CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/08/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169514
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: August 16, 1958

**gaime
- Approved for Release. 2020/01/23 C03169514
(C)
3.3(h)(2)
1(/
16 August 1958
Copy No. C- r
a
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
40-P�SECRET
////////A,L'efi ror4lLe2112f)/f)14/F2c60c49#5(4W///7/717/4/7
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
4.7�Arf gWir
AMIN
To% nil to. op�qp,
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
16 AUGUST 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Albania may be preparing to break
diplomatic relations with Yugosla-
via.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Closer ties between Saudi Arabia and
UAR expected to result from Crown
Prince Faysars stay in Cairo. 0
Iran - Arrests following distribution
of subversive literature indicate gov-
ernment's continuing concern over in-
stability. 0
Britain determined to press ahead with
modified Cyprus plan.
Chinese Communists seen unyielding
on issues blocking restoration of trade
and cultural ties with Japan.
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
h., J-� N....A 16 A-a A
0 South Vietnam - Economic sabotage
campaign launched by Communists and
other dissidents.
III. THE WEST
Cuban rebels gaining strength amid new
signs of dissatisfaction with Batista re-
gime.
LATE ITEM
Nationalist-feared Chinese Communist
air attack on offshore islands fails to
materialize.
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
'Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO3169514
"4404
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 August 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Yugoslavia-Albania: Albania may be preparing to break
diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia. This would make it the
first bloc state to go this far in the dispute with Tito. On
15 August Belgrade rejected an Albanian note in which the
Tirana regime protested the alleged "assassination" of an
Albanian national and warned that Yugoslav failure to accept
responsibility for the act would lead to the conclusion that
the lives of Albanian diplomatic personnel in Belgrade "are
in jeopardy." In 1948, Albania was the only bloc country to
break relations with Yugoslavia.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR - Saudi Arabia: Further moves toward re-estab-
lishing friendly relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAR
can be expected to result from the visit of Saudi Crown Prince
Fa sa who arrived in Cairo on 15 August.
(Page 1)
Iran: The arrest of at least two military and several
civilian figures on questionable evidence, following the dis-
tribution of subversive literature by an alleged "Military
Committee of Iranian Nationalism" indicates the government's
continuing fears for its stability. The resultant rumor cam-
paign will adversely affect the morale of the officer corps.
(Page 2)
FM*
LI
TOP SECRET
4Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514r ,
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
I Lir .CLr*j,i
4'
Cyprus: Britain's announcement on 15 August that it
intends to begin carrying out a modified version of its
Cyprus plan indicates London intends to go ahead in the
face of warnings about adverse effects among the.Greek Cyp-
riots and on the Greek Government. (Page 3)
Japan - Communist China'
there is little chance of
eip ng s moderating its attitude toward restoring trade and
cultural relations with Tokyo. Peiping insists
on the right of its projected trade mission to fly its flag in
Japan, and wants Tokyo to stop supporting the "two Chinas"
concept. The Kishi government has tentative plans to under-
take ambassadorial negotiationj with Peinine and will prob-
ably press ahead on this level. I (Page 5)
South Vietnam: Vietnamese Communists and other dis-
sidents appear to have embarked on a campaign of economic
sabotage aimed at weakening the Diem regime. Attacks on two
large French-owned rubber estates have already cut produc-
tion of this major revenue-producing commodity.
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Cuba: The rebels have increased their strength signif-
icantly since April. They are unopposed in almost half of
the rural areas in Oriente Province and have spread their
operations westward to other provinces. Other opposition
groups have a temporary agreement with the "26th oi July"
movement and have stepped up antigovernment plotting.
Batista continues to depend on the support of the army and
organized labor. However, the army appears to have no
"will to fight" and various elements are reportedly disatis-
fled with their role and with the government's mounting un-
popularity. (Page 7)
16 Aug 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
000 Communist hoop
strength
000 Nationalist troop
strength if. Ground-attack
� SELECTED MAJOR AIRFIELDS
I.+ Piston tighter
)). Jet tighter
if. Piston light bomber
+ Jet light bomber
UGUST 19B
Hengyang,
e.J\)-
Harikow4
Nanking
Chuhsien.
tseREN4--
LI ENCHEN G L AN
LiJNGCH I INGYANG
*AOC 1 CHIANG
IL-1,kv
CM,./ 8.6, 000
*Canton cHEem
?Iv._ HONG KONG ABOUT 500 JUNKS
SIGHTED HERE
80806 80816 7
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Cl-IOU SHAN I.
