-
Soviet bloc economic offensive in which Peiping has offered
a $4,200,000 loan for construction of a textile plant and Mos-
cow has extended $37,400,000 in credits. The United States
has lent $42,300,000 to Burma.
Tokyo, fearful of Communist China's call for a boycott
of Japanese products by Overseas Chinese residents in
Southeast Asia and by price reductions of up to 20 percent
on competitive Chinese products, is anxious to expedite
measures for orienting Asian trade toward Japan. As one
means of achieving this, Foreign Minister Fujiyama will
ask for US assistance in establishing a multinational develop-
ment fund for South and Southeast Asia when he visits Wash-
ington on 11 and 12 September for discussions of problems in
American-Japanese relations.
23 Aug 58 rckrro AI IkITCI I inckirc RI II I PTIM Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
orgrIDE'T
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Indonesian Dissidents Suffering Losses
The surrender of three battalions of dissident troops at
Tomohon has "broken the back" of the dissident movement in
North Celebes,
Djakarta army headquarters is now optinas-
tic over the chances of a quick settlement with the North Celebes
dissidents
he defec-
tion of the sector commander at Tomohon, their last major
stronghold, caused its fall to central government troops on 16
August.
In North Sumatra, the dissidents
have suspended operations on 18 AugusTb�na
of ammunition. They probably nearly expended their slim stocks
of ammunition during their intensive campaign of hit-and-run at-
tacks against government posts during the first half of the month.
Despite supply difficulties, the North Sumatra dissidents have
succeeded in denying to the central government all but a few ma-
jor towns.
SECRET
23 Aug 58 rctorDel im-rpi I impkirp Rill I FTIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
Approved for Release: 2020/0:1/23 C03169519
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
� Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
-613NPIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169519
-17-0P�SEERET-
0:4/#4/,'",
er,
�
/#1
4./
4./
rfj
T
;
�TOID�SECRET�
./,-miezzrnmz,�Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO3169519_, ........ A