CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/08/04
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Publication Date:
August 4, 1958
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4 August 1958
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
hECLASS:FIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATESt130.10. _REVIEWER
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4 AUGUST 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IChrushchev-Mao meeting in Peiping
apparently was to assure identity of
views in anticipation of a summit
meeting.
Soviet Union continues pressure on
Iran in effort to disrupt Western de-
fense arrangements in Middle East.
Shah, still shaken by Iraqi coup, at-
tempts to tighten internal controls.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Middle East - Lebanese leaders con-
tinue negotiations to establish interim
government. Nasir sees rivalry be-
tween military and civilian elements
of Iraqi regime. Ruler of Kuwait ap-
proves entry of British troops in emer-
gency.
France - Soustelle and French Army
in Algeria intensify pressure on De
Gaulle for integration of Algeria.
� Brazil - Communists plan to partici-
pate in demonstrations during Secre-
tary Dulles' visit.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 August 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev-Mao meeting: The brief visit of Premier
Khrushchev to Communist China was apparently motivated
in part by a desire to assure, prior to a summit meeting,
an identity of views between Moscow and Peiping on foreign
policy toward the West. However, the trip may have been
planned prior to the Iraqi coup. The composition of the two
delegations indicates that intrabloc problems and Sino-Soviet
military relations were also discussed. The question of
Chinese Communist military activity in the Far East may
have been covered, but the tone of the communique does not
suggest early action in this area. The communiqud makes
no explicit reference to Chinese Communist participation at
a summit meeting. (Page 1)
USSR-Iran: Soviet Ambassador Pegov's almost four-
hour conversation with the Shah on 1 August falls into the
pattern of continuing Soviet diplomatic and propaganda ef-
forts to disrupt 'Western defense arrangements in the Middle
East and to alai= world opinion by alleging plans for a West-
ern-inspired attack on Iraq. The Shah, still shaken up by
the Iraqi coup, is taking measures to uncover subversive ele-
ments within the armed forces and to tighten his control.
Widespread measures to suppress potential sources of tr
would, however, increase dissatisfaction with the Shah.
(Pages 3 and 8)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Middle East: Lebanese leaders are continuing negotia-
tions to establish an interim regime pending General Shihab's
formal assumption of the presidency. Saeb Salam, the leader
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of the rebels in Beirut's Basta quarter, has professed to be
"very satisfied" over his meeting with Shihab.
Nasir believes rivalry is developing within the new Iraqi
regime between the military and civilian elements. The mil-
itary elements are said to want to join the UAR but the civil-
ians are opposed. Nasir's sensitivity to possible internal prob-
lems in Iraq may be due in part to his reported depression over
economic and political problems in the Syrian region of the
UAR.
Israel will ask the United States, Britain, and other "friend-
ly powers" for new arms, including more modern tanks, "two
or three" submarines, and advanced antiaircraft weapons.
The Ruler of Kuwait has reluctantly approved the entry of
British troops in an emergency; he refused, however, to allow
the Britis fn mime' in A snisill contingent now to protect a local
airstrip. (Page 4)
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria; Elements in Algeria which take their
cue from Information Minister Jacques Soustelle are inter-
preting De Gaulle's draft constitution as implicitly endorsing
full integration of Algeria with France. The French Army in
Algeria also is sympathetic to efforts in this direction and is
continuing to urge integration on the premier. Soustelle, who
is increasing his control over information media, will un-
doubtedly press within the cabinet for the integration formula.
In view of his connections with the Algerian militarry leaders
and Committees of Public Safety, he is in a position to ex-
ercise influence on De Gaulle,
Brazil: The Communists are planning to exploit demon-
strations scheduled by the National Students Union against
Secretary Dulles during his present visit to Rio de Janeiro.
The Rio police expect student demonstrators to number only
between 200 and 300. The police are believed capable of keep-
ing the demonstrations under control.
4 Aug 58
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Visits Communist China
The visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to Communist
China was apparently related,:_in part at least, to the urgency
of assuring an identity of views between Moscow and Peiping
on current international issues before a possible meeting be-
tween Khrushchev and Western leaders. However, the trip
may have been planned prior to the Iraqi coup. The joint com-
munique issued at the conclusion of the four-day visit reflects
Soviet recognition of Chinese interests on such issues as a
summit conference, the Middle East crisis, disarmament,
and intrabloc relations. Khrushchev may allude to Far East-
ern questions, such as Taiwan, at a summit meeting and may
possibly suggest a second conference with Chinese,Commu-
nist representation.
The composition of the two delegations, which included
both Chinese and Soviet defense ministers and high officials
responsible for foreign policy and party affairs, indicates the
talks covered three subjects: foreign policy toward the West,
intrabloc problems, and Sino- Soviet military relations. The
joint communique condemns the United States and Britain for
"aggression" in the Middle East and belabors the West for ob-
structing a summit meeting. It states that the principal tasks
for the moment are the reduction of armaments, discontinuance
of nuclear weapons use, elimination of military blocs and for-
eign military bases, and the conclusion of collective security
pacts.
