CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/11/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169430
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: November 25, 1956

Ar".cil brile,e2st!..iali/10/2;3/(CX�or,ff/A.,1)
3.3(h)(2) Z'
I/4 /
3.5(c) 25 November 1956
/
/ Copy No. 112 r
/
/
/
INTELLIGENCE rt.Tgil\W:SX---------4
,e4 CURRENT
BULLETIN 0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ---
AUT TO
-
DATE
REVIEWER
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the.
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
?UP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
/ Ur Jrat�nr., r
Nor' Noe
CONTENTS
1. LIMITED ISR4ELI DEMOBILIZATION REPORTED
(page 3).
2. !MR OFFER.1 MILITARY SPECIALISTS TO SYRIA
page 5).
3. TURKEY INCREASING TROOPS NEAR SYRIAN BORDER
(page 6).
FERISI 4 YUGOSLAV-SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
(page
8).
5. DOLLAR RESERVES DROP DRASTICALLY
�IHANI(page 10).
6. HUNGARIAN WORKERS' STRIKE
(page 11).
7. POLISH PARTY REPORTEDLY APPROVED PRESS ATTACK
ON SOVIET POLICY IN HUNGARY (page 13).
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP-S-EefiE T
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C0316943
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
J. A-1.11L0 'LA- IL W.11..�
-�11111,1
1. LIMITED ISRAELI DEMOBILIZATION REPORTED
he strength of Israeli military forces
s reported to have been reduced to
bout 135,000 from the estimated
00,000-level attained during the hos-
ilities in Sinai. Israeli strength re-
ains extraordinarily high in compar-
son with any other previous period,
and Israel remains capable of remobil-
izing within 24 hours.
The heavy Israeli concentrations along
the Syrian and Jordanian borders are
reported to have been withdrawn, and
only thin screening forces remain. Field
communication wire which had been ob-
served in the area since late October has
been removed. Some reserve brigades -
are reported to have been demobilized
and others returned to normal garrisons. �The Israeli forces
remaining on duty, however, are considered capable of effec-
tive action against Syria and Jordan, with little or no warning,
upon reoccupation of forward positions.
An extensive reconnaissance by UN truce
observers along Israeles frontier with Jordan on 23 November
revealed "nothing unusual." On the same day other UN ob-
servers made a six-hour patrol of the Israeli side of the bor-
der with Syria and reported no indication that Israel was pre-
paring for offensive action.
Additionally, on 20 November
the Israeli air
force had released those individuals called up for the hostili-
ties in Egypt, and had returned to normal training programs.
On 19 November, Israeli air strength included approximately
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
%."1. JLJla_IL Liu _a
7101
65 jet fighters of all types. The number of Mystere IV-A
high-performance jet fighters noted in Israel, however,
dropped from 66 in late October to 33 on 19 November. In
the same period, the number of Noratlas twin-engined trans--
ports observed dropped from ten to two. These reductions
probably reflect withdrawal of French air units which were
based in Israel and participated in hostilities against Egypt.
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Tijr�Sbtl'ELL-1
2. USSR OFFERS MILITARY SPECIALISTS TO SYRIA
The Soviet Union has offered the Syrian
arms mission in Moscow 190 Soviet
military specialists, a number described
by the Soviet negotiators as "'sufficient
for training!' The Soviets agreed to consider a Syrian request
that the number be increased to about 600 the "minimum neces-
gary for fighting!'
Syria has only a few Czech arms techni-
cians. The number offered by the USSR is slightly less than
half the bloc arms technicians believed to have been engaged
in training and maintenance in Egypt prior to hostilities.
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
3,, TURKEY INCREASING TROOPS NEAR SYRIAN BORDER
The movement by rail of the Turkish
5th Armored Brigade from Mamak, near
Ankara, to a position at Urfa, southwest
of Diyarbakir
continues the
build-up of military forces in southern Turkey near the
Syrian border. It has also been confirmed that the First
Tank Battalion has recently moved from Ankara to the
Iskenderun (Alexandretta) area, and there is some evi-
dence that Turkish infantry units have moved to the west-
ern segment of the Turkish-Syrian border.