EAST CHINA SEA
ISTATLITE MILES
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
V /,
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
IA
-;t4)
LATE ITEM
*Taiwan Strait:
a Chinese Communist
air attack against the offshore islands would take place the
following morning at 0600 hours Taipei time. As of 1200
hours 16 August Taipei time (0100 EDST), no air attack had
occurred and no Communist military activity indicating such
an attack had been noted. A US naval task force on patrol
in the Taiwan Strait reported on 15 August a concentration
of about 500 junks about 70 miles east of Swatow; concen-
trations of up to 300 vessels have been previously sighted
on occasion in the Taiwan Strait and are not considered un-
usual. (See map on facing
page)
16 Aug 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
ii
TOP SECRET
if=arazrrSSISTEEZiliT6T

_ort.e% n, rt." rm. trt inn
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
yrs
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
No back-up material
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Saudi -UAR Rapprochement
Further moves toward re-establishing overtly friendly
relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAR can be expected
from the arrival of Saudi Crown Prince Faysal in Cairo on
15 August. Although King Saud has indicated that Faysal will
not enter into any agreement with Egypt at this time, Faysal
is known to favor much closer relations with Nasir than dqes
the King and could act on his own initiative.
Faysal is scheduled to be back in Saudi Arabia by 17 Au-
gust, but he may also attend the meeting of the political com-
mittee of the Arab League in Cairo on 6 September. Several
recent reports suggest that the league may be revitalized as
a Nasir-dominated grouping of Arab states adhering to a neu-
tralist foreign policy. The current visit of Kuwait's deputy
ruler to Cairo may be related to tais plan, since the Ruler of
Kuwait is apparently willing to provide financial support to
the Arab League.
TOP SECRET
16 Aug 58
�-�lk Irv% A I lk rrri I ir+010/^C DI III CTIAI
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
%of
Instability Increasing in Iran
Recent military and civilian arrests are indicative of
the feeling of suspicion and insecurity that:pervades all ranks
of Iranian society, including the Shah. While only the arrests
of a gendarmerie colonel and a sergeant have been confirmed,
there are rumors that arrests are continuing. Subversive
pamphlets signed by a "Military Committee of Iranian Nationali
and a roster of military and civilian members of the organiza-
tion were reportedly uncovered in the homes of the two arrest-
ed; the materials found in the colonel's house may have been
planted there shortly before they were seized.
All embassies, members of the Majlis, senior military
officers, and influential Iranian businessmen received anon-
ymous mimeographecl, letters from the "committee" highly
critical of the royal family and soliciting support in establish-
ing a republic with or without the Shah. American military
representatives in Tehran believe there is an air of falseness
about the entire proceedings.
Since the Iraqi coup, military officers have appeared some
insecure and extremely nervous as a result of repeated
rumors of arrests. The Shah also continues to be worried over
the possibility of an attempted coup. Criticism of the regime
and preliminary discussions of ways and means of action against
it are spreading among military officers, according to Ambas-
sador Wailes.
16 Aug 58
SECRET
CFKITRAI INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Britain Announces Modifications of Cyprus Plan
Britain acted swiftly to announce implementation of its
seven-year plan for Cyprus following the return of Prime Min-
ister Macmillan from his visit to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.
The plan, as announced in London on 15 August, contains sev-
eral modifications of the original plan made public on 19 June.
These changes appear designed to overcome Greek objections
to the proposals while retaining the general features of the plan
which Turkey previously accepted.
Modifications designed to appeal to Athens include: elim-
ination of official representatives of Greece and Turkey on the
Governor's Council--though official representatives to the gov-
ernor's office will still be appointed; indefinite postponement of
the provisions calling for Cypriots to have dual nationality; and
a vague reference to the possibility of a single island-wide
legislature at some future date. In addition, the British again
have announced that, following a period of peace on the island,
Archbishop Makarios will be allowed to return to participate in
electoral preparations.
While the British announcement goes far to ease Greek
fears that partition is being facilitated by the new plan, it does
not preclude the possibility of eventual partition. In addition,
the new announcement calls upon the governor to authorize;
where feasible, the establishment of separate Greek and Turk-
ish Cypriot municipal councils.