The Chinese seem particularly sensitive to the matter of
foreign military bases and have linked their propaganda on the
Middle East to a renewed emphasis on the "liberate Taiwan" -
theme. The conversations on military matters may have cov-
ered the question of Chinese Communist activity in the Taiwan
Strait, but the communique itself gave no indication of an immi-
nent threat in that area. On the contrary, the communique'
pledged that both sides would do their utmost to ease interna-
tional tensions and prevent war, although it insisted that the
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actions of the West will be an important factor in determining
whether or not war can be avoided.
Communist sources have been dropping the word recently
of Chinese interest and activity in the development of nuclear
and missile techniques, and Peiping may well have urged great-
er Soviet assistance to China in advanced weapons.
On the matter of intrabloc relations, the communique in-
dicated no disposition to seek an early rapprochement with Bel-
grade. The Russians and Chinese pledged themselves to an
"uncomnro7ising struggle" against Yugoslav "revisionism."
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Soviet Ambassador Warns Shah of Iran
Soviet Ambassador N. M. Pegov, in a long conversation
with the Shah of Iran on 1 August, apparently tried to impress
him with the seriousness with which the Soviet Government
views Western military moves in the Middle East in order to
inhibit Iranian participation in Western-backed Middle East
defense measures. Pegov told the Shah he believed we are at
the "very brink of a major war" because, he said, the United
States was "urging" Turkey to invade Iraq, had landed Ameri-
can planes in Turkey, and had moved the Sixth Fleet off the
Turkish coast.
Pegov urged the Shah to protest to the United States the
overflight of Iran on 26 July of an American bomber which
allegedly also overflew Soviet air space and prompted Soviet
protests of "deliberate" violation to the American and Iranian
Governments on 30 July. Pegov is reported to have told the
Shah on 19 July that if American or British troops used Ira-
nian.territory as a base of operations against Iraq, Soviet
forces immediately would invade Iran. The Soviet note of
30 July reminded the Shah that he had pledged that "no foreign
troops would be stationed in Iran" and that "Iran would never
be used against the Soviet Union."
In addition to its warnings to Iran, Moscow has protested
to the governments of Turkey, Greece, West Germany, Austria,
Italy, and Israel for allowing use of their territory or air space
for facilitating the movement of troops and military supplies
to Western forces in Lebanon and Jordan.
Moscow now appears to believe there is little danger of
an attack on Iraq, but is confident it can safely exploit public
apprehension over recent Western military moves and alarm
over alleged plans for a Western-inspired attack on Iraq to
build popular pressures for an immediate summit conference.
Ithrushchev's 28 July notes to the United States, Britain, and
France said that the "preparations for armed interference in
Iraq which are proceeding at full speed" made an early meeting
mandatory. Moscow kept the allegation alive with a TASS state-
ment on 30 July regarding the Baghdad Pact meeting in London,
labeling it "a gathering of conspirators who were planning new
acts of aggression against the Arab countries."
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rtlewol
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Middle East Situation
Lebanon: Intensive postelection political maneuvering
continues, with President Chamoun and.hi a "loyalist" follow-
ers seeking to preserve some semblance of influence which
might enable them to make a comeback in the future, although
Chamoun personally has disavowed any wish to try to run again
for president six years hence, when he would again be consti-
tutionally qualified to do so. Radical opposition leader Saib
Salamis interview with General Shihab was "very satisfactory"
to Salami and the stamp of approval is being placed on the gen-
eral by the Cairo press and even by the new Iraqi regime,
which has sent greetings to Beirut.
Salam emerged from his meeting with Shihab still insist-
ing, however, on the fundamental rebel contention that Chamoun
must resign at once, and that American troops must depart be-
fore the rebels will lay down arms. Saiam also stated that when
Shihab becomes president, the rebels will demand that an oppo-
sition leader, not a neutral figure, form the cabinet. Salam
may not be able to force these demands at this time, however,
since reports from the area of his stronghold in Beirut's Basta
quarter indicate that most of the rebels there wish to resume
normal civil life and that Salam has had to press men into con-
tinuing guard duty on the rebel barricades.
Iraq: UAR President Nasir is reported to believe, on the
basis of his contacts in Damascus with Iraqi leaders, that ri-
valry is developing between Prime Minister Qasim and his
deputy, Colonel Arif, as well as between the military and civil-
ian elements in the Iraqi regime. While reports of the compo-
sition of the new regime and the background of the leaders indi-
cate that heterogamous elements are represented and that con-
flicts of interest are likely to occur, serious splits seem un-
likely until the regime attempts to clarify more specifically
its domestic and foreign policies.
