CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/05/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169424
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: May 30, 1957

,Approved
for Release 2�121121�4069r/
'Y/CUENT
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30 May 1957
uopy NO.
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE !N S
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANC.EA) TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _
AUTH� H 70-j
PAT
REVIEWER
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
,7077
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CONTENTS
. JAPANESE VIEW OF TAIPEI RIOTS
(page 3).
n\l-N
v 2. SUPPORT GROWING IN FRANCE FOR RECOGNITION OF
EIPING (page 4).
. POLITICAL RIOT IN BEIRUT
(page 5).
4. SHOWDOWN LIKELY BETWEEN JORDAN'S KING AND
CABINET STRONGMAN (page 6).
EAST INDONESIA DEFIES DJAKARTA
AI. LAOTIAN CABINET RESIGNS
page 7).
(page 8).
7. PATHETS ADVOCATE SWITCH TO CONCILIATORY TAC-
TICS IN NEGOTIATIONS (page 9).
EARLY CRISIS IN THAILAND FEARED
GOMULKA VISIT TO MOSCOW
(page 11).
(page 10).
10. AFGHAN KING ACCEPTS INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW
(page 12).
t\i) . SOVIET SUBMARINE OFFICERS REPORTEDLY ASSIGNED
TO MERCHANT SHIPS (page 13).
riOANNEX- -Conclusions of the Watch Reoort of the Intelligence
Advisory C,omml.ttee (
(page 14).
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....7Lak.IILL.
1. JAPANESE VIEW OF TAIPEI RIOTS
Japanese Foreign Ministry analysts
have tentatively concluded that the
Chiang Ching-kuo clique was the prin-
cipal Kuomintang group involved in the
riots which they describe as "Obviously prearranged by
important elements in the government of the Republic of
China." The ministry,
has received a number of reports that National
Youth Corps members were identified as among the princi-
pal leaders.
few native Taiwanese were involvect anct that most par
were Chinese mainlanders who sought refuge on Taiwan with
the Chiang regime. The Japanese Foreign Ministry believes
that sentiment aroused by the Reynolds case was exploited by
some elements of the Kuomintang in order to break into Amer-
ican files and ascertain the attitude of the United States toward
Nationalist China.
Comment reported evidence
of prior planning and some have stated that
the Kuomintang and Youth Corps participated in the rioting.
American officials in Taipei report that looting of the embassy
files appears to have occurred without system and that the riots
were probably not staged for that purpose.
he riots "were carried on in a somewnat
organized manner" with the participation of young men in student
uniforms.
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2, SUPPORT GROWING IN FRANCE FOR RECOGNITION
OF PEIPING
Sentiment favoring recognition of Com-
munist China by France is reportedly
gaining ground in center and rightist
parties, I
mong the new advocates of recog-
n ion ar t of the parliamentary group of
Rene Pleven's small center party and Emile Roche, a
prominent Radical Socialist he resident of the
advisory Economic Council.
Comment According to the American embassy in
Paris, a Social Republican (ex-Gaullist)
member of the National Assembly's foreign affairs committee
Is sponsoring a bill calling for recognition. There are also
press reports from Hong Kong and Peiping that former pre-
mier Edgar Faure, who is now on a month-long visit to
Communist China, has voiced his unqualified support for
recognition.
Premier Mollet has continually had to
restrain left-wing leaders of his own party--particularly
Daniel Mayer, chairman of the assembly foreign affairs
committee, from pressing for such a move.
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None
3. POLITICAL RIOT IN BEIRUT
Comment on:
Rioting which followed government
attempts to suppress a political dem-
onstration by opposition groups in
Beirut on 30 May resulted in the death
of at least six persons and the serious
wounding of 23. Pro-Egyptian opposi-
tion leader, ex-prime minister Saib Salam,
received a head wound and is under ar-
rest in a hospital. Most of the casualties
were Palestinian refugees and Syrians.
Warrants are reported to have been issued
for the arrest of all opposition leaders.
Beirut and Tripoli are being patrolled by
tanks and armored cars of the army and gendarmerie.
