CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/08/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169512
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: August 5, 1958

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5 August 1958
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CENTRAL
57
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
DOCUMENT NO.
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3 AUGUST 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian rebels inside Tunisia creat-
ing tense situation; rebel message
states Algerians "awaiting only order
to attack."
Mohamed V of Morocco uneasy about
growth of extreme nationalism; coup
rumors rife.
Israel - Ben-Gurion offers plan to
aid certain Middle Eastern govern-
ments in developing anti-Nasir capa-
bility.
Pressure growing in Lebanon for dis-
missal of the Sami Sulh cabinet and for
Chamoun to leave the country.
Rebel forces were still
fighting outside Beirut as of 3 August.
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�Iraqi foreign minister states his gov-
ernment is "studying" Baghdad Pact
ties; another official sounds out United
States on continued arms aid.
Cyprus - Greek terrorist leader pro-
claims "truce" until 10 August.
Indonesian dissidents planning to move
against Medan in North Sumatra.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 August 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Tunisia - Algeria: Tension between the Tunisians and
the Algerian rebels inside Tunisia appears to be mounting.
Algerian rebel forces in Tunisia, who may outnumber and
re probably better equipped than the Tunisian security forces,
are said to be looking increasingly to the leadership of Nasir
and the USSR.
the Algerians are "only waiting for the order to attack the Tu-
nisians" tends to substantiate other reports that the rebels
may move to overthrow the Bourguiba regime.
(Page 1)
Morocco: King Mohamed V is uneasy about the rapid
growth of extreme nationalism in Morocco since the Iraqi
coup and US-British landings in the Middle East and about
his ability to maintain control. There are rumors that coups
are being planned both within the ruling Istiqlal party and by
opposition groups. (Page 3)
Israel: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion states that Israel has
been in secret, high-level contact with the governments of the
Sudan, Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia for over a year, and hopes
to help these countries develop a capability to halt further ex-
pansion of Nasir's influence. Ben-Gurion wants the United
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States to support an Israeli program of providing a kind of
technical assistance program to the intelligence organiza-
tions of pro-Western governments in the Near East.
(Page 4)
Lebanon: Pressure is increasing for the resignation of
the pro-Western cabinet and for President Chamoun to leave
the country.
Rebel forces were attacking loyalist elements southeast
of Beirut on 3 August. Foreign Minister Malik has sent an
urgent inquiry to New York to find out whether the conditions
of a summit meeting there would be su
Minister Sulh, and Malik could atte d
Iraq: Foreign Minister Jumard has told Under Secretary
Murphy that his government is still studying the question of
Iraq's attitude toward the Baghdad Pact. Jumard observed
that the original decision to join the pact in no sense reflected
popular opinion in Iraq. The new Iraqi Government probably
intends eventually to withdraw from the pact. However, a
member of the government has asked "unofficially" whether
the United States is prepared to continue to supply Iraq with
arms. (Page 5)
Cyprus: A suspension of "all operations" against Turkish
Cypriots and the British on Cyprus was proclaimed by the lead-
er of EOKA, the Greek-Cypriot terrorist organization on 4
August. EOKA warned that operations may be resumed after
10 August if thp Turks 'Anti ritish "continue provocation."
7
(Page 6)
Indonesia: Dissident forces in North Sumatra, who claim
to have the support of Moslem extremists, are said to be plan-
ning an early move against government-held Medan.
(Page 7)
5 Aug 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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vaile NIS
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Early Move by Algerian Rebels Against Tunisian Regime
Possible
Tension between the Tunisian regime of President Bour-
guiba and the several thousand Algerian rebels of the National
Liberation Front (FLN) based in Tunisia appears to be mount-
ing and could culminate in an early move against Bourguiba.
iension4tetween� the-A1geriaris-and7
ZirgnisiarilVas becoming more acute daily and that the Tunisian
National Guard was gathering Algerian civilian refugees--of
whom there now are about 80, 000 in Tunisia--into centers
away from the frontier area in an attempt to avoid incidents
and maintain control. FLN troops in this re-
gion are heavily influenced by Cairo radio, are increasingly
sympathetic toward the USSR, and are looking more and more
to Nash' for leadership.
This growing breach between the Tunisians and Algerians
was further underscored on 31 July when Tunisian Foreign
Secretary Mokaddem, in a conversation with the American am-
bassador, criticized the FLN leaders and deplored the degree
to which the FLN seemed to be falling under Nasir's influence.
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FLN troops in Tunisia may outnumber Tunisian security
forces�which total less than 7,000--and are almost certainly
better armed and equipped. Ultimately, however, the success
of any coup attempt in Tunisia may depend on the extent to which
Bourguiba's popular support, especially in his dominant Neo-
Destour party, may have been eroded by his pro-Western reac-
tion to recent developments in the Middle East.
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Moroccan King Depressed Over Middle East Situatidn
King Mohamed V appeared depressed to a BritAsh writer
to whom he recently granted an audience. The King expressed
disillusionment with the American Government, which he felt
had failed to demonstrate to Morocco the value of an alignment
with the United States.
The King's uneasiness reflects in part the rapid growth of
nationalist extremism in Morocco since the Iraqi coup and has
been reinforced by popular critical reaction to the Anglo-
American landings in the Middle East. Members of the King's
privy council and moderate officials within the government have
expressed disappointment with an apparent lack of firmness by
the King since the assassinations of the Iraqi royal family.
