CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/08/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169408
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: August 3, 1957

riSVg Approved for Release: 2019/12/10
7rj
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
C 19:087 A
1363.3(h)(2) f
3 August 1957
Copy No.
I I'.
NE_ ;-
AUTH� "1 2
DATE
tal
REV1F_WER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The Law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
Approved for for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Ask Amb.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
� XoJL.4AtL.JI
�411111i
CONTENTS
OPPOSITION TO MILITARY CONTROL OF GUATEMALAN
GOVERNMENT (page 3).
F'ERON MAY MOVE FROM VENEZUELA TO NICARAGUA
(page 4)0
Aro 3. GREEKS MIGHT ACCEPT TRIPARTITE CONDOMINIUM
OVER CYPRUS (page 5).
0A4�
0 65.
6 6 �
tiO 7.
t, 9.
N/
ZHUKOV COMMENTS ON SOVIET ARMED FORCES
(page 6).
SOVIET-POLISH TROOP CLASH REPORTED
(page 7).
USSR SAID TO FAVOR SOCIALISTS IN GERMAN ELECTIONS
(page 8).
SOVIET-YUGOSLAV IDEOLOGICAL TALKS APPARENTLY
TO CONTINUE (page 9).
SOUVANNA PHOUMA LOOKS FOR EARLY COALITION
GOVERNMENT IN LAOS (page 10).
INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS GAIN IN EAST JAVA PROVINCIAL
ELECTIONS (page 11).
14010, OPPOSITION PARTY NOMINATING CONVENTION IN
PHILIPPINES (page 12).
BULGARIAN REGIME BROADENS PARTY SHAKE-UP
(page 13).
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRFT P1TW1?
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
omit. .3EL.KL, 1
1. OPPOSITION TO MILITARY CONTROL OF
GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT
Political and military leaders in
Guatemala are trying to persuade
Defense Minister Oliva, who is in
virtual control of the country, not
to run for nrpsiriPnt
i'he argu-
ment is that Oliva is needed as minister of:defense in
order to keep the military united. As a cabinet minister
and high military figure, he is constitutionally ineligible
to become president.
the army
would split into hostile factions if either Oliva or the ambassa-
dor to the United States, Col. Jose Luis Cruz Salazar, Oliva's
strongest military rival for the presidency, became a presi-
dential candidate.
The administration party--the National
Democratic Movement (MDN)- -and other political and
military elements are reported to favor the candidacy of the
Supreme Court president, Miguel Ortiz Passerellio
Comment Oliva, who probably
could arrange to evade constitutional
barriers to his candidacy, was believed to command the sup-
port of both military and political leaders, including high MDN
figures, in his plan to become president. It is possible that
sudden withdrawal of this support in favor of a civilian candidate
could provoke reprisals by Oliva.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
Approved for Release: F01972/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
IL 1.4,0,11L1-4
2. PERON MAY MOVE FROM VENEZUELA TO NICARAGUA
Former Argentine president Peron is
planning to fly soon from Caracas,
Venezuela, to Managua, Nicaragua,
He reportedly will make a temporary stop in
San Jose, Costa Rica.
Comment Peron's departure could be part of
a Venezuelan effort to restore "inter-
rupted" relations with Argentina so that Venezuela can
attend the inter-American economic conference opening
in Buenos Aires on 15 August. According to a Brazilian
has every interest
in re-establishing diplomatic relations with Venezuela,
but that any formula of rapprochement must be based on
Peron's departure from Venezuela. Before the break,
Argentina was demanding only that Venezuela control
Peron's activities.
Nicaragua agreed to grant Peron
asylum last July, just prior to the inter-American
meeting of presidents, when Argentine President
Aramburu was reluctant to visit Panama while Peron
was there.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
T rip 0 Ew rf r FT'
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Aft_ f /I- Lax, .1 Aikk
3. GREEKS AUGHT ACCEPT TRIPARTITE
CONDOMTNITTM OVF.R CYPRUS I
Greek Fofeign Minister Averoff believes
the British are going to propose the crea-
tion of a condominium of Greece, Turk7
and Britain over Cyprus,
Averoff is said to favor a quick
settlement because he believes Turkish officers and arms are
being shipped to Cyprus. He believes Athens would accept a
condominium, on condition that genuine self-government would
soon follow.
Comment Contrary to earlier indications, this report
suggests the Greeks may be willing to attend
a secret conference of Greek, Turkish and British representa-
tives to discuss the Cyprus dispute, if there is evidence of
good faith and if there is reasonable assurance that such a
meeting would not further endanger Greek-Turkish relations.
Although officially the Turkish commitment
to partition is uncompromising,
Turkey's position may not be as adamant as official pronounce-
ments suggest.
The British hope to bring Athens and
Ankara to some compromise agreement by encouraging free
discussion of all possible solutions, but London has given
no indication so far that the British representatives would
advance any specific solution at the proposed conference.