The riots grew out of a 48-hour opposi-
tion ultimatum threatening a general strike if the government
of pro-American prime minister Sami Solh did not resign in
favor of a caretaker government which would supervise the
parliamentary elections beginning on 9 June. Agitation for
a coup d'etat against President Chamoun added to the tension.
the opposition planned a march on and occupation ot the
parliament building. Egyptian
to spend in an mart to
defeat the government. It is probable that some of this money
was used to hire the agitators who participated in the demon-
strations.
The severe measures taken by the govern-
ment in suppressing the demonstration may strengthen the
opposition by providing it with martyrs. More rioting may
occur at a planned mass funeral for those killed. The riot is
reported to have had the effect of consolidating Christian opin-
ion on the side of the government and Moslem opinlon on the
side of the opposition. The increased tension along religious
lines may lead to incidents throughout the country.
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4. SHOWDOWN LIKELY BETWEEN JORDAN'S KING AND
CABINET STRONGMAN
A showdown between King Hussain and
the cabinet strongman, Deputy Premier
and Foreign Minister Samir Rifai, is re-
ported developing over Rifai's reluctance
to request withdrawal from Jordan of the
Egyptian military attache and the Egyptian consul general in
Jerusalem. Rifaits defeat on this question would foreshadow
his departure from the cabinet. This would weaken the king's
position.
� Comment Samir Rifai, although strongly pro-West,
is sensitive to majority sentiment in Jordan
which remains strongly nationalist and anti-West. Therefore,
he has been attempting to prevent further widening of the breach
with Egypt. The two Egyptian officials in question have been
deeply involved in intrigue with antimonarchical left-wing polit-
ical groups in Jordan.
Hussain, in his efforts to strengthen his
personal position as quickly as possible, runs the risk of
alienating elements whose support he needs.
he has also createa resentment
among Palestinian Arab officers in the army by his policy of
increasing the proportion of Bedouin troops and showing favorit-
ism to Bedouin officers.
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5, EAST INDONESIA DEFIES DJAKARTA
Comment on:
In a 29 May broadcast, the military
governor in northern Celebes strongly
denounced the Indonesian government's
recent orders relieving Lt. Col. Samual
of his command in East Indonesia and split-
ting the area into four military regions. He accused Djakarta
of attempting to "divide and rule" in the manner of the Dutch
colonialists, and stated that the people's hope for a policy
based on national peace was "merely a dream!' East Indone-
sians were also warned to be on guard against "stooges" of
the central government, as the "people's fight must be di -
rected against the enemies from without and for the elimina-
tion of the enemies from withinr
Since the governor owes his appointment
to Samual, his statements almost certainly reflect his chief's
viewpoint. While it does not quite constitute a declaration of
independence, this speech underlines the determination of
East Indonesians to win their demands for greater political
and economic autonomy. Samual recently withdrew $9,000,000
from a Celebes branch of the Bank of Indonesia for "local eco-
nomic development!'
Recent developments concerning East Indo-
nesia indicate that President Sukarno is still opposed to grant-
ing any significant concessions to the provinces, despite the
conciliatory position recently taken by Prime Minister Djuanda
in the parliament. In his struggle with the central government,
Samual probably can count on the support of other dissident
leaders in Borneo and Sumatra
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6. LAOTIAN CABINET RESIGNS
Comment on:
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's
cabinet submitted its resignation on
30 May after the government suffered
a defeat in the National Assembly on
its handling of the Pathet Lao negotia-
tions. If Souvanna's resignation is ac-
cepted, as seems likely, Deputy Pre-
mier Katay and his former political
rival, Phoui Sananikone, leader of the
Independent Party, appear to have the best prospects of
forming a new government. They are planning to imple-
ment an agreement they concluded recently under which
Katay would become premier and Phoui his deputy. To
succeed, however, they would need to win support from
several other factions.