Rumors are circulating in Morocco that both the left wing
of the Istiqlal party and a coalition of opposition parties are
planning coups. Led by former Premier Si Mbarek Bekkai, a
close friend of the King, the opposition coalition is said to in-
clude adherents of the Democratic Inclependenpe party (PDI),
which maintains close relations with the embassy of the United
Arab Republic, and has at one time at least had links with
Moroccan Communists and received subsidies from French
right-wing sources. This group is reputed to have arms caches
in traditionally dissident tribal areas of eastern Morocco--areas
from which France is now withdrawing its troops. The right
wing of the Istiqlal is aware of these activities, and one of its
officials claims that the party has ample armed resources to
meet any aggression on the part of the PD!. However, it is
questionable whether the right wing could similarly contain
such activities by the left wing.
The Moroccan Royal Army, numbering 31,000, and secu-
rity forces are reported to be loyal to the King but probably do
not have the resources to quell widespread armed dissidence,,
particularly if the dissidents receive support from the UAR or
other sources.
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Israel Suggests Informal Middle East Alliance Against Nasir
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has proposed that the
United States support the "quiet and informal" development of
a tacit alliance between Israel, Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia, and
the Sudan for the purpose of limiting the further expansion of
Nasir's influence in the Near East and Africa. Ben- Gurion told
Under Secretary Murphy on 31 July that Israel has had very
confidential and high-level contacts with the other four coun-
tries during the past year or more and that it is encouraged at
the interest they have shown in possibilities for mutual co-
operation. The immediate objective of Ben-Gurion's proposed
alliance would. be to strengthen the existing regimes in Iran
and the Sudan, which the Israelis believe "could be overthrown
in the near future. The long-term objective assertedly would
be economic development in the five states to give the people the
kind of life which Nasir "glitteringly promises" his followers.
The Israeli plan apparently results from the increasing sense
of isolation Israeli leaders have felt since the Suez crisis and which
has been heightened by the overthrow of the Iraqi Government.
This sense of isolation is especially acute with regard to Jordan,
where, Ben-Gurion said, "if Nasir comes in, I'm afraid we will
have to fight."
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Iraqi Situation
Sadiq Shanshal, minister of guidance and information in
the new Iraqi regime, "unofficially" has. attempted to sound
out Under Secretary Murphy as to whether the United States
is willing to continue military aid to Iraq. Shanshal, who
probably is the most influential civilian figure in the cabinet,
is a friefid of Nasir and has been a proponent of union with
Syria.
Foreign Minister Jumard, while emphasizing Iraq's de-
sire for friendship with the United States, stated that the ques-
tion of continued Iraqi participation in the Baghdad Pact was
still under consideration. However, he stated that the pact
had been signed without the authority and knowledge of the Iraqi
public, which was ignorant of the country's obligations under
the pact. Jumard's lengthy explanation is probably a sign that
the pact will be scrapped in the near future.
Murphy received the impression that the members of the
new government are not unfriendly, although they are suspicious
of American actions, and that they are an alert and earnest
group.
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EOKA Proclaims Suspension of Operations on Cyprus
The 4 August announcement by EOKA leader George
Grivas of an immediate suspension of operations against
the Turkish Cypriots and the British follows the worst month
of bloodshed on Cyprus since the campaign of violence began
in 1955. Appeals for an end to bloodshed had been made by
the British, Greek, and Turkish premiers and by Greek-
and Turkish-Cypriot leaders. The suspension, if it can be
maintained by the EOKA leadership, would mean the end of
intercommunal warfare on Cyprus, as the Turkish-Cypriot
underground organization, TMT, has previously called on the
Turkish community to forego violence, except in self-defense.
Grivas warned, however, that he reserved the right to order
a renewal of violence after 10 August if British or Turkish
"provocations" continued.
Grivas reasons for suspending operations are unknown.
The recent large-scale British security drive may have de-
prived EOKA of much of its striking power. Repeated state-
ments by British officials promising the return of Makarios
to the island if violence ceased for a period of time may also
have been a contributing factor in EOICA's decision. Finally,
the fact that continued intercommunal violence supports the
Turkish contention that the two communities cannot live to-
gether and the island must, therefore, be partitioned pointed
to the desirability of a truce.
Regardless of the cause for the announced suspension of
violence, its implementation will permit passions to cool on
the island. It will also give NAC Secretary General Spaak an
opportunity to proceed with informal conversations among the
NATO representatives of the three interested powers in his
attempt to find a lormula for an interim Cyprus solution.
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Dissidents May Attempt to Seize Medan in North Sumatra
Dissident troops in Nurth Sumatra are planning to take over
Medan in the near future with the help of Moslem extremists in
Atjeh and the territorial commander in Medan, Lt. Col. Gint-
ings, The central gov-
ernment is aware of the impending coup and of Gintings' pos-
sible defection and has him under surveillance. In view of the
government's knowledge of their intentions, the dissidents an-
ticipate military resistance to an attempt to take Medan.
the dis-
sidents had scheduled an important move somewhere in North
Sumatra in early August. This would be the second dissident
attempt to secure Medan, the first having been made in mid-
March.
Apparently the dissidents do not yet have a firm commit-
ment from either Gintings or the Moslem insurgents. Both Gint-
ings and the Atjehnese are reported to have responded favorably
to advances from the dissidents on previous occasions but failed
to follow through with positive assistance. Their failure to give
assistance now would either force a postponement of the attack on
Medan or result in an abortive attempt.
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