American officials have been denied per-
mission to travel in the area south of Diyarbakir. Both the
BU LO
RE
BLACK SEA
sP�P'
LS 2
ANKARA
,MAMAK
't
USSR
190
290
Miles
--5th ARMORED 3rd
BRIGADE AIR FORCE 12th IRAN
1st TANK DIYARBAKI Rirr
BATTALION N, MARDI%
) URFA1,
� 'ALEPPO
SYRIA
cr_
i9p1NE
LEBANO
�DAMASCUS
I R AQ
25 Nov 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 6
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
EeREr
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
American embassy and the military mission believe the
Turks are not admitting the extent of their military build-
up. The Syrians also allege that Turkish planes are flying
reconnaissance missions over their airfields.
Simultaneously, at least a partial mobili-
zation of Turkey's armed forces appears to be under way.
Turkey's military build-up along its southern border may be
strictly precautionary, but the Turks view the Syrian-Soviet
courtship with increasing anxiety.
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
SECRE T
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
SFCRE
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Neol
4. CRISIS IN YUGOSLAV-SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
Yugoslav differences with the Kremlin
have reached their most critical point
since 1948 as a result of the Soviet sei-
zure of ex-premier Nagy, the latest
Pravda editorial against Tito, and vio-
lent Albanian propaganda against Yugo-
slavia. For ideological and economic
reasons, Tito would be reluctant to make
a complete break, but may now feel that
the entire Yugoslav policy of independent
Communism must be upheld.
According to Belgrade, the Yugoslays
had worked out a firm agreement that the Kadar regime
would not molest Nagy and other members of his govern-
ment when they left their refuge in the Yugoslav embassy
in Budapest. Soviet army officers refused to recognize
the agreement, took the Hungarians into custody, and e-
jected the Yugoslav diplomats assigned to see the men
safely home. The Tito government has now sent two strong
protest notes to Hungary, demanding immediate fulfillment
of the agreement and rejecting the Hungarian explanation
that Nagy and the others went to Rumania of their own voli-
tion. The Yugoslays are likely to withdraw support from the
�Kadar regime. According to press reports, Belgrade has
also sent a strong protest note to Moscow, the first such dip-
lomatic action since Stalin's death.
Yugoslav vice president Kardelj told
Ambassador Riddleberger that the Nagy kidnapping proved
three things: the Stalinist wing is now dominant in Moscow
and Khrushchev's personal position no longer important
since the Kremlin leaders are united on policy; the Soviet
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
3MtEir
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Noe
Name
leaders are now trying publicly to discredit Yugoslavia;
and the Hungarian revolt will be hopelessly crushed as a
lesson to the Satellites. Kardelj said he felt the Yugoslav-
Soviet declarations of June 1955 and June 1956 had received
their coup de grace, not from the Nagy affair, but from the
September directive from Moscow to the Satellites warning
against Yugoslav influence. Another Yugoslav official said
that the "ideological struggle" with the USSR would be "very
lone but would not affect state relations as it had in 1948.
The American embassy in Belgrade has
seen a memorandum, apparently giving regime guidance to
Yugoslav Communists, which says the Stalinists now have
complete control in Moscow, but that anti-Stalinists probably
will regain control gradually. Yugoslav Communists are
warned to expect vilification similar to 1948, but are told
to react calmly to avoid pushing the Stalinists to greater ex-
tremes.
The Albanian press and leaders are now
attacking Tito vehemently, accusing the Yugoslays of "sub-
versive propaganda and conspiracies!' According to a
Yugoslav press correspondent abroad, Tito fears Moscow
may instigate an uprising against Hoxha in order to blame
�Tito and justify an attack on Yugoslavia. While such an at-
tack seems highly unlikely, Moscow may be preparing a
case against Yugoslav interference. Tirana announced on
23 November the execution of three agents for espionage--
presumably for Yugoslavia.