In the event the major leaders are un-
able to agree on a candidate, Prince Petsarath may be the
strongest alternative. He recently returned from a visit to
Pathet-held territory, allegedly convinced that the Pathets
are not Cornmunisth and are no longer controlled by the Viet
Minh,
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7. PATHETS ADVOCATE SWITCH TO CONCILIATORY
TACTICS IN NEGOTIATIONS
The Pathet Lao advised Hanoi
that Prime Minister Souvanna
Priouma, pressed by America, Britain
and France, was being forced to adopt
stiffer tactics and recommended a switch
to more conciliatory tactics, during
negotiations "we have only been discussing questions raised
by us... and have done our best to dodge any questions brought
up by them... These long-standing tough tactics and per-
verseness of ours are bringing the present talks to a stand-
still.... We feel that the time has come to broach the ques-
tion of the two provinces and the armed forces,"
Comment On 27 May, Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma read before the National Assem-
bly a letter from Pathet chief Souphannouvong in which the
latter promised to surrender control of the two northern prov-
inces and Pathet armed forces immediately after the formation
of a coalition government. This proposal undoubtedly was de-
signed to strengthen Souvanna's position, by permitting him to
point to the development of Pathet "reasonableness" as a posi-
tive achievement of his policy of accommodation.
In the event Souvanna's reported resigna-
tion is accepted, the Pathets may well make some dramatic
gesture during the cabinet crisis in the interest of promoting
his return to office or the appointment of Petsarath. In any
event, they will probably follow through with their plan to neu-
tralize Deputy Premier Katay by "breaking" him politically.
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8. EARLY CRISIS IN THAILAND FEARED
expect
trouble to break out in Thailand "be-
fore long." I reported
that the ruling triumvirate of Premier Phibun, Interior
Minister Phao and Defense Minister Sarit is likely to break
up in the near future, with Phibun siding with Phao against
Sarit, who is supported by elements in the court and by con-
servative opposition leader Khuang.
Comment Phibun admitted to the American ambas-
sador on 23 May that the internal situation
in Thailand was "very serious," complaining that even though
his regime was under strong opposition attack, Phao and
Sarit were "fighting" each other and that Sarit was "even
attacking me." The recent decisions of both Phao and Sarit
to cancel projected visits to the US provide, a measure of
the tensions presently underlying the political situation in
Bangkok.
There is a good possibility, however,
that Phibun will be able, as he has so 0fte12 in the past, to
maintain at least an uneasy truce between his two chief sub-
ordinates.
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9
Comment on:
GOMULKA VISIT TO MOSCOW
Polish first party secretary Gomulka
and Premier Cyrankiewicz apparently
went to Moscow for a brief visit over
the week end of 26 May.
the two leaders were accompanied by
Agriculture Minister Ochab.
.01.409 � 9 arePr9.
The visit is reported to have been arranged
by the Kremlin prior to the recent Polish party central cornmittee meeting for the purpose of discussing the results of the
meeting and other political matters. The Poles may also have
gone to Moscow to press the Russians for further economic aid,
possibly an increase in grain and meat deliveries and other
consumer goods.
-
during the period appeared normal.
30 May 57
Soviet military activity in Poland
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10, AFGHAN KING ACCEPTS INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW
Comment on:
King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan has ac-
cepted an invitation to visit Moscow
extended by Kliment Voroshilov, pres-
ident of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, according to a Soviet
radio broadcast of 28 May. No date was mentioned in the
announcement.
Moscow presumably waited until King
Zahir had indicated his acceptance before it made this an-
nouncement. The king's other engagements make it unlikely
that he plans to visit the USSR before next fall, however, and
he may prefer to wait until next year.
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11 SOVIET SUBMARINE OFFICERS REPORTEDLY
ASSIGNED TO MERCHANT SHIPS
the USSR has
issigned submarine officers to Soviet
1(lerchant ships in accordance with a
directive of the Council of Ministers, USSR. These offi-
cers, who are either submarine commanders or senior
assistants to submarine commanders, reportedly were as-
signed for a period of one year for the primary purpose of
gaining first-hand experience with navigation in foreign
waters. In addition, each officer allegedly was issued
photographic equipment and given a specific intelligence
assignment.
Comment Since 1952, the number of contacts made
by Western navies with unidentified sub-
marines throughout the world has increased steadily and the
majority of these contacts have been judged to be Soviet.
The successful completion of these
patrols attests to the mechanical reliability of the Soviet
long-range submarines and the operating skill of their
crew members and commanding officers.
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ss"V
ANNEX
Watch Report 356, 29 May 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against the continental US or its possessions in the
immediate future.
B. No Sino -Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against US forces abroad, US allies or areas periph-
eral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the
Arab states is not probable. Although tensions continue
between the Arab states and Israel and among certain
Arab states themselves, these are not likely to lead to
serious conflict in the immediate future.
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