CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/08/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169415
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: August 8, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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8 August 1957
Copy No.
136
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MTH: HR 7Q-2
DATLite FiEVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
TOP SECRET
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3.5(c)
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CONTENTS
. NEARLY HALF OF SOVIET AMBASSADORS NOW IN
1,.� MOSCOW (page 3).
N�c
(-3�
2. SOVIET-SYRIAN COMMUNIQUE
(page 4).
3. USSR REPORTEDLY PRESSING FOR EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN
A \ UNION (page 5).
4. GREEK GOVERNMENT PLANS DIRECT APPROACH TO
TURKEY (page 6).
5. GROWING PRESSURE FOR ENDING LAOTIAN GOVERN-
MENT CRISIS (page 7).
)11,
PEIPING'S TERMS FOR SINO-BURMA BORDER SETTLE-
MENT REVEALED (page 8).
GUATEMALAN LEADER CONFIRMS DECISION ON
CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (page 9).
\kk. WEST GERMANS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW
page 10).
8 Aug 57
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1. NEARLY HALF OF SOVIET AMBASSADORS NOW
IN MOSCOW
Comment on:
Of the 54 Soviet ambassadors and min-
isters in diplomatic posts abroad, some
26 have returned to Moscow since 1 June.
Eight went home during June; the rest have
returned since mid-July, Some of the 26 have made two trips
to Moscow during this period; only one is known to be back at
his post. In several instances counselors, first secretaries,
and other diplomatic officials have also returned to the USSR.
The movement of a numger of the ambassa-
dors can be attributed to vacations or discussions concerning
the countries to which they are accredited. Foreign representa-
tives could also have been called home for briefings after the
June party shake-up.
The presence in Moscow of nearly half of
all Soviet ambassadors, however, suggests more than routine
matters. There may be general discussions of new moves in
foreign policy or the international Communist movement, such
as the recent talks with Tito, It could also indicate important
government and party meetings to consider as yet unannounced
personnel and organizational changes.
Although several of the ambassadors were
already scheduled to leave their posts before the June plenum
of the central committee, some of the returning diplomats may
be removed as a follow-up to the dismissal of the presidium's
"antiparty group." Ambassador Pegov, for example, who was
appointed to Tehran only last August, is now known to have been
permanently recalled and may be under a cloud for past asso-
ciations in the central nartv apparatus with Malenkov and pos-
sibly Kaganovich.
8 Aug 57
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a.-11-at4.4 .1
2. SOVIET-SYRIAN COMMUNIQUE
Comment on:
The joint communique signed on 6 August,
if it reflects completely the discussions be-
tween the USSR and Syria, indicates that
Syria's minimum requirements were not
met. The communique does not commit
the USSR to alleviate Syria's need for cash, but contains only
vague promises of future aid. The development projects pro-
posed for study by experts might amount to the $112,000,000
program which the Damascus press last week reported the
USSR had offered.
The Syrians may still hope to obtain some
financial relief during their visit to Prague, such as a ofte
ing of payment terms for the arms they have received.
8 Aug 57
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3. USSR REPORTEDLY PRESSING FOR EGYPTIAN-
SYRIAN UNION
The USSR is encouraging a federal
union between Egypt and Syria and is
"attempting to pressure" Cairo into
sending Defense Minister Amir to
Moscow to discuss military cooperation between Egypt,
Syria, and the USSR,
Comment The USSR probably believes that an
Egyptian-Syrian union would be an ef-
fective instrument for bolstering the Nasr regime's strength
and prestige in the Arab world and countering American ef-
forts to bring the Arab states into closer association with the
West. Damascus would probably welcome a Soviet-supported
union with Egypt, and leftist Syrian officers reportedly went
to Moscow recently to discuss the present Soviet views on
Cairo's recent statements on the ques-
tion of union, however, have been lukewarm,. Amir has ac-
cepted Marshal Zhukov's invitation to visit the USSR but has
postponed the trip for the time being. It appears that Cairo
intends to avoid any effective action directed toward union
at present, with or without Soviet backing.
8 Aug 57
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4. GREEK GOVERNMENT PLANS DIRECT APPROACH
TO TURKEY
Greek Foreign Minister Averoff told
Ambassador Allen on 6 August that the
Greek government is ready to undertake
direct negotiations with Turkey on the
Cyprus problem and would even consider a visit to Ankara
by Prime Minister Karamanlis and Averoff. Averoff said
reports from Greek Ambassador to Turkey Pezmatzoglou
led him to hope that influential Turkish officials already re-
alize that partition is not feasible and might be ready to ac-
cept a Cyprus solution agreeable to Greece.
On 3 August, Averoff informed Allen
that Greece might accept a British invitation to a new tri-
partite conference on Cyprus if a majority of the conferees
would support some form of independence or dominion status
for Cyprus,, with provision for later "modification."
Comment Pezmatzoglou was sent to Ankara last
month as Greek ambassador because of
his long-standing friendships with high-ranking Turks and his
reputation as an advocate of Greek-Turkish friendship. In his
enthusiasm to promote a rapprochement between the two coun-
tries,, he has probably been overoptimistic in his reports to
Athens.