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
-SECRET---
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
(Li
Nem,
5. BRITISH GOLD AND DOLLAR RESERVES
DROP DRASTICALLY
In the week ending 17 November, Brit-
ish gold and dollar reserves decreased
by $102,000,000, as compared with
$84,000,000 lost during all of October.
T is re uce � reserves to a total only $67,000,000 above
the two billion dollars considered by British Treasury of-
ficials as the minimum safety level. This decline for a
single week is greater than that for any previous month
this year, and underlines Chancellor of the Exchequer
Macmillan's statement that the
October losses, which preceded the Anglo-French inva-
sion of Egypt, would be "as nothing" compared to those of
November.
The United Kingdom's most immediate
financial concern is to maintain the strength of sterling as
the trading medium for approximately 40 percent of free
world trade. Even before the Suez crisis, there was substan-
tial speculation on the continent against the pound because
of Britain's gold and dollar losses and the poor prospects
for reversing the trend.
In addition, the American embassy esti-
mates that if Middle Eastern sources remain blocked, Britain
will have to spend approximately $225,000,000 over the next
six months to maintain oil supplies at 75 percent of normal
consumption in Britain and among normal British customers
on the continent.
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
-Tell4�Q-FicLR-rf-cr
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
-Are* ft-T--
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
lunge N.4100'
6. HUNGARIAN WORKERS' STRIKE
he American legation in Budapest,
ommenting on the "peak effective-
ess" achieved on the second day of
he 48-hour general strike, states
hat the present mood of the workers
ndicaes no intent to resume work and
hat, in fact, public determination to
ontinue the strike is mounting. A one
our "stay-at-home" protest on 23 No-
ember by the people of Budapest--
iewed by the legation as a "complete
uccess"--appeared to give the popula-
ion a further big morale uplift.
hese observations were made by the
egation prior to the seizure and alleged
eportation of Nagy to Rumania by the
oviets--a move which apparently has
only served to stiffen popular resistance to the ICadar regime.
Kadar, however, appears to be taking a
somewhat stronger approach to the problem of getting the
country back on its feet, despite the obvious unpopularity of
his government. In a speech made on 25 November to a dele-
gation from the Budapest Workers Council, ICadar said,"It
is part of the government's program that (it) cannot be soft
and yielding. Practice has shown that a counterrevolution
cannot be disarmed by concessions." He then went on to make
the same evasive type of promises that he has been making
since he took over--that once order has been restored the
government will be able to take steps to meet popular demands.
The first attack by the government against
Cardinal Mindszenty�still in refuge in the American legation
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
-SECRET-
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Imre
in Budapest--appeared the same day in the party daily, which
described him as "a typical representative of fascism,"
Unconfirmed press reports from Vienna
on 25 November state that renewed fighting has broken out
in Hungary, both in the capital and other parts of the country.
According to unconfirmed refugee reports, insurgents were
fighting in mountainous areas in southern xiungary as late as
21 November.
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430
WAHIIEITTIAL
7. POLISH PARTY REPORTEDLY APPROVED PRESS
ATTACK ON SOVIET POLICY IN HUNGARY
The press attack on Soviet policy in
Hungary in the Polish paper, Zycie
Warszawy, on 23 November was ap-
proved in advance by the press depart-
ment of the central committee of the
Polish United Workers (Communist)
Party,
The articl�hUFthesovi
on Hungary a "senseless theory," attacked the Soviets at
their most sensitive point by stating that the Soviet system
itself as well as Stalin bears a heavy responsibility for
Stalinist practices.
Various other Polish papers have joined
in criticizing Soviet policy in Hungary, although the chief
party daily has not yet entered the controversy. One news-
paper endorsed Tito's views on events in Hungary and called
for Polish-Yugoslav co-operation. Broadcasting of these
articles by the Polish radio suggests that the regime is pre-
pared to engage in public controversy with Moscow.
25 Nov 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 13
Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03169430