Immediate Greek reaction is unfavorable, with both For-
eign Minister Averoff and a representative of Makarios terming
the new plan "unacceptable." Averoff's principal objections are
centered on the retention of official representatives of Greece
and Turkey and the proposed separate municipal councils.
Ankara's reaction to the British modifications is unknown.
Turkish leaders informed Macmillan during his recent trip to
Ankara, however, that they would support the original plan but
SCCRE
16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
�
%of
would demand a tripartite meeting of Britain, Greece, and Tur-
key if modifications were introduced.
Britain's first step in implementing the new plan will be
the preparation of electoral rolls for the island, which may take
two or three months. Meanwhile, Londbn has called on Athens
and Ankara to appoint their representatives by 1 October to con-
fer with Cyprus Governor Foot.
SECRE7
16 Aug 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Itme
Japanese Sees Stiff Terms for Resumption of China
Mainland Trade
there is little chance that Peiping will relax its "harsh"
attitude toward Japan un takes official action to
meet Chinese demands, ras�Takv7these demands include re-
jection of the "two Chinas" policy, removal of obstructions
to gradual normalization of diplomatic relations, and uncon-
ditional approval for the Chinese Communists to fly their
national flag over a proposed trade mission in Tokyo as stip-
ulated in the fourth Sino-Japanese trade agreement.
The terms of this agreement very nearly caused a rupture
in Japanese - Chinese Nationalist relations last spring before
it was rejected by the Japanese Government. Japan's acquies-
cence now in Peiping's demands probably would precipitate a
new crisis between Tokyo and Taipei.
This may convince the Japanese Govern-
ment that private or unofficial approaches to Chinese leaders
will not succeed in re-establishing trade relations as widely
desired in Japan. Tokyo consequently may step up plans for
ambassadorial discussions to solve outstanding issues.
Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama told Ambassador
MacArthur on 12 August that Japan must evolve a long-term
policy toward Communist China, taking into account the Jap-
anese need for trade4, and Peiping's growing importance in inter-
natiOnal affairs. Fujiyama said he hopes to coordinate his gov-
ernment's views with those of the United States when he visits
Washington on 11-12 September.
16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
or, mrs
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Nee
Communist Economic Sabotage in South Vietnam
The 10 August night raid on the large French-owned
Michelin rubber plantation in South Vietnam by a combined
force of some 400 heavily armed Vietnamese Communists
and local dissidents appears part of an evolving new pattern
of economic sabotage designed to weaken the Saigon regime.
A similar attack on another rubber plantation occurred ear-
lier this year. Both raids were well coordinated and apparent-
ly carried out under Communist direction. The extensive
property damage on both occasions is expected materially to
lower Vietnam's rubber exports, a major source of revenue.
Production at Michelin�which annually exports about 8,000
tons of latex, about 12 percent of South Vietnam's rubber ex-
ports--may be halted indefinitely.
The Diem government is deeply disturbed over these open
manisfestations of deteriorating security conditions in the
rural areas. Rural insecurity is seriously jeopardizing Sai-
gon's efforts to strengthen its weak economy by raising rice
production and encouraging French investors to expand their
rubber holdings. The government may react to this latest
incident by reassigning regular army troops from training
duties to conduct a broad security sweep in conjunction with
paramilitary forces normally responsible for internal secu-
rity.
SECRE1
16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
III. THE WEST
Cuban Political Situation
Cpposition groups are acting with increasing determina-
tion to oust the regime of President Fulgencio Batista.. The
rebel movement has grown significantly since its abortive gen-
eral strike call last April. It has extended its control over
most of Oriente Province except for the cities and points of
army concentration, and has spread westward into other prov-
inces. Political opposition groups have established at least
temporary unity against the regime, and exile groups are for-
mulating plans for an invasion attempt.
Although Batista retains the backing of the organized labor
movement, popular dissatisfaction with the regime is increas-
ing, and the President is becoming more dependent on the armed
forces for support. The army itself has alienated the civilian
population, especially in Oriente Province, by its harsh repri-
sals against suspected opponents and its involvement in graft
and corruption. The inability of the armed forces to defeat the
rebels and the government's failure to resolve the political con-
flict could aggravate the dissatisfaction among some army of-
ficer groups and convince them of the necessity of replacing
Batista with a military or joint military-civilian junta. There
are continued reports of plotting among dissident military groups.
-SiteRE-I-
16 Aug 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commalider in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
-CONFIDEN1'1217411-
Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 C03169514
7/. /7//z/z i