The city of Baghdad has returned to a more normal atmos-
phere after the oil-tank fires gradually subsided on 2 August.
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Two American marines, who had been held for investigation
in connection with the fire, have been released. Formation of
a volunteer "popular resistance force" modeled on those of
Syria and Egypt was announced in a decree of 2 August. For-
eign volunteers, Arab and non-Arab, are permitted to join,
thus legally opening the way for "volunteers" from the UAR or
even from the Soviet bloc to be brought in in case of need.
UAR: Nasies sensitivity to possible internal divisions in
the new Iraqi regime may rest in part on awareness Of similar
problems in the Syrian region of the_UAR:-bn 1 August, a
Damascus paper ais�ociate,clzwith the Moslem Brotherhood at-
tacked a Damascus radi6-brOadcast which referred to Michel
Aflaq as the founder of the Baath party, king whether the
station was seeking to remind people of the existence of this
party despite the fact that all parties have been officially dis-
solved.
another large group
of Syrian army officers has been marked for retirement, and
rumors are circulating that Baathi officers are to be retired.
This continuing political squabbling, combined with economic
problems to which Nasir himself referred in a recent speech,
may lie behind the suggestion that the UAR be reorganized into
a looser federation which might include Iraq. In fact, relatively
little change other than name would be required to bring about
such a shift, and if Iraq were added in the process, it could
easily be made to appear as another victory fnr si r ra thp r
than a retreat from the ideal of Arab unity.
From Fawzits descrip-
tion, it would appear that Nasir would like to attend such a meet-
ing, preferably elsewhere than New York, but wants it to deal
with general world problems rather than concentrate on the Mid-
dle East. Nasir hopes the conference would bring about the
withdrawal of American and British forces from Lebanon and Jor-
dan: On other matters, however, the UAR believes the confer-
ence should come to no final conclusions and should be but a
prelude to other such meetings.
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Nio0P1
Jordan: King Husayn has formally admitted that the Arab
Union is dead by urging quick changes in those parts of the Jor-
danian constitution which had been altered to provide for the
union. Husayn has also dismissed Minister of Court Mulki,
who is believed to have been a possible channel of UAR influ=
ence. 1�in-his talk_with Under Secretary Murphy, Husayn still
appeared affected by the assassination of his cousin King Fay-
sal, but Prime Minister Rifai stated that Husayn is still de-
termined to defend his throne and would "never", abdicate.
Israel: Israeli Ambassador Eban in Washington has stated
that his government will ask the United States and other "friend-
ly powers" for substantial financing assistance and arms, in-
cluding M-47 or M-48 tanks, antitank recoillesrlifles, half-
tracks, two or three 500- to',6007ton submarines, helicopters
and transport aircralt, �signal equipment, several hundred "6 x 6"
trucks, and access to new antiaircraft wea-F011s suctk as "Nike"
missiles. The submarines are also being requested frOM the
UK, and combat aircraft are being sought "in the pattern of the
past"--i.e., from France.
Kuwait: The Ruler of Kuwait has refused a British request
for his-approval of the dispatch of a small contingent of British
troops to'becyre a local airstrip for possible future use. The
Ruler reluctantly gave what the local British politidal resident
has construed as approval for the entry of British troops to pro-
test foreign lives in the event of a serious' I6cal disturbance or in
the event of a wider external threat, but the Ruler indicated he
feels neither eventuality is likely. The ikiler's previously re-
ported interest in joining the moribund Arab League�which he
claims to believe might be revitalized by Kuwait's and Bahrein's
participation--is clearly based on his feeling that the move might
serve to deflect more drastic action against him by the UAR.
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Nimrod.
Iranian Shah Taking Measures to Tighten Internal Controls
The Shahof Iran, still shaken by recent events in Iraq,
is taking measures designed to uncover subversive elements
within the armed forces and to tighten his control. The in-
vestigation of Iranian officers by Savak, the Iranian national
intelligence organ, at the Shah's direction, is aimed at un-
covering any "Qasim-type" officers or other potentially dan-
gerous elements. Widespread,measures to suppress poten-
tial sources of trouble will only increase dissatisfaction with
the Shah.
The Shah's decision to promote only 10 percent of the
eligible officers to the rank of general will add to discontent
within the armed forces heretofore only associated with ele-
ments among the junior officers. He also apparently intends
to retire several of his generals, expecially those associated
with General Gharani, who was recently convicted of conspir-
acy against the Shah. The Shah's concern, amid continuing
reports of hostile Kurdish intentions and an unconfirmed re-
port of a Soviet-sponsored plot to kidnap him and organize a
new government, is further demonstrated by the early recall
of Prime Minister Eqbal and the chief of the Armed Forces
General Staff from London, here they h.d been attending
the Baghdad Pact meetings.
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