There is no available information to substantiate Averoff's
charge that men and arms are arriving in Cyprus from
Turkey.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
Approved for'kelea�se:-2'51'9712-21-0-F03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Pa � � �
4. ZHUKOV COMMENTS ON SOVIET ARMED FORCES
Comment on:
the Soviet armed forces number far less
than Western estimates which, according
to Zhukov, exceeded 4,000,000 men. US
intelligence estimates the strength of the Soviet armed forces
to be 4,200,000 exclusive of 400,000 security troops, and
public Western statements have given even higher figures.
The USSR claims it has reduced its military manpower by
1,840,000 men since August 1955. While the reduction pro-
gram was reported to have been halted in September 1956,
recently available Soviet statistics on their labor force
suggest that a substantial proportion of the announced
demobilization has been accomplished.
he
would like to release the actual figures on the Soviet armed
forces, but that Khrushchev and Bulganin did not agree. When
Ithrushchev was asked the strength of Soviet forces during an
interview on 28 May for an American television network, he
declined to answer on the grounds that as he had not expected
the question, he had not asked Defense Minister Zhukov for the
figure. He added, however, "we are always ready to answer
this question."
the
United States had an effective radar network around the
perimeter of the USSR manned by highly trained and efficient
personnel, together with a reserve of highly trained elec-
tronic technicians, while he had "only Ivan."
Zhukov apparently considered
tnat tnis problem would inhibit any further reduction of Soviet
armed forces.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Auk
5. SOVIET-POLISH TROOP CLASH REPORTED
Comment on:
a
clash between Soviet and Polish military
forces took place earlier this summer
during exercises of Soviet troops some-
where in southwestern Poland. The
incident apparently occurred when Polish
troops surrounded the area in response to
protests of local peasants that their crops
were being damaged by the maneuvers.
Moscow reportedly ordered an immediate
cease-fire, restoration of order, and an apology to Polish
leaders by Soviet commanders including General Galicki,
commander of Soviet Northern Group of Forces,
The reported Soviet reaction would be
further evidence of the USSR's extreme nervousness over
Polish anti-Sovietism and the danger that it may break into
the open. The willingness with which Pblish military forces
reportedly came to the aid of the peasants, and the rapidity
and extent of the intervention, would have impressed Soviet
leaders.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
Approved for Release: -20F9712/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
6. USSR SAID TO FAVOR SOCIALISTS IN
GERMAN ELECTIONS
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Semenov "clearly stated"
that the Soviet Union
would like to see Socialist party chief 011enhauer win the
German elections, according to the American embassy.
Semenov said that Adenauer's policies were leadine toward
war.
Comment Khrushchev earlier was reported to
have remarked that 011enhauer "is a
man we can trust."
Moscow probably believes that any
diminution of Adenauery s prestige as a result of the
elections would benefit Soviet objectives. The Soviet
leaders probably do not believe that 011enhauer would
be any more amenable but may hope that neither party
will win a firm majority, forcing a coalition which would
necessarily show less resolve than the present Adenauer
government.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
.STTWrT
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
tawSECRET a
7. SOVIET-YUGOSLAV IDEOLOGICAL TALKS
APPARENTLY TO CONTINUE
Comment on:
The sudden arrival in Yugoslavia of
a Soviet delegation led by presidium
candidate member Mzhavanadze,
Georgian party boss, strongly suggests
a continuation of discussions on Soviet-
Yugoslav ideological differences begun on
18 July in Moscow between Yugoslav Vice
Presidents Kardelj and Rankovic and Soviet patty. boss
Khrushchev. President Tito last week interrupted his
summer stay in Brioni to return hurriedly to Belgrade, and
his two top aides, Kardelj and Rankovic, reappeared on 31
July in Belgrade following an unexpected curtailment of
their European tour.
On 1 August the Yugoslays announced
that "functionaries" of the central committee of the
Communist Party of Georgia had arrived as guests of the
Yugoslav party. They will tour Yugoslavia for two weeks
accompanied by a top Yugoslav ideologist, Jovan Veselinov.
Mzhavanadze was elected a candidate
member of the Soviet party presidium in June and is closely
linked with Khrushchev. Veselinov participated with
Kardelj in the conversations the Yugoslays recently held in
Moscow.
Strains between the Soviet and Yugoslav
parties were reduced by the compromise agreement concluded
on 29 July regarding the resumption of the "postponed" Soviet
credits to Yugoslavia. (SECRET)
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
11.1: JLJLIJ.j.L A. JL.C11-4
NO*
8. SOUVANNA PHOUMA LOOKS FOR EARLY COALITION
GOVERNMENT IN T. A OR
The advance text of Laotian Premier-
designate Souvanna Phouma's immi-
nent investiture speech
calls ior the temporary expansion of the cabinet to include
Pathets until a permanent coalition government can be
created after supplementary elections are held in late
December or early next January. By 1 October he expects
to implement a settlement with the Pathet Lao on the
basis of last year's 28 December accord which provides
for a coalition government.