The Turks may be preparing to moderate
their Cyprus stand and may also be studying the possibility of
an Anglo-Greek-Turkish condominium over the island. Ankara
is not likely at present to agree to a new tripartite Cyprus con-
ference on Athens' terms, although it probably would not dis-
courage a Greek overture for direct talks.
8 Aug 57
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VI-,
5, GROWING PRESSURE FOR ENDING LAOTIAN
GOVERNMENT CRISIS
Comment on:
Opponents of Laotian Premier-designate
Souvanna Phouma's policy of conciliation
with the Communist Pathet Lao feel that
Laos needs "a government, almost any
government," and are willing to permit his investiture on the
assumption that they will be able to control him once he is in
office, Phoui Sananikone, leader of the anti-Communist Inde-
pendent Party, discounts the risk of an early coalition govern-
ment with the Pathets, and apparently believes that Souvanna
is not "the Master of the situation" and can be prevented from
taking any dangerous steps.
The possibility of controlling Souvanna
after investiture may be overstated. Souvanna, who refuses
to believe the Pathets are really Communists, has now indi-
cated he will not demand guarantees of Pathet submission to
royal authority before a coalition government is formed.
If Souvanna fails to win investiture, an in-
terim caretaker government not requiring assembly approval
might be appointed by Crown Prince Savang.
8 Aug 57
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V1-4
6, PEIPING'S TERMS FOR SINO-BURMA BORDER
SETTLEMENT REVEALED
Reference:
Chou En-lai's long-awaited letter contain-
ing Peiping's formal Sino-Burmese border
proposals includes a new demand for the
cession of some 70 square miles of terri-
tory in the Lufang area of the Wa States, according to the
American embassy in Rangoon. The Chinese Communists
are also asking for more territory in the Hpimaw area than
Kachin State leaders had informally agreed to cede. China,
in return, is reportedly prepared to cede the Namwan Tract
to Burma, which was under a "perpetual" lease from China
to British Burma.
The line incorporat-
ing Chinese claims in the
Lufang area reportedly does
not follow any natural topo-
graphic features, which has
led the Burmese Foreign Of-
fice to suspect that the am-
biguities in this proposal are
designed to prolong the nego-
tiations as a pressure tactic
against Rangoon.
the
government will eventually
accept Peiping's terms for
a settlement, but antici-
pates further difficulties
with the Kachins and particu-
larly the Shans when Ran-
goon seeks their concurrence.
The embassy com-
ments that Peiping's new de-
mands are undoubtedly intend-
ed to create maximum prob-
lems for the Burmese govern-
ment with the border peoples
while still maintaining its pose
of friendship and desire to
reach a settlement.
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7. GUATEMALAN LEADER CONFIRMS DECISION ON
CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
Comment on:
CoL Juan Francisco Oliva, powerful
Guatemalan defense minister, confirmed
on 6 August that top political and military
leaders had decided on a civilian candidate
for president. Oliva, who had been considered the most likely
successor to Castillo, Armas, told the American ambassador
that his decision to withdraw his candidacy was based on a desire
to uphold the constitution, which provides that high military of-
ficers and cabinet ministers cannot be elected to the presidency
until six months after they have left office. He also stated that
a committee of nine, which had met under his chairmanship to
choose an acceptable candidate, had agreed on the selection of
Miguel Ortiz Passarelli, president of the Supreme Court.
The ambassador commented that his impres-
sion was that Ortiz would govern in close consultation with army
and political forces. He also stated that he has a high opinion of
Ortiz' legal capacity, integrity, and competence.
Ortiz, who is considered pro-US, was first
presidential designate (vice president) from March 1956 to
March 1957 and served a short term as interim president dur-
ing Castillo Armas' absence in Panama during July 1956.
8 Aug 57
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8. WEST GERMANS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW
West German Ambassador Lahr is return-
ing to Moscow to present a German counter-
statement on repatriation, according to
American officials in Bonn. The new state-
ment will maintain that repatriation remains an issue despite
a Soviet contention to the contrary, and that negotiations on
trade, consular rights, and repatriation must be treated as one
complex. The implication of the German position is that Soviet
refusal to proceed with repatriation talks will result in German
intransigence on trade.
Comment Chancellor Adenauer has said that he ex-
pects the talks to last at least until the 15
September elections, and this is probably the primary aim of
the German delegation. The Foreign Ministry believes Bonn is
in a strong position in the trade negotiations, since there is no
pressure from business circles for expanded trade with the
USSR. In regard to repatriation, the Germans hope to obtain
at least an agreement which would allow about 30,000 Baltic
Germans to choose Soviet or German citizenship. A modifica-
tion of Bonn's position would probably lead to a softening of the
Soviet Union's attitude, in view of the stated Russian desire for
a normalization of relations with West Germany and an expansion
of trade and consular rights.
8 Aug 57
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JONFIDENTIAL
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