Souvanna's projected government, dedi4,
cated to strict neutrality and the "broadest possible formula
for national union," would guarantee full rights to reintegrated
Pathet personnel and to subsequently organized Pathet politi-
cal organizations, provided Laotian laws are strictly observed.
The envisaged settlement calls for the dissolution of Pathet
administrative and military organizations concurrent with the
re-establishment of roayl authority over the two northern
provinces and integration of Pathet combat units into the
national army.
Comment Souvanna's program, which might still
be modified before presentation to the
National Assembly, contains no firm provisions for obtain-
ing guarantees of Pathet Lao submission to royal authority,
indicating his disdain of the tough approach counseled by
his party rival, Katay Sasorith. Although failure to gain
such guarantees caused his downfall last May, Souvanna
probably feels able to continue his original policies
because of the inability of his critics to form a new govern-
ment.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
�r-444T-r-Mr-47437-74-F
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
461* CV/N1f1/tElliliAL
9. INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS GAIN IN EAST JAVA
PROVINCIAL EL
Partial returns from the East Java
provincial elections held on 29 July
show the Communist Party well ahead
of its closest opponent, the orthodox
Moslem organization, Nandlatul Ulama.
On the basis of these returns, which are
chiefly from the cities, the Communists
have increased their electoral strength in
East Java by approximately 25 percent over
the vote they polled in the nat'tonal elections
of 1955. Returns have not yetlbeen reported
from rural areas where the Nandlatul Ula.ma (NU), the leading
party in East Java in the 1955 elections, is expected to make
its best showing. Thus far in East Java, the Communist
Party has made its gains chiefly at the expense of the National
Party, repeating a trend in the earlier local elections in
Djakarta and Central Java. The Moslem parties in those areas
largely held their own.
In Central Java, where elections were
held on 17 and 27 July, 90 percent of the returns indicate
a 10-percent gain by the Communists over the 1955 elections,
The Communists polled about 40 percent of the total votes
compared with 29 percent for the former first-place
Nationalists, 23 percent for the NU and 7 percent for the
Masjumi.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
-�briePktfli-ritrini, 1111_11-,1
tie
10. OPPOSITION PARTY NOMINATING CONVENTION
IN PHILIPPINES
Comment on:
/2
The opposition Liberal Party nomina-
ting convention, which opens on 3 Aug-
ust, is generally expected to name Jose
Yulo, respected prewar speaker of the
house, and Diosdado Macapagal, an able
pro-American congressman, as its presi-
dential and vice-presidential candidates
for the November Philippine elections.
Although a Yulo-Macapagal combination
is one of the strongest tickets available
to the Liberals, it teportedly has lacked' mass appeal in
preconvention campaigning, and the party organization is
still weakened by losses during the Ma sa say administra-
tion and the lingering stigma of the Quirino regime.
In addition, hoped-for divisions in the administration party
have not yet materialized, and there are some indications
that Senator Claro Recto, whose independent presidential
candidacy was expected to draw votes from the Nacionalistas,
may eventually withdraw from the race.
Selection of Liberal senatorial candidates
will probably be left up to the party executive committee, the
same course adopted by the recent Nacionalista convention.
This counters a similar move by the Nacionalistas to keep
disappointed office seekers from bolting to the opposition.
It also enables continued bargaining with the fledgling Pro-
gressive Party, organized by close associates of the late
president Magsaysay.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
-POWAT-FIT-41w94-A-1.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
3GLIKL 1 aft
11. BULGARIAN REGIME BROADENS PARTY SHAKE-UP
Hard- line Commtthist Party leaders
Yugov, Zhivkov, and Chervenkov have
extended the Bulgarian party shake-up
to local officials,
The principal victims are reportedly
those who had criticized Chervenkov for a "personality
cult" when he was premier, particularly at the time of the
April 1956 central committee meeting--Bulgaria!'s_ equiva-
lent of the Soviet 20th party congress.
Distrust and apprehension in the party
rank and file is said to have returned to the level of the
Stalin era. Tension also continues within the leadership,
where there is fear of army officials who reportedly sympa-
thize with the first victims of the shake-up, high-
party officials Chankov, Terpeshev, and Panov.
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 13
C. r�-�
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408
1.F _IL LJI LALIL/1-41
NSF
CORRECTION TO WATCH REPORT 365, 1 AUGUST 1957
Paragraph C should read: "Early
deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the Arab
states is not probable. Although tensions continue be-
tween the Arab states and Israel and among certain Arab
states themselves, these are not likely to lead to serious
conflict in the immediate future."
3 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 14
rrarl cf 77d-fir) Imri,
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03169408